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Abstract
The civil rights movement in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, went beyond a battle
between blacks and whites over segregation. Within each racial group, factions
developed along class, generational, and educational lines. Interactions among these
groups shaped the nature and pace of change in the city.
In 1945, black World W arn veterans launched the movement. Committed to
working within the legal system, they established voter registration schools,
participated in the 1953 bus boycott, and sued to equalize teachers’ salaries and to
integrate public schools, hi thel960s, black college students rose to prominence in the
movement and used direct action, including sit-ins and marches, to challenge
segregation laws. At the same time, working-class activists undertook protests of their
own. Like the veterans and the students, they wanted increased voter registration and
integrated public facilities, but they also demanded equal employment. In the late
1960s, young blacks abandoned nonviolence, embraced Black Power, and advocated
racial separatism.
Each stage o f the movement frightened the city’s white leaders. Although they
supported segregation, white leaders realized that civil rights demonstrations threatened
industrial development in their community. To preserve the stability they felt essential
to continued economic expansion, they attempted to appease the activists by meeting
with traditional black leaders — racial diplomats — and making small changes to the
system of segregation. The compromises delayed integration and angered the activists.
Agreements reached by black and white leaders also infuriated segregationists
and white liberals. Segregationists believed that any changes to Jim Crow would
vi
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destroy southern society and promised to defend racial separation at any cost.
Conversely, white liberals supported the civil rights activists and believed that
compromises undercut the movement. However, most white Baton Rougeans supported
the delaying tactics o f their leaders.
In 1972, the black: activists’ pent up anger at the slow pace of change erupted in
deadly clashes with the police. By then, strict segregation in Baton Rouge had ended,
but blacks had made inroads into the city’s political system. Although whites remained
in control, older African-American activists believed that they could work within the
existing framework to facilitate change.

vii
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Introduction
Located on the Mississippi River, 240 miles north o f its mouth, Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, served as the state’s capital city and was a thriving port and business center
at the beginning o f the twentieth century. Cotton farmers and sugar cane planters from
the rural areas surrounding the city used the port to ship their goods to market and
bought equipment and supplies from local wholesalers. In 1908, one wholesale grocery,
Holmes & Barnes, Ltd., did more than one million dollars worth o f business. Even with
its prosperity, the city possessed few industries and grew slowly. That changed in 1909
when Standard Oil opened a refinery in the community. When production started on the
facility, the city’s economy grew at an astonishing rate. Construction wages for the
plant equaled two-thirds o f the value of all those in East Baton Rouge Parish, of which
Baton Rouge served as the parish seat, for 1909, and when the facility opened, the
community’s economic base quickly went from one that relied on agriculture to one
based on industry. As the twentieth century progressed, the city’s economy continued to
flourish until the Great Depression when many small businesses closed and thousands
of citizens lost their jobs. However, Standard Oil’s refinery remained open and helped
to ease the city’s financial woes by employing large numbers o f Baton Rougeans. As
the nation’s economy began to improve in the late 1930s, three more national
corporations — Solvay Process, Consolidated Chemicals, and Ethyl Corporation —
opened plants in the Baton Rouge.1
‘Mark Carleton, River Capital: An Illustrated History o f Baton Rouge
(Woodland Hills, California: Windsor Publications, Inc., 1981), 156-157,174, 189;
1
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Although all of Baton. Rouge’s industries played a vital role in the city’s
economic success, Standard Oil remained dominant and, in 1940, employed one-third
of the metropolitan area’s population. The bombing of Pearl Harbor in December 1941
launched a wave of industrial growth. During the war, industries spent $125 million on
new construction or expansion o f existing facilities in Baton Rouge. In fact, on the day
after the Japanese attack, Standard Oil announced that it would expend $ 17 million to
expand its Baton Rouge refinery. The plant soon produced more than 75 percent o f the
nation’s aviation fuel and opened a chemical division that manufactured synthetic
rubber. By the end of the war, Standard Oil-Baton Rouge was one o f the largest
facilities o f its kind in the world. Industry so dominated Baton Rouge’s economy that in
1944 approximately 55 percent of the population worked for one of the major
corporations.2
With the rapid industrialization during World War II, the city of Baton Rouge
and East Baton Rouge Parish experienced a period of phenomenal growth. In 1930,
approximately 68,000 people lived in the parish. By 1940, the number increased to

Works Progress Administration, Louisiana: A Guide to the State (New York: Hastings
House, 1941), 136-164.
2 Numan V. Bartley, The New South, 1945-1980, History of the South Series,
eds. Wendell Holmes Stephenson and E. Merton Coulter (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1995), 10-21; Conrad Louis Rein, “From Southland to Sunbelt: The
Legacy o f Dependent Development in New Orleans and Louisiana,” (Ph.D. diss.,
University o f New Orleans, 1997), 229,238; Carleton, River Capital, 156-157,174,
189; Works Progress Administration, Louisiana, 254; Harland Bartholomew and
Associates, The Master City-Parish Plan: Metropolitan Baton Rouge, Louisiana (Baton
Rouge: City-Parish Planning Committee, 1948), 8; Jerry Sanson, “A History of
Louisiana, 1939- 1945" (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University, 1984), 421-507; Stuart
O. Landry, ed., Louisiana Almanac and Fact Book, 1940 - 1950, (New Orleans:
Louisiana Almanac and Fact Book, Inc., 1949), 100.
2
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88,500, and five years later, it topped 107,000. A decade later, the parish boasted more
than 158,000 residents. Throughout this period o f expansion, African Americans made
up approximately 35 percent of the population. With the huge influx o f workers, the
city o f Baton Rouge quickly outgrew its corporate limit o f five square miles, and
unplanned neighborhoods with poor streets and drainage systems sprang up on the
outskirts o f town. Because these unincorporated urban areas were outside its
boundaries, the city government could not provide basic services, such as sewerage or
water to these residents. The police jury, Louisiana’s form of parish government, was
dominated by representatives from the rural areas o f the parish and was ill-equipped to
handle the demands o f its urban residents. Realizing that the unplanned, haphazard
growth created by industrial expansion needed to be addressed, the city and parish
governments, at the request of the Baton Rouge Chamber of Commerce, created a joint
committee to study the problem.3
Members o f this planning commission quickly recognized that the existence of
both a city and a parish government was “badly divided, inefficient, and obsolete.” This
dual system threatened to undermine Baton Rouge’s continued economic expansion.
White leaders proposed creating a consolidated government with a mayor-president as
the chief executive and a city-parish council as the legislative body. The plan also
expanded Baton Rouge’s corporate limits to include the suburban areas surrounding the
3Harland Bartholomew and Associates, Preliminary Report: The Twenty-Five
Year Plan fo r Metropolitan Baton Rouge, Louisiana (Baton Rouge: City-Parish
Planning Committee, 1945), 13, introduction; Milbum Calhoun, ed., Louisiana
Almanac, 1992-1993 (Gretna, Louisiana: Pelican Publishing Company, 1992),142;
Rudolf Heberle, The Labor Force in Louisiana (Baton Rouger Louisiana State
University Press, 1948), 40; Bartholomew, M aster Plan, I.
3
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city. Ia 1947, the state legislature approved a constitutional amendment to alter the
parish’s governmental system, and a heated debate erupted in the parish. Reaction to the
proposed constitutional amendment was mixed. People who lived in urban areas
supported the new plan o f government wholeheartedly. Rural residents balked at the
expansion o f Baton Rouge and feared that the growing metropolis would engulf them.
To appease the rural population, the plan allowed the small towns of Baker and
Zachary, located in the northern part o f the parish, to elect their own mayors and city
councils. On August 12, 1947, voters approved the new plan of government with 7,012
people voting for the change and 6,705 against it Rural voters comprised most o f the
nays. Hailed as a sign o f progress, the plan went into effect in 1949.4
Although its city and parish governments were unified, the community’s
educational system remained divided by race. Baton Rouge served as the home o f the
state’s largest institutions o f higher education for both whites and blacks — Louisiana
State University and Southern University. While funded by the state, the two schools
played integral roles in the community. Many local men and women, who went on to be
community leaders, received their education from these institutions and quickly became
staunch supporters of their alma maters. The faculties and staffs of LSU and Southern,
many o f whom came from other parts of the country, made up an academic elite in both
the white and black communities and played a role in the civil rights movement.
Along with the two universities, by 1946, Baton Rouge boasted ninety
manufacturing plants, most o f them small, that pumped approximately $30 million in

“Carleton, River Capital, 196-197; Bartholomew, Master Plan, 1.
4
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payrolls into the city’s economy and produced more than $ 160 million in goods
annually. The city sustained more than nine hundred retail establishments, four hotels,
and sixteen movie theaters. Many o f these businesses, including Kress, Welch & Levy,
and Rosenfield’s, lined Third Street, which served as the heart o f the downtown
commercial district.5
Although they frequented the businesses on Third Street, African Americans in
Baton Rouge created a separate society for themselves. They owned their own
businesses, formed their own social and fraternal organizations, and attended their own
churches. The city boasted many black-owned businesses, including thirty-nine
restaurants, twenty-three barber shops and twenty-five beauty parlors, six drug stores,
two funeral homes, and one hotel. Seven African-American doctors and three dentists
practiced in the community. One of the most successful black businessmen, Horatio
Thompson, owned several service stations, hi the early 1940s, a group of AfricanAmerican entrepreneurs formed the Negro Chamber o f Commerce to encourage the
growth o f business in their neighborhoods, and, byl945, the organization was thriving.6
Religion played an important role within Baton Rouge’s black population. The
city had seventy-eight African-American churches, including sixty-four Baptist, eight
African Methodist Episcopal (A.M.E.), one Catholic, and one Presbyterian. These
churches varied greatly in size and in the wealth o f their congregations. Reverend

5P olk’s Greater Baton Rouge City Directory, 1946 (Dallas: R. L. Polk and
Company, 1946), 11-12.
6Ibid., 761-800.
5
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Gardner Taylor headed the largest and most prominent, Mount Zion Baptist, which
played a key role in the early years of the civil rights movement.7
Black Baton Rouge also enjoyed a very active social life. Headed by John G.
Lewis, proprietor o f the Fraternal Press, the Prince Hall Masons owned and operated
the Masonic Temple. By day, a variety o f black businesses used it as an office building,
but on the weekends, the Temple’s Roof Garden served as a ballroom for members of
the black middle and upper classes. For members of Baton Rouge’s black elite, several
social clubs existed. Men could join the Purple Circle or the Bonanza, both of which
held formal dances. Several organizations existed for women as well. One, the Junior
Matrons, later renamed the Matrons, organized in 1941 and quickly became the most
prominent. In 1946, it established a debutante ball; a similar debutante system already
existed in the white community. Besides these social organizations, members o f the
black community belonged to several benevolent societies including the Knights of
Pythius, the Daughters of Universal, four Odd Fellows Lodges, and one Elks’ lodge.
Most of these groups met at the Masonic Temple, which served as the center of black
social life.8
Although African Americans created a world for themselves, they could never
forget that they lived in a segregated society and were considered second-class citizens.
Each encounter with a white person reminded them o f their inferior status. When they

7Ibid., 771.
8Dupuy Anderson, interview by Maxine Crump, tape recording, December 29,
1993, T. Harry Williams Center for Oral History Collection, Louisiana Lower
Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, 18; Carleton, River Capital, 209, 193; P olk’s City Directory, 781.
6
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shopped at downtown department stores, they could not eat a sandwich or have a glass
o f lemonade at a department store’s cafeteria or be served at the same lunch counter as
white customers. African Americans also suffered wage and job discrimination.
Although the plants and refineries hired black workers, these facilities relegated African
Americans to low-paying menial and unskilled positions. The East Baton Rouge Parish
School Board also paid its black teachers a fraction o f what it paid white ones.
Disparity also existed between the parish’s white and black public schools. The
School Board maintained seventeen elementary, three junior high, and two high schools
for the approximately 7,700 white children that it served. All twenty-four were
constructed out of brick. Seventeen had auditoriums, six had laboratory facilities, and
five had cafeterias. Baton Rouge and Istrouma High schools contained gymnasiums.
While the board maintained a sufficient number o f facilities to meet the needs of white
children, it crowded nearly 5,000 black children into seven elementary and two high
schools.9 The enrollment o f white elementary schools ranged from 350 to 500 with a
maximum class size o f 35 pupils. More than 700 students attended the larger black
schools whose class size ranged from 51 to 73. Schools housing black students were
poorly constructed and not well maintained. Only four black schools were made o f
brick; the others were wood-frame. Churches provided and maintained the buildings for
two elementary schools — Zion City and Valley Park. Only McKinley High School had
both an auditorium and laboratory facilities. None housed cafeterias or gymnasiums.

9The School Board maintained no junior high schools for African Americans.
Most elementary schools included grade seven, and the two high schools offered either
grades seven or eight through eleven.
7
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African-American children also used cast-off materials from the white schools,
including textbooks. Black parents could do little to force the School Board to equalize
public education because they were, for the most part, disenfranchised and could not
exert political pressure on elected officials. East Baton Rouge Parish’s Registrar of
Voters kept a tight rein on the number o f black voters and only allowed African
Americans to register as Republicans. In 1940, only 144 black Baton Rougeans could
vote.10
The discrimination faced by African Americans on a daily basis and the
disparity that existed between black and white society had long been a source of
concern to many within Baton Rouge’s black community, and in the late 1920s they
organized a branch of the NAACP to address these problems. Insurance agent Benjamin
Stanley headed the organization from 1930 to 1955 and created a stable institution that
survived the Depression. When the nation’s economy crashed, most of Louisiana’s
NAACP branches collapsed only to be reorganized as conditions improved. Having
survived the Depression intact, the Baton Rouge branch boasted 800 members in 1940,
and by the end o f World War n, many o f them, especially the young veterans of World
War n, stood poised to fight the system o f segregation.11

10At the time, the Democratic Party dominated Louisiana politics and most
elections were decided in party primaries. Therefore Republicans rarely voted in state
and local elections but could cast votes in presidential contests. Bartholomew,
Preliminary Report, 13-26.
"Perry Howard, “An Analysis o f Voting Behavior in Baton Rouge,” The
Proceedings o f the Louisiana Academy o f Sciences, XV (5 August 1952): 88; Adam
Fairclough, Race and Democracy: The Civil Rights Struggle in Louisiana, 1915-1972
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1995), 46-47.
8
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One o f the first large-scale challenges to the Jim Crow occurred in 1953 when
African Americans in Baton Rouge launched a boycott against segregated seating on
the city’s buses. The protest lasted for nine days and ended with a compromise that
maintained separation of the races on the city’s buses by reserving two seats for whites
and two for blacks. The deal allowed the rest of the seats to be filled on a first come,
first served basis. O f course, the agreement stipulated that African Americans could not
sit with or in front of white passengers. This agreement m aintaine d segregated seating
to continue until 1963 when a federal court order formally banned the practice. The
boycott established a pattern o f protest, compromise, and anger that continued to
characterize the civil rights movement in Baton Rouge. This pattern did not develop
spontaneously but grew out of a well-established tradition o f race relations in
Louisiana’s capital. When the civil rights movement began in the mid 1940s, white
businessmen and politicians turned to the African Americans with whom they had had
long associations for help in ending the demonstrations and ignored the black
“agitators” who were challenging the status quo. White leaders believed that the
activists represented a small portion of the population and were convinced that the
members o f the black leadership represented the entire African-American population. In
reality, African-American leaders occupied a tenuous position in the black com m unity
and when their meetings with whites produced compromises that fell far short o f the
protestors’ demands, their influence declined. The agreements also created animosity
between the black leaders and the activists, and as the civil rights movement
progressed, the anger and discontent of both the activists and the black com m unity
grew. Dissatisfaction reached a boiling point in November 1972 when students at the
9
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historically black Southern University clashed with police on the school's campus. That
encounter left two students dead. The only way to understand fully how a movement
that began with negotiations and compromises ended in violence is to look beyond
black and white and examine how the interplay between race, class, and generations
shaped the civil rights movement in Baton Rouge.
The relationship between white and black leaders that developed in the decades
before the civil rights movement was not unique to Baton Rouge. Similar relationships
existed in communities throughout the South. In Greensboro, North Carolina, for
example, white leaders felt paternalistic toward African Americans and selected
representatives of the black community, usually ministers, businessmen, and
professionals, with whom they would work. When these black leaders needed
assistance, they would approach their white benefactors and, with proper deference, ask
for help. The benefactors would then render aid and were “convinced that the exchange
testified to how good communications were between the races.” Whites believed that
their hand-picked representatives were the true leaders of the black community.
Therefore when the civil rights movement began, they turned to them to help ease
tensions and assumed that black activists would gladly accept any compromise their
“leaders” reached.12
Yet, in Baton Rouge, as in other cities, African-American leaders did not
represent their entire race. The black leaders with whom members of the white power
structure associated belonged to the city’s small black middle and upper classes. Most
I2William Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights: Greensboro, North Carolina, and
the Black Strugglefo r Freedom (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 8.
10
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were ministers, doctors, lawyers, school teachers, or businessmen, and because they
earned more money than most African Americans, industrial workers also belonged to
this group. Daniel Thompson in The Negro Leadership Class called them racial
diplomats. The racial diplomats understood southern traditions and felt a sense of pride
for their cities. They identified “with the problems of the total community and. . .
[cared] about the welfare of [all] human beings ...[ ,] not just about ‘what is good for
the Negro,’ ” according to Thompson. While protecting their own interests, racial
diplomats thought they were also looking out for the well-being o f their communities.
They knew that the system of segregation made all African Americans second class
citizens, and most o f the diplomats wanted to end segregation. Fearing that protests and
demands for change would only strengthen resistance in the white community,
however, they believed that meeting with white leaders and asking for small
concessions would eventually bring an end to segregation.13
Although white leaders used them to advance their own programs, the racial
diplomats also benefitted from the relationship. Before the civil rights movement, being
one o f the “chosen few” with whom whites met gave them immense power. If
“ordinary” African Americans needed help from a white leader, they would have to ask
a racial diplomat to intercede for them. In his memoir Black in Selma, J. L. Chestnut
recalls that some black leaders in his hometown profited from their relationships with
whites. Reverend D. V. Jemison, the father of Baton Rouge’s black leader Theodore

13Robin Kelley, Race Rebels (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 39; Daniel
Thompson, The Negro Leadership Class (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
1963), 68-70.
11
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Judson Jemison, was “the most powerful black man in Selma,” according to Chestnut.
“White people showed uncommon respect for Jemison, too.” They called him “Dr.
Jemison.” Chestnut said, ‘Tor little crumbs o f power, black preachers and other leaders
could be counted on ‘to keep the natives in line’ — to cool off potential uprisings and
to preach that blacks should clean up their own back yards rather than challenge the
system.” These advantages came with a price. Racial diplomats could not openly
criticize the status quo. If they did, they lost all o f the benefits that went along with
being part o f the African-American leadership class.14
Before World War II, Baton Rouge’s black population allowed the racial
diplomats to represent them and regarded the concessions that their leaders wrested
from the white community as signs o f progress. As veterans returned to Baton Rouge
from the battlefields of Europe and the Pacific, the willingness of African Americans to
accept small changes to the status quo diminished rapidly, and the first group of civil
rights activists emerged. These World War n activists came from backgrounds similar
to those of the racial diplomats but were, for the most part, younger and just starting
their careers as professionals and businessmen. Almost all had served in the armed
forces and had risked their lives for principles of freedom and democracy in foreign
countries, only to be treated as second class citizens when they returned home. World
War II activists nevertheless believed in the American system and wanted to claim a
piece of it for themselves. They championed voter registration, played an active role in
the city’s 1953 bus boycott, and sued to desegregate LSU’s Graduate and Law Schools
14J. L .Chestnut and Julia Cass, Black in Selma: The Uncommon Life o fJ L.
Chestnut, Jr. (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1990), 39-41.
12
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and to gain admission to the city’s public parks and golf courses. The racial diplomats
and the World War H activists shared many o f the same goals; for example, both
advocated voter registration and participation in the electoral process. They differed on
a key point. While the diplomats used their votes to curry favor with white leaders, the
World War II activists wanted to take part in policymaking, so they ran for public
office. None won. When the movement entered its direct action phase in 1960, college
students supplanted the World War II activists as the driving force behind the fight for
racial equality, but the group of older activists remained staunch supporters o f the civil
rights movement and the students. However, they also continued their efforts to end
segregation by working within the system.
Unlike the World War II activists, student activists believed that working
through legal and political channels would accomplish little. They came of age in a
decade marked by the civil rights victory of Brown v. Board ofEducation o f Topeka,
Kansas, and watched as white southerners used every means at their disposal to prevent
its implementation. In response, student activists around the South, including Baton
Rouge, adopted the strategy of direct action and nonviolent civil disobedience to
desegregate lunch counters and other public facilities. Baton Rouge’s student activists
attended Southern University, and when police arrested them for staging sit-ins, they
obtained financial and legal support from both the World War II activists and the racial
diplomats. Older African Americans assisted the younger college students for several
reasons. First, student activists belonged to the upper echelons of black society, and
many were the children o f racial diplomats. In addition, when they protested, they did
so with dignity, even civility. They dressed in their finest clothes for their sit-ins and
13
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politely asked for service at segregated lunch counters. When arrested, they held their
heads high and allowed the police to lead them away. Although student activists
garnered support from the black community, white leaders viewed the students as a
threat to the city’s image of racial harmony and ordered Southern University’s
president, Felton Clark, to expel them. Fearing white reprisals against the university if
he refused, Clark complied.
The nature of student activism changed as the civil rights movement progressed,
and, by the late 1960s, a group o f angry young men and women spouting Black Power
slogans and advocating the use o f violence to overthrow the white oppressor replaced
the first student activists. Black Power activists believed that the best way to change
southern society was through force. Naturally, the white community feared the Black
Power activists even more than they did their predecessors, and white leaders went after
them literally with their guns drawn. The racial diplomats and World War II activists
never identified with this group o f young African Americans and refused to support or
help them. Instead, they greeted Black Power activists with scorn, and some blamed
them for the 1972 riot at Southern University. In return, the students despised the racial
diplomats and called them “sellouts” and “Uncle Toms” because of their willingness to
work with white leaders.
A final group of activists, working-class African Americans, came to the
forefront of the movement in 1962. Like other activists, they wanted increased voter
registration and the desegregation o f schools and public facilities, but they differed
from the other groups in that they also pushed for equal employment, hi 1962, the
working-class activists announced their plan to conduct sustained protests until white
14
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leaders capitulated to their demands. Like the Black Power activists who arrived on the
scene several years later, they did not subscribe to the principles o f passive resistance.
They fought back when arrested and shouted while they picketed; their protests often
ended in violent clashes with whites. The white leaders saw the working-class activists
as uneducated and undignified and refused to meet with them. Other than race, the
black leadership had little in common with the working-class activists and sought to
undercut their demands for change. For example, when the working-class activists
reorganized the city’s chapter of the NAACP in 1962, racial diplomats, who had been
the mainstay o f the branch in the 1940s and 1950s, abandoned the organization. Instead,
they formed their own association, Federated Organization for the Cause o f Unlimited
Self-Development (FOCUS), which worked to increase voter registration, thus
undercutting one plank of the NAACP’s program. The creation of a competing
organization led to animosity between the two groups and almost completely severed
the ties between the racial diplomats and the working-class activists. Working-class
activists also garnered support from the black masses and threatened the racial
diplomats’ position of leadership within the community. To protect their emissaries,
white leaders consciously granted concessions aimed at appeasing the AfricanAmerican population. In 1963, they established a biracial committee to discuss and
recommend solutions for racial problems in. Baton Rouge. In turn the committee
requested and received approval for the hiring of black police officers, the
desegregation o f facilities in the Municipal Building, and the admission o f black
doctors to the staffs of white hospitals. The biracial committee failed to address the
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working-class activists* concerns, however, and the gulf between them and the racial
diplomats continued to widen.
Although white leaders created the biracial committee to bolster the status of the
racial diplomats and prevent dissension within the ranks o f the African-American
population, they could do little to stop the divisions within their own community. The
majority of white Baton Rougeans wanted to maintain segregation, but their level of
commitment to the system of Jim Crow varied. White leaders belonged to the city’s
business and political elite and embraced industrial expansion.15They realized that to
convince national corporations to build multimillion dollar plants and refineries in the
community they needed to create a stable environment in Baton Rouge. White business
leaders had spearheaded the consolidation o f the city and parish governments in large
part to create a plan for the economic growth of East Baton Rouge Parish. When the
civil rights movement began, white leaders feared that racial conflict would disrupt the
stability that they wanted to maintain, so they worked closely with the racial diplomats
to end any protests quickly. Although they wanted to maintain segregation, the white
leadership had “no dogmatic commitment to segregation” and refused to risk the city’s
economic well-being to preserve it. When they could, they made small changes to the
system of segregation. White leaders knew that granting token concessions would
appease the black leaders and make the activists look like irrational troublemakers.
They also believed that with these compromises, they could forestall demands for

lsThe terms white leaders, white business leaders, and business leaders are used
interchangeably throughout this account.
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greater desegregation and, at the same time, maintain control o f the city’s government
and economy.16
Segregationists, on the other hand, thought that any changes to the system of
segregation would destroy the “southern way o f life” and lead to the mongrelization of
the white race. In the years following the Supreme Court’s Brown decision,
segregationist sentiment in Baton Rouge increased as whites faced the prospect of black
and white children attending the same schools, and three anti-integration organizations
formed in the city. Immediately following the Brown decision, businessman John
Easterly formed a segregationist group, the Southern Gentlemen, to preserve “the
southern way of life.” Drawing members from the city’s upper and middle classes, it
actively searched for integrationist sentiment in Baton Rouge’s public institutions,
including LSU; when the Southern Gentlemen found any inkling of it, they publicly
denounced the offending office holder. Baton Rouge also had a chapter o f the White
Citizens’ Council, a segregationist organization founded in October 1954 in
Mississippi. Like the Southern Gentlemen, the Citizens’ Council wanted to expose and
destroy integrationist sentiment in the community. In the 1960s, District Attorney
Sargent Pitcher, a charter member of the Baton Rouge chapter, placed black activists
under surveillance, arrested them on trumped-up charges, and sought the longest
possible sentences for them. He filed motions in court to ban civil rights organizations,
such as the Congress o f Racial Equality (CORE), from holding protests in the city. A

l6Numan Bartley, The Rise o f Massive Resistance (Urbana: University o f Illinois
Press, 1971), 16.
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third group, the Ku Klux Klan, made a brief appearance in the city in the mid 1950s, but
it played virtually no role in the segregationists’ fight against integration.
In the early 1960s, the white leaders gained an ally when a new group, the
accommodationists, stepped into the fray. Although this group preferred, even
advocated the continuation o f segregation, its members refused to destroy Baton
Rouge’s economic well-being to maintain it. Disgusted by the state’s open defiance o f
the federal government during the 1960 New Orleans school desegregation crisis, the
accommodationists wanted East Baton Rouge Parish to acknowledge the authority of
the federal government and to comply with court-ordered school desegregation. They
feared that open defiance would lead to immediate and sweeping school integration and
believed that accommodation would allow them to draft a plan to drag the process out
for years. As Numan Bartley pointed out in The Rise o f Massive Resistance, “a
considerable number of segregationists were unwilling in the end to tear apart the fabric
of southern society and commit the region to anarchy in defense of segregation.” Like
the white leaders, the accommodationists were businessmen, professionals, and
educators who belonged to the city’s middle and upper classes. The accommodationists
wielded economic power and possessed enough clout to silence the segregationists, and
their support gave white leaders enough power to devise a plan for the peaceful but
piecemeal integration of the parish’s schools.17
In addition to white leaders, accommodationists, and segregationists, Baton
Rouge’s white community boasted another group that played an active role in the civil

l7Ibid.
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rights movement— liberals. Most o f the city’s liberal population belonged to one of
three groups, the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), the Council on Human
Relations, and the Louisiana Chapter o f the American Civil Liberties Union (LCLU)Although all three worked to end segregation, they were active at different times and
focused on different issues. The AFSC arrived in Baton Rouge in 1955 and initially,
sought to end workforce segregation in the city’s plants and refineries. When this failed,
they turned their attention to social issues and began to support the black activists’ fight
to desegregate public facilities and schools. The AFSC left Baton Rouge in the mid
1960s when its national office turned its attention to ending the war in Vietnam. The
Council on Human Relations picked up where the AFSC left off. Its members worked
closely with the World War II activists to bring a peaceful end to the segregation of
public facilities and took part in sit-ins in local restaurants. Some members o f the
organization even tutored the first African-American students to attend integrated
schools. Although active in the school desegregation fight of the late 1950s, the LCLU
focused most of its attention on combating police brutality'. Most o f the liberals came
from other parts of the country, and many worked at LSU. Although some were
southem-bom, white leaders and segregationists accused the liberals o f being outside
agitators intent on stirring up the city’s content black population.
Both groups targeted the liberals for “special attention” and intimidation. White
office holders ordered the police and sheriff’s department to place all three
organizations under surveillance. Policemen would cruise the parking lots where the
groups met, write down the license plate numbers o f all o f the cars, and either they or
the FBI would pay a visit to those who attended. Segregationists used harsher methods
19
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to silence the liberals. In 1955, a group o f them shot out the windows o f the AFSC’s
office, and in 1960, they tapped the phones of several prominent liberals. Despite the
threats and harassment, white liberals remained committed to ending segregation and
attaining full citizenship for African Americans.
The divisions that existed within Baton Rouge’s white community were not
unique to Louisiana’s capital city. In fact, historians have discovered similar splits in
cities throughout the South. Subsequent historians have examined the roles played by
these different groups in the civil rights movement. The essays in Southern
Businessmen and the Civil Rights Movement, edited by Elizabeth Jacoway and David
Colburn, examine the impact of industry on the South and conclude that in New SGuth
cities controlled by business leaders who were committed to industrialization
desegregated with very little violence. David Chappell, in Inside Agitators: White
Southerners in the Civil Rights Movement, agreed with the essayists in Southern
Businessmen that white business leaders helped to shape the outcome of the civil rights
movement but added that the divisions within the white community also led to the
ultimate destruction of the system o f Jim Crow. According to him, African Americans
understood that white solidarity on the issue o f segregation was fragile and directed
their protests at the segment of the community most likely to abandon the system of Jim
Crow, the moderate white leaders. However, the willingness o f the white leaders to
agree to changes in segregation laws led black leaders to accept incomplete victories
while white supremacy remained intact. Works on liberals also abound. In one of the
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most notable works, Outside Agitators, Charles Eagles studied northern liberal Jonathan
Daniel’s battle against segregation in Alabama.18
Although they are discussed in most studies o f the civil rights movement, few
works specifically examine segregationists. One of the most comprehensive studies of
staunch segregationists is Neil McMillen’s The White Citizens’ Council. In it McMillen
looks at the creation and development of the organization and its use of massive
resistance to prevent integration. Bartley’s Rise o f Massive Resistance also examines
the evolution o f segregationist sentiment in the South, specifically during the postBrown era. Unlike McMillen, whose focus is narrower, Bartley discusses the response
of “business conservatives” and “neopopulists” to the extreme segregationists.19
While most studies o f the era focus on either whites or blacks, the civil rights
movement in Baton Rouge and in other southern cities went beyond black and white,
and the divisions that plagued both communities and the interactions between different
racial groups determined the course o f the movement. However, few scholars have

l8Bartley, Rise o f Massive Resistance, 1-24; Elizabeth Jacoway and David
Colburn, eds., introduction to Southern Businessmen and Desegregation (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1982), 1-14; David Chappell, Inside Agitators: White
Southerners in the Civil Rights Movement (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1994), xxii-xxv, 214-215; Charles Eagles, Outside Agitator: Jon Daniels and the
Civil Rights Movement in Alabama (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press,
1993); Other works on southern liberals include: Gary Huey, Rebel with a Cause: P. D.
East, Southern Liberalism and the Civil Rights Movement, 1953-1974 (Wilmington:
Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1985); Linda Reed, Simple Decency and Common Sense: The
Southern Conference Movement, 1938 -1963 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1991); John T. Kneebone, Southern Liberal Journalists and the Issue ofRace, 19201944 (Chapel Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 1985).
l9Neil McMillen, The Citizens’ Council (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1971); Bartley, Rise o f Massive Resistance.
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examined the impact o f these divisions and interactions on the freedom straggle. In the
1960s, a bevy o f political scientists, sociologists, and historians conducted studies on
the civil rights movement, and by the 1970s, their number burgeoned. These early
studies examined various aspects o f the movement, including the nature o f black
leadership, the impact of direct action on desegregation, and the segregationist’s
reaction to Brown?0 They usually depicted the movement as one driven by national
leaders and organizations and focused on key events such as the Freedom Rides, the
March on Washington, and violent clashes between activists in cities such as
Birmingham and Selma, Alabama. These studies implied that national leaders and
organizations drove the movement. But, in fact, as Claybome Carson pointed out in his
introduction to Essays on the American Civil Rights Movement, the lives of residents of
communities throughout the South “were affected as much by concessions gained from
local white officials and from the development of the local movement. . . as by the
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the 1965 Voting Rights Act.”21

20These early studies include: Emmett Buell, Jr., “The Politics o f Frustration: An
Analysis of Negro Leadership in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana, 1953-1966"
(masters thesis, Louisiana State University, 1967); Thompson, The Negro Leadership
Class; James H. Laue, Direct Action and Desegregation, I960 -1962: Toward a Theory
o f the Rationalization o f Protest, Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights Movement
Series, ed. David Garrow (New York: Carlson Publishing, Inc., 1989); Emily Stoper,
The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee: The Growth o f Radicalism in a Civil
Rights Organization, Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights Movement Series, ed.
David Garrow (New York: Carlson Publishing, Inc., 1989); Earlean M. McCarrick,
“Louisiana’s Official Resistance to Desegregation” (Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt Univesity,
1964); August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights
Movement, 1942-1968 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973); David L. Lewis,
King: A Biography (Urbana: University o f Illinois Press, 1970).
21Steven Lawson, Running For Freedom: Civil Rights and Black Politics in
America Since 1941 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991), ix; Claybome
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Beginning with Aldon Morris’s groundbreaking work, The Origins o f the Civil
Rights Movement: Black Communities Organizingfo r Change, scholars shifted their
attention away from the movement as a national phenomenon and examined grassroots
activism. Recent studies, including Charles Payne’s I ’ve Got that Light o f Freedom:
The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle and John Dittmer’s
Local People: The Strugglefo r Civil Rights in Mississippi, also emphasized the
importance o f community activism. However works such as these rarely depict the
divisions that existed within black communities. Dittmer, for example, alludes to the
existence of a black leadership class that worked with white officials to bring an end to
protests, but he does not examine the impact of their relationships with whites on the
movement22
Although most o f these studies mention the divisions within the black and white
communities and the interactions among the different factions, few examine the impact
of these groups on the movement. William Chafe’s study of Greensboro, North
Carolina, Civilities and Civil Rights, is one of the books that looks at the movement in a
mid-size New South city and examines both the black and white communities.23 It

Carson, introduction to Essays on the Civil Rights Movement, eds. John Dittmer,
George C. Wright, and W. Marvin Delaney (Arlington: University o f Texas Press,
1995), 4-5.
“ Aldon Morris, The Origins o f the Civil Rights Movement: Black Communities
Organizingfo r Change (New York: The Free Press, 1984); Charles Payne, I ’ve Got that
Light o f Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); John Dittmer, Local People: The
Strugglefo r Civil Rights in M ississippi (Urbana: University o f Illinois Press, 1995).
“ Other studies that examine community development are David Colburn’s
Racial Changes and Community Crisis: St. Augustine, Florida, 1877- 1980 (New York:
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focuses on the impact of civility on the civil rights movement, which brought small
changes to the system of race relations through a series o f polite interactions between
black and white leaders. Greensboro and Baton Rouge had much in common. Industry
served as the basis o f both of their economies. Each had an African-American and a
white college and possessed black communities with clear class delineations. The
AFSC opened offices in both cities in the mid 1950s. The white populations o f both
Greensboro and Baton Rouge included white leaders, accommodationists,
segregationists, and liberals. The movement these two communities followed a pattern
of protest, compromise, and delayed resolution that culminated in violent clashes
between police and the students from the African-American universities. Chafe claims
that this pattern grew out of the politics of moderation rooted in white leaders’
commitment to the principle of civility and their desire to preserve their city’s peace
and stability, but devotion to these two abstract ideals cannot explain the actions of
white leaders. Why did they hold on to the politics of moderation in the face of rabid
segregationist attacks? Why did they meet with black leaders to hammer out
compromises? Where did their commitment to maintaining peaceful race relations
come from? White leaders in most Alabama and Mississippi cities did not share their
Columbia University Press, 1985) and Robert Norrell’s Reaping the Whirlwind: The
Civil Rights Movement in Tuskegee (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1985). Large cities
have merited more studies. Works on Atlanta, for example, include: Ronald H. Bayor,
Race and the Shaping o f Twentieth-Century Atlanta (Chapel Hill: University o f North
Carolina Press, 1996); David Andrew Harmon, Beneath the Image o f the Civil Rights
Movement and Race Relations: Atlanta, Georgia, 1946-1981 (New York: Garland
Publishing, Inc., 1996); and David Garrow, ed., Atlanta, Georgia, 1960-1961, Martin
Luther King, Jr. and the Civil Rights Movement (Brooklyn: Carlson Publishing, Inc.,
1989); Gary Pomerantz, Where Peachtree Meets Sweet Auburn: The Saga o f Two
Families and the Making o f Atlanta (New York: Schribner, 1996).
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concerns; they allowed segregationists free reign. Leaders in these cities did not try to
meet with African Americans to bring an end to protests. What was different about
Greensboro, Baton Rouge, and other cities that exhibited a similar pattern of race
relations?24

24Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights, 1-47.
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Chapter 1
The CtvU Rights Movement in the 1940s
During World War II, Baton Rouge experienced a period o f rapid growth and
industrialization. As the demand for wartime material increased, the chemical plants
and refineries that had lined the banks of the Mississippi River since shortly after the
turn of the century began producing jet fuel, synthetic rubber, and other military
necessities. Increased wartime production brought prosperity to East Baton Rouge
Parish, and white business and political leaders wanted this economic growth to
continue after hostilities ended and that made industrial development their primary
concern. Like their counterparts in other southern industrial and business centers
(Atlanta, Houston, Dallas, Tampa, and Greensboro) the economies of which relied on
influxes of northern investment, white leaders in Baton Rouge knew that racial unrest
was bad for business and committed themselves to preserving order and stability.
Montgomery and other “Old South” cities lacked this industrial base, and when the civil
rights movement began, their political leaders allied with ardent segregationists and met
demands for equality with massive resistance. When black veterans who fought for the
principles of freedom and democracy returned from the war determined to bring an end
to segregation and to win frill citizenship for African Americans, white leaders in Baton
Rouge and other New South cities adopted two methods to silence them, delay and
diplomacy. Whites employed the first tactic when the veterans began launching legal
challenges to segregation laws and used motions and appeals to tie these cases up in
court for years. When civil rights activists continued to demand changes in the system
of segregation or launched protests, members of the white power structure turned to
26
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traditional African-American leaders— businessmen, professionals, and ministers who
had served as liaisons or diplomats between the white and the black communities for
decades — to negotiate compromises to end the protests. These racial diplomats
understood the nature of race relations in the South. While they too wanted equality and
an end to segregation, they believed that these goals could only be obtained by working
with white leaders and not fighting them in court or holding demonstrations. Their
policy o f conciliation angered the veterans and led to divisions within the black
community that grew as the civil rights movement progressed.1
In 1945, racial diplomats were the undisputed leaders of Baton Rouge’s black
community. They belonged to the city’s middle and upper classes and served as
intermediaries between the black and white communities. Racial diplomats could bring
problems to the white leaders and ask for their assistance in solving them. “Common”
African Americans, ones without ties to the white leadership, could also ask the
diplomats to intercede for them. Like their white counterparts, black leaders included
businessmen and professionals who wanted to insure the continued economic expansion
of Baton Rouge. Many belonged to the Negro Chamber of Commerce, and most were
active in social, fraternal, and benevolent societies. One o f the most powerful racial
diplomats, John G. Lewis, Jr., served as president of the Prince Hall Masons, operated
‘Jacoway and Colburn, Southern Businessmen, 1-6; W. Marvin Dulaney,
“Whatever Happened to the Civil Rights Movement in Dallas, Texas?” in Essays on the
American Civil Rights Movement, 66-95; Christopher Silver and John Moeser, The
Separate City: Black Communities in the Urban South, 1940-1968 (Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky, 1995), ix-xi; Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights, 4-8; J.
Mills Thornton, “Challenge and Response in the Montgomery Bus Boycott o f 19551956,” The Alabama Review, 33 (July 1980): 184-186; Thompson, The Negro
Leadership Class, 68-70.
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the Fraternal Press, and ran the Masonic Temple Building- Lewis formed a close
alliance with the NAACP in the 1940s and provided meeting places, offices, and
financial support for the organization. Like his father, John, Sr., he was active in
Republican Party politics and attended every national convention from 1928 to 1940.
Other leading racial diplomats included Doctors George and Leo Butler, Beverly V.
Baranco, and Horatio Thompson. Not only did the Butler brothers practice medicine,
they also owned the Ideal Drug Store and were socially active. Both brothers belonged
to the NAACP, and Leo was active in the Boy Scouts and the YMCA. A dentist,
Baranco was the son of a long-time black leader and businessman who had been active
in the Black and Tan faction o f the Republican Party and served as a delegate-at-large
to several Republican national conventions. A graduate o f Southern University,
Thompson owned several service stations and developed the city’s first up-scale
subdivision for African Americans — Southern Heights. He worked his way through
college by chauffeuring Southern President J. S. Clark, handling campus mail,
operating a branch of Ideal Drug Store out of his dorm room, and establishing a taxi
company. In the early 1940s, he served as secretary o f the local branch o f the NAACP.2
The ranks of the racial diplomats also included another group — plant workers.
Although the city’s industries segregated their workforces and relegated black workers
to menial, unskilled positions and paid them less than whites, these industrial workers

2Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 70; “Baton Rouge Raises Scout Camp
Fund,” Pittsburgh Courier, June 8, 1940,22; “Baton Rougeans Protest Unwarranted
Attacks on Citizenry by Policemen,” Louisiana Weekly, June 28, 1941,1; Carleton,
River Capital, 121; “ Thompson the Man Behind the Scenes,’’Advocate, February 19,
1995, 1G.
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earned more money than most black Baton Rougeans. Working for Standard Oil or
another national corporation also provided these black employees with both economic
and job security. Most belonged to labor unions and established relationships with
white leaders through these organizations. Both white and black workers at the city’s
major plants and refineries belonged to segregated labor unions. Usually, one union
represented the workers at a plant but was divided into a white section and a black
section. When asking for higher wages or improved working conditions, the two
sections usually joined efforts in their meetings with management. This cooperation did
not transfer into a sense of working class unity. Although they asked their employers
for increased wages and better working conditions, these African-American employees
never sought major changes in their employment status and never asked that the
managers integrate the workforces. They took great pride in the fact that they worked
for these national corporations, and some formed all-black booster clubs to promote
industrial development and expansion. In June 1941, two ESSO employees, Joe
“ESSO” Williams and the Reverend Anderson Brooks announced their support of the
plant’s fifteen million dollar building program and secured the promise of plant
officials that the company would employ more African Americans. When the same
group held a picnic in 1952 over 7,500 attended. Black ESSO employees also formed a
health association in 1948 to provide insurance for themselves and their families. By
1952, ESSO employed 1,200 African Americans. Because of the com m unity ’s
industrial base, the economic status o f black Baton Rougeans was the highest in the

29

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

state. That year, 40 percent of the city’s black population owned their own houses as
compared to 12 percent in New Orleans and 18 percent in Shreveport.3
When they saw a need within their community, these plant workers and the
other racial diplomats approached white leaders and asked them for help in meeting it.
As long as the request did not challenge the racial status quo, white leaders usually
complied. If African Americans needed the financial assistance o f their white
benefactors, they asked the black community to provide a portion o f the funds. In June
1940, Leo S. Butler asked white leaders to help pay for black youth to attend a
segregated Boy Scout camp. A white attorney, Fred Benton, promised to donate $1,000
to the cause if African Americans matched that amount. To meet their quota, black Boy
Scout supporters held various fond raisers.4
In the early 1940s, racial diplomats recognized the need for a black elementary
school in an African-American neighborhood inhabited by plant workers. They
obtained the money for this school from the Julius Rosenwald Fund. Rosenwald had
amassed millions of dollars through an investment in Sears, Roebuck and Company in
the late 1890s and established a philanthropic fund to improve the well-being of
Americans, particularly African Americans. As one of its primary goals the fund

3Eugene Sutherland to Thelma Babbitt, March 2, 1955, American Friends
Service Committee Papers, Visits with Community Leaders, South Central Regional
Office, 1954-1955, American Friends Service Committee Archives, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania (hereafter cited as AFSC); “Baton Rouge Column,” Louisiana Weekly,
June 28,1941, 7; “ESSO Boosters Picnic a Spectacle of Fun,” Weekly Leader, June 28,
1952,2; “ESSO Health Ass’n to Hold Election,” Weekly Leader, March 29,1952, 1;
“Legislative Lobby Reports,” Weekly Leader, June 28,1952,7.
““Baton Rouge Raises Scout Camp Fund"Pittsburgh Courier, June 8, 1940,22.
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established a program to build elementary schools for black children. It provided onethird of the money to construct the school, and the local community contributed the rest.
In Baton Rouge, black parents, who wanted their children to attend a neighborhood
school, raised the money for the new building and turned it over to the School Board to
staff and administer. The board, over the protests o f black parents, promptly assigned
white children to the school and renamed it Gilmer Wright, after one of its deceased
members. The racial diplomats who raised the money to construct the school knew that
challenging the board on this issue would complicate their future dealings with whites,
so they remained silent.5
The classification of Gilmer Wright as a white school revealed the disregard that
many white Baton Rougeans had for the city’s black citizens and hinted at the racial
tension that the city’s economic prosperity masked. In 1940, a Louisiana State
University sociology class studying race relations polled a group of African Americans
and discovered discontent within the black community. Black Baton Rougeans
complained “that the lack of hospitalization, proper housing facilities, prejudicial
attitudes on the part o f whites and the low economic sphere” in which the city’s blacks
were placed created a situation that would lead to racial unrest instead of peaceful
discussion. A year later, violence erupted. While responding to a call about a fight
between two men at one of the city’s black-owned theaters, the McKinley Theater,
sPatti Elizabeth Smith, “The Distribution o f Rosenwald Schools in Louisiana
and Their Suggested Impact on Black Education” (master’s thesis, Louisiana State
University, 1992), 20-25; Edwin R. Embree and Julia Waxman, Investment in People:
The Story o f the Julius Rosenwald Fund (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), 28;
Minutes of the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, June 30,1943, Minute Book,
vol. 4, East Baton Rouge Parish School Board Office, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
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police chased their suspects into Ideal Drug Store. The officers beat and then arrested
several people, including Leo’s chauffeur. The Butler brothers had long been active in
the NAACP and had worked with white leaders to improve conditions for black Baton
Rougeans. These men never expected to be the target o f such an attack. In the end,
George paid the bail for every one arrested and then circulated a petition denouncing
police brutality. Many racial diplomats, including members o f the all-black Baton
Rouge Civic League, several ministers, and numerous prominent black professionals
signed it.6
Fearing racial unrest, white leaders convened a grand jury to investigate police
brutality. Over two hundred African Americans attended the hearing, and many testified
to the brutality o f the Baton Rouge police force and the sheriffs department. One
woman, Florence Atkins, claimed that police beat her because she refused to say, “Yes,
sir,” and “No, sir,” when they addressed her. Thomas Delpit, the owner of the Chicken
Shack, one of the city’s most popular black restaurants, testified that several officers
entered his restaurant and beat him because he “did not know how to talk to a white
man.” Immediately following the incident, the state’s leading African-American
newspaper, the Louisiana Weekly reported, “This is the first time Negroes of Baton
Rouge have been so aroused. They indignantly requested that the Attorney General
investigate the reported police brutality and unwarranted arrests” and even threatened to
6“Discuss Race Relations in Baton Rouge,” Louisiana Weekly, May 4, 1940,4;
Sociology Class Report, “The Negro in Baton Rouge, 1939-1940,” (Louisiana State
University, 1940), 48-56; “Baton Rougeans Protest Unwarranted Attacks on Citizenry
by Policemen,” Louisiana Weekly, June 28,1941,1; “Baton Rouge Column,” Louisiana
Weekly, June 28,1941, 7; “Baton Rouge Citizens SeekFederal Aid to Stop Police
Brutal Attacks on Negroes,” Louisiana Weekly, July 26,1941,1.
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send a petition to the federal government. In the end, the grand jury found that the
police acted properly in using force in the arrests at Ideal Drug Store and that they had
not used excessive force in other encounters with African Americans. Although they
grumbled, the racial diplomats accepted the grand jury’s ruling. But the brutality did not
end. On December 25,1942, police for no apparent reason launched a raid into one of
South Baton Rouge’s black neighborhoods. Armed with sawed-off shotguns,
submachine guns, revolvers, and tear gas, they combed the area, terrorizing the
citizenry and arresting sixty-nine African Americans. Once again, African Americans
circulated a petition that white leaders ignored. The racial diplomats, rather than
demand change, dropped the issue.7
In the 1940s, other groups of whites attacked the city’s African-American
population, with bus drivers being the worst offenders. Unlike many white Baton
Rougeans, bus drivers had daily contact with large numbers of African Americans.
They ferried black passengers around the city and expected them to follow their orders.
In March 1944, a bus driver shot a black passenger for being insubordinate. The
passenger, Wiley Kent, a defense plant worker from Washington, D. C., was visiting his
parents in Baton Rouge. While riding a bus from his parents’ house to his brother’s
home, several young white boys started calling the black passengers “niggers” and
“black birds.” Kent told them to stop, but the boys ignofed him and continued their
taunts. The driver did nothing until Kent reached his destination. As he disembarked, he

7“Baton Rouge Grand Jury Completes ‘Wrong Way’ Police Brutality Probe,”
Louisiana Weekly, August 2,1941,1; “Baton Rouge Citizens Continue Their Fight
Against Police Brutality,” Louisiana Weekly, January 23,1943,1.
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held the door for two black women, and the driver angrily got off the bus and asked him
why he was holding the door. When he tried to leave, the driver shot him. Once again,
Baton Rouge’s black population grumbled, and once again, the racial diplomats refused
to confront the white power structure.8
Although these incidents strained race relations in Baton Rouge, they did not
lessen the support of the black community for World War H. African Americans saw
their backing o f the war effort as proof of their loyalty and o f their worthiness for foil
citizenship. Racial diplomats in Baton Rouge also believed that their support of the war
would improve conditions for blacks when the fighting ended. Shortly after the
bombing o f Pearl Harbor, Southern University President Felton Clark, a racial diplomat
who used his relationship with white leaders to secure funding for his school, declared
“The negro [sic] is most proud of his record of loyalty to his country.” He added that by
supporting the war effort African Americans would show their worthiness for being
integrated into “American life and democracy.” Felton, the son of president emeritus of
Southern J. S. Clark, had taken over as head of the university in 1938. Like his father,
Felton Clark realized that accommodation and not confrontation could assure the safety
of Southern. The city’s Negro Chamber of Commerce also sponsored war bond rallies
and parades to encourage black Baton Rougeans to show their patriotism by purchasing
bonds. As Clark said at the 1941 rally, the best way to integrate black citizens into
American life was for them to show their readiness for full citizenship. Other African

8Catherine BarnesrJourney From Jim Crow: The Desegregation o f Southern
Transit (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 38; “Defense Worker Shot by
Driver in Baton Rouge,” Louisiana Weekly, March 4,1944, 11.
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Americans realized that their demonstrations o f patriotism would never convince whites
that they deserved equality.9
While the racial diplomats attempted to show their merit by purchasing war
bonds and holding parades, thousands of black Baton Rougeans were drafted into a
segregated armed forces. Most servicemen who later became activists came from
backgrounds similar to those of the racial diplomats. The majority came from middle
class families. Many were in college when the Japan launched its attack against Pearl
Harbor. For the most part, the activists were at least a decade younger than the racial
diplomats, and even before becoming soldiers, they took pleasure in defying the system
of segregation at every available opportunity. But it was the war itself that convinced
many young veterans to fight for racial equality.
African-American soldiers encountered discrimination on all fronts. They
reported to segregated camps for training, lived in substandard quarters, and served in
non-combat companies headed by white officers. Drafted into the Army Air Corps
immediately following the bombing of Pearl Harbor, dental school student Dupuy
Anderson encountered a racist colonel at an induction center. Upon examining the new
inductees, who were all medical students and second lieutenants in the Medical
Administrative Corps, he commented, “Well I'll be damned, here's a bunch of niggers
without syphilis or gonorrhea.” At one point, the army sent Anderson to Baton Rouge’s

9Iris Johnson Perkins, ‘Telton Grandison Clark, Louisiana Educator,” (Ph.D.
diss., Louisiana State University, 1976), v; “Negroes Urged to Rally for Defense in
Present Crisis,” State-Times, December 22,1944,10; “Baton Rouge to Hold Bond
Rally and Parade Tues.,” Louisiana Weekly, June 9, 1945, 1.
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military air base, Ryan Field, to serve as a medical officer. When he reported for duty,
he received a cold reception.
I went over to the hospital, every typewriter stopped typing, every head turned
toward me. A gray-haired colonel walked out; the captain gave him my papers.
He threw them back to me [and] said, “They must have made a mistake.” I took
my papers, and I came home [and] took offm y uniform. I felt like burning it. I
stayed around here [for a year] and received my pay until I got orders to move. I
got a letter from the Air Force surgeon general wanting to know where I had
been. Where had I been? I was furious!”
The army then sent Anderson to the all-black Tuskegee Air Field, and this time his
commanding officer accepted his paperwork. He soon discovered that conditions for
black soldiers there were dismal as well.
The base was known as the old and the new base. We were put on the new base
[and a group o f white soldiers occupied the old base]. [There were] hardly any
recreation facilities [on the new base], no swimming pools, nothing. Up on the
main base, they had a nice club, swimming pool, and everything. We weren’t
allowed up there. So, a group o f us decided we were going up there. We were
given a reprimand [for our actions, but] they couldn't do anything about i t . . .
People don't realize what we went through wearing a uniform.
Southern University student Johnnie Jones also encountered racism. As one of
army’s first black warrant officers, Jones held a position o f leadership in his unit and
occupied a position slightly below the officers' corps. Because he ranked higher than a
regular enlisted man, he received benefits not afforded to the rank-and-file soldiers. He
lived in the officers barracks, ate in their mess hall, and had his own driver. Yet his
position meant nothing to white troops and the white citizenry. To them, he was just
another “nigger.” As Jones’s unit prepared to leave for England, the army sent it to
Charleston, South Carolina, for last minute preparations. Most bases had separate
barracks for white and black officers, but Charleston did not. In fact, Jones was one o f
the first black officers to go through the facility. Unsure of how to handle him, the
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base’s administration decided to place him in the same barracks as white officers. After
being shown to his living quarters, Jones unpacked his belongings and then left to
attend to his duties. While he was gone, the white civilian crew that cleaned the
barracks dumped all of his possessions out into the street. He reported the incident to
his white colonel, but his commanding officer refused to take action, claiming that to do
so would lead to bloodshed. Left with no place to stay, Jones went into the city and
rented a room. On base, he also encountered racism from enlisted men who refused to
salute him and called him derogatory names.10
Although the war served as a catalyst for their activism, most o f these veterans
had developed a resentment against segregation as children and even before the war had
challenged the system whenever possible.11Bom December 30, 1918, Dupuy Anderson
grew up in middle-class black family in a predominately white neighborhood. His
father worked as a postman, and his mother stayed at home to care for the family. With
white children as his playmates, he became aware of discrimination at an early age.
Unlike his white Mends who rode the bus to a school that was only a few blocks away
from their homes, he walked two miles to and from school every day. In the mid 1930s,

I0Barbara Dennis, “A Second Front: Racial Violence and Black Soldiers in
Alexandria, Louisiana During World War II” (master’s thesis, Louisiana State
University, 1992), 31-33; Richard Dalifume, Desegregation o f the U. S'. Armed Forces
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 1-4; Anderson, interview by Maxine
Crump, December 8, 1993, 6-10; Johnnie A. Jones, Sr., interview by author, tape
recording, September 4, 1993, T. Harry Williams Center for Oral History Collection,
Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries,
Baton Rouge, 27-35.
11Chafe points out in Civilities and Civil Rights that the men and women who
become activists during the civil rights movement grew up fighting the system in
segregation in small ways and had parents or school teachers who encouraged defiance.
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African Americans in Baton Rouge organized a Boy Scout troop, but the local white
council refused to allow them to wear the organization’s uniforms. Angered by this
blatant discrimination, Anderson and some of his fellow Scouts protested. Initially, the
local council refused to change its policy, but in the late 1930s relented and allowed
them to wear uniforms. As a teenager, he also recognized the inequities that existed
between black and white schools. On one occasion, the principal of his high school
asked him and several other students to pick up a case o f used books at a white high
school. Realizing that the books he and the other students at his school had been using
were cast-off, he became angry. His anger at the system o f segregation continued to
grow as he became an adult. His contempt for racial diplomats did as well. He recalled:
They were part of unions at the Standard Oil, which was a big company then,
with its prejudices and racism. They were ministers and the like, and they had
the control o f the union
They were little clowns. Baton Rouge wasn't a
Montgomery or Birmingham or a Mississippi, but it had its faults and brutality
and the like. But not as bad as some places. People were, “Don't rock the boat.”
Well, it's time we rock the boat.
One of his first acts of protest occurred before the end of the war. While on leave he
traveled to Baton Rouge to take the state’s dentistry exam. He went to the public library
to study and to read through some medical books only to be told by the librarian that
African Americans could not use the facility. She offered to send the book over to the
black library, which consisted of a poorly lit room. Anderson, who was dressed in his
uniform, refused and told her, “I’m not going. I’m going to read this book here.”
Sympathizing with the young soldier, the librarian led him to an empty reading room
and allowed him to use the books. “I didn't need to go there every day,” he recalled,
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“but I went every day, walked through the front door and got the books and went in
there and read.”12
Johnnie Jones’s activism also had deep roots. A native o f Laruel Hill, Louisiana,
a small town located in West Feliciana Parish, halfway between St. Francisville,
Louisiana, and Woodville, Mississippi, he grew up defying the system of segregation.
Unlike most other African Americans in the area who worked as sharecroppers, the
Jones family rented their land outright from white landowners. His father, Henry Jones,
served as an unofficial member of the West Feliciana School Board in 1918 and told his
children that the way to achieve better lives for themselves was through education.
Unlike the children of sharecroppers who could not attend school because they had to
work in the fields, Jones and his younger brother, George, went every day. The school
year for black children lasted six months, and then, their father hired the teacher to hold
classes for the two boys and a few other neighborhood children for three more months.
Because the family had very little money, Henry Jones paid the teacher with vegetables
and meat that the family produced. Whites objected to the amount of time the Jones
children attended school. White men driving log trucks from Woodville, Mississippi,
often taunted them and attempted to force them off the side of the road as they walked
to school. Although his brother and the other children would run from the drivers,
Johnnie Jones refused to back down. He stood on the shoulder and faced them, but
never stepped off the shoulder. Similarly, his father refused to back down on the issue

12Anderson, interview by Maxine Crump, December 22, 1994,23; Anderson,
interview by Maxine Crump, December 15, 1993, 1-10, 16-18; Class Report, “The
Negro in Baton Rouge,” 112.
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o f education for his children. Jones’ intelligence became apparent while he was in
elementary school, and that made whites, who disliked the idea o f educating black
children, uneasy. Before he completed elementary school, the man from whom his
father rented land ordered him to take Jones out of school and put him to work in the
field. Henry Jones refused. The school for black children in Laurel Hill ended with
grade six, and there was no black high school in the area for Johnnie to attend. His
father sent him to Southern University’s demonstration school in Baton Rouge, and
upon graduation, he enrolled in the industrial education program at Southern. Although
his father scrounged together the money to pay his tuition to the demonstration school,
Jones was the poorest member o f his class and the only one whose parents farmed. To
help out with expenses, he took a job as a dishwasher at the white-owned Mike and
Tony’s Restaurant but refused to take part in the degrading tipping practice perpetuated
by white customers. They would announce that they were tipping and invite any black
kitchen help — the waiters were all w hite— who wanted a tip to step outside. The
white patrons would then flip coins into the air and require that the black workers catch
them in their mouths.13
After the war, Jones resumed his studies and began to openly fight the system of
segregation. He immediately helped to organize a college chapter o f the NAACP at
Southern. To stir up the student body, he made what he called a rabble-rousing speech,
in which he proclaimed that he could no longer accept the racial status quo and urged
them to join him in fighting it. “Parents and all didn’t believe too much in the
13Jones, interview, September 1,1993, 1-64; Jones, interview, December 4,
1993,102-103.
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movement that we was making,” Jones said. They thought that he and this new group o f
activists were too radical, but Henry Jones supported his son’s stand.14
Johnnie Jones made his determination to fight Jim Crow clear in the summer of
1946 when a state policeman pulled him over for a traffic violation and beat him. Jones
was on his way to New Orleans to have a piece of shrapnel that had lodged in his neck
during the Normandy Invasion removed. With him were two teenage boys on their way
to visit family. The officer stopped Jones and accused him of speeding. (In a 1993
interview, Jones claimed that he had not been speeding.) The trooper pulled Jones out
of the car by his collar, threw him to the ground, and began kicking him. After the
attack, he let Jones go telling him, “Nigger, I don’t want you to be driving over the
speed limit anymore.” Angered by the abusive treatment he received, Jones drove
directly to the office of New Orleans civil rights attorney Alexander Pierre Tureaud,
filed an affidavit with him and Daniel Byrd, Field Secretary for the NAACP, and
decided to sue the state police. Tureaud and the NAACP brought his complaint to the
superintendent o f state police who met with Tureaud and other black leaders and
promised to dismiss the officer. The racial diplomats viewed the meeting with the
superintendent as an honor and saw the dismissal of the trooper as a victory for all
African Americans. The superintendent urged Tureaud not to file a suit and claimed that
if he did racial tensions in the state would escalate.
After conferring with the racial diplomats, Tureaud, who was the state’s leading
civil rights attorney, reluctantly agreed to drop the suit. Because Tureaud was one of the

14Jones, interview, September 4, 1993, 51-53.
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only black: lawyers in the state and no white lawyer would take his case, Jones was
forced to drop his suit, but he did so reluctantly. “Those guys hadn’t gone to war. They
hadn’t fought over at the Normandy Invasion,” Jones recalled. “They didn’t have that
same feeling [as those o f us who did]. They were all good people and good Mends of
mine, and I respected [them]. But,. . . times was [sic] changing.” He added that the
racial diplomats belonged to a different generation, one that believed demonstrating and
demanding change was too militant.15
Although Jones and the other World War II activists returned from the war
determined to obtain equality and therefore chafed at the conservatism of racial
diplomats, they lacked the organization and the support within the black community to
challenge the racial diplomats’ cautious leadership o f the black community. In 1945,
most activists were in their early or mid-twenties, were either still in college or just
starting out in their careers, and had yet to establish themselves as community leaders.
On the other hand, the older racial diplomats were well-established and well-respected.
They owned businesses, taught school, and worked in the city’s plants and refineries.
The diplomats also played active roles within the black community and served as
church deacons, sang in the choir, or headed Boy Scout troops. The black masses knew
them, so when racial diplomats championed a cause, they could count on support from
the AMcan-American community. World War II activists realized that they could not
strike out on their own and often cooperated with the racial diplomats on projects aimed

15Jones Affidavit, ca. July 1946, A. P. Tureaud Papers, box 15, folder 21,
Amistad Research Center, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana (hereafter cited
as APT); Jones, interview, September4,1993, 55-63.
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at advancing the cause of racial equality. At the same time, they criticized the racial
diplomats for accepting compromises offered by white leaders that actually perpetuated
segregation. The activists also revitalized a project initiated by the racial diplomats but
abandoned when they became controversial — the equalization o f teachers’ salaries.
They even initiated some of their own programs and even garnered support for them
from racial diplomats, most notably voter registration and the desegregation of
Louisiana State University. Through their efforts to gain recognition within the black
community, the World War II activists succeeded in creating a strong civil rights
constituency in less than a decade.
The reaction of World War II activists to the construction of a public swimming
pool for black children revealed their willingness to simultaneously work with and
criticize the racial diplomats. In the summer of 1946, Reverend Willie K. Brooks, a
thirty-eight-year-old employee o f ESSO and scoutmaster for the city’s black Boy Scout
troop, proposed that African Americans build a public swimming pool for black
children. At the time, the city’s only public swimming pool was located in City Park
and was reserved for whites. African Americans who wanted to swim were forced to
brave the rivers and lakes that surrounded the city. The previous summer, several Boy
Scouts from Brooks’s troop drowned in the treacherous Mississippi and Comite Rivers
while trying to earn their swimming badges. Saddened and angered by their deaths,
Brooks decided that the city’s African-American population needed a pool of its own.
Knowing that white leaders would never agree to use public funds to build one, he
proposed that the black c o m m u n ity pay for its construction and then turn it over to the
Recreation and Parks Commission to administer. Because he worked within the
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traditional framework o f race relations and did not demand that the city integrate the
white pool or finance a black one, white leaders embraced his proposal and announced
that they would raise $40,000 of the $60,000 necessary to construct the new facility.
The willingness to pay for such a facility was a typical response o f white leaders in
New South cities. With the sanction o f white leaders, racial diplomats sprang into
action. They created the United Negro Recreation Association (UNRA) to direct the
fund drive and asked African-American businessmen, churches, and other organizations
to procure black volunteers to build the pool. With the approval o f Felton Clark,
Southern University proudly donated $5,000.16
While racial diplomats whole-heartedly supported the idea o f building a pool for
black children, World War H activists opposed i t Although they agreed that black
children needed the facility, they thought that the city should either pay for it or
desegregate the white pool. Dupuy Anderson explained the World War II activists’
reservations: “We were paying taxes. We were part of the community. They had a white
swimming pool that we could not use. I objected to raising money to build a black
swimming pool.” He believed that the pool at City Park should be available to all
children, not just white ones. Johnnie Jones concurred and also spoke out against using
private funds to build the public pool. To him, the idea seemed ludicrous. Yet he
realized that black children needed such a facility and donated $ 100. As he put his

16Charles Smith, interview by Marc Sternberg, tape recording, August 24, 1994,
October 25, 1994, T. Harry Williams Center for Oral History, Louisiana Lower
Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge,
Louisiana; “City Planners to Determine Site for Negro Pool,” State-Times, August 2,
1946, 11A.
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money into the collection plate, he told the racial diplomats, “Let this be the last time.”
Not accustomed to having their deals with whites questioned, the racial diplomats
attacked Jones. They labeled him as a militant and attempted to discredit him in the
black community by calling his ideas crazy and foolish. They claimed that by speaking
out against the pool, he was challenging their authority as leaders. Jones defended
himself. He asserted, “I wasn’t against what Brooks was doing. Brooks was doing a
community service. He was going about it the only way he thought it could be done.”
Jones and Anderson wanted to find a new way of doing things. Turning a deaf ear to the
objections o f World War II activists, racial diplomats proceeded with their fond raisers
and within a year, raised the required $20,000. In June 1947, city planners selected a
site for W. K. Brooks Park pool three blocks away from the all-white City Park pool.17
In addition to reluctantly cooperating with the construction of the Brooks Park
pool in 1946, World War II activists also rekindled interest in East Baton Rouge
Parish’s teacher salary equalization suit. In 1943, racial diplomats launched a legal
battle to equalize the salaries o f black and white teachers in East Baton Rouge Parish.
Heartened by the 1942 ruling by Federal Judge Wayne Borah that required the Orleans
Parish School Board to pay white and black teachers equal salaries, the Louisiana
Colored Teachers’ Association (LCTA) decided to file similar suits throughout the

l7W. K. Brooks, interview by Marc Sternberg, tape recording, October 25,1995,
T. Harry Williams Center for Oral History Collection, Louisiana Lower Mississippi
Valley Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana;
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October 2, 1993,20-25; Marc Sternberg, ‘Terpetuation, Accommodation, and
Confrontation: The Evolution o f Civil Rights Protest in Baton Rouge, 1946-1961"
(senior thesis, Princeton University, 1995), 11.
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state. The discrepancy between teacher salaries in East Baton Rouge Parish was
appalling. First-year white teachers with no degree earned $104.14 per month, and
those with a degree earned $123.85. The salary for an African-American teacher with
fifteen years experience and a master’s degree was only $97.35. In early 1943, LCTA
President J. K. Haynes contacted the pastor o f Mt Zion Baptist Church, Gardner Taylor,
a friend of Dupuy Anderson and an activist. Haynes asked Taylor to call a meeting of
black leaders to discuss teacher salary equalization in East Baton Rouge Parish. A
native o f North Louisiana, Haynes was older than most World War II activists but
shared their commitment to obtaining equality for African Americans. As president o f
the LCTA, which later became the Louisiana Education Association (LEA), he used the
organization’s funds to finance school desegregation suits. As the pastor of one of the
city’s largest and wealthiest African-American chinches, Taylor commanded respect
within the black community and occupied a position of leadership. When he asked the
traditional black leaders to talk to Haynes, they complied. Several prominent black
businessmen and educators attended the meeting at Mt. Zion Baptist. The attendees
included: Doctor George Butler and Doctor Beverly V. Baranco, Jr., Horatio
Thompson, ESSO employee Roosevelt Smith, and educators Leon Netterville and Fred
Piper. After listening to Haynes, the group decided to sponsor a suit to equalize the
salaries of black and white teachers and asked A. P. Tureaud to handle their case.
Earlier that year, the LCTA had retained Tureaud as a lawyer and agreed to fund all o f
the education suits filed under the auspices of the NAACP. The group searched for
several months but could not find a p laintiff because any complaint against the School
Board would endanger the job of the teacher who filed the suit This threat became a
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reality in October 1943 when the Jefferson Parish School Board fired that parish’s
plaintiff, Eula Mae Lee, and the boards in several other parishes did the same. In the
end, teachers in Baton Rouge decided to limit the danger o f job loss by filing as a
group. Yet they could not agree on how to proceed, and their suit died.18
Fearing that equalization would come at their expense, white teachers
throughout Louisiana lobbied for a plan that would pay teachers according to their
qualifications, experience, and ability. The State Board o f Education endorsed their
proposal and added merit and responsibility to the criteria that parishes would use to
determine the pay level o f their teachers. Parishes throughout the state quickly adopted
these new guidelines.19
In 1946, Haynes once again tried to organize the black teachers in Baton Rouge
to file suit for salary equalization. Once again, he enlisted the help of Gardner Taylor
and also turned to W. W. Stewart, the activist dean o f Southern’s College of Education.
Both men looked for a plaintiff, but no one wanted to sue. “Most o f the people were
afraid back then,” Haynes recalled. “The black-white relationship was not very good,
and there was a lot of fear about it [filing suit].” After searching for a plaintiff, the
group convinced Malcolm Legarde, a World War II veteran who headed the
Department of Math at McKinley High School, to act as the plaintiff. Knowing that

l8J. K. Haynes interview by Miranda Kombert, tape recording, March 15, 1995,
T. Harry Williams Center for Oral History Collection, Louisiana Lower Mississippi
Valley Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Leon
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I9Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 100.
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Legarde would either be fired or forced to leave his position at McKinley, W. W.
Stewart met with the parish’s black teachers and asked each o f them to donate ten
dollars to help support him. The activists also tried to convince teachers to sign a
petition declaring that Legarde represented them in this class action suit. Only a few
black teachers signed. The majority feared that if they openly supported the suit, they
would lose their jobs. Although most of them agreed to contribute ten dollars to a fund
to support Legarde, few actually chipped in.20
Fearing that the School Board would use intimidation to force Legarde to drop
his suit, Tureaud filed suit before the board had a chance to act. Although not above
resorting to intimidation to get their way, white leaders knew that meeting Legarde’s
suit with outright resistance would only unite the teachers and strengthen their resolve
to sue. The board adopted a plan o f action designed to keep Tureaud off balance. First,
in August 1946, its secretary, C. L. Barrow, refused to give Tureaud a copy of the
minutes for the meeting in which they voted on the budget for the 1946-1947 school
year which prevented the civil rights attorney from knowing how much money had
been allocated for teachers’ salaries. Barrow claimed that the board had not approved or
published the minutes, so he could not release the information. In a letter to Gardner
Taylor, Tureaud claimed, ‘1 am not expecting him to comply with this [request].” He

20Malcolm Legarde to A. P. Tureaud, March 1, 1946, APT, box 31, folder 14;
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also warned Taylor not to discuss the suit because he believed that informants would
tell board members about their plans. White leaders also tried to use the courts to delay
the case. H. Payne Breazeale and Victor Sachse, two o f Baton Rouge’s most powerful
attorneys, represented the board and filed petition after petition to secure continuances.
A frustrated Tureaud wrote to NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) head Thurgood
Marshall, “They are going to delay all they can and are using this method for that
purpose.”21
In addition to delaying the suit, the School Board also adopted a policy of divide
and conquer; it offered to raise black teachers’ salaries by 20 percent a year over five
years if Legarde dropped his suit Sachse warned, “any other terms . . . would impede
the budgetary program of the Parish School Board.” Tureaud denounced this offer and
argued that a five-year delay was much too long. Although the proposed equalization
schedule was protracted, Tureaud feared that the black teachers in East Baton Rouge
Parish who supported Legarde would abandon the suit if he pushed the case through the
courts. “It has been a difficult problem to get the teachers organized for these fights,
because no one wants to sacrifice his job,” he noted in a letter to Carter. Tureaud added
that only a few die-hard teachers, the ones who started the equalization fight, wanted to
continue with the case. The board destroyed the resolve o f the less committed teachers
by offering this incremental equalization and immediately raised the salaries and
classifications o f black teachers not involved in the suit. White leaders would return to
21A. P. Tureaud to Thurgood Marshall, April 30, 1946, APT Papers, box 31,
folder 14; A. P. Tureaud to Gardner Taylor, August 30,1946, ibid.; A. P. Tureaud to
Robert Carter, August 12,1946, ibid.; A. P. Tureaud to Thurgood Marshall, September
18, 1946, ibid.
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their strategy o f appeasement throughout the civil rights movement. “Baton Rouge is
known for appeasement,” Dupuy Anderson recalled. “Give us a little taste o f the pie,
and they quieted us down.”22
Those African Americans who wanted more than “a little taste o f the pie” failed
to get it. With the support o f the majority o f black teachers lost, Tureaud quickly
negotiated a settlement with Sachse. The board agreed to equalize salaries in three years
if the teachers agreed to drop their suit. J. K. Haynes denounced the plan. “W e do not
want any such compromise,” he proclaimed. “They’ve had all these years to do these
things and have done literally nothing. We insist that something must be done now.”
African-American teachers in East Baton Rouge Parish refused to follow Haynes’
advice. Instead, they accepted the concessions offered by the School Board and trusted
its members to equalize their pay by September 1948. O f course, the School Board did
nothing.23
Two years later, in April 1948, the teachers o f East Baton Rouge Parish asked
Tureaud to revive the case of Legarde v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board. Once
again, the School Board maneuvered to avoid a legal battle. In early August 1948, it
promised the parish’s African-American teachers that it would equalize salaries
beginning in the 1948-1949 school year if they dropped their suit. A year earlier, a

22A. P. Tureaud to Robert Carter, September 23, 1946, APT, box 31, folder 14;
A. P. Tureaud to Robert Carter, October 11, 1946, ibid.; Anderson, interview by
Maxine Crump, January 5, 1994, 3.
23A. P. Tureaud to Robert Carter, October 11, 1946, APT, box 31, folder 14; J.
K. Haynes to A. P. Tureaud, October 2,1946, ibid.; A. P. Tureaud to Victor Sachse,
November 11, 1946, ibid.
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federal judge had ordered the equalization of teachers’ salaries in Iberville Parish, and
in 1948, a similar ruling brought the salaries of white and black teachers in line in
Jefferson Parish. At that point, the NAACP formulated a plan to file equalization suits
throughout the state in an attempt to force the State Department o f Education and the
state legislature into action. To forestall further litigation, the Department of Education
ordered every school system to equalize the salaries of its African-American and white
teachers, and the legislature voted to allocate $8 million for that purpose. With money
in hand, the East Baton Rouge School Board quickly voted to equalize pay beginning in
September 1948.24
The School Board still punished Legarde for his insubordination. He lost his job
as head o f McKinley’s Math Department. Although he obtained other teaching
positions, the stigma of being the man who sued the School Board followed him. Years
later, he was appointed principal for the summer school session, and somebody
reminded the board that he had filed suit to equalize salaries. The board promptly
dismissed him, and according to J. K. Haynes, he made no money that summer. Fearing
that any interaction with Legarde would label them as troublemakers, AfricanAmerican school teachers shunne d him and his wife, and he lost his status within the
black community.25

24Horatio Thompson to A. P. Tureaud, April 3, 1948, APT, box 31, folder 15;
Victor Sachse to A. P. Tureaud, ca. August 1948, ibid.; Daniel Byrd to A. P. Tureaud,
August 11, 1948, APT, box 9, folder 12; A. P. Tureaud to Horatio Thompson, August
14, 1948, APT, box 31, folder 15; Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 106-108.
“ Steven Lawson, Black Ballots: Voting Rights in the South 1944-1969 (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1976), x; Haynes, interview by Miranda Kombert;
Reed, interview, June 23, 1998.
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The battle of teacher salary equalization reinforced the World War II activists’
belief that in order to effect change African Americans needed to be a part o f the
political process. In Black Ballots, Steven Lawson noted that African Americans
believed that once they attained the vote they could assert influence on elected officials.
“Once Negroes experienced their vote, the could help elect sheriffs who would be less
likely to brutalized them,” Lawson wrote. “They would select officials who would see
to it that ghetto streets were paved and cleaned and ultimately they would use their
ballots to dismantle the entire Jim Crow caste system.” Yet only a handful o f black
Baton Rougeans could vote. In 1940, the city’s voting rolls included only 144 blacks.
World War H veteran Willis Reed was one o f them. Reed, who quit school in the fourth
grade to help support his family, worked for a grocery wholesaler in Baton Rouge
before the war. As a trusted employee, he made daily trips to the downtown Post Office
to pick up the owner’s mail. Always interested in politics and current events, he loitered
around the Post Office’s garbage can and read the newspapers and m agazines that
customers threw away. In the 1930s, Reed, then a teenager, became fascinated with
Huey Long and established the city’s only black Share-Our-Wealth club. For his
interest in politics, African Americans chastised him and told him that he should keep
his nose out o f white people’s business. Before the war, Reed decided to register to vote
and encountered no resistance when he asked to sign up. He simply filled out the forms,
and Registrar o f Voters Jodie Smith declared him a registered Republican. Smith
offered Reed no choice of party affiliation. Dupuy Anderson experienced similar
treatment. When he reached the age o f majority in 1939, he also decided to register to
vote. After meeting all requirements, he wrote on his application that he wanted to be a
52
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member of the Democratic Party. “They immediately stamped Republican [on my
form],” he recalled. Both men became enfranchised before the 1944 Supreme Court
decision in Smith v. Allwright, which declared Texas’s white primary unconstitutional.
Since the Democratic Party dominated politics in the South, the outcome o f the primary
election, in which Republicans could not vote, determined which candidate won the
office. Republicans in Louisiana and in Baton Rouge rarely ran a candidate o f their own
in the general election. Since black Republicans could only vote in presidential
elections, a few African-American Republicans posed no threat to the white-dominated
Democratic party and its domination over the city’s politics.26
Even after the April 1944 Supreme Court ruling in Smith, East Baton Rouge
Parish Registrar of Voters Jodie Smith ignored the ruling and refused to allow African
Americans to register as Democrats. Until someone complained or threatened to sue,
Smith and other white leaders in Baton Rouge saw no reason to change their policy.
The chairman of the Louisiana Democratic Committee, Fred Odom, spoke for white
Baton Rouge when he noted that a ruling against Texas’s white Democratic primary did
not affect the Louisiana primary system. “Even if it does apply,” he added, “I doubt that

26Howard, “Voting Behavior,” The Proceedings o f the Louisiana Academy o f
Sciences, XV (August 5, 1952): 88; Reed, interview, June 24, 1998; Anderson,
interview Maxine Crump, December 8,1993,3; Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 103;
Jack Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts: How a Dedicated Band o f Lawyers Fought
fo r the Civil Rights Revolution (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 108-109; Lawson,
Runningfo r Freedom, 13-15.
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it will change the set up in Louisiana until, or unless, the colored Democrats are invited
to participate in party primaries by white Democrats.”27
In 1942, the Baton Rouge chapter o f the NAACP, at the time dominated by
racial diplomats, established a registration committee, but instead o f encouraging
African Americans to become voters, its members wanted to call the attention o f their
“liberal-minded white friends” to the problem o f black disenfranchisement. This
strategy added few names to the rolls. Before the end o f the war, a few activists, led by
Gardner Taylor, tried to increase black registration, but they received little support from
the racial diplomats. Taylor and his supporters decided that stressing the importance of
registration to members o f their communities, establishing a voter education program,
and filing suit would be the only ways to insure black enfranchisement. The same group
met a month later to raise money to fund a voter registration suit Very little came of
their meetings. The activists, whose numbers were small, failed to gamer enough
support in their communities for their voter education program or their suit.28
World War II veterans returned home determined to register to vote and to
convince others to do the same. They believed that the only way to secure and protect
their civil rights was through the ballot. Although many African Americans remained

27“Southemers Consider Plan to Offset Ruling Allowing Negro Voting,” StateTimes, April 4,1944, 5A.
28Baton Rouge Branch News Bulletin, April 20,1942, Branch Files, National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People Papers, Group II, box C69, folder
1, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited as NAACP Papers); “Leaders
Discuss Right to Vote,” Louisiana Weekly, December 11, 1943,2; “Second Statewide
Ballot Conference Endorses $ 10,000 Vote Campaign Fund,” Louisiana Weekly, January
15, 1944,1.
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loyal to the Republican Party, most World War IT activists wanted to register as
Democrats. Many blacks idealized Franklin D. Roosevelt and believed that his New
Deal policies improved conditions for them during the Depression. Because the party
dominated city and state politics, they knew that registering as Republicans would
accomplish little. Voting in Democratic primaries would give them a voice in the
electoral process and allow them some power over office holders.29
Although they could tolerate a few black Republicans, white leaders did not
want large numbers of African Americans voting, so they made the registration process
difficult and demeaning for black Baton Rougeans. Yet, unlike their counterparts in
Mississippi, whites in Baton Rouge never used violence or threats o f violence to
prevent black enfranchisement. To register, African Americans had to take time off
work, go downtown, and stand in line. Most blacks worked for white employers and
would have to explain why they needed time off. At best, they would lose a few hours
pay; at worse, they would lose their jobs for wanting to register to vote. To keep their
employers from knowing what they were doing, some African Americans would slip
away from work without telling anyone where they were going. Even if willing to brave
the wrath o f their employers, blacks still had no guarantee of becoming a registered
voter. Those who made it to the courthouse faced a difficult and degrading registration
process. The registrar o f voters required that applicants calculate their ages in days.

29David Goldfield, Black, White, and Southern: Race Relations and Southern
Culture, 1940 to the Present (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990),
27-45; Patricia Sullivan, “Southern Reformers, the New Deal, and the Movement’s
Foundation,” in New Directions in Civil Rights Studies, Armstead Robinson and
Patricia Sullivan, eds. (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1991), 82-87.
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This requirement prevented many who wanted to vote from even attempting to register.
If an applicant passed this math portion o f the test, filling out the registration form
provided the next obstacle. The registrar searched for any error on the form, and if he
found one, even a minor one, he denied the application. If that happened, the rejected
petitioner could not reapply for thirty days. The applications o f African Americans who
wanted to join the Democratic Party received the most scrutiny. The registrar rejected
most of their forms by declaring that the applicants spelled the name o f the party
incorrectly. If an African American indicated that he wanted to register as a
“Democrat,” the registrar would tell him that the proper spelling was “Democratic.” If
he indicated that he wanted to be a member o f the “Democratic” Party, the registrar
would deny his application saying that “Democraf’was the name of the party. Usually,
if an African American wanted to join the Republican Party, Smith simply added his or
her name to the rolls.30
To counter these obstacles, in 1945, World War II activists quietly set up voter
registration schools throughout the parish. Johnnie Jones opened one in the North Baton
Rouge community of Scotlandville. Dupuy Anderson and Raymond Scott set one up in
South Baton Rouge, and Willis Reed created one in the city’s First Ward. To encourage
African Americans to attend the schools, the NAACP formed a speakers bureau to
travel from church to church announcing times and locations of registration classes.
Although they acted independently from one another, these schools shared many
30Lawson, Runningfo r Freedom, 21; Payne, I ’ve Got that Light o f Freedom, 2328,47-55; Corinne Maybuce, interview by Jacqueline Holmes, tape recording,
December 31, 1982, YWCA Oral History Series, Centroplex Branch, East Baton Rouge
Parish Library, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Jones, interview, December 4,1993,22-23.
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common characteristics. Volunteers, most o f them women, ran these schools and taught
their students how to calculate their ages in days and showed them how to properly fill
out a registration form. The “teachers” worked with potential voters until they
memorized the answers to all of the questions. Registrar Smith would not allow African
Americans to bring in slips of paper with this information written on them. To insure
that their students actually went down to the courthouse to register, Jones or one of the
other activists gave them free rides downtown or put them on buses and paid their
fares.31
Even though all of the new applicants could properly fill out the forms, Jodie
Smith continued to reject their applications because of “mistakes” on their registration
forms. Jones knew this would happen and sent several groups o f applicants to the
courthouse before he attempted to register because he wanted to challenge Smith on his
refusal to allow African Americans to register as Democrats. Knowing that Smith
rejected applicants for “misspelling” the party’s name, Jones decided to abbreviate it.
Smith declared that Jones failed because he did not to spelled the word and informed
him that he could not attempt to register again for thirty days. Jones ignored this order
and returned the next day. “I was looking for trouble,” he recalled. He got none. While
Smith wanted to intimidate African Americans to keep them from registering as
Democrats, he did not want a direct confrontation with black applicants. He and other
white leaders feared that if such a confrontation occurred that the city’s peaceful race

3lMrs. D. J. Dupuy to Lucille Baker, April 14,1945, NAACP Papers, Group n,
box C69, folder 1; Jones, interview, December 4,1993,23; Anderson, interview by
Maxine Crump, December 15, 1993,46-48.
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relations might be disrupted and thereby tarnish Baton Rouge’s image of being a stable
and progressive community.32
In the late 1940s, Smith began allowing greater numbers of African Americans
to register as Democrats. Although the reasons for his change in attitude remain
unclear, in all probability, white leaders trusted in their relationships with racial
diplomats and believed that they could control their ballots and, through the diplomats,
the ballots o f the black community. White leaders also knew that Smith could easily
limit the number o f African Americans registered. By 1952, nearly 6,000 blacks could
vote in East Baton Rouge Parish, with most of them registering between 1948 and 1952.
Although the number of registered blacks increased by over 5000 percent from 1940 to
1952, only 10 percent of the city’s 60,000 plus African-American population could
vote. World War II activists continued to encourage black Baton Rougeans to register,
but the number o f applicants declined rapidly in the early 1950s. Clay Williams, the
assistant secretary o f the NAACP and member o f the East End Civic Club, which
worked for increased voter registration, lamented that African Americans simply were
not interested in voting. Willis Reed believed that blacks refusal to register grew out of
psychological impact of segregation. African Americans in Baton Rouge were
convinced that politics rested in the white domain and that they had no right to take part
in the process.33

32Jones, interview, December 4, 1993,23-26.
33Letter from the Executive Board o f the Baton Rouge NAACP to A. P.
Tureaud, December 22,1947, APT; Reed, interview, June 23, 1998; Clay Williams to
Lucille Black, November 29, 1948, NAACP Papers, box C69, folder 2.
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Disappointed that only seventy new black names had been added to the rolls
between January and June 1952, the city’s activist African-American newspaper, the
Weekly Leader, launched a voter registration campaign for the July 1952 city-parish
elections. The paper stressed that the laws passed by the city-parish council and rulings
by the School Board affected all citizens, including African Americans, and claimed
that by voting they would have a voice in city-parish government. The paper even
attempted to comfort its readers and informed them that the registration process was
easy and that “the people in the [registrar’s] office are very congenial and cordial.”
Several civic groups accepted the Weekly Leader’s challenge and began urging African
Americans to register. The Baton Rouge Women’s Civic and Political Organization sent
15,000 letters to black women throughout the parish urging them to register and set up a
voter education program to teach others how to fill out the form. The Weekly Leader
even held a voter registration rally but reported sadly that attendance was sparse. In the
end, the Weekly’s voter registration campaign added only a few name to the rolls.34
Despite the disappointing registration drives, the 1952 city-parish election
marked the entrance o f African Americans into the political arena and revealed the
strength and solidarity o f the black vote. In that election, two African Americans
announced their candidacies for the School Board. Although one immediately dropped
out of the race, the other, Carrie Taylor— a native Baton Rougean, owner o f Carrie’s
34Howard, “Voting Behavior,” 88; Perry Howard, Political Tendencies in
Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971), 286; “Delirium,”
Weekly Leader, June 5, 1952,4; "WPCO Registration School is Set for Friday
Evening,” Weekly Leader, June 14, 1952, 1; “A Last Moment Plea,” Weekly Leader,
June 28, 1952,4; Clay Williams to Lucille Black, November 29,1948, NAACP Papers;
Reed, interview, June 23,1998.
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Beauty School, and member o f the Negro Chamber o f Commerce and the NAACP —
remained in the race and received 1,815 votes in the primary election. Although she did
not make the run-off, she received more votes than two white candidates. Even with her
unprecedented candidacy, the issue of race played no role in either the campaigns or in
the outcome o f the election. Race baiting in Baton Rouge did not begin until after the
Supreme Court’s 1954 Brown v. Board o f Education decision.35
In addition to trying to secure equality through voter registration, World War II
activists also filed suit in federal courts to obtain full citizenship. One o f the first
inequities they attacked was the segregation o f graduate and professional schools at
Louisiana State University. Although battle to desegregate higher education was a
statewide one, the city’s white leadership led the fight against integration, and
desegregation orders had a direct impact on race relations in Baton Rouge.
The first attack against the state’s segregated system of higher education came
in 1943 when the LCTA demanded that the state provide graduate education for black
Louisianians. J. K. Haynes organized a committee on graduate and professional
education, asked racial diplomat and president emeritus of Southern University, J. S.
Clark, to serve as chairman, but named several activists to the committee. The activist
dean of Southern’s College of Education, W. W. Stewart, declared that he was tired of
paying taxes to support a university that African Americans could not attend and
suggested filing a suit to integrate the graduate programs at white Louisiana State
35“T wo Negroes Qualify for Office in City-Parish Race,” Louisiana Weekly,
June 7,1952, 1; “How East Baton Rouge Voted in Yesterday’s Primary,” State-Times,
July 30,1952, 7A; “Jesse Webb, Jr.,” Morning Advocate, July 3,1952, 11A; “Join the
Fight,” Morning Advocate, August 22,1952, 9B.
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University. Stewart’s proposal prompted Clark, who had cultivated a relationship with
the state’s board o f education, to speak out. I f a committee upon which he sat advocated
integrating LSU, Clark warned, white leaders would vent their wrath upon Southern
University and slash its funding-36
After conducting a study, the committee decided not to sue for admission to
LSU but instead to ask the state to pay the tuition of black students who went to
graduate schools in other states, a practice that other southern states also adopted in the
1940s. Josh Gibson, head of the board of education, fearing that African Americans
would attempt to desegregate LSU if other arrangements were not made, approved the
plan and asked the legislature to appropriate $100,000 to pay for the program. The bill
breezed through both houses only to have Governor Jimmie Davis veto it. As a result,
in August 1944, Kermit Parker, an African-American pharmacist from New Orleans,
applied to LSU’s Medical School. The university rejected his application because of his
race. When the legislature met again, a bill funding out-of-state graduate study once
again sailed through and this time, received the governor’s signature. Haynes later
admitted that the decision to request funds for out-of-state graduate study disappointed
him, but he acknowledged its contribution. “Many of our teachers and doctors and
lawyers and others who did their graduate work, did it at the expense o f the state with
out-of-state aid. It might have been a compromise, but at that time, I think it was the
best that we could do.” World War II activists, in an attempt to make the program as

36Haynes, interview by Miranda Kombert.
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costly as possible, immediately began flooding the state with requests for out-of-state
tuition waivers.37
State officials did not allocate funds for out-of-state tuition because they wanted
to provide educational opportunities for African Americans. Rather, their so-called
“generosity” grew out o f the fear that black applicants would take the state to court and
be granted admission to the state’s white colleges and universities. Their fear was not
unfounded. In 1938, the U. S. Supreme Court had ordered the University of Missouri to
admit Lloyd Gaines to its law school because the state failed to furnish a separate but
equal one for African Americans. Louisiana officials also realized that to prevent the
courts from ordering them to admit black students to LSU’s law, medical, and graduate
schools they needed to establish these divisions at Southern, but they decided to wait
until the situation warranted their creation.38
After Parker’s fight to enter the Medical School ended with the rejection o f his
application, the next applicant to LSU, Charles Hatfield, proved more persistent and
forced officials to devise a plan to keep him out of the university. On January 10, 1946,
Hatfield wrote to LSU’s registrar expressing his desire to enroll in the Law School. He
clearly stated that he had received his undergraduate degree from Xavier University in
New Orleans, an all-black private school, and that he wanted to enroll that summer.
Fourteen days later, Law School Dean Paul Hebert informed him, “LSU does not admit

37“Louisiana Board Asks $100,000 for Negro Study,” Louisiana Weekly, May
20, 1944, 1; “State has Authorized S. U. to Set Up Medical School,” Louisiana Weekly,
October 28, 1944,1; Haynes, interview by Miranda Kombert.
38George Lynn Cross, Blacks in White Colleges: Oklahoma’s Landmark Cases
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1975), ix.
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colored students’*but added that the state of Louisiana had recently authorized the
creation o f a law school at Southern. When Hatfield wrote to Southern’s president,
Felton Clark, asking about the new division, Clark replied that his university did not
have a law schooL39
Telling Hatfield to apply to a nonexistent law school was just one of many
delaying tactics university officials used to prevent him from filing a suit. In the
summer of 1946, Hatfield resubmitted his application, this time directly to LSU’s Board
of Supervisors. Realizing that he would not easily give up, a special joint committee of
the Board of Supervisors and the State Board o f Education convened to discuss the
problem of black applicants. The committee agreed that Hatfield met all requirements
for admission, “except for his race,” and that the only way to get around the Gaines
decision would be to create a law school at Southern. Yet until the school opened, the
courts could force LSU to admit Hatfield, so officials devised an ingenious method to
delay the inevitable suit. The university’s attorney, B. B. Taylor, advised Board of
Supervisors President James McLemore and Dean Hebert to make themselves scarce. la
an August 12 letter to McLemore, he wrote, “We might get a little time from these
colored students by telling them that you are out o f the state and will not return for
some weeks.” Hebert and McLemore followed Taylor’s advice. When Hatfield’s
attorney, A. P. Tureaud, wrote to Hebert on August 22 asking for a clarification o f
LSU’s position on the admission o f black students, Taylor replied, five days later,

39Charles Hatfield to Registrar, January 10,1946, APT, box 66, folder 22; Paul
Hebert to Charles Hatfield, January 24,1946, ibid.; Felton Clark to Charles Hatfield,
February 15,1946, ibid.
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saying that both Hebert and McLemore were out o f state but assured him that LSU was
studying the question. On September 5,1946, the joint committee met and voted
unanimously to establish a law school at Southern beginning in the 1947-1948 school

year. Days later, Taylor met with Tureaud and attempted to persuade him “to defer
taking legal action against the University.” He also suggested that Hatfield attend an
out-of-state law school until the one at Southern opened. Far from being dissuaded,
Tureaud informed Taylor that a suit would be filed within days.40
Tureaud faced a dilemma. In July 1946, NAACP Legal Defense Fund Attorney,
Robert Carter warned him, “Hatfield will definitely go to some other law school in
September if we do not file suit.” Yet Tureaud and LDF attorneys delayed for nearly
two months because they could not decide whether to file the suit in state or federal
court. On this issue, Tureaud received conflicting advice. Thurgood Marshall, head of
the LDF team, wanted to follow existing NAACP policy and file in state court while
Robert Carter urged breaking with tradition and going directly to a federal district court.
Following Marshall’s advice, Tureaud chose to file both Hatfield’s suit and one to
desegregate LSU’s Medical School in a state court. In April 1947, a state judge refused
to admit Hatfield and Viola Johnson, the Medical School applicant, saying that the

R e p o rt o f the Meeting of the Representatives of LSU and Representatives of
the State Board o f Education, August 12,1946, Board of Supervisors Records, Record
Group #A0003, drawer 4, box 1, folder 294, University Archives, Louisiana State
University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; B. B. Taylor to McLemore, ibid.; B. B.
Taylor to Tureaud, August 27,1946, APT, box 66, folder 22; A. P. Tureaud to Paul
Hebert, August 22, 1946, ibid.; Minutes of the Meeting o f the Special Committee on
Higher Education for Negroes in Louisiana, September 5,1946, Board of Supervisors
Records, drawer 4, box 1, folder 294; B. B. Taylor to James McLemore, September 18,
1946, ibid.; B. B. Taylor to A. P. Tureaud, September 17,1946, ibid.
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Board of Education had taken steps to open both a law school and a medical school at
Southern. The decision to file in state court puzzled and disappointed some black:
leaders. In a 1995 interview J. K. Haynes said, “Fve never understood why Tureaud
filed it in state court.” Yet, he conceded, “They gave us the Southern University Law
School which was a blessing. When I started out, we had one black lawyer and that was
A. P. Tureaud.”41
In the remaining years o f the 1940s, several other African Americans applied to
LSU only to be turned down. In light of these rejections and countless others in schools
throughout the South, the LDF reevaluated its strategy. After losing case after case in
state courts, its attorneys decided to go directly to the federal courts with their school
desegregation suits. Employing their new strategy, in 1950 LDF lawyers filed suit on
behalf of Hermann Sweatt against the University of Texas’s Law School and in it
attacked the constitutionality of “separate but equal.” They argued that segregation
automatically meant inequality and pointed out the huge disparities between Texas’
black and white institutions of higher education. They also compared the University of
Texas’ Law School with the state’s black law school and showed that tangible
inequalities existed, such as the lack of a law library and a faculty at the black school.
On June 5,1950, the United States Supreme Court found the separate law school
inferior and ordered the University of Texas to admit Sweatt42

“‘Robert Carter to A. P. Tureaud, July 10,1946, APT, box 66, folder 22; Robert
Carter to A. P. Tureaud, September 4,1946, ibid.; Haynes, interview by Miranda
Kombert.
42Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts, 65 -78.
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Heartened by the Sweatt decision, African Americans in Baton Rouge and in
Louisiana once again prepared to attack segregation at LSU. With the support of the
Louisiana Education Association (LEA), formerly the LCTA, a group of black
applicants from Baton Rouge decided to march to the campus and to fill out
applications for various graduate and undergraduate programs. Yet once again black
leaders were divided. After hearing about the proposed march, Tureaud attempted to
dissuade the organizers from holding it Previously the NAACP’s lawyers conference
had agreed to conduct a fight against school segregation at all levels, but had decided
not to begin filing suits until the national office had drafted and approved a plan o f
I

action. Refusing to wait for permission to proceed, on July 6, nine African Americans,
six of whom were veterans, marched to LSU to apply for admission.43
LSU’s president, Harold Stoke, a northerner, immediately contacted the
university’s attorneys for advice. They told him to allow the men to submit their
applications and to turn them over to the Board of Supervisors for review. When Stoke
gave them to the board, he noted that all nine men met “formal requirements for
admission.” He added that before the recent Supreme Court decision, the university
could have simply turned them down, but the Sweatt ruling raised “serious questions as
to the validity of the University’s basis for the rejection of these applicants.” Refusing
to admit African Americans before directly ordered to by the courts, the board ignored
his advice.44
43A. P. Tureaud to J. B. Moore, June 29, 1950, APT, box 70, folder 1.
44Administrative Council Meeting, July 11,1950, Office of the President
Records, Record Group #A0001, drawer 6, box 2, folder 1127, University Archives,
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At this point, NAACP attorneys sprang into action. Thurgood Marshall urged A.
P. Tureaud “to push all o f these cases as hard as possible.” Within days, Tureaud wrote
J. K. Haynes, whose organization funded the LSU desegregation suit, and asked him to
get the applicants together. African-American leaders decided not to pursue all o f these
cases but rather chose to focus all resources and attention on desegregating the Law
School. This decision brought with it a dilemma— whom to select as the plaintiff. The
choice came down to two, brothers, Roy and Henry Wilson from Ruston, Louisiana.
Haynes wanted Henry to be the plaintiff. Although he had not graduated from college,
Henry had completed one year of law school in Texas and met the necessary
requirements for enrollment at LSU. Haynes stated that something about Roy made him
feel uneasy, but Tureaud and LDF lawyers believed Roy’s chances for admission were
better than Henry’s because he had a college degree. In a rush to file a class action suit
before the semester began, they did not investigate Roy Wilson’s past.45
At Wilson’s hearing, NAACP attorneys called several witnesses, including the
presidents and the Law School deans of both Southern and LSU. Their testimony
showed that the quality of LSU’s Law School facilities, library, and faculty far
exceeded those at Southern, which had been established only three years before. While
LSU could not deny the disparity that existed between the two schools, its attorneys

Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Harold Stoke to LSU
Board of Supervisors, July 18,1950, Board of Supervisors Records, drawer 9, box 1,
folder 698.
4SThurgood Marshall to A. P. Tureaud, July 12, 1950, APT, box 73, folder 1; A.
P. Tureaud to U. Simpson Tate, July 31, 1950, ibid.; J. K. Haynes to A. P. Tureaud,
September 9, 1950, APT, box 73, folder 2; A. P. Tureaud to Thurgood Marshall,
September 11,1950, ibid.
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attacked the suit itself, claiming it did not meet the criteria for a class action suit. Its
attorney, Lawrence Brooks, claimed that “the numbers o f Negro citizens in Louisiana
seeking admittance to LSU are not numerous.” Of course, the university’s refusal to
even consider black applicants probably helped to keep that number down. The court
denied Brooks’ request and ordered the University to admit Wilson immediately. It
ruled that “the Law School at Southern University does not afford the plaintiff
educational advantages equal or substantially equal to those that he would receive if
admitted to the Department of Law of the Louisiana State University. — ” With the
semester already underway, Wilson, accompanied by J. K. Haynes, enrolled at LSU in
late October 1950 and began taking classes.46
Although the officials complied with the ruling and admitted Wilson, they
immediately appealed the judges’ decision and began investigating Wilson’s past
Within days, Hebert’s successor, Law School Dean Henry McMahon, phoned Tureaud
and began asking questions about Wilson’s character. In a letter to Thurgood Marshall,
Tureaud said that Wilson had recently told him that he and his wife were separated, but
Tureaud added that he did not think this would be serious enough to keep Wilson out of
LSU. Unbeknownst to Tureaud, problems with Wilson’s character went far beyond his
separation. In a matter of weeks, school officials learned about Wilson’s long history of
violent behavior. Grambling University had suspended him for six months for fighting.
He briefly attended Southern and left after an altercation with his roommate. He lost

46“Asks Admission Suit Dismissal,” State-Times, September 29, 1950,1; Wilson
v. Board o f Supervisors, October 7, 1950, Board of Supervisors Records, drawer 4, box
2, folder 299.
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three defense jobs for disputes with other workers, received a dishonorable discharge
from the army, and was arrested and jailed for perjury in connection with his divorce.
O f course none of this information appeared on his application to LSU, and neither
Haynes nor Tureaud knew about Wilson’s previous problems. But Wilson’s past gave
LSU, which required its students to have good character, legitimate grounds to expel
him.47
Wilson’s expulsion threw Tureaud and LDF attorneys into a tailspin. Thurgood
Marshall told Tureaud, “There is no doubt in my mind that Wilson will be bounced out
with as much ceremony and with much publicity and we will get bad press on it.” He
went on to say that the case took precedence and that they should immediately
substitute another plaintiff. He also advised Tureaud not to defend Wilson and added,
“If we had known of his past background and his character, we would not have
represented him in the first place.” He also urged Tureaud to make this clear to LSU, its
attorneys, and the judges and advised him to make careful background checks of future
plaintiffs. In the end, Wilson’s expulsion did not destroy the case. Tureaud found a new
plaintiff, Robert Collins, and the next year, he and another student, Ernest N. Morial,
began their studies and eventually graduated from the LSU.48

47A. P. Tureaud to Thurgood Marshall, November 8, 1950, APT, box 73, folder
2; Deposition of Roy Wilson, January 3,1951, Board o f Supervisors Records, drawer 4,
box 1, folder 299,4 - 38; A. P. Tureaud to Thurgood Marshall, January 4, 1951, APT,
box 73, folder 8.
48Thurgood Marshall to A. P. Tureaud, November 15,1950, APT, box 73, folder
2; Thurgood Marshall to A. P. Tureaud, January 10, 1951, ibid.
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With the desegregation of the Law School underway, black leaders turned their
attention to the Graduate School. In June 1951, Lutrill Payne submitted an application
for admission to the master’s program in agriculture. LSU’s new president, General
Troy Middleton, a native Mississippian and a veteran of both world wars, immediately
rejected it. The state, he explained, “maintained LSU for white students.” But the
university could do nothing to keep him out. Lutrill Payne was not another Roy Wilson.
He had an exemplary past and enjoyed the wholehearted support o f the LEA and the
NAACP. In fact, the forty-year-old Payne served on the executive committee o f the
NAACP. Before taking a job as a vocational agricultural instructor who taught farmers
better production methods, he had worked as a teacher and a principal in his home
parish of Natchitoches. His wife of ten years also taught school and served as a
principal. Although accepted by Cornell University, Payne decided to sue for admission
to LSU because he wanted to attend graduate school in Louisiana. On June 13, federal
Judge Herbert Christenberry issued an injunction ordering Payne’s admission. The
following day, he registered for the summer session and moved into a dorm. At the end
of the summer, Payne reported to Tureaud, “I had the most enjoyable summer at LSU. I
am pleased to tell you that everyone at LSU treated me most royal [«c]

You may

be assured that my conduct was, and will be [,] o f such a nature that you will never
regret your effort.”49
49“Negro Seeks to Enter LSU,” State-Times, June 2,1951, 1; ‘Teacher Files Suit
Against LSU,” Louisiana Weekly, June 9,1951, 1; Lutrill Payne to A. P. Tureaud, May
20, 1951, APT, box 69, folder 15; E. A Johnson to Tureaud, May 16,1951, ibid.; “LSU
Graduate School Ordered to Admit Negro Applicant,” Morning Advocate, June 13,
1951,1; “Negro Enters Graduate School,” Daily Reveille, June 14,1951, 1; Lutrill
Payne to A. P. Tureaud, August 21, 1951, APT, box 69, folder 15.
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Although it is doubtful that LSU treated Payne royally, he and the several
hundred graduate students who followed him in the 1950s were not segregated on
campus. They lived in the same dormitories, sat in the same classrooms, and ate in the
same dining halls as white graduate students. For the most part, the university
community did not welcome them. James Reddoch, special assistant to Troy Middleton,
taught one o f the first black graduate students. “I had one o f them in class,” he recalled,
“There were a few students who told me that they wanted a seat where they would be in
front of and not near the black student When he came into class, he chose to sit on the
back row.” The reaction of Reddoch’s students was mild compared to several other
incidents on campus: two cross burnings; one near-riot at a football game; rocks thrown
through the window of a black married couple’s campus apartment; and a shooting that
injured two black graduate students outside of their dormitory. University officials even
apologized for the presence of black graduate and law students. On one occasion Board
o f Supervisors member Stewart Slack stated, “Louisiana State University has repeatedly
made it clear it does not want Negro students___ It admits them under court order.
They attend LSU through no fault of the University.”50
Although they attempted to achieve equality through legal means, World War II
activists also challenged the system of segregation whenever the opportunity arose. In

50James Reddoch, interview by author, tape recording, February 17,1993, T.
Harry Williams Center for Oral History, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley
Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 28 ; Affidavit
of Troy Middleton, Board o f Supervisors et al. v. A. P. Tureaud, 15540, U.S. Fifth
Circuit Court o f Appeals, APT, box 7, folder 19; Vertical File - Segregation - Education
Higher, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State University
Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
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1949, for example, they refused to march in a segregated American Legion parade
being held as part of the organization's state convention. As a black member of the
arrangement’s committee, Willis Reed helped to plan the convention but knew nothing
about the segregated parade. When he learned that white veterans would march in the
front half of the parade and black veterans would bring up the rear, Reed demanded that
the parade be integrated. In a meeting with the commander o f his post, Fred Piper, who
served as a captain in the army and worked as a teacher at McKinley High School, the
two agreed that Reed should continue to oppose the segregated parade. Because he
feared for his job, Piper could not make his views public. Reed worked for the blackowned Keystone Insurance Company and had a degree o f job security. When the white
legionnaires discovered that Reed’s post intended to pull out of the parade if it remained
segregated, they demanded a meeting to discuss the situation. Representatives of the
white Nicholson Post and the Legion’s state officers met in Reed’s office. The whites,
who felt uncomfortable negotiating with the activist Reed, asked that racial diplomat W.
K. Brooks to attend the meeting. Reed refused because he feared that Brooks would
agree that the parade should remain segregated. “Reverend Brooks was well like by
both whites and blacks,” according to Reed, “but mostly by the white people, and they
[the whites] believed Reverend Brooks could persuade us to get back in the parade.” 51
Instead, he called his new pastor, Reverend Theodore Judson Jemison of Mount
Zion Baptist Church. Bom in 1919 in Selma, Alabama, Jemison replaced Gardner
Taylor as the church’s pastor in 1949. The son of D. V. Jemison, president o f the

SIReed, interview, June 23, 1998; Reed, interview by Marc Sternberg.
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National Baptist Convention (NBC), he belonged to one o f the nation’s premier black
Baptist families. Initially, Jemison occupied the middle ground between the racial
diplomats and World War II activists, and until the early 1960s could not decide to
which group he belonged. He supported many o f the goals o f the activists, but his
ambition to succeed his father as president o f the NBC prevented him from offering
them his full support. Jemison realized that the conservative members o f the convention
would never elect a radical as their president. Reed knew very little about the newcomer
Jemison but hoped he would side with him. After tracking Jemison down at a local
prayer meeting, Reed asked him to attend the meeting with the white legionnaires, and
the young pastor agreed. Initially, Reed regretted his decision to invite Jemison because
he seemed to be siding with the whites. He told them, “We’re all in this thing together,
and we’re going to have to try to live together.” Jemison’s comments startled Reed,
who feared Jemison would give in. Instead, Jemison told the white Legionnaires, “If we
went into the foxholes together and we fought battles together, we can march down the
street together.” The whites disagreed and refused to allow the black veterans to march
alongside them; Reed’s post pulled out of the parade.52
While Jemison’s stand on the parade seemed to challenge white authority, it
actually followed the city’s traditional pattern o f race relations. Initially, Jemison used

52Reed, interview by Marc Sternberg; Sternberg, “Perpetuation,
Accommodation, and Confrontation,” 34; Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America
in the King Years, 1954-1963 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), 145,336; T. J.
Jemison, interview by Marc Sternberg, tape recording, March 15, 1995, T. Harry
Williams Center for Oral History Collection, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Collection,
Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Reed by Marc Sternberg;
Reed, interview, June 23, 1998.
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conciliatory language when dealing with the whites at the meeting. He assured them
that he did not want to challenge the system o f segregation. Only when whites refused
to negotiate a compromise on the parade's line-up did he decide that the black
participants should pull out o f the parade. Jemison's stand delighted World War II
activists who believed that he would follow in the footsteps o f his predecessor Gardner
Taylor.
By the end o f the 1940s, the World War H activists had started to challenge the
racial diplomats for the leadership of the black community. They attracted the attention
o f the black masses by denouncing the construction of Brooks Park pool, reviving the
teacher salary equalization suit, establishing voter education programs, and supporting
the NAACP’s efforts to integrate LSU’s Law and Graduate Schools. To preserve their
standing in the black community, the racial diplomats were forced to adopt some o f the
activists’ programs, such as voter registration. The initiatives o f World War II activists
also caused white leaders to agree to some changes in the system o f segregation. To
preserve racial stability, white leaders accepted teacher salary equalization and allowed
increased voter registration. But they refused to make any sweeping changes to the
system of segregation. By employing the tactics o f delay and diplomacy, white leaders
successfully stalled most o f the activists’ initiatives. Surprisingly, segregationists
offered little opposition to these changes in the system of Jim Crow, and white leaders
held out hope that race relations in this booming industrial center would remain
peaceful. They soon discovered that the World War II activists wanted more than token
changes in the system o f segregation and would defy both the racial diplomats and the
white leaders to achieve them.
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Chapter 2
The Bus Boycott, 1953
As the 1940s ended, racial diplomats remained firmly entrenched as leaders of
the black: community, but the status o f World War H activists had risen. Their
commitment to obtaining equality for African Americans had attracted the attention of
the black masses, but their following remained small. Many blacks refused to take part
in the activists’ initiatives, especially voter registration, because they feared white
reprisals. In 1953 when the city-parish council voted to raise fares on the city’s buses, it
unintentionally raised the status o f World War II activists. The fare increase angered
black bus passengers who made up more than 80 percent o f the system’s riders.
Although they paid full fare, the African-American men and women who used public
transportation were forced to sit or stand in the backs o f buses while the front ten seats,
reserved for whites, remained empty. Following the traditional pattern of race relations,
the black passengers asked the racial diplomats to intercede with white officials for
them. After hearing their request, white leaders quickly enacted legislation that ended
reserved seating but preserved segregation on the city’s buses. Both black and white
leaders believed the new ordinance was logical, and neither expected any adverse
reaction to it. Although the new law did not challenge the system o f segregation, it set
off a series o f protests that began in June 1953 with a bus drivers’ strike and ended with
an African-American boycott o f the public transportation system. The boycott, which
initially united Baton Rouge’s black community, shattered the fragile coalition that
existed between racial diplomats and World War H activists and perpetuated the pattern
of protest, compromise, and anger that characterized the city’s civil rights movement.
75
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The fight over reserved seating began quietly on February 11, 1953, when
Reverend T. J. Jemison, who usually tried to be an activist and a racial diplomat
simultaneously, denounced the fare increase at a meeting of the city-parish council and
asked its members “to take some action to have the bus company allow negro [szc]
passengers to occupy seats [usually reserved for whites] on buses where there were no
white passengers.” Although the thirty-two-year-old Jemison was a relative newcomer
to Baton Rouge, his position as pastor of ML Zion Baptist Church, the city’s largest and
most prosperous black church, made white leaders take notice. At its February 25
meeting, the council voted to amend the city’s seating code to allow African Americans
to sit in the front seats of the buses if they did not occupy the same seat as or sit in front
of a white passenger. It abolished reserved seating but required African Americans to
board the buses from back to front and white passengers from front to back. The race
with the majority of riders determined where the line of segregation began. The
proposed ordinance would also allow bus drivers to order black or white riders to sit in
their own sections when seats there became available. The council decided to hold a
public hearing before taking a final vote but did not advertise it in any o f the city’s
newspapers. At the sparsely attended hearing, Jemison spoke again. He told the council
that “the negroes [szc] did not want to raise an issue but that they mainly wanted to
request that when they pay fifteen cents to ride a bus that they be given a seat.” The
council passed the new seating law, Ordinance 222, without a dissenting vote and
ordered it to go into effect on March 19.1
‘Minutes, February 11 ,1953, February 25, 1953, March 11, 1953, all in East
Baton Rouge City-Parish Council Minute Book, Administrative Building, Baton Rouge,
76

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

White office holders agreed to end reserved seating for several reasons. First,
allowing the buses to run with vacant seats was simply uneconomical and impractical.
Buses could carry more passengers on routes running through black neighborhoods if
African Americans could sit in seats previously reserved for white passengers. Second,
the existing relationship between racial diplomats and white leaders contributed to the
enactment of the new law because it allowed white leaders to grant special favors to
their African-American “friends.” Jemison described his relationship with white leaders
and their reaction to the proposed ordinance: “I had developed a fine rapport with
several members of the city council and also the mayor. They were all fair-minded
people. From the city government, from the mayor, from the city council, we had no
opposition. We had no opposition in high places.” The dramatic increase in the number
of black voters from 144 in 1940 to nearly 6,000 in 1952 also gave African-American
leaders enough political clout to influence the city’s political leaders. In fact, black
voters had provided the margin o f victory for Mayor-President Jesse Webb, Jr., in the
1952 election, and although he later denied it, he probably backed Ordinance 222 as a
favor to his black supporters. Finally, the city-parish council believed that since the
ordinance affected very few whites that there would be no outcry against it.
Although those in “high places” did not object to the new law, they did not
enforce it. Nor did racial diplomats, who were satisfied with the concession granted to
them by the white power structure, ask for it to be implemented. For nearly three
months, the front ten bus seats remained reserved for white passengers, even on routes

Louisiana; “Bus Drivers Strike Over Race Issue,” State-Times, June 15, 1953, 6.
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going through black neighborhoods. In early June, World War II activists brought an
end to the apathy o f the white leaders and racial diplomats. Although little is known
about the incident, several World War II activists remember that they demanded action
after a bus driver m anhandled an unknown African-American woman who attempted to
occupy one of the front seats. For them, merely having a law on the books was not
enough. They wanted it enforced. Postal carrier Gus Williams recalled, “the young
military veterans were incensed.” Willis Reed, the president of the First Ward Voters’
League, became the spokesman for the World War II activists. He contacted the
parish’s political boss and the mayor’s father, Jesse Webb, Sr., and asked for a meeting
to discuss the lack of enforcement o f Ordinance 222. Webb, Sr. had served as the
parish’s tax assessor for over a decade and held immense power in the parish. Although
his son occupied the office o f mayor, many believed that he controlled the office.
Although Webb, Sr. agreed to meet with Reed, he made him wait for more than thirty
minutes in an outer office while he laughed and joked with some of his cronies in the
inner one. Webb, Sr. finally called him into the inner office, and he made the chief of
police, Joe Green, listen to Reed’s complaint. The World War n activist told the men
about the problems on the buses and outlined the drivers’ brutal treatment o f black
passengers, especially black women. After listening to his plea, Webb, Sr. turned to the
chief and told him, “Go up to the [bus] bam and tell those boys, the bus drivers, that
they [’re] not [officers]. They don’t have any business arresting nobody on the buses.”
He added that Green’s officers should not arrest anyone unless a fight broke out, and if
that happened, they should bring in both parties, white and black. Reed believed that
Webb, Sr. agreed to enforce the ordinance as repayment for the support the First Ward
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Voters League gave his sou in the previous year’s mayoral election. The bus company
officials heeded Webb, Sr.’s, order because in early June, H. Flynn Cauthem, its
manager, issued a directive requiring the drivers to comply with Ordinance 222.z
Racial diplomats immediately told the black community about Reed’s
successful meeting with Webb and the bus company’s directive. They even printed a
flier describing the ordinance and advising black passengers not to give up their seats
when ordered to by the drivers. If the police tried to intervene or arrest them, the flier
told them, “Do not resist arrest. . . take the officer’s badge number so it can be reported
to the proper authorities.” Jemison decided to test the bus company’s directive himself.
‘To show the people,” he recalled, “I immediately went downtown and sat on the front
seat to ride back” to my church. When the driver ordered him to move, Jemison replied,
“If you’re talking to me driver, this seat seems strong enough to hold me, so I’m going
to sit here.” At that point, the driver drove the bus directly to the police station, and an
officer boarded the bus. The policeman told Jemison, “You can do one o f three things.
You can get your money and get off; you can get up and go to the back [with] the rest
of the colored folks; or you can go [to jail].” Jemison refused to do any of the three.
Instead he showed the officer a copy o f the ordinance, and when the policeman said he
had never heard o f it, Jemison replied, “One of the first lessons I learned in civics was

2G us Williams, interview by Betty Morse, tape recording, August 11, 1983, T.
Harry Williams Center for Oral History, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley
Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 30; Reed,
interview by Marc Sternberg.
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that ignorance [of the law] is no excuse.. . . The fact that you don’t know it, doesn’t
mean it’s not a law.” The officer backed down, and Jemison retained his seat.3
Challenges like Jemison’s to their authority angered the drivers. Before the
ordinance, they controlled seating on the buses. When police officers sided with black
passengers, the drivers became incensed. They believed that white leaders had
compromised the principles of white supremacy by enacting Ordinance 222, and they
wanted to reclaim what their leaders had given away. They knew that if they complied
with the law, they would lose one of the things that set them apart from their black
passengers, white superiority. Under the system o f segregation, even the lowest classes
of whites, including the bus drivers, ranked higher in society than the wealthiest, welleducated African Americans. When ordered to comply with Ordinance 222, the drivers
appealed, through their union, to Mayor Jesse Webb, Jr. He claimed that he did not
have a vote on the council and could not repeal the law. The mayor advised them to talk
to the city council. Believing that the ordinance made sense financially and quieted the
World War activists and their supporters who wanted to end segregation on the buses,
the council refused either to rescind or to amend the law.4
For the drivers, the final insult came on June 13 when Jemison intervened in an
argument between a driver and an African-American woman who refused to move to

3Reed, interview by Marc Sternberg; Jemison, interview by Marc Sternberg,
March 15, 1994,2; Jemison, interview by Roderick Jones, Derrek Vaughn and Michelle
Johnson, tape recording, June 15, 1995, Williams Center for Oral History, Louisiana
Lower Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton
Rouge, Louisiana, 6.
4“Bus Drivers Strike Over Race Issues,” State-Times, June 15, 1953, 1.
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the back of the bus. In an. attempt to get her to give up her front seat, the driver
summoned a police officer and demanded that he arrest her. When the policeman tried
to force her to move, Jemison stepped in and told her to remain seated. He assured her
that the police officer and the bus driver were the ones breaking the law, not her. The
officer then attempted to arrest Jemison for interfering, but his desk sergeant, fearing
the reaction of Webb, Sr., ordered him not to detain the young pastor. During the
confrontation, Cauthem arrived. Jemison told him, “If I was manager o f the bus
company, I would suspend him [the driver] or fire him.” Cauthem, knowing that his
driver had indeed violated Ordinance 222, took Jemison’s advice and suspended him /
The drivers viewed the suspension as the ultimate indignity. Siding with a black
man, even a well-educated one who served as pastor o f the city’s largest and most
prosperous African-American church, over a white man was not acceptable under the
Jim Crow system. The drivers took action. In the early hours of June 15, 1953, all
ninety-five of them went on strike to protest the suspension of the driver. “The first and
only issue in the strike is racial segregation,” Roy Finley, secretary-treasurer of the
drivers’ union told a reporter. “The bus drivers o f Baton Rouge are not striking for any
personal gain or benefit but are on strike to protect the white bus riders of Baton Rouge
from being denied transportation in accordance with state law.” The drivers demanded
that the city council reinstate reserved seating for white passengers.6

5Jemison, interview by Marc Sternberg, March 15, 1994,2-3.
Drivers Strike Over Race Issue,” State-Times, June 15, 1953, 1; “City Bus
Strike Will Continue, Talks Planned,” State-Times, June 16,1953, 1.
6“ Bus
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The strike angered white leaders because it left approximately 20,000 Baton
Rougeans, black and white, without any transportation to and from work. Some
employers provided rides for their employees, especially their housekeepers. Other bus
riders took taxis or car pooled, but those without access to alternate transportation
simply missed work. White leaders knew that if the strike continued Baton Rouge’s
economy would suffer. They wanted to get the buses rolling again as quickly as
possible and, at the same time, sought to preserve peaceful race relations. The city
council’s president pro tem, Frank McConnell, told the drivers that the city would not
make any concessions to them because “all o f the pressure we’re getting is from the
strikers

There have been no complaints from the public.” Unlike the drivers, white

leaders did not see the ordinance as a challenge to white supremacy. Rather, they
viewed it as a practical solution to a simple problem. As Dr. James Wood, Jr., a white
liberal who later served as a member of the American Friends Service Committee’s
local advisory board, pointed out in a letter to the editor o f the State-Times, ending
reserved seating provided “maximum utilization of the seats and assure[d] that no
special privileges pertain[ed] to passengers of either race.” Other moderates believed
the strike would damage the city’s progressive image. LSU student Peter Balinas
pronounced Louisiana “a progressive state” and demanded that the bus company fire
the striking drivers unless they complied with the law. White moderates did not
understand the drivers’ anger. Because of their social and economic standing, they
could make concessions to African Americans without threatening the racial balance of
power in their world, but working class whites could not tolerate any challenges to that
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balance. Any chinks in the annor o f white superiority lowered their status and placed
them on the same level as African Americans.7
Because the drivers had questioned the validity o f the ordinance, City-Parish
Attorney Gordon Kean asked the state’s attorney general, Fred LeBlanc, to give his
opinion on its constitutionality. LeBlanc, a Baton Rougean, ruled that it did indeed
violate the state’s segregation laws, which required “separate seats and compartments”
for black and white passengers. His decision convinced the drivers to end their four-day
strike. Speaking through their attorney, Robert Williams, they declared victory. The city
council accepted LeBlanc’s opinion and graciously admitted defeat. Councilwoman
Mildred DuBois conceded, “We are happy to abide by the attorney general’s opinion.
Anytime that we pass an ordinance that is invalid, we are the first to want to make a
correction.” Councilman Jack Christian concurred and promised that the council would
work for “an amicable settlement” that would satisfy all parties. White leaders did not
want to force the issue or draw too much negative publicity, especially from outside the
state because they felt any hint of racial disorder would drive prospective industries
away from Baton Rouge.8
The attorney general’s ruling and the city council’s acceptance of it angered
African Americans. On the night LeBlanc issued his opinion, more than two hundred

Drivers Strike Over Race Issue,” State-Times, June 18, 1953,1;
“Editorial,” State-Times, June 17, 1953,11; “When People Speak,” State-Times, June
19, 1953, 5A; “When People Speak;” State-Times, June 18, 1953,2D.
7“B us

8“Bus Strike Will Continue, Talks Planned,” Morning Advocate, June 19,1953,
8A; “City Bus Strike Slated to End at Dawn Today,” Morning Advocate, June 19, 1953,
L
83

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

people from around the city met and formed the United Defense League (UDL).
Although few o f its members rode the buses, the new organization refused to accept a
return to the degrading system of reserved seating and decided to stage a bus strike of
their own. UDL members knew that for a boycott against the bus system to be
successful they had to have the support of the working-class African Americans who
depended on public transportation to get to and from work. The black working class
occupied a precarious position in Baton Rouge society. Because, for the most part, they
depended on whites for employment and credit, any challenge to the system of
segregation would render them the most vulnerable to white reprisals. According to
Dupuy Anderson, reserved seating, denied working-class blacks “the privilege of riding
that bus comfortably after a hard day’s work, even after coming out of the white
kitchen, tired and sweaty.” The working-class riders wanted to do whatever it took to
obtain seats on the buses. UDL members knew that for the boycott to be successful they
needed to provide an alternate form o f transportation for the black bus riders. During
the meeting, Anderson recalled, a “little woman from Georgia asked to speak. She got
up and gave a very stirring speech.” She said that “she had an old raggedy car, and she
would run it until it couldn’t run anymore.” Accepting her suggestion, the UDL quickly
organized a free ride system for black bus passengers. That evening, they secured more
than one hundred volunteer drivers and cars and arranged with Horatio Thompson, the
black gas station owner, to purchase fuel at wholesale prices for the free ride
automobiles.9
9Anderson, interview by Maxine Crump, December 22,1993, 39; “Negroes
Here Continue Bus Boycott,” Morning Advocate, June 20, 1953,1.
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With the plans for the boycott in place, the UDL faced the problem of getting
word o f the protest out to the African-American community. Early in the evening of
June 19, the organization asked a local radio station, WLCS, to reserve some air time
for a special announcement. Between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m., several UDL members
arrived at the station, and local tailor and World War II veteran, Raymond Scott went
on air and announced that a bus boycott would begin the following morning. He urged
all African Americans to stay off the buses. The Morning Advocate reported that he
“appealed to all Negroes to refuse to ride city buses under the present seating ordinance,
which he described as unfair to Negroes.” Scott then promised free rides for all
boycotting black passengers. Fearing white reprisals, UDL members hastily left the
radio station after Scott’s announcement. “Everybody got into their cars like a bat out o f
hell and went home,” UDL board member Willis Reed recalled. “Well, I didn’t go
[straight] home. I had to go by my sister’s to borrow a shotgun from my brother-in-law.
I had that shotgun right by my bed. Fortunately, nothing happened.” Fear of white
retaliation weighed heavily on the minds of UDL leaders. Advocating a mass protest
abandoned the accepted framework of traditional race relations and opened the racial
diplomats up to the fury of segregationists. UDL attorney Johnnie Jones received death
threats from angry whites and offers of money in exchange for dropping out o f the
boycott. Jemison’s fear o f white retaliation grew so intense that he hired armed guards
to protect him, his family, and his church.10
l0Reed, interview by Marc Sternberg, 7; “City Bus Strike Will Continue, Talks
Planned,” Morning Advocate, June 19, 1953, 1; Jones, interview, October 2,1993,6669; Jemison, interview by Jones, et al., 16-17; Morris, Origins o f the Civil Rights
Movement, 19.
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Despite the threats, both physical and economic, African Americans pulled
together to support the boycott. On June 19,1953, the bus boycott began. That morning,
several African Americans who went to bed before Scott made his announcement rode
the buses, but by that afternoon, the boycott was 100 percent effective. Rather than
riding the buses, boycotting passengers piled into 115 free ride vehicles. This system
guaranteed the success of the boycott. It provided a steady stream o f vehicles to pick up
and deposit passengers with dispatchers controlling their movement across the city. On
his way to work, postal worker Gus Williams gave rides to people waiting by the side
of the road. “It was a time when you saw the black community pull together like I have
never seen before or since,” he recalled. “Even the thugs on the comer [joined in]. If
they saw a black get on a bus, they would pull him off.”11
The sense of community created by the boycott grew stronger as thousands
attended the nightly meetings sponsored by the UDL and held in various locations, first
in churches and, as the crowds grew larger, in larger venues. Those attending heard
reports on the status of the boycott given by various UDL officers. Each night, Jemison
gave the final impassioned speech, prayed with the crowd, and urged members o f the
black community to donate money to support the fiee rides. Donations totaled at least
$1,000 per meeting and once topped $4,000. Jemison always assured those attending
that the boycott would continue until black passengers could “sit down when we have
paid our fares.” Although he never advocated desegregating the buses, many of those

"Morris, Origins o f the Civil Rights Movement, 19; “Negroes Here Continue
Bus Boycott,” Morning Advocate, June 20, 1953, 1; Williams, interview by Betty
Morse, 30-31.
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attending the meetings nevertheless believed that integration was the ultimate goal of
the boycott, and they wanted to continue their protest until they attained i t 11
The solidarity of the UDL began to crumble even before the boycott ended.
Racial diplomats never intended to push for the integration o f the buses, while World
War II activists and many bus passengers wanted to end the practice of segregated
seating. “It was not necessarily a federal crime for buses to be segregated.” Jemison
later recalled. “I didn’t want to forget my original purpose, to get seats and not
necessarily end segregation.” He even suggested that the city council create a separate
bus company for African Americans or charge black passengers who stood a reduced
fare. When the boycott began, the racial diplomats, along with Jemison, initiated talks
with members o f the city council and representatives of the bus company to work out an
end to the boycott Moderation characterized the boycott and the talks that ended it.
Racial diplomats wanted the boycott to be peaceful and did not want to alienate white
leaders. They therefore urged the African Americans to conduct themselves with pride
and dignity and enforced their vision o f proper behavior by creating their own “police
force” to patrol black neighborhoods. The racial diplomats also asked owners of the
city’s black saloons to close every evening at six p.m., and “ ‘the drunks and winos of
the black community were not allowed to do their customary drinking in the streets’ ”
because black leaders feared that drunk boycotters might cause trouble and make white
leaders pull out of compromise talks. The bar owners willingly complied. At one mass
l2“Over $ 1,000 Is Contributed to Boycott Fund,” Morning Advocate, June 22,
1953, 1; “BR Negroes May Petition for Separate Bus System,” Morning Advocate, June
21, 1953, 8A; “New Ordinance on Bus Seating is Kept Secret,” Morning Advocate,
June 23, 1953, 6A.
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meeting, Jemison told the free ride volunteers, “We can’t have liquor on your breath. If
you do, you’ll have trouble, not with the police but with me!” He also warned African
Americans not to make spectacles o f themselves but to behave “as gentlemen and
ladies.” He promised these well-behaved ladies and gentlemen that “through trade
schools, through colleges, through skilled hands, the Negro is arriving!” Wanting to
remain on good terms with white leaders and ease their fears about the ultimate goals of
the African-American protesters, Jemison declared, “We’re not worried about social
equality; first live with people and social equality will take care o f itself.” World War II
activists disagreed with Jemison and the racial diplomats. They knew that social
equality would not just happen. They wanted to enjoy the benefits of American
citizenship and were prepared to defy both the racial diplomats and the white leaders to
achieve that goal. These activists saw ending segregation on the buses as a step toward
achieving first class citizenship and took part in the boycott with that goal in mind.13
O f course, white leaders never intended to establish integrated seating on the
buses. But they did want to bring a quick end to the boycott, so they met with the racial
diplomats in secret to hammer out an acceptable compromise. After several days of
meetings, the two groups of leaders reached an agreement that preserved the spirit of
Ordinance 222 by requiring African Americans to load the buses from back to front and
whites from front to back but prohibiting blacks from sitting with or in front of white
passengers. In a nod to the bus drivers, they agreed to reserve the front two seats for
I3Jemison, interview by Marc Sternberg, October 24,1994, 16; “Baton Rouge
Negroes May Petition for a Separate Bus System,” Morning Advocate, June 21, 1953,1;
Morris, Origins o f the Civil Rights Movement, 19; “New Ordinance on Bus Seating is
Kept Secret,” Morning Advocate, June 23, 1953, 6A.
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white passengers and the long back seat for African Americans. This agreement also
gave the bus drivers the power to order passengers to give up their seats, and if the rider
refused, he or she faced criminal charges and could be sentenced to jail for up to sixty
days. Fearing both the white and the African-American response to the compromise, the
leaders decided to keep their deal a secret until members of the city council could
outline it on the city’s radio stations. The announcement went out over the airwaves
while several thousand African Americans were gathered at Memorial Stadium for a
mass meeting. Jemison broke the news o f the compromise to them.14
Before telling the black community about the deal, Jemison brought it before the
UDL executive board to obtain its approval. The Morning Advocate reported that the
board, “under strong protest,” voted five to three to accept the compromise only if the
UDL sued the city and the bus company over reserved seating. Although the paper did
not list the board members, World War II activists, Dupuy Anderson, Raymond Scott,
and Willis Reed, probably cast the dissenting votes. Jemison received a similar
reception when he announced the terms of the compromise to the black community at a
mass meeting. Some accepted it and viewed it as improving conditions on the buses and
guaranteeing seats for African Americans. The fact that the compromise reserved the
two front seats for whites and prohibited them from sitting in rows in front o f or in seats
with white passengers did not bother them. They believed that the compromise marked
a victory for the African-American community. Others responded with anger when
Jemison described the compromise. The Morning Advocate reported that “an echoing
14“Bus Fight Settlement is Possible,” Morning Advocate, June 24, 1953, I; “Bus
Case to be Aired on Radio,” State-Times, June 23, 1953, I.
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oration of voices shouting ‘Stay off! Stay off!’ rose up from the Memorial Stadium,”
and that others shouted, “Walk! Walk!” Jemison told the crowd that he would not force
anyone to ride the buses but declared the boycott over and disbanded the free ride
system. He also ordered African Americans not to attend the next day’s city council
meeting at which the compromise ordinance would be voted on to “avoid friction or
incidents which might introduce violence into the touchy dispute.”13
The sudden compromise took many by surprise. Dupuy Anderson, a UDL
member, heard about it as he ferried boycotters in downtown Baton Rouge. Believing
desegregation to be the goal o f the boycott, the news surprised him. He remembered:
I had been working since early that morning. I had two cars carrying people
backwards and forwards. At twelve noon, I was on the comer of North
Boulevard and Third Street, where the buses usually make [their] exchange.__
We received word that there had been a compromise. I can’t tell you how I felt.
We were totally in disagreement [with it, and we asked,] “Who compromised?”
We knew we had the boycott in control, and we were quite disappointed at the
compromise.16
Similarly, UDL attorney Johnnie Jones read about it in his morning newspaper. Just as
with Anderson, Jemison’s actions angered him. Both men knew that the boycott was
effective and could be sustained indefinitely. Jones recalled:
Jemison. . . went down and entered into a compromise with the mayor and the
city council [agreeing] that they wouldn’t desegregate the buses. They were
operating within the framework o f the law, separate but equal. Jemison thought
that was right because that was the law. I said, “ No. That’s still not the law.”
Now, I am his lawyer, and we’re all [in this] together, and there wasn’t any
animosity between us. It was ju st that I didn’t agree. And I couldn’t come to

15“Bus Fight Settlement is Possible,” Morning Advocate, June 24, 1953,1;
“Negroes End Bus Boycott,” Morning Advocate, June 26, 1953, 1.
I6Anderson, interview by Maxine Crump, January 5,1994,11.
90

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

that. I wasn’t going to come to that because, to me, separate but equal was
wrong.17
Wanting to express their displeasure about the continued segregation o f the city’s buses,
Jones and his law partner Bruce Bell decided to disobey Jemison’s directive and attend
the city council meeting.
When they arrived at the meeting, they attempted to write their names on the
speakers’ list, but white officials refused to allow them to do so. The two men decided
to speak anyway and muscled their way to the podium. When the cotmcihnen saw them,
Jones remembered, “Somebody said, ‘They’re out of order. They’ve got no business
here. They’re not supposed to be here. Arrest them!’ ” The call for their arrest galled
Jones. He thought, “This is a public meeting, and we don’t have no business there?”
The police went after the two men. Jones, a short, wiry man, managed to escape by
weaving through the crowd, but the police detained Bell.
Fear o f violence permeated the city council meeting. On the night of the
compromise vote, three hundred whites, including many segregationists, gathered to
watch the proceedings. Sheriff Bryan Clemmons and Police Chief Joe Green dispatched
seventy armed deputies and officers to the Municipal Building to keep the peace. The
show of force proved unnecessary. The council quickly approved the compromise,
Ordinance 251, and turned to other business. For the most part, the white community,
including segregationists, accepted the compromise. The new law, despite a concession
to African Americans, still preserved Jim Crow seating on the buses and allowed the
drivers to control where black passengers sat. But the compromise marked the last tim e
17Jones, interview, October 2, 1993,66
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segregationists quietly accepted a change in the city’s Jim Crow laws. In the years
following the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board o f Education, they
adopted a hard line and refused to grant any concessions to African Americans.18
The boycott had crippled the Baton Rouge Bus Company, and the compromise
did not alleviate the situation. Large numbers of working-class blacks refused to return
to the buses. Rather than face the indignity of continued segregation, they made other
arrangements to get to and from their jobs. Those who could car pooled, others walked,
some obtained rides from their neighbors or employers, and a few purchased their own
automobiles, hi the days following the boycott, a bus company official lamented, “It’s
very slow___ We haven’t retrieved half of our old customers. Nearly empty buses still
operate.” For the next decade, ridership remained low, forcing the company to increase
fares and abolish some routes. Even the riders who returned showed their displeasure
with the compromise. In October 1953, a forty-one-year-old black man, Joe Howard,
boarded a city bus, sat next to a white man on one of the two front seats reserved for
white passengers, and refused to move to the back of the bus when ordered to by the
bus driver. A policeman arrested him, and City Judge Cecil Bankston fined him twenty
dollars or ten days in jail for violating the bus ordinance.19

l8Ibid., 64-66; “City Council Passes New Bus Ordinance,” Morning Advocate,
June 25, 1953, 1; “Council Enacts Emergency Ordinance,” State-Times, June 25,1953,
1.
I9“B us Boycott is Lifted, Traffic is Subnormal,” State-Times, June 26, 1953, 1;

“Bus Business is O ff as Negroes Resume Riding,” Morning Advocate, June 27, 1953,1;
“Negro Sentenced for Bus Violation,” State-Times, October 16, 1953, 3B.
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True to the agreement that they made on June 23, the UDL board members sued
the city and the bus company for continuing the practice o f reserved seating, but instead
o f pursuing the goals o f the racial diplomats, the UDL’s attorneys, Jones and Bruce
Bell, filed a suit that challenged not reserved seats but segregated city buses. They
claimed that the separation of races on the buses violated the United States Constitution
and the United Nations’ Charter. The men also charged the attorney general with
exceeding his powers and the city council with illegally enacting Ordinance 251 by not
reading it publicly at two consecutive meetings before voting on it. Because they defied
the racial diplomats and attacked segregated seating, Jones and Bell were punished.
When the racial diplomats discovered the content of the suit, they accused die two men
of being insubordinate. Jemison told Jones that he was supposed to follow his
leadership without asking questions. Angered, Jones told Jemison, “You are wasting
your time telling me what not to do

I know that this is wrong.” Under the

Fourteenth Amendment, “you can’t have separate but equal,” he added. John G. Lewis,
grandmaster of the Prince Hall Masons and a powerful racial diplomat, also scolded the
men for their defiance. He upbraided the young lawyers for not listening to the advice
of the community’s traditional leaders and for being too radical. Because Jones and Bell
>

refused to back down, Lewis ordered their senior partner, Leonard Avery, to evict them
from his office, which was located in the Masonic Temple Building. Avery complied.
The racial diplomats also removed the men from the boycott case and turned it over to
Avery and another black attorney, Alex Pitcher, who consulted with the NAACP’s
attorney, for Louisiana, A. P. Tureaud, Sr. In September 1953, State District Judge
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Charles Holcombe dismissed the bus seating case, and Jemison and the other racial
diplomats listed as plaintiffs refused to appeal.20
Following the Supreme Court’s 1956 ruling in the Montgomery bus boycott
case, Cauthem assured white Baton Rougeans that segregation would prevail on the
city’s buses, and Mayor Jesse Webb, Jr. vowed to the public that the Supreme Court’s
ruling did not apply to Baton Rouge. Webb died in a plane crash a few days later.
Because of intense segregationist sentiment in Baton Rouge, his successor, Jack
Christian, refused to make any changes to the bus seating ordinance without a court
order. In a speech before the recently-formed local chapter of the Citizens’ Council, he
even declared that most African Americans in Baton Rouge did not want bus
integration and claimed that those who did made up a small minority o f the population.
Most blacks, he explained, “would not desire to have a change in their way o f living
here.” He even boasted o f the city’s good race relations and attributed it to the make-up
o f the black community. “A majority of Baton Rouge Negroes are older, Southern [sic]
Negroes,” he explained. To a point, Christian’s description was correct. Most o f the
African Americans with whom he and other white leaders dealt did indeed belong to the
traditional group o f black leaders, but by 1957, the power o f racial diplomats was
beginning to decline while the influence of the activists was on the rise.21

20 Jones, interview, October 2, 1993, 68-69, 59-61; Alex Pitcher to A. P.
Tureaud, July 8,1953, APT, box 10, folder 23; “Rule on Phase of Transit Suit,”5'mreTimes, September 22, 1953, 1.
2I“Halt Intrastate Bias, City Not Affected,” News Leader, 28 April 1956, 1;
“Council Appoints Liaison Group on Bus Question,” Morning Advocate, January 3,
1957, 1; “Says Small Group of Negroes Push Bus Integration,” Morning Advocate,
February 27,1957,9A.
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Racial diplomats recognized the increasing popularity o f World War H activists
and feared that they would become leaders of the black community and convince the
black masses to take action against segregation on the buses, thus undercutting the
diplomat’s own leadership within the community. Jemison and several other racial
diplomats quickly retained an attorney, Alex Pitcher. They sued Christian, the city, and
the bus company and demanded an end to the segregation o f public transportation.
Their suit meandered its way through the court system and withstood constant attacks
from the city’s attorneys. Only in 1962 did a federal court finally overturn Ordinance
251 and end segregated seating on the city’s buses.22
The specter of the successful Montgomery bus boycott and Martin Luther King,
Jr. weighed heavily on the minds o f African Americans in Baton Rouge. Realizing that
their boycott could have brought an end to segregated seating on buses throughout the
South if their leaders had not reached a compromise with white leaders, black Baton
Rougeans, in the decades after the more famous boycott, attempted to intertwine their
boycott with Montgomery’s to enhance their role in the civil rights movement. Jemison
equated his decision to sit in the front seat of a bus with Rosa Parks’ actions. He even
called himself the father of the bus boycott, with Parks as the mother. The fact that the
compromise he reached with white leaders helped to preserve segregation on the city’s

“ “Negroes Take BR Bus Seating Fight to Courts,” Morning Advocate, February
5, 1957, I; “City is Seeking Bus Segregation Suit’s Dismissal,” Morning Advocate,
March 30, 1957, 1; “Baton Rouge Bus Segregation Case is Continued,” Morning
Advocate, March 28,1958,7C; T. J. Jemison to A. P. Tureaud, February 28, 1960,
APT, box 31, folder 2; “Bus Integration Suit Comes Up Here on Monday,” Morning
Advocate, October 13, 1960,1; “Bus Segregation Law Overturned,” Morning Advocate,
April 26, 1962,1.
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buses for nearly a decade after the boycott did not, in his mind, diminish the importance
of his role in the movement. Black Baton Rougeans also claimed that they played a
large role in the planning of the Montgomery boycott. In a 1996 Advocate article,
Jemison, Jones, and Anderson recalled a visit King paid to Baton Rouge before the
Montgomery boycott even began. All three remembered meeting with King to discuss
strategy for his city’s impending protest. Jones even described the Plymouth King drove
and the hat he wore. “It was just the three of us, Reverend Jemison, King, and I,” Jones
recalled, “We talked about how to organize a boycott. It was before [Rosa] Parks sat.”
In his book, Stride Toward Freedom, King did acknowledge the help he received from
Jemison in setting up his community’s free ride system. According to King, he and
Jemison exchanged ideas in a long distance phone call; King admitted that Jemison’s
“painstaking description of the Baton Rouge experience was invaluable.” King could
not have visited Baton Rouge before the Montgomery bus boycott began because the
civil rights leader played no part in the early stages o f that protest. In fact, black leaders
drafted him to head the Montgomery Improvement Association (MIA) after Rosa
Parks’ arrest. He could not possibly have been in Baton Rouge before the Montgomery
protest began, but by rearranging the chronology o f King’s involvement in the boycott,
African Americans in Baton Rouge carved a place for themselves in the civil rights
movement and connected their boycott to the more successful one in Montgomery.23

“ “King’s Legacy,” Advocate, January 15,1996,1; Jemison, interview by Marc
Sternberg, March 14, 1994,9; Jones, interview, November 13, 1993,2; Martin Luther
King, Jr., Stride Toward Freedom: The Montgomery Story (New York: Harper, 1958)
75; Branch, Parting the Waters, 136; Morris, Origins o f the Civil Rights Movement, 51.
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While African Americans created a legend out o f the Baton Rouge boycott,
whites barely remembered it and took no pride in the event. Lasting only a week and
ending in a peaceful compromise, it affected few white Baton Rougeans. White
moderate, Carlos Spaht, a native Missourian and candidate for governor in 1952,
remembered the boycott but claimed that it affected neither him nor his law practice.
Marian Reynard Baun, a native o f Illinois and the wife of liberal LSU Law School
Professor Charles Reynard, echoed Spaht. In a 1998 interview, she recalled the protest
but added that neither she nor her husband paid much attention to the boycott.24
August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, in Along the Color Line, claimed that the
Baton Rouge boycott was an isolated incident that had no impact on the boycotts that
followed, especially on the Montgomery movement. These scholars failed to recognize
the impact of this protest on communities throughout the South. While the leaders of
the Montgomery movement did not consult Jemison before their boycott, they
undoubtedly knew about events in Louisiana’s capital city. The national black press and
some major white newspapers carried stories about the Baton Rouge protest, and as
Aldon Morris pointed out in Origins o f the Civil Rights Movement, the news of the
boycott quickly spread through the black ministerial networks, most notably the
National Baptist Congress. Jemison’s father served as president of that organization.
Morris noted that Jemison brought a blueprint o f the boycott to the organization’s 1956
24Carlos Spaht, interview by author, tape recording, July 27, 1993, T. Harry
Williams Center for Oral History, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley Collection,
Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 48-49; Marian Baun,
interview by author, tape recording, June 6, 1998, T. Harry Williams Center for Oral
History, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State University
Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
97

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

convention and shared it with interested ministers and consulted with boycott leaders in
several southern cities including Tallahassee, Florida and New Orleans.25
In addition to playing an important role in launching the use o f direct action to
challenge segregation, the week-long boycott marked the first time African Americans
from all segments of the community united to demand changes to Baton Rouge’s Jim
Crow laws. This cooperation crippled the city’s public transportation system and
revealed the power that a cohesive black community wielded. Fearing that such unity
would bring with it racial unrest and violence, white leaders adopted a strategy o f using
the politics o f moderation, granting small concessions to racial diplomats to end
activists’ protests and to drive a wedge between racial diplomats and the activists. With
each compromise, the chasm between the two groups grew larger, and racial diplomats
began to lose respect. In 1953, they were the leaders o f the black community, but a
decade later, many African Americans viewed them as sellouts and denounced the deals
they reached with whites. Each compromise not only diminished the leadership abilities
of the racial diplomats but increased the discontent of the black community and led the
city closer to the racial violence that white leaders wanted to avoid.

“ August Meier and Elliott Rudwick, Along the Color Line, Explorations in the
Black Experience: Essays (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1976), 366; Morris,
Origins o f the Civil Rights Movement, 25.
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C h a p ter!
From Boycott to Brown, 1953-1954
The brief period between the June 1953 bus boycott and the Supreme Court’s
May 1954 Brown decision, which called for school desegregation, marked a dynamic
period in Baton Rouge’s civil rights movement. From June 1953 through September
1954, World War II activists launched a series o f direct attacks against the system of
segregation. They demanded the integration o f the city’s public parks and supported an
attempt to desegregate LSU’s undergraduate programs. After Brown, a group of activist
parents allowed Johnnie Jones and another black attorney to take their children to a
white school and to ask the principal to admit them. White leaders feared that these
unprecedented demands would lead to racial unrest in the city and parish, and they
turned to the traditional black leaders for help in quieting the activists. Working with
the racial diplomats, white leaders adopted an outwardly moderate approach but wanted
to stifle civil rights sentiment in the black community. Although their tactics impeded
integration, they failed to silence the World War II activists. The activists only
redoubled their efforts when racial diplomats and white leaders attempted to placate
them with agreements that fell short of their demands. However the white leaders’
strategy proved successful. Using legal maneuvers, they successfully delayed the
integration of the parks, LSU’s undergraduate program, and the public school system
for a decade.
In the first o f these three desegregation efforts, World War II activists petitioned
the Recreation and Parks Commission, in May 1953, to desegregate the parish’s public
parks. Although separate facilities existed for black and white residents, parks
99

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

designated for whites contained tennis courts, swim m in g pools, softball fields, and golf
courses. Brooks Park, which was built in 1947 and paid for, in part, by donations from
the black community, was the only black park with a swimming pool. Other black parks
possessed none of the amenities of white ones. In their petition, the activists argued that
since tax dollars financed the parks, African Americans should be allowed to use all of
them. After receiving the petition, Ralph Hileman, chairman of the Recreation and
Parks Commission, announced that his organization had initiated a study into the
feasibility of building a nine-hole golf course for African Americans at Harding Field,
located near Southern University in the northern part o f the parish. To avoid white
outcry against the study, the commission also promised to look into building another
18-hole course for white golfers.1
World War II activists refused to be appeased by the promise to investigate the
possibility of a golf course, and on September 17, 1953, six activists including Malcolm
Legarde, who filed the salary equalization suit in the mid 1940s, went to the City Park
and tried to use the links. Breaking with the traditional pattern of race relations, they did
not meet with white leaders to discuss their grievances before taking action nor did they
ask racial diplomats to intercede for them. Instead, when the park operator refused to
allow them to use the course, they contacted attorneys Bell and Jones and asked them to
sue to desegregate City Park.

‘“Negroes Ask Use o f Park,” State-Times, September 18, 1953,1; “Confab, on
Demand of Negroes for Park Use Slated,” State-Times, September 22,1953,6A;
“Committee Study Started on Issue o f Golf Dispute,” State-Times, September 23, 1953,
1.
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In a letter to both the commissioners and to the City-Parish Council, the two
lawyers stated that their clients paid taxes to support City Park and should not be denied
use o f it simply because of their race. Shocked, the Recreation and Parks Commission
demanded a meeting with African-American leaders “to come to an agreement” about
the park situation. Commission members never met with the six activists who sought
entry to City Park. Instead, they created a special interracial committee consisting of
commission members and African Americans to study the issue. They named a group of
racial diplomats, including Jemison and Baranco, and a few World War H activists to
the committee and asked the attorney for the six men, Johnnie Jones, to serve on it.2
Jemison and Baranco announced that the black activists would drop demands to use
City Park if white leaders agreed to construct a separate golf course for African
Americans. The handful of World War n activists who attended the meeting, including
Raymond Scott, Bell, and Jones, balked at the men’s offer. “We want these facilities
now, not tomorrow or the next day or the day after that,” Jones told the white
leadership. “We want to play now in order to enjoy the money we spend for taxes.” He
added that his clients would agree to drop their suit only if the commission adopted a
plan similar to the one established in New Orleans in 1952 that designated alternating
days for black and white golfers to use public courses.3

2Although Jemison often acted as an activist, on this issue, he sided with the
racial diplomats and will be characterized one o f them.
3“Negroes Ask Use of Park,” State-Times, September 18, 1953, I; Jones,
interview, November 13, 1993,60; “United Defense League to Back Move on Parks,”
State-Times, September 19, 1953, 1; “Name Committee on Dispute Over City Golf
Course,” State-Times, September 26, 1953, 1; Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 106.
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Whites attending the meeting refused to consider Jones' suggestion.
Commission member Frank “Tickie” Saia, the general manager o f Sachse Electronics,
claimed that white golfers would abandon the City Park course if African Americans
used it, and, without white golfers, the entire facility would close. Commissioner V. L.
Roy added that any change in the racial status o f the parks would disrupt the city’s
long-term plans for expansion and improvement. White leaders also tried to discredit
the activists. According to Johnnie Jones, District Attorney J. St. Clair Favrot, who also
attended the meeting, told the audience, “Johnnie comes up with all o f these hare
brained ideas.” John Easterly, a contractor who would later become the leader of the
Southern Gentlemen, a local segregationist organization formed shortly after Brown,
condemned the World War U activists and claimed that they wanted to destroy “the
peace of our community.” Jones recalled that when he outlined his clients’ demands,
Easterly jumped out o f his seat and shouted,
Listen to that damned nigger. That damned nigger ain’t going to be satisfied
until they get the whole damned thing. I don’t care what you give them damned
niggers, they ain’t going to ever be satisfied
Go outside and look at their
cars. They’ve got cars finer than ours. Follow them niggers home, them niggers
got finer houses than we got.. . . What them damned niggers want now is our
wives, our daughters. That’s what them damned niggers want because they’ve
got every thing else we got.4
The reaction o f white leaders to the City Park issue stood in direct contrast to
their response to Jemison’s request that they end reserved seating on the city’s buses.
Instead of quietly agreeing to set up a plan for African Americans to use the white golf
course, they refused even to discuss the possibility of designating a day or two a week
^‘Committee Study Started on Issue o f Golf Dispute,” State-Times, September
23, 1953,1; Jones, interview, October 2,1993,97,104-105.
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for black golfers to use the course. Several factors influenced this decision. First, the
activists had abandoned the traditional pattern of race relations. Instead of going to the
white leadership and asking for them to help finance a golf course for African
Americans, the activists attempted to use facilities at City Park, and, when turned away,
they contacted a lawyer and threatened to sue to desegregate them. Second, allowing
African Americans to use the City Park links affected a larger number of upper- and
middle-class whites than ending reserved seating on the buses had, and white leaders
knew that this group did not want to share their golf courses with African Americans.
Finally, even after white leaders agreed to allocate $20,000 to finance and construct a
course at one of the city ’s black parks, Jones’s clients decided to proceed with their suit.
As the suit made its way through the federaL courts, the Recreation and Parks
Commission and the parish’s district attorney used every legal means at their disposal
to delay the case and hoped that by dragging it out, the plaintiffs would become
discouraged and drop it. In 1956, the commission even voted to close all parks if a court
ordered integration because integration “would seriously retard the social, moral, and
economic advancement of the state.” The commission’s strategy of legal delays proved
effective. Nearly a decade passed before a federal judge finally heard the case and
ordered Baton Rouge’s public parks to integrate.5

5“Name Committee on Dispute Over City Golf Course,” State-Times, September
26, 1953, 1; “Park Use Suit Filed By Negroes,” State-Times, November 18, 1953,1;
“New Deadlines Set for Answers in Park Suit,” Morning Advocate, November 8,1955,
1; “East Baton Rouge Facilities to Stay Segregated,” Morning Advocate, December 2,
1955, 1; “Rec. Facility Desegregation Efforts Planned,” Morning Advocate, August 6,
1963, 8A; “West to Deliberate on Park Integration,” Morning Advocate, April 18,1964,
11A.
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Meanwhile, the Recreation and Parks Commission went ahead with their
promise to improve separate facilities. On December 22,1954, the commission opened
a nine-hole golf course for African Americans in North Baton Rouge, named the J. S.
Clark Memorial Park. At the dedication ceremony, T. J. Jemison declared, ‘This is
progress. We are headed in the right direction, and it can be progress for the whole
community if we continue to work together in the spirit of brotherhood and love.” Of
course, the World War H activists viewed the park as a setback to the cause of civil
rights. Although Jones applauded building a golf course in North Baton Rouge, he
continued to denounce the fact that it was segregated. He believed that the city’s
publicly funded parks should be open to all citizens, black and white. T wanted it
[Clark Memorial Park] to be for the people of East Baton Rouge Parish,” Jones recalled,
not just black people. Dupuy Anderson expressed a similar opinion. “They hurriedly
built a black golf course, nine holes. I objected to that. I was invited to the dedication of
that, but I did not go. It was a long time before I played golf.”6
Although their agreement with white leaders delayed the integration of the city’s
parks, the racial diplomats realized that if they challenged their white counterparts on
this issue, the black community would receive nothing. Jemison, acting as an activist,
experienced the wrath of white leaders on June 18, 1953 when he demanded that the
Louisiana Building Authority (LBA) construct a swimming pool at Southern
University. He complained that Southern went without a pool while LSU had one of the

^‘Dedication of New Negro Golf Course, Recreation Center is Marked Here,”
Morning Advocate, December 22,1954, 16B; Jones, interview, October 2, 1993, 106;
Anderson, interview by Maxine Crump, December 22, 1994,25.
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largest in the nation. Members of the LBA claimed that having a pool at Southern
would be “too luxurious for Negroes.” Southern President Felton Clark bore the brunt
of white displeasure for Jemison’s demand. Charles Tooke, a member o f the Senate
Finance Committee, warned Clark, “In my opinion, if we build the swimming pool,
your chances o f getting other funds from the next legislature are zero.” He also
reprimanded Jemison. “You are showing a great deal of ingratitude,” Tooke said. “You
are doing a disservice to your people.” Although he conceded that Southern needed a
pool, Clark quickly disassociated himself from Jemison and claimed that he knew
nothing of the minister’s activism. Clark realized that if he sided with Jemison, the
legislature would cut o ff Southern’s funding, and he refused to ask the LBA to
construct a swimming pool because the university could survive without one. It could
not get by without state money. The board rejected Jemison’s request, and he never
again directly challenged the white power structure.7
The second major desegregation battle fought during the period between the
boycott and Brown was over the admission of African Americans to LSU’s
undergraduate programs. Even after black graduate and law students gained admission
to LSU, in 1950 and 1951, the university’s undergraduate divisions remained
segregated. Few Baton Rouge activists played a part in the suit to integrate LSU, but the
reaction to this desegregation attempt by LSU’s administration, most notably its
president Troy Middleton, reflected the determination of Baton Rouge’s white
leadership to maintain peaceful race relations while using the court system to delay the

7“Board Rebukes Negro Leader,” State-Times, June 19,1953, 1.
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admission of black students. In the summer of 1953, seventeen-year-old New Orleans
high school student, Alexander P. “Alex” Tureaud, Jr., decided that he wanted to attend
LSU. The son o f the state’s leading civil rights attorney, he knew that LSU was the best
college closest to his home in New Orleans. Although his father did not directly recruit
him as a plaintiff, he made several trips to the campus, and on one visit, the elder
Tureaud told his son, “LSU is a wonderful school. Look at these buildings. Look at the
faculty. We should have some of this. We should be here.”8
In his letter o f application, Alex Tureaud stated that he wanted to major in
liberal arts law, an accelerated course o f study that allowed a student to obtain both a
bachelor’s degree and a law degree in six years. Although a similar major existed at
Southern University, no students majored in it. In a letter to A. P. Tureaud, Sr.,
Southern Law School Dean A. A. Lenoir stated that LSU’s liberal arts law degree was
far superior to the one at his school and urged the civil rights attorney to stress the
differences between the two programs. In early August, the Board of Supervisors
rejected Tureaud’s application declaring that LSU only admitted black students when
ordered to by the courts. After this rejection, Tureaud sued on his son’s behalf saying,
“There is no other institution maintained by the state where the plaintiff can obtain the
advantages involved in the combination course here nor combine his college and law

8A. P. Tureaud, Jr., interview by Rachel Emanuel-Wallace, tape recording, April
25,1993, T. Harry Williams Center for Oral History, Louisiana Lower Mississippi
Valley Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 2.
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school work to the same extent and on equal level o f scholarship and intensity as in the
school o f LSU.”9
Although university officials re lu c ta n tly accepted the fact that the courts
required them to admit black law and graduate students, they were determined to
prevent any black undergraduates from enrolling. They believed that white Louisianians
would either react violently or pull their children out o f LSU’s undergraduate programs.
Troy Middleton expressed the feelings of the majority of whites when he said:
Peaceful behavior is threatened far less by the admission o f Negro students to
the graduate schools than would be the case in undergraduate schools [because
graduate students are mature]. They have established patterns of behavior and
spend most of their time studying and do not participate in university activities.
Undergraduate students are establishing friendships, developing interests in
extracurricular activities as well as engaging in their studies.
A segregationist attorney W. Scott Wilkinson expressed a similar concern. In a letter to
Board of Supervisors member Lewis Gottleib, he wrote,
It will come to pass that instead of having mature negroes [sic] in the law and
graduate schools, you will also have a horde of teenage negroes [sic] in the
undergraduate courses. When that happens, you will find the better people of
Louisiana sending their boys and girls to Tulane, Newcomb, Centenary, and
other privately endowed institutions.
Indeed, Tureaud wanted to take part in the social life of LSU. He wanted to make
friends, join a study group, and pledge a fraternity.10

9A. A. Lenoir to A. P Tureaud, July 1953, APT, box 71, folder 15; A. A. Lenoir
to A. P. Tureaud, August 6,1953, ibid.; Tureaud, interview by Rachel-Emanuel
Wallace, 2; “Negro Student Seeks Admission to LSU College,” State-Times, August 3,
1953, 5B; “Rejected Student Sues LSU,” State-Times, August 24, 1953,1.
‘“Affidavit o f Troy Middleton, APT, box 7, folder 19; W. Scott Wilkinson to
Lewis Gottleib, November 10,1955, Robert Kennon Papers, box 4, folder 92, Louisiana
and Lower Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge,
Louisiana (hereaftercited as Kennon Papers).
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Ia early September, federal judge Skelly Wright began hearing Tureaud’s case.
Represented by ten lawyers, including ultra-segregationist Leander Perez, LSU
launched an all-out attack against Tureaud. At times, that attack became personal. Alex
Tureaud recalled one incident involving Perez:
He was dressed in a plantation beige outfit with a string tie. He was very
dramatic and also could be very cruel and biting and sarcastic
One
statement that he made that I’ll never forget. He pointed to me, and walked in
my direction, and looked right dead at me, and said, “There sits the only
ungrateful nigra in the state of Louisiana because we have gone through great
expense and trouble to build fine black universities in this state. Why is Mr.
Tureaud not willing to avail himself o f this opportunity?” He said it with such
sarcasm and with such belief it was just very intimidating, and it made me
angry.
Perez’s arguments held little sway over the judge. On September 11, Wright ruled
against LSU and ordered Tureaud’s admission saying that although “Louisiana has
made a bonafide effort to maintain and operate an adequate institution in the Arts and
Sciences level at Southern University,” it is not equal to LSU. He added that denying
Alex Tureaud’s admission solely because of his race also violated the Fourteenth
Amendment."
Although LSU fought Tureaud’s admission, James Reddoch, President
Middleton’s assistant, noted that school officials “took the position, that if this is the
law o f the land, then we’re going to operate the university in a way that is consistent
with the law of the land.” O f course, university officials chose to meet only the
minimum requirements of the law of the land, and they immediately appealed Wright’s

"Tureaud, interview by Rachel Emanuel-Wallace, 39; “LSU Ordered to Admit
Negro Undergraduate,” State-Times, September 11,1953, 1.
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ruling, saying that Alex Tureaud’s case should have been heard by a three-judge panel.
In the meantime, he enrolled at LSU and began attending classes.12
To young Tureaud’s dismay, the university community adopted an unofficial
policy for dealing with him — everyone shunned him. ‘Tt was like I didn’t exist,” he
recalled. “People talked about me as though I was an inanimate object. Nobody sat near
me. The kids sat all around me. If I sat in the comer, they would move to the opposite
side of the room. If I sat in the middle, they would move to the sides.”13
In early November 1953, the Fifth Circuit Court o f Appeals ruled that Skelly
Wright had indeed exceeded his jurisdiction in ordering Tureaud’s admission. Days
later, without the court’s permission, LSU canceled his enrollment. His father and LDF
attorneys asked the Supreme Court to order his readmission. The justices condemned
the hasty dismissal, but took no action to force the university to reinstate him. In May
1956, the Supreme Court finally ruled in Tureaud’s case and ordered LSU to admit him
to the liberal arts law program. Tureaud did not want to return to LSU. At the time, he
was attending Xavier and majoring in education. University officials refused to allow
other black undergraduates to enroll. Saying that the court’s decision applied only to
Tureaud, they simply chose to ignore the fact that Tureaud v. LSU was a class action
suit and successfully maintained its segregated undergraduate program until the
summer of 1964.14

12Reddoch, interview, January 20, 1993,28.
I3Tureaud, interview by Rachel Emanuel-Wallace, 9-12.
14‘U.S. Appeals Court Reverse Louisiana State University Decision,”
Pittsburgh Courier, November 7, 1953, 5; “LSU Appeal is Upheld in Negro Case,”
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Because Tureaud’s admission occurred before Brown, white reaction to his
enrollment differed sharply from the responses o f whites in other southern states to the
admission o f black undergraduates into their universities. White leaders in states such
as Alabama used delaying tactics similar to LSU’s, but when the federal courts ordered
them to integrate, they responded with direct defiance. In 1952, a year before Tureaud
applied for admission to LSU, two women, Autherine Lucy and Pollie Ann Myers
applied for admission to the University o f Alabama as undergraduates. For four years,
the university’s attorneys used legal maneuvers to delay the court’s decision, but in
early 1956, a federal judge ordered the admission of the two women. After investigating
the lives o f Lucy and Myers, the university discovered that Myers, who married and
gave birth to a child during the intervening four years, had conceived her child before
the nuptials and refused to admit her because she failed to meet the university’s moral
standards. They could find no reason to reject Autherine Lucy’s application, and she
enrolled under a court order February 3, 1956. Lucy attended classes for two days, and
that night, a riot broke out on the Tuscaloosa campus. When she arrived for class the
following day, a jeering crowd o f approximately 3,000 people met her and threw gravel,
eggs, and rotting produce at her. University officials attempted to protect her from the
mob and hid her in the library until the crowd dissipated. That evening, the university’s

State-Times, October 29, 1953, 1; “High Court Says LSU Must Accept A. P. Tureaud,
Jr.,” Morning Advocate, May 8, 1956, 1.
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board o f trustees voted to suspend Lucy to prevent further violence. Her lawyers sued
for her readmission, but she never returned.15
Less than a year after Tureaud’s suit against LSU, the Supreme Court issued its
landmark ruling in Brown v. Board o f Education, and World War II activists quickly
launched a direct attack against the system of segregation. On September 3,1954,
attorneys Alex Pitcher and Johnnie Jones, at the request of a group of black parents, led
thirty-nine children to Gilmer Wright Elementary, the former Rosenwald school that
blacks helped to build but the board designated as white, and attempted to enroll them.
When Pitcher and Jones arrived with the students, the school’s principal, Lily Taylor,
immediately turned them away saying that the school was for whites only. The
willingness o f the parents to allow their children to play a role in this protest reflected
the desire o f black parents to secure equality in education for their children. In the early
1950s, these parents formed the North Baton Rouge Civic Association to lobby the
School Board to switch the designation o f the school from white to black. The board
ignored their pleas, so they hired Pitcher to represent them. Jones became involved in
the case by chance. One day, he and his father were on the way to his office when
Pitcher flagged him down and asked for his help in preparing a suit against the School
Board. The two men met with a large number of parents at a black church in the Gilmer
Wright neighborhood. Jones remembered,
The church was packed wall-to-wall with blacks. It looked like every black in
that area had come---- We talked at that meeting, and we roused up everybody.
All those people were waiting for somebody who was going to stand up for
i5E. Culpepper Clark, The Schoolhouse Door: Segregation’s Last Stand at the
University o f Alabama (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 54-90.
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them. Alex and I gave them that confidence. We were there, and there wasn’t
going to be any backing down. Both o f us had been to the service and had war
experience. When we gave that speech all of them said, “Let’s march on the
white school.”16
Shortly after Brown, the NAACP had issued a statement calling for the school
desegregation and had urged parents from around the state to sue to end the dual school
system. The organization wanted to coordinate and rank the cases and expected African
Americans to contact them before proceeding with their suits. Parents in the area
surrounding Gilmer Wright refused to wait for an outside organization, the NAACP, to
give them the go-ahead. After the registration attempt at Gilmer Wright, NAACP State
Secretary Daniel Byrd noted, “East Baton Rouge Parish is way down on the list in
desegregation attempts.” He added that black parents in the parish had not even filed a
petition with the NAACP asking for the organization’s assistance. Although Jones and
Pitcher both belonged to the organization, they had acted independently and did not
even consult the local NAACP chapter before making the desegregation attempt. Their
reason for bypassing the organization was simple. Racial diplomats controlled the
Baton Rouge chapter and would, at the very least, have discouraged them from taking
such a defiant step. After the incident, Jemison informed white leaders that he played no
role in the protest and promised that African Americans would not try to enroll at any
other white schools.17

l6Jones, interview, October 2,1993,26-30; “Negro Group Asks Admission to
White School,” Morning Advocate, September 4, 1954, 1.
l7“Negro Group Asks Admission to White School,” Morning Advocate,
September 4, 1954, 1; “Negro Attorney Issues Statement on Registration,” Morning
Advocate, September 26,1954,13A.
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For openly challenging the parish's separate school system, Jones and Pitcher
incurred the wrath o f both white leaders and segregationists. The School Board, after
consulting with the state’s Joint Legislative Committee on Segregation and the parish’s
district attorney, J. St. Clair Favrot, filed an ethics complaint against the two attorneys
with the Louisiana Bar Association. The board refused to believe that the black parents
in this working class neighborhood had hired the attorneys and agreed to allow them to
lead their children to Gilmer Wright. In its complaint, the board charged the lawyers
with violating the bar association’s rules against barratry and with fomenting strife. The
bar association launched a probe into the allegations and called the two men to appear
before its ethics board.18
The probe into the charges against Jones and Pitcher was little more than an
attempt to discredit the two men and to bring an end to their outspoken activism. The
School Board’s attorneys levied inconsistent charges against the black lawyers. They
accused Jones and Pitcher of approaching the parents in the area surrounding Gilmer
Wright and convincing them to file a suit to integrate the school. The board’s lawyers
also claimed that the men took the children to the school without first obtaining parental
permission. Defense witnesses countered these assertions. They testified that the North
Baton Rouge Civic League had indeed hired Alex Pitcher and asked him to sue the
School Board. Ellis Robinson, the guardian o f one of the children, testified that he gave
his nephew permission to take part in the protest. Jones claimed that members of the bar
association, led by Baton Rouge native and Citizens’ Council member Sargent Pitcher,
18“Negro Attorney Issues Statement on Registration,” Morning Advocate,
September 26,1954, 13A.
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tried to intimidate him. Sargent Pitcher and others in the organization promised that if
he admitted to the charges and apologized for his actions that he would receive a token
reprimand. If he refused, they would disbar him. Jones refused to accept the offer but
suspected that Alex Pitcher bowed to their pressure and confessed to the charges.
Members of the association continued to badger Jones and to try to wrest a confession
from him. They told him that they believed he had made a mistake by leading the
children to the school and that he had not considered the implications o f the protest
before acting. Jones viewed their offer as anything but charitable. The committee
members wanted him to confess to violations that he had not committed. Their offer
infuriated him, he recalled. “You call yourselves charitable?” Jones told his accusers.
“What 1 would consider charitable would be not to havegbrought these charges in the
first place. What I consider charitable would have been to recommend to the School
Board to turn this school back over to these people.” After he rejected their offer, the
members of the committee accused him o f being an “arrogant nigger.” Some o f them
even claimed that he came from the North and was simply faking his southern accent.
They refused to believe that an African American from Louisiana would openly defy
them. The segregationist members of the ethics board did everything in their power to
discredit Jones. They even hired a black man to impersonate him and to ask African
Americans to take part in a school desegregation suit. One woman whom this man
approached testified at the hearing. When the prosecuting attorney asked her to look
around the room and point to Jones, she could not identify him; they then asked her to
describe him. She claimed that the man who visited her had dark skin and was six feet
tall and heavyset. Jones, a light-skinned black man, stood approximately five feet five
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inches tall and weighed one hundred twenty-nine pounds. The room burst into laughter
when the woman completed her description. Even after this embarrassment, Jones’
accusers refused to back down. They pointed to him and asked her if the young civil
rights attorney was the man who had spoken to her. She declared that he was definitely
not her visitor. In the end, the ethics board had no choice but to exonerate Jones. His
accusers could produce no evidence against him. Alex Pitcher, because he signed the
confession, received a reprimand and was placed him on probation for six months. He
retained his license to practice law, however.19
Although the World War II activists dominated the civil rights movement in the
post-Brown years, the racial diplomats tried desperately to maintain their position of
leadership in the black community. Seizing upon the success of the World War II
activists’ voter registration drives of the 1940s, they decided that they could curry favor
with the city’s black community if they launched a program o f their own. In fact, when
Jemison announced the end of the bus boycott, he promised that the United Defense
League would work to enfranchise African Americans. Racial diplomats promoted
voter registration because they believed that would help them to maintain their position
of leadership within the black community. Voter registration symbolized citizenship for
African Americans. The quiet acceptance o f increased black registration by white
leaders in the late 1940s convinced the racial diplomats that they could advocate
enfranchisement without alienating their white patrons. They could also use their
l9“Attomey Says He was Retained by Civic Group,” Morning Advocate,
December 3, 1954, 1; “Disbarment Case is Taken Under Advisement Here,” Morning
Advocate, December 4,1954,1; Jones, interview, October 2,1993, 34-39; “The Need
for Voters,” News Leader, July 23,1955,4B.
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influence as leaders o f the black community to direct blocs of voters to candidates their
patrons supported. Although activists supported black voter registration, they
denounced the fact that racial diplomats used the votes o f enfranchised African
Americans to curry favor with the white leadership. A July 1955 editorial in the News
Leader, the city’s activist African-American newspaper, denounced the practice. “The
Negro has grown tired of self-appointed so-called politicians meeting behind closed
doors telling candidates [about] the votes he can send,” It proclaimed. “Negroes have
grown tired o f some Negro leaders selling them down the river.”20
To encourage African Americans to register, racial diplomats established voter
registration schools in Several neighborhoods, and several of the city’s ladies’ clubs set
up schools in churches throughout the city and donated a cash prize to the congregation
with the largest percentage of registered voters. Racial diplomats also urged teachers to
register to vote, claiming that it was their duty as leaders o f the black com m unity. The
involvement o f racial diplomats in the voter registration process proved successful. The
number of black voters increased from 6,700 in 1952 to 8,125 in January 1956, giving
Baton Rouge one of the highest number of enfranchised African Americans in the
state.21

20“If We had More Votes,” News Leader, December 3, 1955, 1; “Mt. Calvary B.
C. Wins in Delta’s Voters Drive,” News Leader, January 7, 1956; Reed, interview, July
14,1998; “Uncle Toms Must Go,” Weekly Leader, July 12, 1952,4; “Voter
Registration Picking Up,” News Leader, November 19, 1955, 1.
2l“More Energy for Voters,” News Leader, July 30, 1955,4B; “Negro Voters Up
50 Percent in Four Years,” Morning Advocate, January 11,1956,1; “Negro Voters
Increase for Governor’s Race,” News Leader, November 3, 1956,1; “Record 70,000
Now Registered to Voter in EBR,” Morning Advocate, October 23, 1959, ID.
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When segregationists launched a statewide purge o f black: voters in 1956, East
Baton Rouge Parish did not participate. Their concern for continued industrial
development guided the white leaders. They feared that if they took part in the purges
the city would receive negative attention from the national media. For the community to
continue to prosper, they needed to uphold the city’s image o f peaceful and progressive
race relations. Throughout the 1950s, white business leaders worked diligently to
encourage industrial expansion and described the city as “the hub o f a comparatively
lucrative metropolitan market.” Chamber o f Commerce President S. G. Henry told the
citizens of Baton Rouge, “Industry is interested in locating a plant where workers will
be happy to live.” Workers did not want to reside in communities rife with racial strife.
U. S. Senator Russell Long, a Baton Rouge resident and son of former Governor Huey
Long, lauded his community’s record of allowing black registration in a speech
opposing the Civil Rights Act of 1957. He contended that, without federal interference,
large numbers o f blacks registered to vote in East Baton Rouge Parish because white
leaders allowed them to and added that this enfranchisement led to improved conditions
for the African Americans.22
The period from the end of the bus boycott to the Brown decision marked the
ascendency of World War II activists as leaders in Baton Rouge’s black co m m unity.
While white leaders still turned to racial diplomats to settle conflicts, African

“ Advertisement, Morning Advocate, October 13, 1954, IB; “Attracting
Industry,” Morning Advocate, December 9, 1955, 8A; Speech Opposing the Civil
Rights Bill, ca. 1957, Russell Long Collection, box 556, folder 9, Louisiana Lower
Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge,
Louisiana.
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Americans, such as the parents o f children in North Baton Rouge, turned away from
these traditional leaders and began looking to the World War II activists when they
needed help. As Jones said, black people knew that the activists would stand up for
them and not back down. The six men who filed suit against City Park refused to drop
their case when the white leaders built Clark Memorial Park. After LSU expelled A. P.
Tureaud, Jr., black activists continued to demand admission to the university’s
undergraduate programs. Even an ethics probe into the law practices of Jones and
Pitcher could not convince the men to abandon their clients and drop their school
desegregation suit. Although World War n activists viewed Brown as a victory in their
fight for equality, the decision almost destroyed the city’s burgeoning civil rights
movement as it galvanized both the state’s and the city’s segregationist population,
which quickly seized control of the state government and enacted of series of
prohibitive state laws aimed at destroying the civil rights movement
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Chapter 4
Rise of Segregationist Sentiment, 1954-1958
While the Brown decision delighted the World War H activists, it served as a
catalyst for uniting the city’s ultra-segregationists.1Before Brown, Mayor Jesse Webb,
the city-parish council, and racial diplomats such as Jemison, Baranco, and the Butler
brothers, could meet and hammer out compromises to undercut the rising popularity of
the activists and to prevent protests. After Brown, making any changes to the system of
segregation, no matter how small, became nearly impossible. In the weeks following
the ruling, the city’s segregationist population, which lacked cohesion before the
decision, united and publicly denounced anyone who supported even small changes to
the system of segregation. They devoted special attention to the issue o f school
desegregation and believed that if the schools integrated, Baton Rouge as they knew it
would be destroyed. Baton Rouge attorney Paul G. Borron expressed the
segregationists’ position on Brown in a letter to Governor Robert F. Kennon. He
compared the decision to Reconstruction and proclaimed that whites needed to fight it
with all of their might to preserve the “southern way of life.” He expressed the fear of
many whites when he claimed that integration would eventually bring mixed classes
headed by black teachers and warned that white children would learn the “low moral
standards of the Negro” from black teachers and students. To prevent integration from
happening, segregationists in Baton Rouge formed three organizations — the Southern
1As noted in the introduction, most white Baton Rougeans wanted to m aintain
the system o f Jim Crow, but the white leaders and the accommodationists refused to
sacrifice the city’s economic well-being to protect it. Segregationists, on the other hand,
wanted to preserve the status quo at all costs.
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Gentlemen, the White Citizens’ Council, and the Ku Klux K lan— and launched an allout attack on the civil rights movement.2
Segregationists saw Brown as an attack against both the Constitution o f the
United States and the southern way o f life and believed that Brown and other federallyimposed desegregation orders represented a usurpation o f states’ rights. The Jim Crow
supporters advocated using the doctrine of interposition to block federal court decisions.
In a decade that saw the escalation o f the Cold War and the red-baiting of
McCarthyism, the civil rights movement seemed to the segregationists to be a
communist plot that threatened the very core of southern society. Segregationists
believed that if the system of Jim Crow ended, chaos would ensue, and civilization as
they knew it would be destroyed. They viewed blacks as morally, biologically, and
culturally inferior and thought that integration would bring miscegenation. In their
minds, racial mixing would mongrelize the white race. The only way to preserve racial
purity was by keeping the races completely separate. Although their main goal was to
prevent school integration, segregationists also worked to stop all forms of social
interaction between blacks and whites.3

2P. G. Borron, Sr. to Robert F. Kennon, 31 May 1954, Kennon Papers, box 4,
folder 91; McCarrick, “Louisiana’s Official Resistance,” 3, 14-16; Michael Karlman,
“How Brown changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis,” Journal o f American
History, 81 (June 1994): 82-84.
3David Goldfield, Black, White & Southern, 84; Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle
fo r Black Equality 1954-1992, rev. ed. (New York: Hill & Wang, 1991), 25; Dan
Carter, The Politics o f Rage (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 86-87; Bartley, The
New South, 199-204; Bartley, The Rise o f Massive Resistance, 135.
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On July 22, 1954, a group of middle class segregationists in East Baton Rouge
Parish filed articles o f incorporation for the Southern Gentlemen, which became the
only segregationist organization to operate in Baton Rouge for nearly two years.4
Although chapters quickly sprang up around the state, the Baton Rouge chapter directed
their activities, and John Easterly, a resident of the capital city and a concrete
manufacturer, organized the Baton Rouge chapter and served as the group’s state
president. The goals o f the Southern Gentlemen were simple. It wanted “to maintain
segregation in public schools, parks, playgrounds, etc.,” and to insure “the continuation
of the Southern

traditions and customs of our noble forefathers.” Initially, the

group eschewed violence, but by 1956, Easterly warned that when they exhausted all
legal means to prevent integration, they would “use other means” to maintain
segregation and prevent the “mongrelization” of the white race.5
The Southern Gentlemen set up an elaborate initiation process for new
members. It required anyone interested in joining to submit an application, including
references, and to list his reasons for wanting to join the organization. A membership
committee screened all applicants and only admitted the most committed
segregationists. Although it kept its membership list secret, the Southern Gentlemen’s
officers and board o f directors quickly became public. While not a part o f the city’s
elite, most belonged to the middle or upper middle class. Out of thirteen identified

4In July 1954, the first chapter of the White Citizens’ Council was formed in
Indianola, Mississippi.
sSAC, NO to Director, July 6,1955, Southern Gentlemen, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, File 105-38567, Federal Bureau o f Investigation, Freedom o f Information
Act Division, Washington, D. C., (hereafter cited as FBI).
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members of the Southern Gentlemen, seven held white collar jobs. Two, L. Norman
Day and Frank McLavy, served as principals o f schools in East Baton Rouge Parish.
Two others owned their owned businesses. ESSO employed the final two — one as an
operator and the other as a meter man.6
In 1956, segregationists in Baton Rouge formed a chapter of the Citizens’
Council. Organized on May 25, the Baton Rouge Citizens’ Council, with its ties to
other chapters across the state and the South, subsumed the Southern Gentlemen by the
end o f the decade. The two organizations shared similar goals. Both wanted to maintain
segregated schools, to preserve white supremacy, and to prevent social interactions
between blacks and whites. Although, they too, believed in the inferiority of African
Americans, the Citizens’ Council made greater use of the states’ rights argument than
the Southern Gentlemen. However, like the SouthemGentlemen, the Citizens* Council
attracted “respectable segregationists” and often recruited their members from civic
organizations, such as the Rotary, Lions, and Kiwanis Clubs and the American Legion.
In fact, most Council members belonged to a higher social class than the Gentlemen.
The social make-up of the Council can be inferred from its officers and board o f
6Charter, July 26,1954, Southern Gentlemen, FBI, File 105-38567; Bartley, The
New South, 204. Identifiable members of the Southern Gentlemen included: John
Easterly, owner of Easterly Concrete; Guy Cobb, building contractor; L. Norman Day,
principal Prescott Junior High School; Frank McLavy, principal Hollywood School and
commander of the Veterans o f Foreign Wars; Easterly’s sons, John Easterly, Jr.,
supervisor, American National Insurance Company; Mark Easterly, office manager,
Easterly Concrete; and Ed Easterly, clerk, Ethyl Corporation; William Lee Lawrence,
agent, American National Insurance Company; Odis J. Lea, collector, State-Times;
Amo Easterly, accountant, State Auditing Department; Godwin P. Raleigh, claim
director, Retail Credit; Harold Smith, meter man, Esso; William D. Falconer, operator,
ESSO. Employment information obtained from: Polk's Greater Baton Rouge City
Directory, 1956.
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directors. At its first meeting, attorney Jared Y. Sanders, Jr. presided. Sanders belonged
to the city’s aristocracy and, in 1929, led the impeachment attempt against Huey Long.
Seventeen worked in professional o r white collar positions. Eight held white collar or
supervisory jobs at either ESSO or Ethyl, six were business owners, and one was a
student. The occupations of eight could not be determined.7 From its inception, the
Baton Rouge chapter operated openly and made its meetings and membership lists
public. To them, the secrecy of the Southern Gentlemen resembled that of the Ku Klux
Klan. The Council also opened its membership to all like-minded whites and did not
require them to apply for admission into the group or to submit a list of references.8

7Although the Citizens’ Council submitted its membership list to the Secretary
of State’s Office, that document could not be located by the author. Members of the
Citizens’ Council’s Executive Board included: J. Y. Sanders, attorney; Carl Blunck,
physician; R. O. McCraine, owner, McCraine-McElyea Insurance Agency; Sargent
Pitcher, attorney; Chester Achord, operator, ESSO; D. H. Alessi, owner, Alessi’s Drive
Inn; J. B. Alexander, owner of insurance agency and mortgage company; Steve Alford,
attorney; O. H. Bacon, chief engineer, United Gas Pipeline; R. N. Ball, salesman; Paul
G. Borron, Sr., attorney; James E. Broome, owner, Broome’s Victoria Drag Store; G.
Norman David, unknown; L. N. Day, principal Prescott Junior High; W. H. Dickerson,
foreman, Ethyl; Henry Dimattia, pipe fitter; John M. Foote, unknown; Steve Hester,
unknown; Dr. W. Keman Irwin, physician, ESSO Medical Association; Thomas Carroll
Jeter, electrician, Kaiser Aluminum; Dr. Jack R. Jones, owner, Jones and Miller;
Lawson Lott, president, Independent Industrial Workers Association; Dan McDonald,
supervisor, Ethyl; Leon M. McGraw, operator, ESSO; Charles McKay, supervisor,
Copolymer Corporation; Frank McLavy, principal, Hollywood School; Tom Moreland,
student; Russell Nettles, clerk, ESSO; E. C. Newman, unknown; E. H. Noland,
unknown; Alton W. Odom, unknown; Dr. Ashton Robins, physician; Robert R.
Sanchez, Jr., attorney; Lenton Saratain, attorney; Merritt Shilz, pharmacist; and Sam
Terito, owner, Samdot Insulations. Employment information obtained from: Polk's
Greater Baton Rouge City Directory, 1956.
8Neil McMillen, The Citizens ’ Council, 10-11,60,161; Bartley, The New South,
197-204; Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 191-194; T. Harry Williams, fluey Long: A
Biography (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), 354; “Citizens’ Council Hold Board
Meet, Elect Officers,” Morning Advocate* May 25,1956,10D.
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The Ku Klux Klan, the third organization, made a brief appearance in Baton
Rouge, but it proved short-lived. On May 31, 1956, twenty-three men from the Ku Klux
Klan o f metropolitan Baton Rouge and the rural areas o f East Baton Rouge Parish
announced the organization of a local chapter. Unlike the Southern Gentlemen and the
Citizens’ Council, the Klan drew its membership from the parish’s lower classes. O f the
twenty-three members, ten worked as plant laborers. Seven of these worked for Ethyl.
One Klansman owned his own business and another was a meat cutter. Remaining
members lived in the rural areas o f the parish, and their occupations could not be
ascertained.9The organization proved unpopular in the parish and even the Southern
Gentlemen and the Citizens* Council denounced i t In early December 1956, a
spokesman for the Klan announced that it planned to dissolve because the members
discovered that they had “used a name ‘extremely distasteful’ to the public.” A month
later, six officers and board members officially resigned. While a segment o f the group
may have remained active, Klan activity played only a minor role in Baton Rouge’s
civil rights movement.10

°Dave Clark, parish resident; M. W. Brown, parish resident; Raymond Dyer,
meat cutter, Community Cash Grocery; Melvin Cupstid, K aiser Alum inum ; Lonnie
Cain, parish; Earl Edward Huff, welder, Ethyl; Henry Harless, welder, Ethyl; Alex
Harrison, helper, Gulf States Utilities; Oscar Land, parish resident; Finnon D. Lewis,
owner, Lewis Cafe and Service Station; Ralph Martin, pump operator, Ethyl; Herbert
Moss, parish resident; Larry Oneillion, parish resident; Julian Robinson, mechanic,
Ethyl; Perry Strickland, parish resident; Eugene Starkey, parish resident; Aubrey
Rogers, parish resident; Thomas Stogner, guard, Ethyl; Paul Stogner, guard, Ethyl;
Robert Whittington, operator, Ethyl; Joe R. White, parish resident; Edgar Taylor, parish
resident. Employment information obtained from Polk’s Greater Baton Rouge City
Directory, 1956.
l0“Local KKK Group Files Organizational Charter; Denies Burning Cross,”
Morning Advocate, June 1, 1956, 1; “Ku Klux Klan Files List of Members Here,”
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The Southern Gentlemen, which in the early years after Brawn remained the
most important of the three, focused most of their attention on preventing the
integration o f the public school system. Representatives attended School Board
meetings to watch for signs that board members, who belonged to the leadership class,
were “soft” on segregation. In late August 1955, the organization urged the School
Board to stop “pussyfooting” around and take a stand against integration. On August
25, the board had passed a resolution declaring that it would comply with the state’s
segregation laws but refused to promise that it would continue to maintain separate
facilities if a federal court ordered the desegregation o f the East Baton Rouge Parish
school system. Promising to uphold existing segregation laws was not enough for the
Southern Gentlemen because they knew that the federal courts could declare these
ordinances unconstitutional and force integration. The state secretary-treasurer o f the
Southern Gentlemen, William Lawrence, told the board, “We want you to take a stand
so Negro children won’t show up at white schools.”"
In addition to their preoccupation with the School Board’s commitment to
segregation, the organization also wanted to insure that the city’s and the state’s elected
officials firmly opposed integration. The Southern Gentlemen’s interest in the records
o f elected officials became paramount in late 19S5 and early 1956 as Louisianians
prepared for state and local elections. The organization sent questionnaires to all
candidates running for office asking if they believed in states’ rights, supported

Morning Advocate, December 5,1956, 1; “Six Officials of Ku Klux Klan Resign from
Unit,” Morning Advocate, January 3, 1957,1.
"Report, November 11, 1955, Southern Gentlemen, FBI, File 105-38567.
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segregation, and wanted to maintain separate schools, parks, and public facilities. The
group then publicized the candidates* answers. Easterly urged whites to vote against
any candidate who received the majority o f black votes in primary elections and
claimed that these office seekers “promised in some way to let down segregation’*to
attain African-American support. In previous elections, few Baton Rougeans had cared
about which candidates blacks supported. In fact, white candidates, such as Jesse Webb,
had courted black voters.12
Besides targeting white office holders, the Southern Gentlemen also launched an
attack against the NAACP. In 1955, it reprimanded the East Baton Rouge Parish School
Board for allowing the NAACP to meet at McKinley High School. Claiming that both
black and white Baton Rougeans wanted the races to remain segregated, the Southern
Gentlemen accused the civil rights organization of fomenting discord by trying to
convince local blacks to push for integration. In fact, racial diplomats controlled the
Baton Rouge chapter, and it did not publicly participate in any attempts to overthrow
the system o f segregation.13The School Board refused to give in to the Southern
Gentlemen’s demands and allowed the NAACP to meet at McKinley, but the
Gentlemen succeeded in publicizing their view of outside agitators coming into Baton
Rouge and stirring up the “contented” black masses. In an October 1955 speech,
Easterly declared that the NAACP wanted racial mixing and miscegenation. He

I2Report, January 20,1956, ibid.
I3The local chapter had provided some assistance to A. P. Tureaud, Sr. in his
suits against LSU and worked behind the scenes to secure plaintiffs for the Graduate
and Law School desegregation suits.
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promised that the Southern Gentlemen would fight to maintain segregation at all costs
and warned politicians not to solicit black votes. He promised, “We are going all out to
eliminate low white trash who desire the Negro vote” and claimed that those candidates
for office who solicited black support ranked lower on the despicable scale than “the
bushwhackers and carpetbaggers who plagued our grandfathers.” Easterly added,
“Louisiana is a white man’s state,” but expressed a desire to treat African Americans
fairly. Of course, his definition o f fair treatment required that blacks remain
segregated.14
Initially, white leaders viewed the actions of the Southern Gentlemen with
disdain and refused to comply with the group’s demands. When the organization asked
the city-parish council and the mayor to bar black soldiers taking part in army
maneuvers near Baton Rouge from entering the city, they declined. Easterly and his
followers also wrote to army officials and requested that they keep black troops out of
the city. Angered by this unreasonable request, military officials immediately contacted
Mayor Jesse Webb, Jr. and demanded an explanation. Knowing that any banishm ent of
black troops would bring the wrath of the federal government down upon his city,

l4“Continuance o f Segregation Aim of Local Group,” Morning Advocate,
August 24,1954,6B; “Set Southern Gentlemen State Meeting in City,” Morning
Advocate, October 13, 1955, 1; “Group to Protest NAACP Meeting in Public School,”
Morning Advocate, March 20,1955,1; “Suggests City be Placed O ff Limits to Negro
Troops,” Morning Advocate, October 24,1955, 1; “Keep Negro Troops Away From
Capital, Is Demand,” Times-Picayune, October 24,1955,22.
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Webb refused to prevent the soldiers from spending their leave in Baton Rouge but
warned that these troops would be required to comply with the city’s segregation laws.15
While white leaders in Baton Rouge ignored the demands of segregationists, the
state legislature embraced them. Unlike other southern states, the Louisiana legislature
was in session when the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Brown, and both houses
began frantically to pass bills and propose constitutional amendments in an attempt to
circumvent the ruling. Governor Robert Kennon called for calm and speculated that
Brown would have little impact on Louisiana because “the races work together in
harmony.” The legislature refused to listen to him. On May 21, the House of
Representatives passed by a margin of eighty-four to three a resolution calling for
legislative action in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision. Baton Rouge’s
delegation voted with the majority. Three days later, the Senate concurred. Senator
Willie Rainach of Claiborne Parish, a state segregationist leader, spoke out in favor of
the resolution, declaring that Louisiana needed to express its displeasure over Brown.
Quoting two African Americans from his parish, he declared that black Louisianians
also disapproved o f the ruling and wanted to maintain segregation.16

I5“Suggests City be Placed Off Limits to Negro Troops,” Morning Advocate,
October 24,1955,1; Unknown to H. A. Belmoont, October 26, 1955, Southern
Gentlemen, FBI, File 105-38567; CG ARMYFOUR to TAG DEPTAR, October 27,
1955, Southern Gentlemen, Department of the Army, File 105-38567-9, Department of
the Army, Freedom o f Information Act Division, Fort Meade, Maryland; “Ask Negro
GI Ban for La. Towns,” Item, October 24,1955,4.
16“Govemor Kennon Says State Has Time to Work on Answers to Decision,”
Morning Advocate, May 18,1954, 1; “Positive Action on Segregation Asked by
House,” Morning Advocate, May 21,1954, 1; “Education Committee Gives
Unanimous Approval to House-Passed Resolution on Segregation,” State-Times, May
24, 1954,1.
128

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The legislature did not wait long before taking “positive” action against Brown.
Within a month of the decision, both houses passed three acts aimed at preserving
school segregation and established the Joint Legislative Committee on Segregation to
study integrationist sentiment in the state. The first act proposed a constitutional
amendment that would allow the legislature to call itself into a special session any time
a federal court attempted to force Louisiana schools to desegregate. Another bill
required that the state maintain separate school systems to preserve “peace and good
order in the state” and denied free textbooks and state-financed free lunches to any
schools ordered to integrate. Finally, in an attempt to prevent the courts from assigning
black students to white schools, the legislature placed the responsibility o f pupil
placement on each parish’s school superintendent. The state’s governing body knew
that none of the state’s sixty-four school superintendents would assign black students to
white schools. Rainach declared, “A vote for these bills is a vote to preserve our
southern way o f life. A vote against these bills is an open invitation to the
carpetbaggers, scalawags, and National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People to integrate our schools.” Segregationists thought that the NAACP solicited
local support for suits against segregation. O f course, recent historical studies show that
local people actually pushed the NAACP and other civil rights organizations into
action. In November 1954, the state’s white electorate approved the constitutional
amendment by a margin of four-to-one, but Baton Rouge officials, including Jesse
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Webb, Jr. refused to endorse it. Governor Kennon signed the other two bills into law.
Two years later, the Supreme Court declared all three unconstitutional.17
Segregationists in Baton Rouge and around the state also developed an
obsession with ending integration at LSU, and the legislature devoted much of its time
conjuring up laws aimed at removing black students from the state’s flagship university
and preventing any social or athletic interaction between the races on campus. This
placed university officials in a precarious position. Although they opposed integration,
LSU President Troy Middleton, members o f the Board o f Supervisors, and high-ranking
university administrators refused to defy the authority of the federal government by
restricting the admission of black law and graduate students. But, as members o f the
white leadership class, they wanted to maintain peace and stability within the
community, so they could not simply ignore the vocal segregationist segment o f the
population. They realized that angry mobs o f segregationists staged protests, similar to
those that occurred at the University of Alabama in 1956. Such a protest would gamer
negative publicity for both the university and the city and could hurt the progressive
image that white leaders tried to maintain. Also, if it wanted, the segregationistcontrolled legislature could destroy the university by stripping its funding. Therefore,
school officials devised a plan for dealing with the segregationists. When a potentially

n“Three Measures on Segregation Passed by House,” Morning Advocate, June
29, 1954, 1; “Bills on Segregation Win Final Approval,” Morning Advocate, July 1,
1954, p. 1; “Light Vote Set in State Today on Amendments,” Morning Advocate,
November 2, 1954, 1; “NAACP Asks Suit be Removed to Federal Court,” Morning
Advocate, 29 March 1954, 1; Caroll Joseph Dugas, “Dismantling De Jure Segregation
in Louisiana, 1954-1974" (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University, 1989), 184-186;
McCarrick, “Louisiana’s Official Resistance,” 24.
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controversial racial issue arose, LSU’s administration asked segregationists for their
advice but usually ignored it. This strategy made the segregationists think that they
played a role in determining the university’s racial policies.
In August 1954, LSU officials implemented their strategy when a black male
graduate student asked for permission to swim in the university’s pool. After examining
the request, the university’s attorneys determined that under the terms o f the federal
injunction LSU must allow the student to use the pool, but to quiet the inevitable
protest, they wrote to segregationist lawyers from around the state asking for their legal
opinions. Each of these attorneys said that the school should prohibit black students
from using the swimming pool, even if it meant defying the injunction. W. Scott
Wilkinson, a Shreveport lawyer, warned that if they allowed African-American students
to swim, blacks would eventually ask for interracial dances and social functions. He
also suggested that LSU find unofficial ways to preserve segregation on campus by
assigning black students to the same dorm rooms and requiring them to eat in
designated cafeterias. He warned that indiscriminate interaction between AfricanAmerican and white students would earn the contempt o f the alum ni and whites
throughout the state. Leander Perez, one of the state’ s most outspoken segregationists,
offered one of the more imaginative solutions to the swimming pool problem. He
suggested that if a federal court ordered its integration that the university should fill it in
with concrete and put up a plaque proclaiming “another victory for com m unist
infiltration.” After receiving replies from various attorneys, Fuller wrote to them and
informed them that the university would allow black students to use the swimming pool
because refusing to do so would be a direct violation o f the terms of the federal
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injunction. Although they did not agree with Fuller’s decision, the fact that he asked
their opinions placated the segregationists, who blamed the federal government for the
racial mixing and not university officials.18
The Southern Gentlemen and other Jim Crow supporters believed that the
NAACP was responsible for the desegregation of LSU. They held that the organization
had infiltrated Baton Rouge and stirred up anti-white sentiment in a formerly happy and
content black population. The NAACP therefore became the prime target of the
segregationists. On March 1,1956, Louisiana’s Attorney General Fred LeBlanc, a
Baton Rouge segregationist, with Rainach’s support, filed suit against the civil rights
organization claiming that it violated the state’s 1924 Fuqua Law that required all
organizations to file their membership lists with the Secretary of State’s Office. This
law, which was originally designed to destroy the Ku Klux Klan, had not been enforced
since the 1920s. The Southern Gentlemen and the Citizens’ Councils immediately
submitted their lists before the attorney general took action.19Knowing that
segregationists would use its rolls to intimidate and persecute its members, the NAACP
refused to comply with LeBlanc’s order. In response, State Judge Coleman Lindsey of
Baton Rouge’s Nineteenth Judicial District ordered the organization to submit its
membership list by the end of 1956. The NAACP immediately appealed Lindsey’s

l8W. Scott Wilkinson to James Fuller, August 19,1954, Board of Supervisors
Records, drawer 4, box 2, folder 302; Henry Sevier to Taylor, Porter, Brooks, et al., 17
September 1954, ibid.; Leander Perez to Taylor, Porter, Brooks, et al., September 17,
1954, ibid.; James Fuller to W. Scott Wilkinson, n. d., ibid.; James Fuller to Robert
Chandler, August 17, 1954, ibid.
19Unfortunately, copies of those lists could not be located in the records of the
secretary o f state.
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ruling to the Louisiana Supreme Court. The high court upheld the lower court judge's
decision, and in late April 1956, the Baton Rouge judge issued a permanent injunction
against the NAACP prohibiting any branch from meeting until it filed a membership list
with the secretary o f state. Refusing to capitulate to the segregationists' terror tactics,
NAACP leaders filed an appeal in the federal courts but announced that the
organization would cease operation in Louisiana until that court issued a ruling. Several
branches, including those in New Orleans and Lake Charles, filed their membership
lists before the December 31, 1956 deadline. Baton Rouge’s branch, which was headed
by racial diplomats, did not submit its membership list. Its president, Dr. C. J. Gilliam,
an optometrist, stated, “I doubt very much that we will file.” With that, the Baton
Rouge branch of the NAACP ceased operations and remained inactive for nearly four
years. However many black Baton Rougeans continued to pay dues to the national
organization and retained their memberships. Some business, professional, fraternal and
social organizations even collected NAACP dues and sent the money to the national
office.20
20“Ask Ban Against the NAACP,” Morning Advocate, March 2,1956,1;
Clarence Laws to Branch Officers, March 30, 1956, NAACP Papers, New Orleans
Branch, box 68, Archives Division, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans,
New Orleans, Louisiana; Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 196-197; “Says Louisiana
High Court Must Rule on NAACP,” Morning Advocate, April 5, 1956, 1; “Nullification
of Injunction is Asked by NAACP,” Morning Advocate, April 5, 1956, 13A; “Supreme
Court Refuses to Lift Ban on NAACP,” Morning Advocate, April 10,1956, 1; “NAACP
Permanently Halted from Holding Meetings,” Morning Advocate, April 24,1956, 1;
Clarence Laws to Branch Heads, May 3,1956, NAACP Papers, New Orleans Branch;
box 68; “Appellate Court Puts NAACP Case in Federal Court,” Morning Advocate,
November 27, 1956, I; “NAACP Warned Criminal Charge May Be Filed,” Morning
Advocate, December 20, 1956,1; “First List of Members Filed by NAACP,” Morning
Advocate, January 1, 1957, I; “State Officers of NAACP Filed with Martin Here,”
Morning Advocate, January 5,1957,1; Clarence Laws to Branch Leaders, April 5,
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White leaders in Baton Rouge viewed the enforcement of the Fuqua Law with
consternation. In a letter to Attorney General LeBlanc, Baton Rouge attorney Fred
Benton expressed his dismay. He told LeBlanc that he regretted the attorney general's
decision to sue the NAACP and claimed that suing the group would only serve to stir up
ill will between the races. White leaders believed that the open attack against the
NAACP would strengthen the position o f World War n activists within the black
community and lead to increased demands for integration. They feared that if the
activists gained control o f the black community, peaceful race relations would be
destroyed. With racial diplomats in control, white leaders knew that they could forestall
desegregation. “In the final analysis,” Benton wrote LeBlanc, “integration does not
depend either on enactment of a law or the enforcement of a law .. . . There will be no
real integration o f the races except by mutual consent.” He added that if the state
handled the issue properly and did not antagonize the black masses, it could prevent
integration for years. O f course, segregationists refused to listen to Benton and other
white leaders.21
When the Louisiana legislature convened in 1956, Willie Rainach again seized
control and passed a v a rie ty of acts aimed at circumventing Brown and asserting the
supremacy of state over federal authority. One amendment to the state’s constitution
blocked integration suits by withdrawing the state’s consent to any lawsuits, except
those involving contract disputes, against any city, parish, or state agency. The
1956, NAACP Papers, New Orleans Branch, box 68.
2IFred Benton to Fred LeBlanc, n. d., Attorney General’s Papers, box 11, State
Archives, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
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legislature also passed a law placing all public parks under state authority and voted to
end compulsory school attendance for school systems ordered to integrate. Emmitt
Erwin, president of the New Orleans chapter of the Citizens’ Council, applauded the
segregationist legislative package. He charged that integration grew out o f a com m unist
plot to overthrow the United States government. John Easterly echoed Erwin’s
statement, “We want to do this [maintain segregation] in a peaceful way, but we are
going to stay segregated in Louisiana come hell or high water.”22
Within days, Rainach’s bills breezed through the House and Senate, and Senator
J. D. DeBlieux of East Baton Rouge Parish provided the only opposition to the
segregationist legislation. DeBlieux grew up Ouachita Parish, in the northeastern
portion o f Louisiana. The son o f a sharecropper, he moved to Baton Rouge in the mid
1930s to attend LSU’s Law School. His decision to oppose the segregationist legislative
package grew out of two things, he later explained: his upbringing and his belief in the
sanctity o f the United States Constitution. As a child his parents taught him to respect
all people, including African Americans, and even required him to address the black
sharecroppers who lived nearby as “Miss” or “Mister,” a courtesy almost unheard of at
that time. Segregationists angrily denounced DeBlieux’s refusal to vote for the
legislation. Other members o f Baton Rouge’s delegation to the state legislature voted
for the bills, but none of them proposed any segregationist legislation or sat on any of
the committees controlled by Rainach. The Southern Gentlemen issued a press release

“ James McCLean, “7-Point Plan on Segregation Due this Week,” Morning
Advocate, May 20,1956,1; “Delay Vote on Bill to Prohibit Mixed Sports,” Morning
Advocate, June 27, 1956,1.
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accusing DeBlieux of ignoring the wishes o f his constituents. Other segregationists
made threatening phone calls to the Baton Rouge senator, and a group of them burned a
cross on his front lawn. White leaders and liberals, however, sent him letters o f support
and encouragement.23
Although it passed a variety o f segregationist laws, including one that banned
television programs that depicted black and white characters as social equals, the 1956
legislature focused most of its attention on preventing school desegregation and ending
the court-ordered integration of LSU’s Law and Graduate Schools. In February, the
Southern Gentlemen and segregationist members of the Board o f Supervisors attempted
to convince the entire board to ban athletic competition between the LSU and schools
with black athletes on their teams. The board refused to agree to the self-imposed ban.
The Southern Gentlemen also asked that LSU tighten its entrance requirements to
exclude African-American students. President Troy Middleton denounced changing the
university’s entrance requirements stating, “LSU has repeatedly made it clear it does
not want Negro students but will at no time resort to subterfuge in the application of
policies.” He added that black students enrolled under a federal injunction and that he
and university officials believed in law and order and could not in good conscience
violate the law. Angered by the board’s refusal to alter its admission policies and to
adopt a color ban for athletic competitions, the Southern Gentlemen demanded that its

23J. D. DeBlieux, interview by author, tape recording, T. Harry Williams Center
for Oral History Collection, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana
State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; “Interposition Move Approved by
Senate,” Morning Advocate, May 29,1956,1; “DeBlieux Blasted by Southern
Gentleman,” Morning Advocate, June 3, 1956, 13C.
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members resign. The organization claimed that their resignation would be “the decent
thing to do” and would allow the governor to select a new board that would “fulfill the
wishes o f the citizens o f the state.” Southern Gentlemen president John Easterly
accused African Americans who enrolled at LSU of wanting to cause racial mixing
rather than obtain an education. He advocated “educating Negroes well enough so that
they can be sent back to Africa to run their own governments.” Easterly also suggested
that if LSU continued to admit black students it would be unworthy of the support of
white Louisianians.24
Frustrated by Middleton and the board, the segregationists remained determined
to remove African-American students from LSU, even if it meant defying the federal
injunction. Therefore, they turned to the legislature, which gladly took up the cause.
The House and Senate immediately passed a law banning athletic contests between
teams with players o f different races. Opponents of the measure claimed that the law
would prevent LSU from competing against universities from areas outside o f South
and would ruin the school’s chances for winning a national championship in football.
Some segregationists, including Willie Rainach, feared that a law that hurt LSU’s
chances of being invited to one o f the major bowl games would prevent passage o f the
legislation because, for many Louisianians, Tiger football took precedence over

24“Segregation Bills Hold Legislature’s Interest,” Morning Advocate, June 13,
1956, 1; “LSU Board Rejects ‘Color’ Clause, Makes No Change in Entrance
Requirements,” Morning Advocate, February 19, 1956, 1; “Move to Revive Color Ban
on Athletics at LSU Killed by Board,” Morning Advocate, April 8,1956, 1;
“Segregationists Ask LSU Board for Resignation,” Morning Advocate, February 23,
1956, 1; “Easterly Scores LSU Stand onNegro Question,” Morning Advocate, April 11,
1956, 6A.
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everything, even segregation. One supporter of the bill, Stewart Slack, a Shreveport
native and member o f the Board of Supervisors, claimed that African Americans would
not be satisfied with the integration of athletic competitions. If the state gave in, he
believed, blacks, who were never satisfied with just a little, would push for integration
o f the grandstands. In the end, the segregationists won, the law passed, and Governor
Earl Long reluctantly signed it Long, though, predicted that the Supreme Court would
overturn it, which it did in May 1959.25
While some segregationists hesitated to ban mixed athletic contests, they
eagerly passed laws to tighten LSU’s entrance requirements. One law required all
students to obtain certificates o f eligibility and good moral character signed by their
high school principals and their parish superintendent o f education in order to enroll at
any o f the state’s colleges and universities. LSU, with its integrated Graduate and Law
Schools, was the primary target o f the new law. To prevent principals and
superintendents from signing certificates for black students attempting to enroll in white
schools, segregationist legislators passed the Teacher Tenure Act that called for the
termination of any teacher or school official who advocated integration. In combination,

^ “Rainach to Study Bill Outlawing Mixed Athletics,” Morning Advocate, June
17, 1956, 1; “Delay Vote on Bill to ProhibitMixed Sports,” Morning Advocate, June
27, 1956,1; “Long Asks for Views on Athletic Segregation Bill,” Morning Advocate,
July 16, 1956, 1; “Long Signs Bill to Ban Mixed Athletic Contests in State,” Morning
Advocate, July 17,1956,1; “High Court Throws Out Law on Mixed Sports,” Morning
Advocate, May 26,1959, 1.
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these laws prevented African Americans who graduated from a Louisiana high school
from gaining admission to LSU.26
The university’s administration realized the Supreme Court would overturn the
law, but Middleton and his advisors complied with it because it applied to all students
and did not directly violate the injunction requiring the admission of African-American
graduate and professional students. Although Middleton agreed to ask for certificates o f
eligibility before admitting new students, he refused to demand that continuing students
supply them. His decision angered segregationists. They wanted the immediate end to
integration at LSU and asserted that the new law required all students to submit
certificates. To insure enforcement o f the law, Rainach and his supporters demanded
that the district attorneys of the parishes that housed colleges and universities force
colleges to comply with it. J. St. Clair Favrot, East Baton Rouge Parish’s district
attorney, refused to bow to segregationist pressure. He decided to let the university
formulate its own admissions policy for continuing students because he feared that if
LSU required continuing students to file certificates, the federal courts would overturn
the law. Favrot supported the end to integration at LSU but wanted to achieve it in a
way that would generate the least amount of negative publicity for Baton Rouge.
Nevertheless, the segregationist onslaught against the university continued. Fearing that
the legislature would slash the university’s funding if it held out, Middleton and the
Board o f Supervisors changed the policy and decided to require continuing students to

26“Segregation Bills Okayed by Senate Education Group,” Morning Advocate,
June 7, 1956, 1; “Appropriation, Segregation Bills Are Signed,” Morning Advocate,
July 11, 1956, 1; “Act 15 of 1956,” Morning Advocate, July 16, 1956,2A.
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submit certificates. Middleton defended the reversal and stated that until the courts
ruled the law unconstitutional, LSU would comply with it beginning in the spring
semester o f 1957.27
African-American graduate students and black activists immediately decided to
test the constitutionality of the law. hi November 1956, Amease Ludley, an AfricanAmerican graduate student at LSU, asked A. P. Tureaud to represent her in her fight
against the certificate o f eligibility requirement. Tureaud set out to prove that although
the law applied to all students, it discriminated against blacks and prevented them from
attending LSU because no teacher or school employee would dare sign a certificate for
a black student for fear of losing his or her job. A graduate of Grambling High School,
located near Ruston in North Louisiana, Ludley attempted to secure her certificate.
First, she asked LSU’s registrar’s office for a copy of the eligibility form to send to her
former principal and superintendent. The office refused to give her one, stating that
only white students and black students who attended out of state high schools could
obtain the forms. The only four African Americans attending LSU to file acceptable
certificates graduated from out-of-state high schools. Undaunted, Ludley proceeded
without an eligibility form. She wrote to her high school principal, Arthur Smith, and
asked him to vouch for her good moral character. He replied that he had no eligibility

27“Segregation Bills Okayed by Senate Education Group,” Morning Advocate,
June 7, 1956, 10D; “Appropriation, Segregation Bills Are Signed,” Morning Advocate,
July 11, 1956, I; “DAs Plan Stricter Enforcement of Law School Eligibility,” Morning
Advocate, October 2, 1956,11A; “Favrot Differs from Rainach on Meaning of Law,”
Morning Advocate, October 12, 1956,1; “LSU to Demand Certificates of All Students,”
Morning Advocate, October 14, 1956,1; Dugas, “Dismantling De Jure Segregation,”
146-148.
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forms and added that even if he had one he would not sign it because “under state law, I
would lose my job.” He apologized, “I assure you my refusal to sign the certificate is
not intended to cast an unfavorable reflection against your character. I just cannot take
the risk of losing my job.” With this evidence in hand, Tureaud filed suit, and in
January 1957, Federal Judge Herbert Christenberry issued a temporary restraining order
preventing LSU from requiring the certificates until a federal court ruled on the laws’
constitutionality. He ordered the university to admit Ludley and all other black graduate
students who met the school’s other entrance requirements. Even after the judge’s
injunction, the number o f black graduate students plummeted from eighty-five in the
spring of 1956 to thirty-seven in the spring o f 1957.28
In January 1957, LSU suspended Ludley claiming that her grades had dropped
below the required average, and the university’s attorneys asked the judge to dismiss
the suit because Ludley was the only plaintiff. The judge refused, and Tureaud quickly
substituted two other plaintiffs, Ruth Mae Johnson of Natchitoches and Audrey Carr
Robertson of New Orleans. Both women unsuccessfully attempted to obtain certificates
of eligibility, and in April 1957, Judge J. Skelly Wright o f New Orleans, who later
earned the wrath of segregationists by ordering the integration of Orleans Parish
schools, declared certificates of eligibility and the Teacher Tenure Act unconstitutional.

28Amease Ludley to A. P. Tureaud, November 15, 1956, APT, box 69, folder 1;
Arthur Smith to Amease Ludley, November 26, 1956, APT, box 69, folder 1; “Rule Out
Eligibility Papers,” Morning Advocate, June 18,1957,1; ‘Tour Negroes Give
Acceptable Papers at LSU,” Morning Advocate, January 24,1957,11A; “LSU Policies
on Segregation are Spelled Out,” Morning Advocate, September 2, 1956, 1.
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O f course, the state’s attorney general Jack Gremillion filed an appeal, but the Supreme
Court upheld the ruling in June 1958.
University officials refused to enforce other segregation laws because they
directly violated court orders. One required complete segregation on campus. Troy
Middleton knew that under the court order requiring the admission of black law and
graduate students the university could not implement this act, but he feared that direct
defiance o f it would bring the wrath of the Joint Committee down upon himself and the
university. He turned to the Board of Supervisors for help. He sent its members a list of
twenty-one questions asking in minute detail how the university should treat black
students. Their answers became the official policy for desegregation at LSU. Among
other things, Middleton asked if black students could live in the same dorms, use the
same restrooms and water fountains, and eat in the same cafeterias as white students.
The board answered yes. He asked if the silverware black students used should be kept
separate from that o f white students. The board answered no. It decided that all of the
university’s academic functions would be open to black students but that all social
aspects of these functions must end. Organizations with black members could not serve
refreshments at their meetings or hold banquets. When faced with the problem of
African-American alumni attending homecoming events, the university’s
Administrative Council decided to inform them o f the new policy by “designating
someone to take. . . [them] into a separate room and explain the situation while serving
refreshments.” The answers to the questions placated the Joint Committee and allowed
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the university to operate within the boundaries o f the federal injunctions. The Supreme
Court eventually declared all o f these segregation laws unconstitutional.29
Although LSU officials wanted to follow the court’s rulings, they also wanted to
make it clear to the segregationists that they abhorred integration. In September 1958,
the Board o f Supervisors issued a statement declaring, “This board wishes to point out
that any Negro student whose enrollment is forced upon the u n iv e rs ity enters as an
unwanted matriculant” It added that the presence o f black students “served as a symbol
of defiance o f tradition and customs o f this university” and created discord between the
races “instead of the feeling o f mutual respect which both races have had for each other,
lo these many years.” The university even advised black applicants to apply to Southern
University’s graduate programs. The State Board of Education had established a
graduate school at Southern in 1957.30
While the administration proclaimed its support for segregation, many o f the
university’s professors, especially those from the North and West, did not. State
legislators feared that these outsiders taught integration in their classrooms and
attempted to convince young white students to abandon their traditional system o f race
relations. In July 1956, LSU’s student newspaper, the Reveille, published an editorial

29“LSU Policies on Segregation Spelled Out,” Morning Advocate, September 2,
1956, 1; Administrative Council Minutes, Office o f the President Records, drawer 16,
box 2, folder 1127.
30“LSU Announces Stronger Stand on Segregation,” Morning Advocate,
September 14, 1958,1; J. K. Haynes to Daniel Byrd, October 22,1958, Daniel Byrd
Papers, box 2, folder 13, Amistad Research Center, Tulane University, New Orleans
(hereafter cited as the Byrd Papers), Louisiana; Arthur Chapital to J. K. Haynes,
September 1958, NAACP Papers, New Orleans Branch, box 69.
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criticizing the legislature for passing the package o f segregationist acts and immediately
incurred the wrath o f Willie Rainach and his supporters. He accused integrationist
professors o f brainwashing the members of the Reveille staff and urged parents to
contact the university to ask if professors taught integration in their classrooms.
Rainach also demanded that LSU’s administration censor the student newspaper.
Although some members of the Board of Supervisors wanted to change the paper’s
editorial policy, the majority believed that such action would violate the students’ First
Amendment rights. The board’s firm stand on the issue silenced the segregationists, but
their obsession with the infiltration of integrationist sentiment at LSU continued to
grow.31
The rise o f segregationist sentiment in East Baton Rouge Parish created
problems for Troy Middleton and other white leaders. They wanted to continue to
attract new business and industry into the area and believed the segregationists
threatened the social, economic, and political stability o f Baton Rouge. The Southern
Gentlemen and the Citizens’ Council tried to convince the white masses that any
concessions on the issue of segregation would lead to the destruction o f southern
society, and they charged anyone who advocated changes to the system o f Jim Crow
with being integrationists. White leaders dealt with the segregationists much as they did
the black activists; they granted minor concessions in an attempt to appease them. In
1955, the School Board used this policy when it passed the resolution declaring its

3I“Rainach Hits Editorial in Daily Reveille,” Morning Advocate, July 28,1956,
1; “Rainach Urges Reveille Probe,” Morning Advocate, August 2, 1956, 1; “Lake
Charles Man Heads LSU Board,” Morning Advocate, August 5,1956, 1.
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support for segregated schools but refusing to advocate closing facilities to prevent
integration. LSU lawyers used a similar tactic when it polled segregationists about
allowing an African American to swim in the campus’s pool. While these concessions
temporarily mollified them, the segregationists continued to demand that white leaders
take stronger stands against integration and, to some degree, succeeded. Although
Middleton wanted to apply the law requiring certificates o f eligibility only to new
students, segregationist pressure forced him to ask all students to submit them. The
policy of appeasement did not destroy segregationist sentiment in Baton Rouge, nor did
it silence organizations such as the Southern Gentlemen. But, it prevented violence, and
as riots erupted in Tuscaloosa and federal troops marched in to Little Rock, Baton
Rouge remained peaceful and continued to grow and prosper.
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Chapter 5
Liberal Opposition to Segregation, 1955-1960
As the segregationists launched their attack on Brown, a new group arrived on
the scene — the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC). On February 1, 1955,
the Philadelphia-based group opened a job opportunities office in Baton Rouge and
launched its Employment on Merit (EOM) Program in the city. In the 1940s, the
Friends had lobbied for improved working conditions abroad, especially in Asia, but
had ignored the impact o f segregation in the United States. After receiving criticism for
overlooking the segregation of employees in the South and the wide disparity between
wages earned by black and white Americans, they decided to create the EOM Program
to address job discrimination “on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic origin” in the
United States and opened offices in Chicago, Indianapolis, Dallas, and Greensboro. In
each location, AFSC representatives met with businessmen and community leaders and
urged them to end discriminatory hiring practices.
The Friends selected Baton Rouge as one of their target cities for several
reasons. In the 1950s, the city of 160,000 had become one of the largest industrial
centers in the Deep South. Besides the existing industries, between 1955 and 1958,
several national corporations, including U.S. Rubber, Dow, Shell, and Dupont, built
plants in the community, creating thousands of new jobs. The AFSC wanted the new
and existing plants to desegregate their workforces, including their professional and
office staffs. Because these companies operated at a national level but employed
thousands of local people, both black and white, the Friends thought that they could
integrate without suffering from segregationist reprisals. The AFSC also saw Baton
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Rouge as an ideal place to challenge workforce segregation because, unlike other Deep
South communities such as Birmingham, which boasted some industrial development
but were dominated by rabid segregationists, moderate white leaders ran Baton Rouge.
They had worked diligently for over a decade to attract business and industry to the
city, and the Friends believed that officials would accept desegregation of these
industries’ workforces to keep them in the community.1
In early 1955, the Friends’ national office sent field representative Eugene
Sutherland to Baton Rouge. Dedicated to the idea of teaching through example, the
AFSC decided to operate an integrated office in Baton Rouge, although its local
contacts advised against it. One o f Sutherland’s advisors, Milton Vigo, a New
Orleanian who headed the Louisiana Council on Human Relations, advised him not to
tell potential landlords o f his plan because no one would rent to him if he or she knew
about the interracial staff. Vigo also encouraged Sutherland to move slowly because the
city’s white leaders were not ready to make major changes in the system of segregation.
Because few African Americans wanted to risk the wrath of the white com m unity by
accepting a clerical position in an integrated office, Sutherland searched for two months
before he found a qualified black applicant willing to work as his secretary. On April
15, 1955, Myrtle Douglas, a Southern University graduate, accepted the job. Two days
later, the manager of the AFSC’s office building evicted the group. One of the other
renters in the building, Glen Nordyke, director of the local Boy Scouts, informed
‘Report on Merit Employment Program, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, August 1957,
AFSC, Community Relations Files, 1957; Baton Rouge Merit Employment Program,
AFSC, Community Relations Files, 1955; Richard Bennett to Thelma Babbitt, October
28,1955, AFSC, Community Relations Files, 1955.
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Sutherland that the presence o f a black secretary upset his two female clerical workers.
One claimed that if her father learned o f the conditions in the AFSC office, he would
not allow her to work in the building. The other stated that her husband would make her
quit her job if he feund out about the black secretary. Forced to abandon their office,
Sutherland and Douglas moved to a building on Government Street in a racially mixed
neighborhood. Sutherland’s landlord also evicted him from his apartment and told the
Quaker representative that Baton Rouge was not ready to accept the employment of a
black secretary in a white office. Sutherland believed that the Southern Gentlemen
pressured his landlord into forcing him out.2
In fact, when Sutherland opened the Baton Rouge office, the Southern
Gentlemen had targeted him and anyone who associated with him for harassment. On
May 12, 1955, two members o f the segregationist group appeared at the AFSC office
and interrogated Sutherland. One identified himself as a supervisor at Gulf Utilities and
the other claimed that he worked at ESSO. In his report to his supervisors, Sutherland
did not name the men. He did relate that they had asked him if he was a southerner by
birth — he was not — and accused him and the AFSC of hying to stir up trouble
between the races. The two men quoted the Old Testament to prove that “the Negro
race had a separate and lowly origin [and was] destined to fulfill the role of chore-boy
for the white man.” After an hour, they left, but Sutherland encountered one of them
three days later in the parking lot of the Unitarian Church where he was scheduled to
2Eugene Sutherland to the File, ca. February 1955, AFSC, Baton Rouge
Employment on Merit Program, South Central Regional Office, 1955; Eugene
Sutherland to the File, May 10, 1955, ibid.; Eugene Sutherland to the File, June 2,1955,
ibid.
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give a speech about the EOM Program. Two members o f the Southern Gentlemen,
along with their president John Easterly, attended the service and asked Sutherland why
he refused to interview white applicants to work as his secretary. The extent o f the
segregationists’ hatred of the Friends manifested itself on July 20, 1955, when a
gunman shot out the windows o f their office. In a separate incident on the same night,
gunmen also shot and injured two African-American graduate students on the LSU
campus. The incidents so traumatized Douglas that she quit, but Sutherland refused to
allow the segregationists to intimidate him. The police failed to arrest anyone in the
shooting incidents, but Sutherland believed that the Southern Gentlemen were
responsible.3
Determined to carry out the EOM Program, Sutherland began meeting with
white liberals to plan its implementation. He first contacted Marjorie Longsdorf, one of
the few Friends in Baton Rouge. Longsdorf was a vocational counselor at Baton Rouge
High School; her husband Ford worked as an insurance agent and played an active role
in community affairs. He belonged to the Kiwanis Club and worked with the Boy
Scouts. Although not a Friend, he supported the EOM Program. The Longsdorfs
encouraged Sutherland to take a “slow and gradual” approach to changing Baton
Rouge’s employment practices. They suggested that he contact other white liberals.
When asked to recommend black leaders with whom the AFSC could work, the
Longsdorfs urged him to talk to racial diplomats, including B. V. Baranco, Felton
Clark, and Leo S. Butler. They told him to avoid contact with Jemison because the
3Eugene Sutherland to the File, May 16, 1955, ibid; Confidential Report on Visit
to Baton Rouge and Austin, October 10 - October 21, 1955, ibid.
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white community perceived him as a “troublemaker” who was actively involved in the
NAACP and responsible for the 1953 bus boycott Jemison, they argued, was “persona
non grata in the community at large, and his participation in our program would deter
many others from cooperating.” In reality, Jemison had acted like a racial diplomat
during the last stages o f the boycott and had negotiated an amicable settlement between
black and white leaders, hi the 1960s, the white power structure would turn to him
when problems arose in the African-American community.4
Sutherland met with several other white liberals in an attempt to discover the
state of race relations in the city, to determine the best course o f action to follow in
setting up the EOM Program, and to organize a biracial advisory committee to help him
carry it out. He first met with Rabbi Walter Peiser, a native of Austin, Texas, and a
twenty-eight year resident of Baton Rouge. Peiser offered advice similar to the
Longsdorfs’ and told him that only by moving slowly could racial progress be made.
Reverend William Trice of University Methodist Church showed little interest in the
AFSC program but offered Sutherland some advice on how to proceed. He suggested
approaching the large industries first because their top management came from out of
state and were not bound by the local patterns of race relations. Other religious and
business leaders echoed Trice’s suggestion. Reverend John Felton o f the First
Presbyterian Church urged Sutherland to contact the manager of the ESSO plant, Henry
Voorhies. Felton described Voorhies as “exceptionally able and broad-minded” and
added that the plant manager “has done more for Baton Rouge than any other single

4Eugene Sutherland to Fay K. Hutchens, February 10, 1955, ibid.
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individual

Once ESSO breaks through the color barrier, the First Presbyterian

church will be in a position to follow suit.” Other white liberals agreed that ESSO or
one of the other national corporations could best initiate racial changes. They blamed
working-class whites who had moved into the area from rural Louisiana and Mississippi
for most of the racism in Baton Rouge. Trice described the recent migrants as
“backwards” and poorly educated. He added, “It will take time to weed out the
prejudices that flourish in this milieu.” Felton declared this group lacked “a cultural
background which would ameliorate emotional explosions.” With his interviews with
liberals complete, Sutherland asked racial diplomat James Cook, Jr., an ESSO
employee and owner o f Cook’s Theater; Melvin Dakin, LSU Law School professor;
Mary Epperson, wife of LSU Music Professor Gordon Epperson; Edwin Gaskill, a
research engineer at Allied Chemical Company; Martin Harvey, Southern’s dean of
students; Jane Rein’l, a community activist; and O. J. Wenzel, former coordinator of the
Baton Rouge Trade and Industrial Schools, to join the AFSC’s biracial advisory
committee. All agreed to serve on the committee.5
With the advisory group in place, Sutherland met with three groups of
employers white business leaders, plant managers, and owners and operators of
department stores, restaurants, and other small businesses — to discuss implementation
of the EOM Program. White business leaders declared that Baton Rouge’s economic
condition far surpassed that of other southern cities. Many feared that the presence of
sIbid.; Eugene Sutherland to the File, Re: Reverend William Trice, June 14,
1955, ibid.; Gene Sutherland to the File, Re: Reverend John Felton, June 14,1955, ibid.
The quotes attributed to Sutherland’s interviewees come from his written reports to his
superiors.
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the Friends would make conditions worse for black employees. Executive Director o f
the Chamber of Commerce Opie Shelton claimed that he knew o f “no particular
discrimination practices in employment” He added that black Baton Rougeans earned
more money than their counterparts in other parts o f the country. He attributed much of
the race’s progress to ESSO and the other plants and refineries. White leaders also
believed that African Americans were happy with the conditions of their employment
because they had heard no complaints. Herman Moyse, the senior trust officer of City
National Bank, told Sutherland that the EOM Program disgusted him and warned him
not to disturb “the happy state of affairs” in Baton Rouge.6
Sutherland also met with representatives o f the city’s plants and refineries and
discovered that plant officials, fearing that their white employees would strike, were
reluctant to integrate their workforces. The AFSC representative visited ESSO first. As
one of the city’s largest employers, ESSO’s workforce in 1955 numbered 7,300, of
whom approximately 1,100 were black. The plant’s manager, H. J. Voorhies, bragged
that the local facility operated as an autonomous unit and that he and the other on-site
administrators “ran the show.” He told Sutherland that the plant’s hiring practices had
improved conditions for black Baton Rougeans and added that although the plant’s
black employees worked in unskilled positions, some operated machinery such as
rubber packing machines and lawn mowers. A few African Americans even headed all
black work crews in the auxiliary department, which was made up of common laborers.

6Eugene Sutherland to Thelma Babbitt, March 2,1955, AFSC, Employment on
Merit Program, South Central Regional Office, 1955; Eugene Sutherland to the File,
April 13,1955, ibid.
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Although they accrued seniority within this department, they could not transfer it to
other departments. Therefore, if ESSO lifted all racial barriers and allowed African
Americans to work in skilled and professional positions, they would lose their seniority.
When asked about carrying out the Employment on Merit Program, Voorhies stated that
doing so would hurt the black workers and would lead to layoffs because white workers
were inherently superior and would take jobs currently reserved for black workers. He
believed that, with a few exceptions, African Americans “lacked native ability.” The
plant’s director of Employee Relations echoed Voorhies. He told Sutherland that if
white and black workers were forced to compete for common laborer positions, the
African Americans simply would not make the grade. Both men boasted that ESSO
paid its black workers well and added that they earned higher salaries than most African
Americans.7
Unlike white liberals who believed that the integration of ESSO’s workforce
would lead to changes in the community, Voorhies claimed that local customs required
that his plant maintain separate workforces. He told Sutherland that in Arabia, the
corporation did not try to “make Americans out of Arabians.” He added that if he
changed the plant’s hiring policies, he would offend whites and destroy the good
relationship that existed between ESSO and the white community. More important, he
knew that if he filled skilled positions with African Americans, then white workers
would strike. In fact, when black workers took over the mowing of the plant’s grounds

7Gene Sutherland to the File, May 2,1955, ibid.; Gene Sutherland to the File,
May 23,1955, ibid.
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from white workers, the white union threatened to strike if blacks continued to maintain
the lawn.8
After Voorhies refused to integrate ESSO’s workforce as part o f the EOM
Program, the Committee on Federal Contracts forced him to reconsider. The committee,
created by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, required industries receiving government
contracts to have integrated workforces. To retain his facility’s government contracts,
Voorhies initiated a series of secret meetings with plant officials and representatives o f
its white and black unions, the Independent Industrial Workers Association Sections
One (white) and Two (black). After meeting more than twenty times, Voorhies and the
unions agreed to desegregate portions of the plant’s workforce. The plan allowed black
workers to move into the helper pool, which had previously been reserved for whites,
and to be paid $2.26 per hour. At the time, African Americans starting in the auxiliary
section earned a little over a dollar per hour. Plant officials promised that when black
workers in the helper pool obtained enough experience, they could enter an apprentice
program and eventually become skilled workers. This process would take at least four
years and was limited to only thirty positions. The plan did not address the integration
of the clerical, technical, or professional staffs. The Committee on Government
Contracts nevertheless approved ESSO’s hiring agreement in late 1955, but the
company refused to make the policy change public.9

8Gene Sutherland to the File, June 24, 1955, ibid.
9Gene Sutherland to the File, October 11,1955, AFSC, Visits with Placement
Directors, South Central Regional Office, 1955.
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According to James Cook, the vice president o f the Independent Industrial
Workers Second Section Two, the plant required African Americans applying forjobs
in the helper pool to pass an aptitude test He confidently proclaimed that enough blacks
would pass the test to fill the thirty available positions. As a racial diplomat, Cook
viewed the agreement as a victory for black workers even though it preserved
segregated facilities, including the cafeteria and restrooms. He believed these barriers
would “wither away” on their own as black workers proved their ability and reliability.
He and other black union members refused to push the corporation for greater changes,
and the World War H activists denounced Cook and the other union members for their
timidity. The activists realized that ESSO officials would never willingly desegregate
plant facilities or hire African Americans to fill professional positions.10
Although the EOM Program focused its attention on the city’s large
corporations, it also pursued the desegregation o f other Baton Rouge businesses.
Sutherland visited several department stores to discuss employment on merit. Store
managers listened with interest to his description o f the program, but when he asked
them to hire black store clerks and cashiers, they refused even to consider it. They
believed that white shoppers would shim their businesses if they hired black
salespeople. The manager of I. H. Rubenstein claimed that white Baton Rougeans
“would literally see red at being served by Negroes.” John Stotler, the manager of J. C.

I0Minutes o f the Baton Rouge Employment on Merit Program’s Advisory
Committee Meeting, November 28,1955, AFSC, Employment on Merit Program,
South Central Regional Office, 1955; Gene Sutherland to the File, October 19,1955,
AFSC, Visits With Placement Directors, South Central Regional Program, 1955.
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Penney, said that whites “would refuse to trade with the employer who breaks the
barrier.”11
Despite its attempts to encourage businesses to integrate their workforces, the
AFSC accomplished very little during its first year in Baton Rouge. Although ESSO
agreed to start limited employment on merit, the federal government rather than the
Friends was the driving force behind its change in hiring practices. Most white Baton
Rougeans saw the Friends as outside agitators who wanted to convince African
Americans to demand changes in the system o f segregation and to create racial
animosity in the community. Although white liberals agreed with the goals of the AFSC
and pledged their support, many were too frightened to play an active role in the city’s
only interracial organization. With a strong and capable leader, the Friends might have
been able to serve as a unifying force for white liberals, but Eugene Sutherland
possessed neither of these characteristics. He hailed from the North, and white Baton
Rougeans immediately pegged him as an outsider. In addition, he was untidy in
appearance, disorganized, argumentative, and unwilling to listen to the views of others.
All of these factors lessened his ability to deal with the hostile environment that he
encountered in Baton Rouge. Fearing that Sutherland would alienate potential
supporters, the AFSC placed him on probation, and in 1956, he resigned and left Baton
Rouge.12

"Gene Sutherland to the File, September 30, 1955, AFSC, Visits with
Placement Directors, South Central Regional Office, 1955; Gene Sutherland to the File,
September 7,1930, ibid; Gene Sutherland to the File, September 20, 1955, ibid.
l2The AFSC records do not reveal the reasons for his departure. Richard Bennett
to Thelma Babbitt, October 28,1955, AFSC, Baton Rouge Employment on Merit
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Still convinced that the EOM program could succeed in Baton Rouge, the AFSC
replaced Sutherland with Wade Mackie. A native o f North Carolina, Mackie was
committed to “the brotherhood o f man and the dignity and worth of individuals.” He
believed that all men and women, regardless of race or creed, should be treated equally.
He even treated those who held different opinions, the segregationists, with respect.
Mackie possessed the personal and organizational skills necessary to unite white
liberals, who before his arrival could not agree on a course of action, and to mastermind
white resistance to segregation. Under his direction, the AFSC’s Baton Rouge program
flourished.13
Mackie and the Friends remained committed to the EOM program, and ESSO
remained the key to the AFSC’s plan. Like Sutherland, the Quaker leader met with
Voorhies and encouraged him to increase the numbers o f African Americans hired to
All non-traditional jobs. The plant manager, however, remained unmoved by —
Mackie’s pleas. Two years after the agreement between ESSO and the Committee on
Government Contracts, the only non-traditional jobs open to African Americans were
the thirty allocated in 1955. Other industries, including Kaiser Aluminum and Ethyl,
had promised to begin the process of desegregating their workforces, but they promoted
few blacks to positions usually held by whites. The plant managers defended their
hiring practices and claimed that no African Americans had applied for “white”
positions. Mackie believed that they were lying, so he devised a plan to reveal their

Program, South Central Regional Office, 1955.
I3Baton Rouge Employment on Merit Program Report, August 1956, AFSC,
Relations Files, South Central Regional Office, 1956.
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duplicity. He wanted to ask several o f Southern University’s top graduates to test the
hiring practices at local plants. High ranking Southern graduates easily obtained jobs
with national corporations in other parts of the country, and if the Baton Rouge-based
plants were truly committed to the EOM program, they would also hire Southern’s top
scholars. But Mackie was never able to carry out his plan. When Mackie asked
Southern’s President Felton Clark for help in recruiting the top graduates, he refused.
Clark feared that if he even associated with Mackie, segregationists in the state
legislature would destroy the university.14
The responses of Baton Rouge’s white plant and store managers to the EOM
Program were not unique. In their other forays into the South, the Friends received
similar reactions. From 1952 to 1956, the AFSC operated an EOM Program in
Greensboro, North Carolina. There, just as in Baton Rouge, a representative contacted
the managers of all of the major industries and department stores and asked them to hire
black workers to fill non-traditional skilled and clerical positions. In every case, the
managers refused and told the Friends that integration should start with the churches
and not with the businesses. Despite the liberals’ hopes for leadership from the national
corporations, they usually conformed to southern racial practices.15

14Baton Rouge Employment on Merit Program Report, August 1956, AFSC,
Community Relations Files, South Central Regional Office, 1956; Report to the
American Friends Service Committee’s Regional Committee, AFSC, Baton Rouge
Employment on Merit Program Reports, South Central Regional Office, 1957; Jean
Fairfax to Barbara Moffitt, December 11, 1957, ibid.
I5Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights, 34-35.
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Unlike Sutherland who focused his attention almost exclusively on the EOM
Program, Mackie wanted to attack segregation in other areas o f the Baton Rouge
community. He met with a variety of church groups to make contacts within the black
and white communities and organized an interracial ministerial alliance to improve the
relationship between the races. Mackie believed that the ministers who joined the group
represented “a segment o f the community, white and Negro, from whom a witness for
brotherhood and the moral righteousness o f integration must come.” Approximately ten
ministers joined the new group, hi his reports to his superiors, Mackie never named the
ten but described them as “liberals caught unprepared by the Supreme Court decision
[Brown] and left confused and immobilized by the wave o f [segregationist] reaction to
it.” The ministers who supported integration applauded the alliance, but without the
AFSC, they would have continued to flounder because they feared the wrath of the
segregationists. One unidentified minister told Mackie, “We need organization worse
than any other professional group.” Although their numbers remained small, these
ministers used their pulpits to denounce segregation and call for social and economic
equality. O f course, the majority of Baton Rouge’s clergy refused to join the
organization, and some would not meet with Mackie. The Quaker leader reported that
one minister, who denied his request for a conference, “feels like a saint while
maintaining the status quo” and described another as possessing “one of the worst
attitudes I have encountered, accompanied by a sense o f holiness.” Other ministers
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claimed to support integration, but refused to join the alliance because of their fear of
reprisals from their congregations and from segregationists.16
While they supported the work of the Friends, many white liberals in Baton
Rouge sympathized with the plant and retail store managers and wanted the AFSC to go
slowly. Reverend John Felton refused to consider hiring a black secretary because he
believed that his congregation would fire him and that segregationists would desecrate
his church. The General Secretary o f the Baton Rouge YMCA, E. B. Davis, declared
that he supported desegregation but added that he had to keep his feelings under wraps
because if they became public, his standing in the community would be jeopardized.
When he first arrived in Baton Rouge in 1945, he had suggested desegregating some of
the organization’s activities but received such a negative response from the white
community that he abandoned the idea. In 1955, the Southern and LSU branches of the
YMCA asked Davis to use the organization’s Camp Singing Waters for an integrated
meeting. He refused, saying that if white parents learned that African Americans had
slept on the mattresses, they would refuse to send their children to the camp. Despite
Davis’s refusal, the integrated conference took place at another location, and three years
later, segregationists forced President Troy Middleton to fire LSU’s YMCA Director
Hollis Hayward for hosting it. While the national organization of the YMCA supported

l6Baton Rouge Merit Employee Program Report, August 1956, AFSC,
Community Relations Files, 1956; Report of American Friends Service Committee’s
Regional Committee, AFSC, Baton Rouge Employment on Merit Program, South
Central Regional Office, 1957; Baton Rouge Employment on Merit Report, August
1956, AFSC, Community Relations Files, South Central Regional Office, 1956.
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integration, Baton Rouge’s branches, like those in other southern cities, maintained
separate facilities until the late 1960s17.
Fear o f segregationist reprisals forced many AFSC supporters to abandon the
organization. Ford Longsdorfurged Sutherland not to move quickly on integration
because a strong push in that direction would stir up segregationist activity and tarnish
the images o f AFSC supporters. In 1956, the head of the Friends’ interracial advisory
committee, Edwin Gaskill, resigned his post because he feared that he would lose his
job as an engineer at Allied Chemical, that he would suffer an attack by segregationists,
and that they would ostracize his children at school. A native of Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania, Gaskill was a birthright Friend who had moved to Baton Rouge in
1949.18
Although many liberals, such as Gaskill, feared the segregationists, Wade
Mackie found a core group of committed supporters who wanted to bring about
integration, even if it meant a direct confrontation with the Southern Gentlemen and the
Citizens’ Council. As noted in the previous chapter, the forced integration of Little
Rock, Arkansas’ Central High School in September, 1957, and the progression of
desegregation suits against several Louisiana school districts through the courts

I7Gene Sutherland to the File, June 14,1955, AFSC, Baton Rouge Employment
on Merit Program, South Central Regional Office, 1955; Eugene Sutherland to Thelma
Babbitt, March 1, 1955, ibid.
l8Gene Sutherland to the File, October 18,1955, ibid.; Eugene Sutherland to
Thelma Babbitt, February 22, 1955, ibid.; Wade Mackie to the File, August 2,1956,
AFSC, Baton Rouge Employmenton Merit Program, South Central Regional Office,
1956; Richard Bennett to Thelma Babbitt, October 28,1955, AFSC, Baton Rouge
Employment on Merit Program, South Central Regional Office, 1955.
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prompted the legislature to pass a series o f laws to keep black students out o f the state’s
white public schools. When the legislature convened in the spring o f 1958, its members,
led by Rainach, immediately began discussing ways to prevent the integration of
Louisiana’s schools and decided that if the courts ordered white schools to admit
African Americans that it would follow Virginia’s plan, which was enacted in 1956, for
dealing with that situation — it would simply close the public school system and
replace it with a private one.19
In February 1958, fearing that the legislature would close the public schools if
the federal courts ordered them to integrate, Mackie turned to the Louisiana Civil
Liberties Union (LCLU) for help. Although a state chapter had existed for several
years, in January, 1958, liberals in Baton Rouge first formed a local chapter. Mackie
contacted the Baton Rouge group’s vice president, Waldo McNeir, an English professor
at LSU and a longtime southern liberal, and asked him to convince the LCLU to lead
the fight against the school closing legislation. A recent trip to Europe had bolstered
McNeir’s commitment to ending segregation. While there, Europeans constantly asked
him to justify the system of segregation. He realized that he could not offer any reasons
for maintaining it and returned to Baton Rouge determined to bring an end to Jim Crow.
After discussing strategy, McNeir and Mackie invited local LCLU members to a
planning session at the AFSC office. To keep the Quaker leader’s involvement quiet,
I9“Solons Talk Wiping Out Public Schools, Scourge Troop Use,” Morning
Advocate, September 29, 1957,1; Bartley, The New South, 194-196; Matthew Lassiter
and Andrew B. Lewis, “Massive Resistance Revisited: Virginia’s White Moderates and
the Byrd Organization in Virginia,” in The Moderates ’Dilemma: Massive Resistance
and School Desegregation in Virginia, Matthew Lassiter and Andrew Lewis,
(Charlottesville: University ofVirginia Press, 1998), 6-7.
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they sent the invitations on LCLU letterhead. Ten LCLU members attended the March
25, 1958, meeting and decided to circulate a petition expressing the organization's
opposition to the proposed school closing law. They worded the petition in such a
manner that people who wanted to integrate the schools as well as those who supported
segregation but wanted to maintain the public school system, could sign. The LCLU
members knew that the number of integrationists was small and wanted to obtain as
large a number o f signatures as possible. After circulating the petition for only fifteen
days, the organization had gathered more than six hundred signatures, with one-third
coming from LCLU members. Sixty-six of the signers taught at LSU.20
On June 1, 1958, the LCLU presented its petition to the House Education
Committee, and eight days later, at the committee’s public hearing on the school
closing bills, several liberal and the moderates spoke out against them, including Waldo
McNeir and Law School Professor Charles Reynard. McNeir’s testimony drew the
committee’s attention to the LCLU petition. He stressed that the school closing bills
violated the United States Constitution and would harm all school children if enacted.
Reynard, an Illinois native and constitutional law expert, was not a member of the
LCLU but was committed to the cause of ending segregation. A longtime liberal, he had
been an ardent supporter o f Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal and an advocate of
improving conditions for the country’s poor and working classes. He abhorred the anti
r e p o r t and Evaluation of Recent Work on Desegregation, June 21, 1958,
AFSC, Baton Rouge Program, South Central Regional Office, 1958; Louisiana Civil
Liberties Union, “Analysis of Part I of the Report o f the Joint Legislative Committee to
Investigate LSU,” May 28,1959, Charles Reynard Papers in the possession of his
widow Marian Reynard Baun, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 2 (hereafter cited as Reynard
Papers).
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integration laws that the legislature passed after Brown, but the lack o f white opposition
before 1958 had kept him quiet. Reynard also feared that he would lose his job at LSU
if he denounced the segregationist legislation, but he summoned the courage to speak
out against closing the public schools to prevent integration. In a letter to his friend and
colleague Douglas Maggs, a professor o f constitutional law at Duke University, he
explained, “After four years of sitting idly by and watching these measures steamroller
through the legislature, I finally gathered my courage, threw caution into the wind, and
appeared yesterday afternoon before the House Education Committee in opposition to
the bills.” In fact, he used, as the basis for his argument, a statement Maggs made
before the North Carolina General Assembly when his state considered similar
legislation in July 1956. In his testimony, Reynard said that the bills under
consideration were clearly unconstitutional and that he had no doubt that the Supreme
Court would overturn them. Apart from their unconstitutionality, if enacted, these laws
would hurt white children more than African-American ones because only white
schools would close. Since black schools would not be integrated, they would remain
open.24
In addition to McNeir and Reynard, several other LSU professors testified
before the house committee, including Edward B. Robert, dean of the College of
Education, and Irwin L. Forbes, professor of plant pathology. Unlike their liberal co24Louisiana Civil Liberties Union, “Analysis o f Part I of the Report o f the Joint
Legislative Committee to Investigate LSU,” May 28, 1959,2; Charles Reynard to
Douglas Maggs, June 10, 1958; Statement by Douglas Maggs on Legislation Proposed
by the North Carolina Advisory Committee on Education, July 24,1956 with Charles
Reynard’s additions for his testimony before the Louisiana legislature on June 9, 1958.
All in Reynard Papers.
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workers, Robert and Forbes supported the proposed legislation. Roberts bragged that
none of his professors signed the LCLU petition. Forbes declared that segregated
schools were better than integrated ones and demanded that the state’s dual system of
public education be maintained. He added that Reynard and McNeir represented only a
small portion of LSU’s faculty. According to him, most professors wanted to maintain
segregated schools at any cost. Forbes’ assurances held little sway over the legislators.
The House of Representatives immediately voted 70-0 to call President Middleton and
the deans of the colleges whose faculty members had signed the petition to appear
before the JLCS “to answer charges that some LSU faculty members are dispensing
anti-segregation views in the classroom” and brainwashing students into supporting
integration. In a letter to Maggs, Reynard joked that he could not be brainwashing his
students into supporting desegregation because three members of the JLCS had taken
his constitutional law course while they were in law school.25
The JLCS met on June 10 to ferret out integrationist sentiment at LSU. Like
Rainach, most of the committee’s members came from the state’s staunchly
segregationist northern parishes. None came from East Baton Rouge Parish. In his
opening statement, Rainach set the tone for the hearing. He claimed that the committee
would seek out those professors who discussed subjects “contrary to the laws o f the
state of Louisiana and to the way of life of our people.” He added that the LCLU and its
parent organization were pawns of the Communist Party and that their members tricked
the sixty-six LSU professors into signing the petition. Rainach then called Troy
^ “House Orders LSU Officials for Quizzing,” Morning Advocate, June 10,
1958,1; Charles Reynard to Douglas Maggs, June 10,1958, Reynard Papers.
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Middleton as the JLCS’s first witness. In a prepared statement, Middleton, one of Baton
Rouge’s most powerful white leaders, declared that he and the university’s
administrators supported segregation and fought diligently to prevent the integration o f
LSU, but he added, “The university’s position has been to obey the laws o f the state and
the country.” When the federal courts ordered the school to admit black students, the
administration complied. He acknowledged that some professors, including Reynard,
discussed integration in their classes but did so only in courses where the topic had
some relevancy, such as in constitutional law, political science, history, and sociology.
Middleton held that few students or faculty members ever talked about integration until
the JLCS began its hearing. He refused to punish Reynard and McNeir for expressing
their opposition to the school closing bills because the two men appeared as private
citizens and not representatives o f the university. Reprimanding or firing them for
expressing their opinions would be, according to him, a violation of their First
Amendment right to freedom o f speech. Middleton repeated that he and the Board of
Supervisors believed in academic freedom and added that he would not seek out
integrationist professors on campus.26
Reynard and other LSU professors cheered Middleton’s remarks. In a letter to
Professor Clyde Summers o f Yale’s Law School, Reynard declared that Middleton
“said just enough to handle the situation___ As an old Army man, he never lets the
public forget that he once took an oath to uphold and defend the Constitution. While he
zsMarian Reynard’s notes of the Joint Legislative Committee on Segregation
Meeting, June 11,1958, Reynard Papers, 1-2; “Committee Okays Bill Creating Super
Board for Higher Education,” Morning Advocate, June 12,1958, I; “Middleton Says
No Reds Teaching Classes at LSU,” ibid.
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personally would prefer segregation, he is first and foremost for law and order and will
serve to uphold the law of the land.” Middleton’s support for academic freedom helped
to defuse the situation as did the reaction o f LSU’s alumni. Although many former
students wanted to maintain segregation, they believed strongly in academic freedom
and feared that any attempt to censor freedom o f expression would hurt the university’s
national reputation. Theo Cangelosi, a Baton Rouge attorney and vice chairman o f the
Alumni Council, denounced the legislative probe even though he declared that his
views differed from those o f the sixty-six professors who signed the petition. The
council urged its members to contact their legislators and the JLCS to express their
displeasure with the probe. The professors who spoke out against the acts received only
a couple of negative responses and nearly one hundred letters, phone calls, and
telegrams o f support.27
McNeir’s and Reynard’s stand against the state legislature and the subsequent
support from accommodationists and white leaders ushered in a new era in the civil
rights movement in Baton Rouge. When they realized that speaking out would bring no
significant reprisals, more liberals denounced the segregationist agenda put forth by the
state legislature. As the legislation made its way to the Senate, Mackie once again
worked behind the scenes to organize the opposition. This time, he asked several
ministers to appear before the Senate Education Committee. Some longtime AFSC
supporters, whose names do not appear in his reports to the national office, refused. He
27Charles Reynard to Clyde Summers, June 23,1958, Reynard Papers; ACLU
Report, Reynard Papers, 3; “Alumni Council Calls on Members to Defend LSU,”
Morning Advocate, June 10,1958, 1; ACLU Report, Reynard Papers, 8; Charles
Reynard to A1 and Les Harrison, June 13,1958, Reynard Papers.
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convinced Rabbi Walter Peiser and Methodist minister D. W. Poole to speak out.
Several months earlier, the state’s Methodist Conference had passed a resolution, which
received little attention at the time, denouncing the school closing legislation.
Following Mackie’s advice, Poole sent copies o f the resolution to all o f the members of
the state legislature. The Quaker leader also urged all o f his media contacts, both local
and national, to do stories on the resolution and called “influential people” to advise
Senator J. D. DeBlieux to oppose the school closing laws. None of the liberals who
spoke out against the bills expected them to be defeated. Rather, they wanted to send a
message to the public that some Louisianians opposed segregation and hoped to
convince like-minded people to join their cause. Although the state legislature passed
the segregation bills and the governor signed them into law, Mackie’s plan to unite the
liberals and to encourage them publicly to denounce Jim Crow succeeded. By the early
1960s, the city possessed a significant and vocal liberal population that was, for the
most part centered around LSU and several o f the city’s Protestant churches and Jewish
synagogues.28
In 1955, the AFSC had arrived in Baton Rouge determined to carry out its
Employment on Merit Program. Convinced that the city, with its industrial-based
economy, would provide the perfect testing-ground for the project, the Friends soon
discovered that the segregation that characterized southern society was also ingrained in
the community’s plants and refineries. Managers of ESSO and the other facilities, like
“ Report and Evaluation of Recent Work on Desegregation, June 21,1958,
AFSC, Baton Rouge Program, South Central Regional Office, 1958; “Segregation
Measures Okayed as Ministers Protest,” Morning Advocate, June 19,1958,1;
“Segregation Legislation Finally Passes,’’ibid.
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the white leadership, wanted to maintain a stable working environment in Baton Rouge
and refused to upset the balance by forcing their workers to integrate. Only after federal
intervention did they open traditionally “white” jobs to African Americans. In the late
1950s, the AFSC abandoned the EOM Program and focused its attention on ending
segregation. The group believed that economic equality was not possible without social
equality and directed its field workers in southern communities to focus their attention
on combating the system o f Jim Crow. In cities such as Atlanta, AFSC representatives
joined white liberals in the fight to desegregate public schools, lunch counters, and
public transportation. In Baton Rouge, Mackie used his organizational skills and charm
to convince liberals to engage in a public battle against segregation. Without Mackie,
the group would, in all probability, have continued to flounder. In the 1960s, under the
direction of the Quaker leader, liberals became a powerful force in the fight to
desegregate public facilities, to end police brutality, and to integrate the public
schools.29

Garm on, Beneath the Image, 107, 193.
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Chapter 6
Sit-ins, 1960-1961
The 1950s ended with liberals in Baton Rouge and in Louisiana speaking out
despite threats of violence and intimidation. Although World War II activists continued
to support the civil rights movement, they took part in no public protests in the years
following Johnnie Jones’s and Alex Pitcher’s attempt to enroll black students at Gilmer
Wright. Instead, they used the federal courts to fight for racial equality and believed
that the only way to obtain racial equality was by working through the framework o f the
United States Constitution. The 1960s ushered in a new era o f the civil rights movement
in Baton Rouge and in the South as a whole as a new group o f activists, AfricanAmerican college students, began to challenge the system o f segregation through
protests rather than in the courts.
The student activists came of age during the first stages o f the civil rights
movement and witnessed its pivotal moments, including the Montgomery Bus Boycott,
the Brown decision, and the Little Rock school desegregation crisis. Most o f their
parents belonged to the upper and middle classes, and ofien with the support o f their
parents, teachers, and peer groups, they began challenging the system of segregation as
teenagers. Nearly two decades younger than the World War II activists, the student
activists soon grew impatient with the slow pace of desegregation. Refusing to wait for
the federal courts to wipe out Jim Crow and disgusted by the state legislature’s attempt
to undermine federal authority, students at Southern University began using sit-ins,
marches, and picketing to demand change. Inspired by the wave o f lunch counter sit-ins
that began in February, I960, when a group of black students in Greensboro, North
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Carolina, sat at a segregated lunch counter and demanded service, eight Southern
University students followed suit on March 28. The following year, the Congress o f
Racial Equality (CORE) established a chapter at Southern University and sponsored a
series of protests. Direct action frightened white Baton Rougeans. Convinced that racial
unrest was imminent, white leaders turned to the racial diplomats to hammer out
compromises to silence these young activists. When that failed, they attempted to
prohibit the students from conducting protests by securing state and federal injunctions
that forbade CORE from operating in East Baton Rouge Parish. Although white leaders
managed to maintain peaceful race relations through diplomacy and legal intimidation,
they failed to silence the student activists. Racial tension in Baton Rouge continued to
rise.1
On February 1, J.960, four North Carolina Agricultural and Technical College
students walked into Woolworth’s in Greensboro, North Carolina, sat at the lunch
counter reserved for whites, and placed an order. When the waitresses refused to serve
them, they remained seated. The next day, they, along with other students, returned and
repeated the process. The sit-ins in Greensboro attracted thousands o f black and white
supporters, continued for more than five months, and spurred other black college
students into action. By the end of I960, sit-ins had occurred in approximately 104
communities throughout the South, and in many o f these places, violence accompanied
protests.2
‘Laue, Direct Action and Desegregation, 76-79.
2Chafe, Civilities and Civil Rights, 61-85; Sitkoff, The Strugglefo r Black
Equality, 61-87; Martin Oppenheimer, The Sit-in Movement o f1960, Martin Luther
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The prospect o f a sit-in in Louisiana convinced the segregationists to take
action. At a March 6, 1960, state meeting o f the Louisiana Citizens* Council, Senator
Willie Rainach warned that students at two private black colleges in New Orleans,
Dillard and Xavier, were attending classes on how to conduct lunch counter sit-ins.
Rainach told his fellow segregationists that in other states the demonstrations were
handled locally, but if necessary to deter protesters, the legislature would strengthen the
state’s laws against trespassing and disturbing the peace. Nothing could stifle the sit-in
movement, however. On March 8, approximately two hundred Dillard students picketed
along a road near campus to protest against segregation, but none took part in lunch
counter sit-ins. State officials knew that eventually Louisiana college students would
follow the example o f their contemporaries and stage their own protests. On March 15,
1960, the Louisiana State Board of Education ordered all college presidents under its
authority to “take disciplinary action against any students involved in incidents that
would discredit the institution or the state educational system.”3 Because whites took
part in demonstrations in other southern cities, the board stressed that the policy applied
to both white and black students. Within days, President Felton Clark called a
convocation of Southern’s student body and told them that he would expel any student
taking part in a demonstration. He held a similar meeting with faculty members and

King and the Civil Rights Movement Series, ed. David Garrow (New York: Carlson
Publishing Company, 1989), xiii, 177-178.
3The State Board o f Education oversaw all state-funded colleges and
universities, vocational and technical schools, and public elementary, middle, and high
schools. LSU had its own governing body and was not under the direct control of the
Board of Education. Public Affairs Research Council, Louisiana State Agencies
Handbook, 1960 (Baton Rouge: Public Affairs Research Council, 1960), 49-51.
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warned them against encouraging students to protest. If any faculty member
collaborated, Clark added, he would demand their resignation. Rather than deter
students, Clark’s announcement strengthened their resolve to hold a sit-in o f their own.
They viewed his warning as a challenge that they could not ignore.4
During February, eight Southern University students began meeting in secret to
discuss ways to support the Greensboro sit-ins. They discussed several options,
including raising money to help finance the North Carolina protest and even traveling to
Greensboro to take part in the sit-ins. Because they had little money, they decided to
stage a sit-in o f their own in Baton Rouge. The group included six men and two women.
All belonged to the top academic and leadership ranks of the university. Three of them
— John Johnson, twenty-five of Cullen, Louisiana; Kenneth Johnson, twenty-two of
Columbia, Mississippi; and Donald Moss, twenty-two ofWinnfield, Louisiana— were
juniors in the Law School. The others were undergraduates. The only non-southemer in
the group, Marvin Robinson, hailed from Gary, Indiana. Twenty-year-old Monroe,
Louisiana, native Janette Hoston majored in psychology, and Jo Ann Morris, the only
freshman in the group, was from Shreveport. Bacteriology major Felton Valdry was
twenty-two and came from the small town o f Bueche, Louisiana; and Major Johns, a
theology major was from the Baton Rouge area.5

4“Negroes at Dillard in Protest,” State-Times, March 8, I960,1; “State Board of
Education Acts to Curb ‘Sit-Downs,” Louisiana Weekly, March 26, 1960, 3; “State
College Heads Warned on ‘Incidents,’ ” Morning Advocate, March 16, I960,1; Wade
Mackie to Jean Fairfax, April 6,1960, AFSC, Baton Rouge Program, South Central
Regional Office, 1960.
5Janette Hoston Harris, interview by author, tape recording, January 9,1994, T.
Harry Williams Center for Oral History Collection, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley
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The eight students came together from a variety o f backgrounds for the same
reason — to bring an end to segregation. In March I960, Student Government President
Marvin Robinson was twenty-eight days away from graduating from Southern. An
education major and a track star, he had a job lined up to work as a coach at his alma
mater. When the Greensboro sit-ins began, he realized that he could no longer accept
continued segregation. Other students, inspired by the lunch counter protests, turned to
Robinson, as student body president, for advice and guidance, and he quickly became
the leader of Southern’s student activists. Major Johns was one o f the most outspoken
o f the group. The theology student was a compelling speaker, a fiery preacher, and fully
committed to ending segregation. He worked closely with Robinson and helped him
plan the sit-in. Both Johns and Robinson later became field representatives for CORE.
Felton Valdry became involved in the sit-in movement when he realized that, after
graduation from the all-black Southern, where his academic achievements were
recognized and applauded, he would be faced with the reality that his academic
achievement meant little in the South’s segregated society. He was black, and whites
would treat him like a second-class citizen regardless o f his intelligence or skills.
“Suddenly, I had to deal with what I was being educated for, as opposed to real life,”
Valdry recalled. John Johnson planned to pursue a career as a country lawyer when he
became involved in the civil rights movement, and Donald Moss was a married second
year law student who worked as a graduate counselor on Southern’s personnel staff. “I

Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 55-56; “Two
More Arrested in Second ‘Sit-Down’ Incident,” State-Times, March 29, I960,1; “Sit-In
Students’ Motions Up Here Today,” Morning Advocate, April 29,1960,4A.
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wanted to be free without paying any dues,” Moss said. Although in later years, the fact
that he had to completely disrupt his life by being arrested and expelled to achieve his
goal still angered him.6
Morris was a shy, quiet freshman, and the other student activists were puzzled
by why she became involved in the sit-ins. However, she, too, was inspired by the
Greensboro demonstrations, and although she rarely spoke, she possessed the strength
o f character to defy white authority and take her place at the lunch counter. The
daughter o f activists, Hoston grew up in Monroe, Louisiana. As a junior high school
student, she helped her father with a voter registration drive in her hometown. She also
regularly defied Monroe’s bus segregation laws. “At least once a week during my junior
and high school days, I was driven to jail by the bus driver because I wouldn’t get in the
back o f the bus,” she recalled. “Because we would not move, he would drive us to the
courthouse, [and] call the principal. The principal would call my father, and my father
would say, ‘Again?’ ” Her activism continued after she graduated from high school and
enrolled at Southern. Shortly after arriving on the Baton Rouge campus, Hoston led a
student protest to improve the quality of food on campus. Kenneth Johnson was the
nephew of Law School Dean A. A. Lenoir, who had supported Alex Tureaud’s
admission to LSU’s undergraduate program. Unlike Hoston, he did not grow up in an
activist home, but his parents encouraged him and his siblings to get a college

6“Reunion in D. C. Evokes Bittersweet Memories o f Louisiana Sit-In,” The
Washington Post, May 27,1990, D l; Meier and Rudwick, CORE, 108; “Expelled
Student Named to NAACP Youth Council,” Louisiana Weekly, May 28, 1960, 1.
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education. “They thought it would lessen the impact o f discrimination. The higher
educated you were, the less impact that racism could have on you,” Johnson said.7
Although events in Greensboro inspired Kenneth Johnson, John Johnson, and
Donald Moss, the 19S9 lynching of Mack Charles Parker had already convinced them
to take action against segregation. Parker, a black man, was suspected o f raping a
pregnant white woman in Poplarville, Mississippi, located near the Louisiana border.
Although the rape victim picked Parker out o f a line-up, she conceded that his voice
was different from that of the rapist, and Parker maintained his innocence. But while
Parker was in jail awaiting trial, a mob of masked men stormed the prison and abducted
him. Law enforcement authorities later recovered his savagely beaten body floating in
the Pearl River and arrested the leaders of the mob. A local grand jury refused to indict
them. At that point, the Justice Department entered the Parker case and brought the
suspects before a federal grand jury in Mississippi. It too refused to indict them.8
In late February, the eight student activists began meeting to plan their protest.
The students hosted a rally to show their support for the Greensboro sit-ins and “to get
the students involved in understanding what the issues were.” The student activists

7“Reimion in D. C. Evokes Bittersweet Memories o f Louisiana Sit-In,” The
Washington Post, May 27, 1990, D l; Harris, interview, 55-56; Kenneth Johnson,
interview by author, tape recording, January 11, 1994, T. Harry Williams Center ibr
Oral History Collection, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana
State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 9.
8Johnson, interview, 26-27; “FBI Identifies the Body Found in Pearl River as
Missing Negro,” Morning Advocate, May 5,1959; ‘Tarker Jury to be Picked Monday,”
Morning Advocate, January 3,1960,10A; “No Indictments in Parker Case,” Morning
Advocate, January 15, 1960,1. For a Ml account o f the Mack Charles Parker case see:
Howard Smead, Blood Justice: The Lynching o f Mack Charles Parker (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1986).
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asked civil rights attorney A. P. Tureaud to be the keynote speaker, telling him that they
planned to conduct a nonviolent sit-in at a Baton Rouge lunch counter. We “believe it is
our duty to show our resentment to segregation by actively participating in such a
movement,” Major Johns explained on behalf o f the group. Tureaud, however, refused
to appear, so the students asked Jemison to speak. Although he usually sided with the
racial diplomats, he agreed to appear at the rally. Felton Clark learned about the
unauthorized meeting several days before it occurred and warned the students that if
they staged a sit-in, he would expel them. He even phoned Harris’s father and asked
him to “talk her out of doing anything foolish.” Her father rushed down to Baton
Rouge, appeared at the rally, which was held in the university’s auditorium, and
announced his support for the sit-in movement. The rally received no newspaper
coverage, and little information is available about its scope or content.9
Before the unauthorized meeting, Major Johns wrote to CORE to inform the
organization that he and several other students would stage a sit-in in Baton Rouge.
“We are planning this demonstration in order to let the southland know that we too are
impatient with its slow compliance with the Supreme Court’s decisions on segregation.”
CORE played no role in the Baton Rouge demonstration.10

Boston, interview, 54-56; Major Johns to A. P. Tureaud, March 30, 1960, APT,
box 11, folder 3; Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 267; Sternberg, ‘Terpetuation,
Accommodation, and Confrontation,” 92.
l0Major Johns to CORE, March 15, 1960, Congress of Racial Equality Papers,
Series V, reel 20, Amistad Research Center, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana
(microfilm).
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Although they told Tureaud and CORE that they would stage a sit-in, the
organizers gave them no details, and the actual plans for the protest, including the date
and location, remained secret. Sit-in organizers even refused to tell the other
participants the date o f the protest because they feared word would leak o u t “We were
determined to pull it off in secrecy,” recalled Kenneth Johnson. The student leaders
knew that if Felton Clark discovered the time and date of the protest, he would tell the
white leaders and thwart the sit-in. As the day o f the sit-in approached, Hoston and the
other participants sensed that the time was near, and for two days, they dressed in their
best clothes to be ready for the protest. Hoston remembered:
I was on my way to class. 1 was walking with a friend o f mine, and they came to
me and said, “We need you to come to the men’s dormitory now.” I knew. I said
to my friend, ‘Take my books, and call my mother if anything happens. Let her
know that I’m all right.” She said, “What are you going to do?” I said, “Well
I’m not sure yet, but you’ll hear about it.”11
The leaders decided to target the lunch counter at Kress located in downtown
Baton Rouge. On March 28, seven of the eight student activists went to the store and
split into two groups. Fearing that the police would arrest them, the student activists
selected the eloquent Johns as their spokesman, and he remained on campus while they
sat-in. After making a purchase in the store, the students walked into the cafeteria. Store
manager Reynolds Matthews sat at the counter eating his lunch, and Morris and Hoston
took the seats next to him. The male students occupied seats at intervals along the
counter. Matthews told them to move to the counter reserved for black customers, but

"Johnson, interview, 24-25; Harris, interview, 28-29,15-16; Report on Sit-Ins
Continued, Negro Community, April 1960, AFSC, South Central Regional Office,
1960.
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they refused. The waitress would not take their orders. She told Kenneth Johnson, “You
know that your mother and your father didn’t teach you-all to act like this, and you’re
causing trouble for everybody. You-all should leave.” She even threatened to pour
coffee on him. Johnson simply repeated his order. Some white patrons seated at the
counter ignored the five students, but a crowd quickly gathered behind them. The
students believed that the white crowd would attack them. “I remember white people
coming up behind me with objects in their hands,” said Johnson, “I remember sitting
there with my hands on the back of my head, covered from behind, so that my skull
wouldn’t get busted from behind. I couldn’t look back because that would have shown a
sign of fear. I remember being completely wet, ringing wet from sweat. I was so
frightened.”12
Chief of Police Shirley Arrighi and Captain Robert Weiner of the Juvenile
Division arrived within minutes of being called by Matthews. Arrighi asked the
students either to move to the counter reserved for blacks or to leave the establishment.
They politely refused, and the chief arrested them for disturbing the peace. A month
earlier, the mayor, the district and parish attorneys, the sheriff and Arrighi had met and
decided that any person who took part in a sit-in would be charged with that violation.
When placed under arrest, the seven stood up and walked quietly to the paddy wagon.13

l2Johnson, interview, 32-34; ‘Two Arrested in Second ‘Sit-Down’ Incident,”
State-Times, March 29, 1960, 1; Harris, interview, 33-35.
13Jones, interview, December4,1993,49,43; “Negro Students Arrested Here
After Sit-Down,” Morning Advocate, March 29,1961,1.
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Once in jail, the students contacted Johnnie Jones and asked him to represent
them. The World War Et activist agreed. Although they preferred to attack segregation
by working within the legal system, the men and women o f the World War Q
generation applauded the actions o f the young college students and gave them financial
and moral support after their arrests. In a meeting with Jones and his clients, racial
diplomat Felton Clark, in contrast, castigated the students for their actions and told
them, “When your lawyer [Johnnie Jones] graduated from here,” he told them, “he was
just as militant as you-all, but he didn’t interrupt things.” The student activists had
selected Jones because of his record o f fighting against segregation and because they
believed that he truly supported their cause. Kenneth Johnson so admired Jones that he
later became his law clerk. While the students wanted Jones to represent them, racial
diplomats encouraged them to select another lawyer because he was too militant and
too hotheaded. Jones recalled:
Now there were some blacks didn’t want me to be their attorney on that case.
What the white people call the black leaders, didn’t want me on the case, but
those . . . students had their mind made up. They liked what I had been doing...
. I’d been up to Southern and talked on certain programs and they had been
watching me all along
They knew my record.
The judge presiding over the case, former Attorney General Fred LeBlanc, set the
demonstrators’ bond at $1,500 apiece and ordered them to post it through a licensed
bondsman who required 10 percent to be paid in cash up front. Because these young
men and women represented the best and brightest of the black community and
conducted themselves in a polite, dignified manner, black leaders and World War II
activists, who had the most disposable income, secretly provided the bond money. In
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less than six hours, black leaders raised the $1,050 necessary to secure the release o f the
arrested students.14
The following day, 3,500 Southern students rallied on behalf of the arrested
students and vowed to repay the com m unity leaders and to raise additional money to
pay the protesters ’ legal fees. The spokesman for the seven jailed activists, Major Johns,
proclaimed, “No longer can we endure the back door of public places, the denial o f
equal job opportunities, the right to vote or any privilege granted to a full-time
citizen.”15
As the rally took place, police arrested nine more Southern students for staging
sit-ins. Two Baton Rougeans, John Gamer and Vemon Jordan, attempted to desegregate
the lunch counter at the downtown Sitman’s Drugstore, and seven political science
majors, including Eddie Charles Brown, the brother of H. Rap Brown who later became
the president of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), tried to eat at
the lunch counter at the Greyhound Bus Station.16The seven well-dressed students
entered the station in the late afternoon, walked to the white lunch counter, and placed
their orders. Whites eating at the counter immediately abandoned their seats, but
approximately fifteen of them milled around and watched the black students. Just as

I4Report on the Sit-Ins Continued, April 1960, AFSC, South Central Regional
Office, 1960; “Negro Students Arrested Here After Sit-Down,” Morning Advocate,
March 29, 1960,1.
I5“Two More Arrested in Second ‘Sit-Down’ Incident,” State-Times, March 29,
1960, 1.
I6The students included Eddie C. Brown, Mack H. Jones, Larry L. Nichols,
Charles Peabody, Lawrence Hurst, Sandra Ann Jones, and Mary Enola Briscoe. Mack
Jones came from Fort Worth, Texas, but others were from Baton Rouge.
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they had done the previous day, Police Chief Shirley Arrighi and Captain Robert
Werner o f the Juvenile Division arrived within minutes o f being called by management
and ordered the students either to use the black: counter or to leave the premises. The
students refused, and Werner arrested them. He claimed that their presence in the white
section o f the counter constituted a disturbance o f the peace. A spokesman for the
group, Mack H. Jones, a twenty-seven-year-old from Fort Worth, Texas, addressed
reporters as he was being led to the paddy wagons. “We want some human dignity,” he
said, “You have to do something to let people know you are a man.”17
The nine students arrested on March 29 also asked Johnnie Jones to represent
them. On the night of their arrest, Jones, Jemison, and an unidentified man went to the
jail to meet with the students. As they entered the facility, Jemison told the press, “We
weren’t aware of this at all.” When they departed, Jemison, who usually relished the
attention, refused to address the media. His reasons for eschewing media attention were
simple. In addition to wanting to remain in the good graces o f Baton Rouge’s white
leadership and to maintain his position as a leader o f the black community, Jemison
also aspired to become president of the National Baptist Convention. Earlier that year,
Martin Luther King, Jr. and several other activist ministers had formulated a plan to
overthrow NBC President J. H. Jackson. The pastor o f Olivet Baptist Church in
Chicago, the conservative Jackson had succeeded Jemison’s father, D. V. Jemison, as
president of the organization in 1953 and refused to use the NBC to advance the cause
17“ T w o More Arrested in Second ‘Sit-Down’ Incident,” State-Times, March 29,
1960, 1; Louisiana v. Mary Briscoe, et al., No. 35,566,19th District Court, Baton
Rouge, Division A; “Seven More Students Arrested Here,'* Morning Advocate, March
30, 1960, I; “Jail 16 in La. ‘Sit-Downs,’ ” Louisiana Weekly, April 2, 1960,1.
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of civil rights. King wanted the organization to bolster the movement and believed an
activist should serve as president. He selected as his candidate Gardner Taylor, who
preceded T. J. Jemison as pastor o f Mt. Zion Baptist Church in Baton Rouge and was
the pastor o f Concord Baptist Church in Brooklyn, New York. For nearly nine months,
King and his supporters plotted Jackson’s overthrow and even asked Jemison, who had
served as secretary of the NBC since 1953, to take part in the coup. Jemison refused
because he believed that his ambition to head o f the organization would be best served
by supporting Jackson, who ran the NBC with an iron fist and had purged state
presidents from the organization for disloyalty. The same goal led him to take a less
visible role in the Baton Rouge movement. “I felt that my future was not in civil rights
but in the church,” Jemison later explained.18
The response of the students to their meeting with Jemison, Jones, and the third
man may have led to the Baptist minister’s silence. Unlike the first group to hold sit-ins,
these students told the men that they wanted to remain in jail to protest the continuation
of segregation. Racial diplomats disregarded the wishes of the nine protesters and
scrambled to raise bail money. Even after the funds became available, the nine refused
to accept it and chose to remain in jail. On March 31, Thurgood Marshall told the
Morning Advocate that the NAACP had offered to bail the students out of jail, but they
refused to accept the money. The students said that “they would not come out until this

l8Branch, Parting the Waters, 335-339; Jemison, interview by Marc Sternberg,
March 15, 1994,20; “Third Street Boycott by Negroes,” Morning Advocate, March 30,
1960, 1; “Negroes March Downtown,” State-Times, March 30, 1960, I; Resolution,
Citizens Committee for Cooperative Action, March 31,1960, CORE Papers, Series V,
reel 20; Jemison, interview by Marc Sternberg, October 24, 1994, 9.
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is settled,” Marshall explained; “I do not encourage this, but if they want to do it on
their own, I’m going to support them.” Marshall and the NAACP took an interest in all
of the sit-in cases, and the Legal Defense Fund helped local attorneys plan the defenses
of the student activists. The same could not be said of the racial diplomats. They were
exasperated to learn the last nine, early advocates o f the “jail-over-bail” strategy that
characterized the sit-ins and Freedom Rides o f the summer of 1960, wanted to remain
in the parish prison. “It seems fairly certain that the nine preferred to remain in jail even
when they were finally released on bond,” Wade Mackie claimed.19
On March 30, approximately 2,000 Southern students staged another rally in
support of the sit-in participants. It began on campus but ended in a march to downtown
Baton Rouge, where the group briefly picketed Kress, Sitman’s, and the Greyhound Bus
Station. The march then culminated on the steps o f the State Capitol. Johns addressed
them. He recited the Preamble of the Constitution and told those gathered that they
should work to obtain equality for African Americans. Echoing Abraham Lincoln, he
proclaimed, “Our nation can’t stand half free and half slave.” After singing several
hymns, the students quietly made their way back to the campus to attend another mass

19Five sit-in participants in Tallahassee, Florida, first used jail-over-bail in
February 1960. All members of CORE, their goal was to remain in jail to draw attention
to the freedom struggle and to convince the black community to become involved in the
civil rights movement. The Tallahassee jail-in led to a community-wide boycott of
downtown department stores. ‘Two More Arrested in Second ‘Sit-Down’ Incident,”
State-Times, March 29, 1960,1; “Seven More Arrested Students Arrested Here,”
Morning Advocate, March 30 1960,1; “Jail 16 in La. ‘Sit-Downs,’ ” Louisiana Weekly,
April 2, I960, 1; “Dr. Clark Warns of Arrests,” Morning Advocate, April 3,1960,1;
Report on Sit-Ins (Continued), Negro Community, ca. April 11, I960, AFSC, Baton
Rouge Program Reports, South Central Regional Office, 1960; Meier and Rudwick,
CORE, 102-107.
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meeting. Robinson and Moss, both o f whom took part in the Kress sit-in, headed the
second gathering and urged the student body to boycott classes for the rest o f the day.20
Unlike other university presidents whose students participated in sit-ins, Felton
Clark refused to back the protesters. On March 28, Clark was in Washington, D. C.,
attending a conference, and the Dean of Men Ulysses S. Jones served as the acting
president. In defiance o f the State Board of Education’s automatic expulsion rule, Jones
even allowed the Kress students to return to class until the administration conducted an
inquiry. “We’ve got to satisfy the board of education, the students, and the community.
We don’t want to hurt anyone,” he told the Morning Advocate. Jones hedged on
expelling the Kress protesters because they were the university’s top students and all
came from “fine backgrounds.”21
When Clark returned from Washington, he abandoned Jones’ moderate position.
Concerned about the white reaction to the protests, he issued a statement promising to
take disciplinary action against “all students who fail to attend classes or who violate
university regulations, ordinances of the city and parish, or the laws of the state of
Louisiana.” On March 30, Clark met with the demonstrators and black leaders,
including Louisiana Education Association President and longtime activist J. K.
Haynes, for about five hours, and then expelled the student leaders. Haynes recalled:

20“Negroes March Downtown; Grand Jury Begins Inquiry,” State-Times, March
30, I960, 1.
2I“Negro Students Arrested Here After Sit-Down,” Morning Advocate, March
29, 1960,1; “Seven More Students Arrested Here,” Morning Advocate, March 30,
1960, 1; ‘Two More Arrested in Second ‘Sit-Down’ Incident,” State-Times, March 29,
1960,1.
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They must have had three thousand students on the grounds in front of that
building waiting___ Water came out of my eyes to see these brilliant students
leave. When they announced it to the students out on the yard, there was crying,
and when the nine students left in A. A. Lenior’s station wagon, these students
were hanging on to the station wagon and crying. It was quite an emotional
thing.
The expulsion of the protest leaders outraged many African Americans. On March 31,
about half o f the school’s 4,900 students attempted to resign in protest, but the dean o f
students refused to let any o f them withdraw without parental approval. The
administration knew that only a few parents would allow their children to drop out o f
school and abandon their education. Clark also asked supportive members of Southern’s
alumni to intercede. On April 2, the alumni association met with the student body. The
group’s secretary, Corrine Maybuce, the daughter of an ESSO employee, had driven an
automobile for the free ride system during the bus boycott She urged the students to
remain in school and told them that Clark was simply complying with the State Board
of Education’s order. She told the students that they had placed Clark “in a tough spot”
She added that because of Clark’s willingness to comply with the board, the university
would carry on despite the demonstrations.22
At a mass meeting held on the outskirts of campus, the expelled protesters
encouraged the 4,000 students present to resign for the university. They could not meet
on campus because the administration barred the sit-in leaders from the school’s
“ “Negroes March Downtown; Grand Jury Begins Inquiry,” State-Times, March
30,1960, 1; Haynes, interview by Miranda Kombert; “Mass Resignation Begun at
Southern After Suspensions,” State-Times, March 31,1960,1; “Leader Asks Southern
U. Student Body to Quit School,” Morning Advocate, April 1,1960, 1; ‘Ted-Up
Students Abandon SU in Droves,” Louisiana Weekly, April 9,1960,1; “Dr. Clark
Warns o f Arrests,” Morning Advocate, April 3,1960,1; Maybuce, interview by
Jacqueline Holmes.
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grounds. Major Johns urged the students to leave Southern University until Clark
rescinded the expulsions and permitted students to take part in boycotts, sit-ins, and
picketing. Robinson encouraged those attending to embrace the principles o f passive
resistance to combat segregation. He chided the older members o f the black community,
especially the racial diplomats, for not taking any action against segregation even
though they wanted equality. He claimed that they failed to act for three reasons, “One,
they are either too scared or they haven’t got enough sense, or two they’re making more
profit from segregation than they would from integration. . . or three, they’re lying.”23
In an attempt to ease tensions on campus, Clark and other members of the
administration met with the Kress protesters to discuss ways to prevent a full-scale
walkout. For six and a half hours, 3,000 students waited outside while their leaders and
Clark hammered out a deal. The details o f their six-hour meeting remain sketchy, but
the student activists agreed to leave Baton Rouge in exchange from a promise by the
administration not to expel any other students. The leaders then called a meeting of the
student body and encouraged them to remain in school “to carry on the fight for our
cause.” Donald Moss pleaded with the students to keep fighting and added that their
display of solidarity in the walkouts would always be a threat “to anything that doesn’t
stand for democracy and human rights.”24

“ “Leader Asks Whole Southern U. Student Body to Quit School,” Morning
Advocate, April 1, 1960,1.
24“Leaders Ask Students to Leave Southern U.,” State-Times, April 2, 1960, 1;
Major Johns, “Baton Rouge: Higher Education Southern Style,” copy o f article
provided by Janette Harris, place of publication unknown.
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The reaction o f the black community, especially the racial diplomats, to the sitins, the marches, and the mass meetings ranged from lukewarm to hostile. Racial
diplomats gave the students very little support. Although they wanted to end
segregation, they believed that the best way to do so was by negotiating with white
leaders for change. Racial diplomats feared that the militancy o f the student activists
would alienate the white leadership and upset their efforts to end segregation. Leading
diplomat Leo Butler refused to become involved with the student protests because he
“did not agree with the students and did not identify with their cause.” Wade Mackie
claimed that these members of the black community were “poorly prepared” for the sitins. In fact, when Clark expelled the leaders, none of the racial diplomats offered to take
them in. Some rented rooms at the Lincoln Hotel, but as large numbers of students left
the university in protest, the rooms quickly filled up. CORE representative James
McCain, who was sent to observe the Baton Rouge sit-ins, feared that the “chaotic
conditions” at the hotel would lead to violence and asked Mackie to persuade some
black leaders to help find housing for the students or provide money for them to return
home. Mackie turned to a well-respected activist, J. K. Haynes, and a racial diplomat,
John G. Lewis, for help. Before this, Lewis had no involvement with the student
activists, but he feared that if large numbers of angry students were allowed to remain
in Baton Rouge, violence would erupt and the peace and stability of the community
would be shattered. Haynes and Lewis, both revered in the black community, found
lodging for the students.25
“ Report on Sit-ins (Continued), ca. April 11, 1960, AFSC, Baton Rouge
Program Reports, South Central Regional Office, 1960; Buell, “The Politics of
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Most blacks shared the racial diplomats’ belief that student activism would lead
to violence. They thought that if they publicly supported the students they would suffer
white reprisals. Nevertheless, on March 29, Jemison called fo ra boycott of downtown
stores during the upcoming Easter season but did little to promote it. The following day,
few African Americans complied, and the boycott died. Jemison even tried to form a
Citizens’ Committee for Cooperative Action (CCCA) to support the sit-ins, but the
organization did little to help the students or perpetuate the protests.26
A few members of the black community, however, denounced Clark’s actions.
A group of Southern alumni from across the country claimed that expulsion was too
harsh a punishment and called for the readmission of the students. Other African
Americans castigated Clark for not backing the students and claimed that college
presidents throughout the South had stood up to the white power structure and refused
to expel sit-in participants. The state’s largest African-American newspaper, the
Louisiana Weekly, declared that Clark should have resigned rather than comply with the
Board of Education’s expulsion decree.27
In the end, approximately 5 percent of Southern’s 4,900 students resigned, and
the expelled demonstrators transferred to other universities. Calm returned to the
campus. A state district court convicted the protesters of disturbing the peace and

Frustration,” 134.
26“Third Street Boycott by Negroes,” Morning Advocate, March 30,1960, 1;
“Negroes March Downtown,” State-Times, March 30,1960, 1.
^ “Reinstatement for 18 SU Expelled Students Sought,” Louisiana Weekly, April
16,1960, 1; “Penalty for Students Too Severe,” Louisiana Weekly, April 23, 1960.
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sentenced each o f them to four months in jail. Refusing to accept the jail term, the
students’ lawyer Johnnie Jones, assisted by Tureaud and LDF attorneys Thurgood
Marshall and Jack Greenberg, appealed the case to the U. S. Supreme Court. In
December 1961, the justices issued their decision in Gamer v. Louisiana. Speaking for
the majority, Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote that the records o f the case “contain no
evidence to support a finding that these petitioners disturbed the peace.” He added that
their convictions violated their right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although civil rights leaders viewed Gamer as a victory, it changed very
little in Baton Rouge.28
The white community’s reaction to the sit-ins followed the pattern that
developed in the 1950s. White leaders wanted to maintain peaceful race relations.
Unlike white officials in Nashville who, on March 15 , allowed segregationists to attack
protesters with “rocks, fists, and lighted cigarettes,” Baton Rouge’s white leaders
preferred to adopt a peaceful approach for dealing with the student activists. The
response o f Mayor-President Christian, District Attorney Favrot, and Chief Arrighi
foreshadowed the white response to massive civil rights protests in Albany, Georgia,
that began in November 1961. White leaders in both communities did not arrest sit-in
participants for violating segregation laws, which were subject to legal attack, but
instead jailed them for violating laws aimed at maintaining public order, i.e., disturbing
the peace and trespassing. Police officers in both com m unities also refrained from using
“ “High Court Gets Sit-In Appeals,” State-Times, January 4, 1961,1; “First SitIn Appeals Reach Supreme Court from BR Negro Cases,” Morning Advocate, January
4, 1961, 1; Gamer etal. v Louisiana, 368 S. Ct. 157 (United States Supreme Court,
1961).
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violence against the protesters and protected them from segregationists bent on doing
harm to them. Immediately following the Kress sit-ins, Favrot, after consulting with
Mayor-President Jack Christian, announced, “Those jeering crowds and fighting back
and so forth in several cities . . . we won’t put up with that for one minute.” He added
that city officials would not tolerate violence from either whites or blacks. When the
Southern students marched to the State Capitol on March 30, Christian urged all Baton
Rougeans to stay away from the area and let law enforcement officials handle the
situation. Both men knew that if segregationists showed up at the rally, violence would
ensue, so they allowed the students to meet on the steps of the State Capitol but
surrounded them with officers. If any trouble occurred, they could immediately step in
and quash it. The white leaders allowed the students to march and hold rallies because
they believed that if they cracked down on them, the black community, which for the
most part did not support the students, would be drawn into the movement. Therefore,
the city’s politicians and business leaders wanted to bring a quick end to protests but
without allowing violence to erupt.29
White leaders decided that the only way to stop the sit-ins was to expel the
student activists. “As far as the state board is concerned, we have some very firm, strict
rules about people who get mixed up in affairs with the police,” said State Board of
Education President Joseph Davies of Arabi, Louisiana, a small town located near New
“ ‘Two More Arrested in Second ‘Sit-Down’ Incident,” State-Times, March 29,
1960,1; “Negroes March Downtown; Grand Jury Begins Inquiry,” State-Times, March
30, 1960,1; Branch, Parting the Waters, 279, 527-561; “Let’s Keep Our
Heads,” Morning Advocate, March 31, 1960, 1; Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 217;
“Negroes March Downtown; Grand Jury Begins Inquiry,” State-Times, March 30,1960,
1.
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Orleans. Clark wanted to protect Southern, so he complied with the board’s orders. He
feared that the university would suffer if he defied the Board of Education’s directive.
In addition to ridding Baton Rouge o f the student activists, this strategy also diverted
the attention o f the Southern student body away from the sit-ins and toward their
student leaders. The activists hoped that the sit-in movement in Baton Rouge would
continue beyond their arrests. But their punishment at the hands of the administration
shifted student anger away from the system o f segregation and toward Felton Clark.
The expelled activists lamented this change in focus but were powerless to stop it.30
While white leaders wanted to end the protests quickly, the city’s liberals tried
to help the demonstrators. As always, Wade Mackie stood at the forefront of this group.
Although he knew nothing o f the students’ sit-in plans beforehand, he immediately took
up their cause when the demonstrations began. He also served as a liaison between
CORE representative James McCain and the city’s black community. When Southern
expelled the eighteen students, Mackie, who knew Clark quite well, rebuked him for
putting Louisiana’s segregation laws above the basic human rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. He asked Clark if there was a limit on what the Board of Education could
get him to do. In addition to working with the black community during the sit-ins,
Mackie also collected $150 from LSU faculty members and students who supported the
sit-ins but feared segregationist reprisals if they spoke out.31

30“Resume Classes at Southern U.,” State-Times, April 5, 1960, 1; Report on
Baton Rouge, La., Sit-in Demonstrations, ca. April 11, 1960, AFSC, Baton Rouge
Program Reports, South Central Regional Office, 1960.
3’Wade Mackie to Felton Clark, April 19,1960, AFSC, Employment on Merit,
South Central Regional Office, 1960; Final Report of Sit-In Effects, May 9, 1960, ibid.
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Segregationists, unwilling to accept the possibility that Baton Rouge blacks
were unhappy with the reigning racial order, accused outside agitators of fomenting the
protests. After the Kress demonstration, Louisiana Governor Earl Long expressed
confusion. “I don’t think that the colored people o f this state have anything
fundamentally to complain about,” he told the press. He claimed that the “good colored
people” were obtaining bad advice from the NAACP and other groups and urged
dissatisfied African Americans to go back to Africa. Other segregationists believed that
outside forces convinced the Southern students to demonstrate but described them in
more nefarious terms. At an April 1 meeting of the Citizens' Council, its executive
council declared that communist front groups such as the NAACP, the ACLU, and
CORE brainwashed the students and used them as part o f their “well organized and
carefully laid out plan to harass and intimidate the officials and white citizens of our
city.” It also claimed that the student demonstrators came from other parts of the
country when, in fact, only a couple o f them, Marvin Robinson and Kenneth Johnson,
were from other states. “There had been no previous incidents of provocation to explain
their actions,” said the executive council. “Their alleged grievances are the same old
shopworn complaints o f the professional Negro agitators.” On March 29, an
unidentified group o f segregationists burned a cross in the front yard of a home in
Southern Heights, an upperclass African-American neighborhood located near the black
campus. The same night university officials found an effigy o f a Southern University
student hanging from a lamp post on LSU’s campus, hi addition to these two incidents,
a group of white youths picketed outside of the Greyhound Bus Station on March 30
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and carried signed declaring, “If you don’t like it here, go back to Africa” and “Go
Home, Sambo.”32
Although the March 1960 sit-ins failed to end lunch counter segregation in
Baton Rouge, they had a lasting impact on the city’s civil rights movement. The fact
that Clark and the racial diplomats .acceded to the white leaders’ demand that the
student activists be expelled intensified the feeling o f distrust between the student
activists and the racial diplomats. The young students saw the older leaders as pawns of
whites. Racial diplomats viewed the students as hotheaded troublemakers who, if
allowed to continue their protests, would destroy their own hard-earned relationship
with white leaders. They believed that white leaders would never capitulate to the
demands of the marchers or demonstrators but would agree to make gradual changes to
the system of segregation if approached through the traditional lines of communication.
Their fears proved well-founded. Concerned about the police department’s long
tradition of brutality against black suspects, racial diplomats, in March I960, asked the
city-parish council to hire black policemen. They approached Frank McConnell,
president pro tern of the council and asked him to bring the proposal up for a vote. On
March 23, McConnell introduced the measure, and council members agreed to consider
it at a special meeting to be held on March 30, two days after the sit-ins. Five racial
diplomats, including Acie Belton and Fred Levy, who had served as a United Defense
League officer in 1953, went to the meeting and claimed that the city needed black
32“Long Suggests That Dissatisfied Negroes Leave,” Morning Advocate, March
29, 1960, 1; “2 Councils Say Youth’s Brainwashed,” State-Times, April 1,1960, 1;
“Negroes March Downtown; Grand Jury Begins Inquiry,” State-Times, March 30, 1960,
1.
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officers because they could enforce the law better in African-American neighborhoods
than white officers. They added that cities throughout the South and in neighboring
parishes employed black policemen with great success. Mayor Christian told the racial
diplomats, “I have heard nothing tonight that makes me feel that we need Negro
policemen and certainly not in light o f what is happening in Baton Rouge.” Councilman
Robert Breazeale made it even clearer that the student activists' actions directly
affected the council’s decision to vote against hiring black officers. He claimed that
through their actions, the students showed that they had no concern for doing what was
best for the black community and displayed “a lack o f awareness of civil
responsibility.” Black Baton Rougeans “must earn the rights they are now demanding,”
Breazeale added.33
For a year and a half following the 1960 sit-ins, Southern’s student body staged
no protests; racial diplomats and the white leaders concluded that the demonstrations
were over. During that time crucial changes occurred in Baton Rouge, hi the summer of
1960, the city-parish held elections for mayor-president, council members and district
attorney, and several African Americans entered the race. Most of them were World
War II activists, including Dupuy Anderson who ran for mayor-president and Johnnie
Jones who campaigned for district attorney. The incumbent district attorney, J. St. Clair
Favrot, decided not to seek reelection. In 1960, East Baton Rouge Parish had 64, 215
white voters and 10,288 black voters, and although they did not win, African-American
33“Council Conducts Hush-Hush Meeting on Sewer Program,” Morning
Advocate, March 24,1960, 1; “Negro Policemen Request Goes to Council Today,”
Morning Advocate, March 30, 1960, 1; “Policeman Plan by Negroes is Rejected,” StateTimes, March 31, 1960,1.
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candidates did well in the primacy election. Dupuy Anderson finished fourth in a field
of seven and garnered 5,751 votes. Christian, the front runner, received 19,365 votes.
Johnnie Jones came in sixth in a field o f seven, but 6,556 African Americans cast their
ballots for him. The frontrunner Lawrence Uter, with 12,358, made it into a runoff with
Sargent Pitcher, one of the founding members of the Citizens’ Council. Pitcher used
race to defeat Uter. He bragged about his support for segregation and urged white
citizens to vote en masse because the “NAACP bloc vote” would surely go to his
opponent. In the August 27 runoff election, Pitcher’s race-baiting paid off. He soundly
defeated his opponent. Race-baiting played no part in the mayoral election, however; all
candidates, except for Anderson, announced their support for segregation. Jack
Christian, whose campaign focused on maintaining the city-parish system of
government, handily defeated his opponent, A. T. “Apple” Sanders. Because white
leaders continued to control the police and sheriff’s departments, law enforcement’s
reaction to civil rights protests remained virtually unchanged. Maintaining the peace
remained foremost in their minds. Pitcher, however, handled the cases o f demonstrators
who had been arrested. He always asked for exorbitant bails for civil rights activists,
often increased the charges against them after they were jailed, and asked judges to
impose long prison sentences for the men and women who challenged the system of
segregation. Because Pitcher’s actions were not violent and attracted very little negative
national publicity, white leaders embraced his methods for dealing with jailed
activists.34
34“65% o f Demos Go to Polls in EBR Vote,” Morning Advocate, July 27, I960,
1; “Christian, Sanders to Run Off; Uter, Pitcher in Race for D.A,” Morning Advocate,
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Undaunted by the city’s new segregationist district attorney, student activists
regrouped in October 1961 and formed the Baton Rouge chapter o f CORE.35 Led by
Southern undergraduates, Ronnie Moore, Weldon Rougeau, and Patricia Tate, the
organization planned an attack against segregated facilities and discriminatory hiring
practices in downtown department stores. Wanting to forge alliances with World War II
activists and other like-minded adults, the local CORE organizers met with AfricanAmerican ministers and leaders of several black organizations. They garnered some
support from FOCUS, a new organization dedicated to increasing voter registration.
Both racial diplomats and World War II activists, including Raymond Scott, Johnnie
Jones, and Dupuy Anderson, initially joined FOCUS, but the activists quickly became
frustrated by the conservatism of the racial diplomats and abandoned it in early 1962 to
reorganize the Baton Rouge branch o f the NAACP.36

July 24, 1960, 1; “Pitcher Pledges Stiff Handling of Gaming Cases,” Morning
Advocate, August 8, 1960, 8A; “Pitcher Gives Campaign Talks to Two Groups,”
Morning Advocate, August 28, I960, 2A; “Pitcher Issues Statement Here for DA.
Runoff,” Morning Advocate, July 26, 1960, 5B.
35Although CORE played an important role in the civil rights movement, few
studies are devoted to the organization. CORE, by August Meier and Elliott Rudwick,
was one o f the first studies of the organization and is still the only book-length
treatment o f the organization. In it, the authors discuss CORE’S involvement in Baton
Rouge. James Farmer, who was one o f the founding members of CORE and served as
its director during the civil rights movement, in his autobiography Lay Bare the Heart:
An Autobiography o f the Civil Rights Movement (New York: Arbor House, 1985)
provides a first-hand account of the formation o f the organization and o f its role in the
freedom struggle. Other works, Fairclough’s Race and Democracy, and Kim Lacy
Rogers’s, Righteous Lives: Narratives o f the New Orleans Civil Rights Movement (New
York: New York University Press, 1993) discuss CORE in Louisiana.
36Meier and Rudwick, CORE, 166; Dave Dennis to Marvin Rich, November 25,
1961, CORE Papers, Series V, reel 20.
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With support from some black adults in hand, CORE held high hopes for its
Baton Rouge chapter and assigned field secretary David Dennis to work with the newly
formed group. A veteran of the 1960 Freedom Rides, Dennis came from the Shreveport
area where his father worked as a sharecropper. As a student at Dillard University in
New Orleans, he joined the New Orleans chapter of CORE in early 1960. In November
1961, Dennis told the national office, “The Baton Rouge CORE group [with a
membership o f sixty-five] looks very good, at the present time.”37
Under the direction of Dennis and Moore, the organization decided to begin its
protests in December 1961 by staging a series of hit-and-run lunch counter sit-ins.
Before the protests began, white leaders — especially downtown business owners and
operators, the Chamber of Commerce, and city officials who supported industrialization
and economic expansion decided to ignore these sit-ins. White leaders believed that if
the protesters remained free, the marches and mass meetings of the previous year could
be prevented. To preserve the peace, store managers instructed their employees to
ignore the protesters when they sat-in. Managers refused to call the police. Without
being asked to intervene, law enforcement officials could not arrest the sit-in
participants. The city’s newspapers, which were owned by the Manship family,
relegated all accounts of the protests to the back pages. Charles and Douglas Manship
owned one television station, one radio station, and the city’s two newspapers. Both
men belonged to the white leadership class and worked for Baton Rouge’s economic
growth. In 1963, Doug Manship served as the president of the Chamber o f Commerce.

37Ibid.
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The practice o f ignoring or burying news o f protest was not unique to Baton Rouge.
Other southern industrial and business centers used similar tactics to prevent racial
violence or avoid unfavorable national attention. In June 1960, white newspapers and
merchants in Houston adopted a similar media blackout to avoid racial conflict over an
attempt to desegregate lunch counters. On December 5, Baton Rouge CORE members
staged the first o f their sit-ins at Kress and McCrary’s. Much to their disappointment,
their protests received very little publicity. Waiters at both counters ignored them, and
the police were not called. The students left after a few minutes.38
In addition to conducting the hit-and-run sit-ins, Ronnie Moore phoned store
managers to ask them to desegregate their lunch counters and to hire black salespeople,
but failed to reach them. Their secretaries told Moore that the managers were either out
of town or too busy to take his calls. At that point, he sent letters to twelve downtown
department stores warning them that unless they desegregated their lunch counters and
hired African Americans to work as sales clerks and cashiers, the organization would
conduct more sit-ins and also picket and boycott their businesses.39

38Weldon Rougeau to Gordon R. Carey, December 4,1961, CORE Papers,
Series V, reel 20; “Baton Rouge is Named CORE ‘Mix’ Target,” Morning Advocate,
December 3, 1961, 6B; “Negroes Test Two Downtown Lunch Counters,” State-Times,
December 5, 1961, 8A; “CORE Claims Two ‘Eat-Run’ Minus Success,” Morning
Advocate, December 10, 1961,8G; “7 Negro Sit-In Demonstrators Ignored Here,”
Morning Advocate, December 6, 1961, 8B; Thomas Cole, Wo Color is My Kind: The
Life ofEldrewey Stem s and the Integration o f Houston (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1997), 36-57.
39The stores included: Kress, Goudchaux's, Woolworth, Welch & Levy,
McCrory’s, Sears, Holmes, Three Sisters, J. C. Penney, Rosenfield’s, Shopper’s Fair,
and Montgomery W ard. “CORE Gives Notice on 12 BR Merchants,” State-Times,
December 7, 1961,7F; “CORE Issues Ultimatum to 12 BR Stores,” Morning Advocate,
December 8, 1961,12C.
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In addition to CORE’Sprotests, the managers faced the possibility of a white
boycott o f their businesses. The city’s segregationist population promised to retaliate
against any store that capitulated to CORE’S demands. Some segregationists urged the
managers to “fire all Negroes” if a picket line formed outside of their businesses or if
student activists followed through with their threatened boycott W. H. Rutledge of
Shreveport, the executive director of the Citizens’ Councils of Louisiana, issued a
warning to Baton Rouge merchants. If they caved into CORE’Sdemands, then whites
would boycott their businesses. Unsure how to respond to the threatened boycotts, the
store managers met with city officials and decided that in order to avoid possible
segregationist-inspired violence they would ignore CORE’S demands.40
On December 11, the same day the Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Gamer, CORE staged a series of sit-ins at the businesses to which Moore had written.
Two groups o f Southern students held separate sit-ins at Kress’s lunch counter. The first
group, made up o f two men and two women, sat at the counter for thirty minutes, and
following the prescribed rules for dealing with such protests, the waitresses ignored
them. In the afternoon, fifteen student activists, ten women and five men, tried a
different approach. They filled all of the stools at the black lunch counter. Each ordered
a drink and remained seated for two hours, effectively shutting down the counter. Still,
the management refused to call the police. In addition to sending the nineteen students
to Kress, CORE deployed twelve members to McCrory’s and ten to Woolworth’s to sit
in at their lunch counters. Employees at both stores ignored them. When questioned by

40Ibid.
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reporters about his inaction, Police Chief Wingate White replied that the city-parish
attorney advised him that he had no authority to arrest the protestors unless they refused
to leave when asked to by store managers. Even then, he could arrest the demonstrators
only if the businesses requested assistance. The only way he could arrest the students
was if they took their protests out o f the businesses and into the streets.41
The refusal of store managers to call the police frustrated CORE leaders. They
needed publicity for their cause, and the best way to gamer the attention o f the press,
especially the national press, was through mass arrests. CORE realized that white
leaders would never agree to end segregation without being forced to do so by the
federal government. The organization knew from experience that protests and arrests
galvanized the black communities, as well as white liberals, and spurred many of its
members into action.
To achieve mass participation and to attract media attention, CORE stepped up
its protests. On December 10, members o f the organization began handing out fliers
calling for African Americans to boycott the twelve downtown stores. The broadsides
pleaded, “Use your dollar as a weapon against segregation,” and told the black
population, “Freedom is not a gift, but freedom is a merit that is acquired only through
determination and sacrifice.. . . The evil of segregation can be conquered through
SELECTIVE BUYING.” In addition to asking the black community to take part in the
boycott, on December 13, approximately one hundred student activists picketed the

4I“Four Negroes Ignored at Kress Counter,” Morning Advocate, December 12,
1961, 1IB; “New Sit-Ins Ignored at BR Lunch Counters,” State-Times, December 12,
1961,10A.
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downtown stores. The police ordered the protesters to disperse but arrested no one.
Once again, the newspapers kept the story off the front pages. By moving their protests
out of privately-owned businesses onto the public streets and sidewalks, the student
activists made white leaders uneasy. The leaders feared that segregationists would
attack protesters if they allowed African Americans to continue their picketing. When
sit-ins occurred inside buildings, the participants were afforded some protection from
potential attacks. However, outside, they would attract the public’s attention and would
draw crowds o f angry white onlookers, leaving them vulnerable to attack. After the
December 13 picketing, Pitcher, Kean, White, and Sheriff Bryan Clemmons issued a
statement warning that anyone blocking a street or sidewalk while taking part in a
demonstration would be arrested and prosecuted for violating a state statute against
disturbing the peace and for criminal mischief. They also encouraged all citizens, black
and white, to “ignore the agitation advocated by CORE.”42
The following day, a group o f student activists tested the resolve o f city officials
by picketing the twelve downtown stores. Twenty-five student activists marched
outside o f these businesses for about a minute and a half before police officers arrested
them. District Judge Fred A. Blanche, Jr. set their bonds at $1,500 each. Adopting the
tactics o f remaining in jail in lieu o f bail that John Gamer and the others who
participated in the second wave o f sit-ins in March 1960 had employed and that
42Summary of Testimony o f Ronnie Moore, Committee of Inquiry, May 25,
1962, CORE Papers, Series V, reell7; CORE Fliers, Lawyers Constitutional Defense
Committee Papers, reel 17, Amistad Research Center, Tulane University, New Orleans,
Louisiana (microfilm); “CORE Pickets Dispersed by Police Request,” State-Times,
December 13,1961,12A; “EBR Officials Warn Against Demonstrations,” Morning
Advocate, December 14, 1961, 1.
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Freedom Riders had used the previous summer to fill the jails in Mississippi, the
activists refused to post bail and remained in jail.43
On December 15, Ronnie Moore drove a sound truck around Southern’s campus
urging the students to take part in a march to downtown Baton Rouge. Moore rented the
same equipment used by politicians and kept the volume on medium. Nevertheless,
sheriff’s deputy arrested him for illegal use o f a sound truck and for violating the city’s
anti-noise ordinance.44
Approximately 4,000 young African Americans crowded into the streets outside
of the parish prison to show their support for the jailed students. Since Moore was in
jail, Reverend B. Elton Cox, a CORE field secretary from High Point, North Carolina,
led the demonstration. He told Chief White and Sheriff Clemmons that he planned to
lead the crowd in singing and prayer and then give a brief address. He promised that the
program would take less than half an hour. Chief White told Cox that he would allow
him to speak for seven minutes but no longer. At that point, 350 city policemen and
sheriff’s deputies surrounded the courthouse. This massive force included the entire
police department armed with revolvers, riot guns, submachine guns, and tear gas. The
city’s two police dogs were also on hand.45

“ Summary of Testimony o f Weldon Rougeau, Committee o f Inquiry, May 25,
1962, CORE Papers, Series V, reel 17; “23 Negroes Arrested for Demonstration,”
State-Times, December 14,1961, 1; “Negro Pickets of Stores Sill Held in Jail,”
December 15, 1961, 1.
“ Moore Testimony, CORE Inquiry, CORE Papers, Series V, reel 17.
“ Statement of Facts, Cox v. Louisiana, Lawyers Constitutional Defense
Committee Papers, reel 17; “Tear Gas is Used as Negro Groups March Downtown,”
State-Times, December 15, 1961,1.
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The demonstration started peacefully with the crowd reciting the Pledge of
Allegiance and the Lord’s Prayer. Cox denounced the arrest of the twenty-three young
men and women and told the rally’s participants that the Bill of Rights guaranteed the
right o f every American, black or white, to take part in peaceful protests. He urged the
marchers to be brave in the face of white opposition. “If we go to jail, we will go
without bail,” he proclaimed. “If they give us tear gas, we will take it and fall
honorably.” Cox concluded his speech by asking the marchers to disperse and to
conduct an hour-long sit-in at the twelve department stores. During his speech, a group
of approximately 200 whites heckled him. As the rally started to break up, the jailed
picketers sang, “Oh students, don’t you weep. Don’t you mourn,” and the crowd of
students cheered.
At that point, Clemmons panicked. Using a bull horn, he ordered the students to
disperse. The State-Times reported that the sheriff told the students, “We have given
you the opportunity to demonstrate here, but now you are creating a disturbance. This is
all — now break it up.” Without warning, the officers fired tear gas into the crowd. The
students scattered but attempted to reassemble. The officers fired another volley of tear
gas and used their night sticks and police dogs to prevent them from regrouping. The
next day, Police Inspector Rufus S. Trigg tried to ease the racial tension that erupted
after the melee by denying that law enforcement officers used physical force to subdue
the crowd. He told the Morning Advocate, "Never was anybody touched by a hand, fist,
nightstick or any other instrument at the disposal o f the police.” Cox told a different
story. He said that police unleashed their dogs on some of the fleeing students and beat
others with night sticks. Although the reaction of Clemmons and his deputies ran
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counter to the white leaders’ desire to maintain peace, the sheriff apparently feared that
the jeering crowd o f segregationists would attack the marchers and cause a full-scale
riot in the heart o f downtown Baton Rouge.
Despite Clemmons’ efforts, a group o f marchers escaped the tear gas and
crowded onto the sidewalks of Third Street, the hub o f downtown commerce, and began
to picket the stores that lined the street. Some even tried to stage sit-ins at McCrory’s,
Kress, and Rosenfield’s, but the stores closed their lunch counters to prevent protests.
Two hours after the march, the protest ended, and the students returned to campus. The
police did not immediately arrest any o f the protesters. Perhaps they feared that the
wholesale arrest o f march participants would lead to more demonstrations.46
Instead, they waited several hours before making any arrests. In the early
evening of December 15, Cox, unable to walk because a tear gas shell had injured his
ankle, was scheduled to meet with students at a North Baton Rouge church to discuss
further action. When he arrived, several deputies were on hand to arrest him. They
charged him with conspiring to riot and inciting a riot. Judge LeBlanc set his bond at
$ 1,500. When CORE’S main office offered to pay Cox’s bail, the judge raised it to
$4,000, then to $6,000, and finally to $8,000. However, he eventually dropped it back
down to $6,000. With help from CORE’S national office, Cox bonded out of jail on
December 27, 1961. The same day, law enforcement officials arrested fifty others,
46“Tear Gas is Used as Negro Groups March Downtown,” State-Times,
December 15, 1961,1; “50 Negroes Jailed as Tear Gas is Used,” Morning Advocate,
December 14,1961, 1; Statement of Facts, C ar v. Louisiana, "Lawyers Constitutional
Defense Committee, reel 17; Committee o f Inquiry, May 25, 1962, CORE Papers,
Series V, reel 17; “Police ‘Tear Gas’ Non-Violent Students,” Louisiana Weekly,
December 23, 1961, 1.
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mostly Southern students, in connection with the march. They charged the four students
who were in the sound truck with Moore with illegal use o f a loud speaker. Sixteen
others were charged with simple obstruction of a highway. Five went to jail for
vagrancy and another eighteen for illegal picketing.47
The jailed activists received harsh treatment in prison. Cox spent his entire ten
days in solitary confinement and was not given his mail. Clemmons justified this
isolation by claiming that “he [Coxj had the company o f another nearby.” The sheriff
added that he separated the CORE leader from the other black prisoners for his own
safety because some o f them did not share Cox’s “sentiments.” He did admit that he
believed Cox would stir up the other jailed demonstrators. The sheriff refused to give
the North Carolina minister his mail because most o f it came from CORE. Weldon
Rougeau spent twenty-one days in jail before posting bond, as did Ronnie Moore.
Moore, along with Jerome Smith and Dave Dennis, who was jailed on the first day of
picketing, claimed that their jailers beat them. “[The] jail atmosphere was hostile,” said
Moore, “I was denied consultation with ministers, mail, and use of the telephone. After
making three requests in one day to see a doctor, 1 was slaoped and choked.” Smith was
beaten for asking a guard to retrieve a receipt that he had forgotten in the pocket o f his
pants. His injuries were so severe that the prison sent him to Charity Hospital in New

47“Board o f Education Issues Warning to Negro Students,” State-Times,
December 16,1961,1; “Open Letter to the Citizens o f Baton Rouge,” Morning
Advocate, December 20, 1961,3C; “Board of Education Issues Warning to Negro
Student,” State-Times, December 16* 1961,1; “Calm Returns to City Mall in Wake of
Demonstrations,” Morning Advocate, December 17,1961,1.
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Orleans for treatment. Dennis received a beating when he asked to meet with the
warden to discuss the brutal treatment o f the other two men.48
In addition to using the criminal justice system to silence the jailed CORE
members, white leaders took steps to destroy student activism at Southern. On
December 16, the State Board of Education issued a directive ordering the immediate
suspension o f any student arrested or jailed and forbade students who lived on campus
from taking part in demonstrations not sanctioned by the university. Board o f Education
President Robert Curry of Shreveport declared that any student disobeying the rule
would be expelled. To prevent the type o f mass rallies that followed the March 1960 sitins, Felton Clark closed the campus for the Christmas holidays three days early. He also
postponed taking any action against the jailed students until after the holiday.49
On December 20, FOCUS took out an advertisement in the city’s white papers
in support o f the students. More than fifty African Americans, including World War II
activists and racial diplomats, signed the ad which proclaimed, “We are interested in
Baton Rouge, its growth and development, concerned with our youth, and disturbed and
embarrassed about the image that Baton Rouge has created and communicated to the
world.” The organization added that the arrest of students for taking part in a peaceful
assembly violated their constitutional rights. The signers added that all African

'““CORE Official to Continue Protest Fast,” Morning Advocate, December 28,
1961,10C; ‘TBI Probing BR Beatings,” Louisiana Weekly, June 13, 1962,1;
Testimony o f B. Elton Cox, Weldon Rougeau, & Ronnie Moore, Committee of Inquiry,
May 25,1962, CORE Papers, Series V, reell7.
49“Board o f Education Issues Warning to Negro Students,” State-Times,
December 16, 1961,1.
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Americans wanted segregation to end. Although they disagreed with the methods
employed by the student activists, the racial diplomats shared their goal o f ending
segregation; they continued to think that the best way to accomplish this goal was
through negotiations with white leaders. And, in fact, the ad called for Mayor-President
Christian to marshal the city-parish’s resources, including LSU and Southern, business
and industry leaders, and “people of sufficient foresight, forethought, goodwill and
integrity to take immediate steps toward progress.” They called for “people with pride
and dignity” to step forward to form a biracial committee that would “be entrusted with
the duty of proposing a solution to the problems o f our community.” Putting their
names on this advertisement allowed the racial diplomats to maintain their image as
leaders of the black community to both African Americans and to white leaders.
Notably absent from the list of signers and silent throughout the crisis was T. J.
Jemison.50
After failing to prevent mass demonstrations, white leaders immediately called
for calm, blamed the unrest on outside agitators, and instructed Pitcher to ask district,
state, and federal judges to issue a restraining order against COKE that banned the
organization from East Baton Rouge Parish. The previous year, a judge took a similar
action against the group’s New Orleans branch after it launched a series o f lunch
counter sit-ins. Pitcher’s petition claimed that CORE represented a threat to public
peace and security by “sponsoring, financing, and encouraging people to foment
violence, to promote breaches of the peace, and other violations o f the law.” Three state
s0“An Open Letter to the Citizens o f Baton Rouge,” Morning Advocate,
December 20, 1961,3C.
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judges C. A. Barnett, Fred Blanche, and Fred LeBIanc readily agreed to the ban.
Federal Judge E. Gordon West, one of President John F. Kennedy’s appointees, also
approved the petition.51 These injunctions crippled CORE and forced the national office
to direct its attention away from Baton Rogue and toward the rural parishes surrounding
the city. Local CORE leaders reluctantly complied. Their spokesman, D ’Army Bailey
had announced, “We feel it is our duty as law-abiding American students to adhere to
the specifications set forth in the injunction.” Bailey attended Southern and majored in
political science. He added that suspension o f protests did not signal a retreat but
reaffirmed CORE’S belief in the federal system o f justice.52
In addition to the CORE ban, white leaders took other steps to keep outside
agitators out of Baton Rouge. At the December 16 meeting of the Louisiana Board of
Education, Louis Doherty, a member of the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board,
presented a petition signed by a dozen local residents asking the board to screen
applications submitted by out-of-state students to tax-supported colleges and
universities. Obviously, Doherty and the petition’s signers believed that students from
other states stirred up Southern’s otherwise “happy” student body and convinced them
to protest. Yet of the seventy Southern students arrested in December 1961, eight came
from other parts o f the country, and only two o f them were from the North — one from
Kansas and the other from Illinois. The other six were from South Carolina, Texas, and
SIKennedy named West, a Baton Rougean and an ardent segregationist, to the
post to curry favor with Louisiana Senator Russell Long.
52“Federal, State Judiciary Sign Orders to Ban Demonstrations,” Morning
Advocate, December 16, 1961,1; “Calm Returns to City Mall in Wake o f
Demonstrations,” Morning Advocate, December 17, 1961, 1.
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Arkansas. Although the vast majority o f the protesters were from Louisiana, only eight
were Baton Rouge natives. The small number of local students among the activists can
be attributed to several factors. Most o f them lived at home with their parents and not
on campus, the stronghold o f the student activists. Few parents, most of whom worked
for white employers and relied on white bankers and businessmen for credit, would
allow their children to take part in these types of public protests.53
Segregationists believed that outside agitators were behind the CORE
demonstrations. In a letter to the editor o f the Morning Advocate, one segregationist
accused CORE representatives of being “paid agitators. . . [with] no intentions of
trying to improve any situation. Their only motive is exploitative for either financial
gain or political motives.” He also charged FOCUS with using “pressure tactics” to
force the mayor and other white leaders to form a biracial committee. Another writer
declared that the police should “use more tear gas, more police dogs, larger night sticks,
and whatever arms are required to protect the rights of our citizens to use the sidewalks
and streets and to shop and carry on business in peace.” He added, “Our community has
always enjoyed wonderful race relations until outside agitators came into this area and
created problems of tension.”54
Although a few segregationists wrote hostile letters to the city’s newspapers,
none resorted to violence, cross burnings, or bombings. Instead, they allowed Pitcher to

S3“Board o f Education Issues Warning to Negro Students,” State-Times,
December 16, 1961,1; “Negro Pickets o f Stores Still Held in Jail,” Morning Advocate,
December 15, 1961,1.
54“When Readers Speak,” Morning Advocate, December 23, 1961,12A.
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use the power o f his office to silence the demands o f the civil rights activists and to
prevent further demonstrations. Perhaps their strategy would have worked if the Baton
Rouge civil rights movement had been stirred up by outside agitators, but in reality, the
discontent o f local people drove the movement. After the banishment of CORE, local
activists continued to picket, march, and to demand an end to segregation.
As the students returned to Southern in January 1962, Felton Clark met with
Pitcher and convinced him to drop the charges against sixty-six o f the jailed student
protesters. Charges remained against seven student leaders. The sixty-six were released
from prison in time to take their final examinations. The rules governing state colleges
stated that no student “involved in a case of police action, which has not been resolved
in an acceptable legal form” could remain in school, but Clark declared that he allowed
the sixty-six to return school because they were “no longer embroiled in legal
proceedings.” Clark added that the seven leaders did not fall into this category because
they still had charges pending against them. When the fall semester resumed in midJanuary, Southern’s disciplinary board expelled the seven leaders, including Ronnie
Moore, Patricia Tate, and Weldon Rougeau. While Clark could expel a small number of
“agitators” with impunity, he could not eject seventy-three without incurring the wrath
of parents, alumni, and Baton Rouge’s black community, especially the World War II
activists. Like all racial diplomats, he needed to appease both the black and white
communities, and he believed that securing the release of sixty-six followers and
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allowing them to take their finals while expelling the seven leaders satisfied both
sides.55
For Southern’s student body, seven expulsions were too many. To show their
support for Moore and the others, approximately one thousand students held a prayer
vigil outside o f Clark’s home. The following day, Clark expelled an eighth student,
D’Army Bailey, who organized the vigil. Citing a “continuous disturbance by a
segment of students,” he closed Southern on January 18 and ordered all students off the
campus by 5 p jn . He believed that his action would prevent the type o f mass rallies that
had followed expulsion of the student activists in 1960. Clark also announced that all
students would have to apply for admission for the spring semester. While he could not
suspend all o f the student activists, the process o f reapplying would allow the
administration to weed out anyone suspected of being an agitator.s6
As the 5:00 p.m. deadline approached, few students remained on campus.
Ronnie Moore, who spent most of January 18 in downtown Baton Rouge preparing for
his arraignment, returned to Southern at 4:50 to pack up his belongings. He quickly
gathered his property and met with Weldon Rougeau in front of the gymnasium at 5:20.
As the two prepared to leave, they stopped to talk to six students who were about to do
the same. Before they could depart, a university official spotted them, alerted a sheriffs
55“Southem University Plans to Resume Classes Jan. 29,” State-Times, January
20.1962, 1; “Southern Bars Seven Student Demonstrators,” Morning Advocate, January
18.1962, 1.
56“Southem University Plans to Resume Classes Jan. 29,” State-Times, January
20.1962, 1; “Southern to ‘Purge’ the Entire Student Body,” Louisiana Weekly, January
27.1962, 1; “Southern Bars Seven Student Demonstrators,” Morning Advocate, January
18.1962, 1.
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deputy who had been cruising the campus, and asked him to arrest the CORE leaders.
The deputy charged them with criminal trespass and disturbing the peace.57
Moore’s and Rougeau’s arrest and imprisonment reflected Pitcher’s zerotolerance approach for dealing with civil rights activists. He requested and received
exorbitantly high bonds, $31,000 for each. While in parish prison, their jailors
attempted to break their resolve by isolating the CORE activists from the general prison
population and holding them in a seven feet by seven feet cell, where they remained for
forty-eight days. For much o f that time, the warden refused to give them mail or let
them make phone calls and allowed them to shower only twice a week. Pitcher cracked
down so heavily on CORE leaders because he and the majority o f white Baton
Rougeans believed that these “outsiders” were responsible for all civil rights activity in
the city. They reasoned that this harsh treatment would convince other activists to leave
the city, and then the movement would die.58
CORE immediately denounced the closure o f Southern and the expulsion of the
eight activists. On January 19, the organization’s national'director James Farmer
telegraphed Clark and urged him to reconsider his decision to expel the student leaders
and to require all students to submit applications for readmission. Farmer stated,

57“Southem Closed as Anti-Segregation Protests Continue,” Morning Advocate,
January 19, 1962, 1; “No Word Given on Re-Opening o f Southern University,” StateTimes, January 19, 1962, 1; Testimony of Moore and Rougeau, Committee o f Inquiry,
May 25, 1962, CORE Papers, Series V, reel 17; “Harassment, Vandalism Cited in SU
Closure,” Morning Advocate, January 21,1962,1.
58Testimony of Moore and Rougeau, Committee of Inquiry, May 25,1962,.
CORE Papers, Series V, reel 17.
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Public funds supporting Southern University come from Negro as well as white
citizens and must not be used to compel acquiescence to Jim Crow. A state
university may not be free to support the current fight for equality but it is
unopposed only at the price o f rejection by an enraged people whom it purports
to serve.
In addition to writing to Clark, Farmer also sent a telegram to President John F.
Kennedy telling him about the situation at Southern and urging him to cut off federal
funds for higher education in Louisiana because the State Board o f Education
appropriated federal funds on a segregated basis with white universities receiving
approximately $110.90 per student and black universities receiving $5.80 per student
In addition to the telegrams sent by Farmer, Patricia Tate, the Baton Rouge chapter’s
secretary, and Cox sent a letter to all of Southern’s faculty and administrators asking
them to support the student activists and their demands for ending segregation. While
Farmer’s pleas to Clark and Kennedy fell upon deaf ears, the letter to the faculty
garnered some support for the students. On January 24, 1962, history professor Adolph
Reed wrote to Clark and denounced his actions. Reed told Clark that the university
“must learn to live with sit-ins.” He likened the Southern president to Nazi Adolph
Eichmann and stated that both contended “that there is no administrative alternative to
carrying out the evil designs o f perpetrators . . . o f an evil social system.” He added that
if Clark stood up to the Board o f Education, the faculty would support him. Reed called
the police patrols on campus a “disgusting spectacle” and told Clark, “These students
are not criminals for protesting globally accepted concepts o f injustice and human
degradation.” In late January, 102 o f Southern’s 300 faculty members signed a petition
expressing their support for the student demonstrators. It stated, “We are opposed to
racial segregation and discrimination and feel there is a need for constructive
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reappraisal o f the present policy regarding student participation in such protests,” the
signers declared. Clark refused to comment on the faculty petition or to readmit
expelled students.59
When registration opened on January 25, three of the eight expelled CORE
leaders, Thomas Peete and Willie Bradford of Shreveport and D’Army Bailey of
Memphis, Tennessee, attempted to enroll, but officials rejected their applications. Dean
of Men Ulysses Jones charged them with trespassing and asked security guards to
escort them off the campus. In addition to denying entry to the three, Southern rejected
the applications o f forty others who took part in the December demonstrations. Fearing
more protests because of the rejections, Clark warned the student body, “The university
is not an organization for social action like other similar institutions, its primary
function is formal education.” He added that any student who disrupted that function
would be punished. Clark’s statement failed to silence the protesters. On Saturday,
January 27, approximately three hundred students gathered on the outskirts o f campus
to listen to Bailey and several other speakers. Bailey urged the crowd to boycott classes
the following Monday to protest the expulsion o f the student leaders. He told the crowd,
“We failed in ‘60, we’re at that same point now. It’s an issue as to whether this
movement shall fail or whether it shall succeed. If it means closing Southern

59James Farmer to Felton Clark, January 19,1962, CORE Papers, Series V, reel
20; James Farmer to John F. Kennedy, January 1 9 ,1 9 6 2 , CORE Papers, Series V, reel
17; Patricia Tate and B. Elton Cox to Administration and Faculty Members, January 22,
1962, CORE papers, Series V, reel 20; Adolph Reed to Felton Clark, January 2 4 ,1 9 6 2 ,
NAACP Papers, Group III, box E7, folder 3; “Southern Profs Ask Reappraisal o f Policy
Here,” Morning Advocate, January 29, 1 9 6 2 ,1 ; “Classes are N orm al at Southern
University,” State-Times, January 2 9 ,1 9 6 2 ,1 .
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University, then, hell, let’s close i t ” To drive the point home, Bailey introduced Marvin
Robinson, one o f the leaders o f the 1960 sit-ins. Robinson told the crowd, “We left off
at this point in 1960

and we made a drastic mistake. We began to listen and to

adhere to . . . the rules o f an evil system.” He urged the students to stand firm in their
support o f their banished leaders. Bailey’s and Robinson’s pleas had little impact. When
the university reopened on January 29, the majority o f students returned to class.60
Those who continued to call for a boycott received harsh treatment from
university officials. Dion Diamond, a field secretary for the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and a native o f Petersburg, Virginia, claimed that he
wanted to transfer to Southern and urged the students to walk out of their classes to
support the cause. Clark asked police officers to arrest Diamond. They complied and
charged him with interfering with a lawful assembly, unlawful assembly, and vagrancy.
Judge LeBlanc set his bail at $6,000. Diamond’s attorney, Johnnie Jones, asked him to
lower it, but the judge refused. The SNCC member remained in jail, and on March 8,
Pitcher added the charge o f criminal anarchy to the counts against him. He claimed that
Diamond encouraged Southern students “to hold unruly and unauthorized
demonstration which would foreseeably alarm and disturb the public.” Criminal
anarchy quickly became Pitcher’s favorite charge to levy against civil rights activists.
On February 12, he added it to the counts against the jailed Ronnie Moore, claiming

“ “Mass Meet Staged near Southern U,” State-Times, January 27,1962, I;
“Negroes Ousted from Southern Urge Boycott,” Morning Advocate, January 28, 1962,
1; “Classes are Normal at Southern U,” State-Times, January 29,1962,1.
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that the CORE leader “advocated opposition to the government in Louisiana by
unlawful means.” Because o f this new charge, Moore’s bond increased to $12,500.61
Whites’ fears of outside agitators stirring up the local black population became
so intense in early 1962 that law enforcement officers targeted all civil rights activists
as potential troublemakers. On February 17, two SNCC leaders, Charles McDew and
Robert Zellner, who were passing through Baton Rouge, tried to visit Diamond in jail.
When they arrived, the pair asked to see their friend, but a guard denied their request
saying that black prisoners could not receive visitors that day. The men then asked if
they could leave books and cigarettes for Diamond, and the guard assured the two men
that they could. McDew and Zellner, who were waiting for a bus, rushed out to
purchase some items for Diamond. When they returned to the parish prison to drop
them off, a d e p u ty arrested them on suspicion of vagrancy even though the two had bus
tickets and two hundred dollars in cash. Four days later, Pitcher charged them with
criminal anarchy, and a judge set their bond at $7,000 each. While in Baton Rouge,
neither man urged the local population to protest. In fact, they had little contact with the
black community. In the eyes o f the Baton Rouge police, however, their membership in
SNCC and the fact that the white Zellner traveled with the African-American McDew
meant that they advocate^ practiced, and taught “opposition to the government of the
state of Louisiana by unlawful means.” Until SNCC bailed them out, the men spent

6I“Southem Campus Quiet After Trespassing,” Morning Advocate, February 2,
1962,12A; “Sixth Charge Against Negro is Filed Here,” Morning Advocate, March 9,
1962,4A; “Habeas Corpus Hearing Delayed in Diamond Case,” Morning Advocate,
March 10,1962,2A.
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thirteen days in solitary confinement for traveling to Baton Rouge and attempting to
visit a friend in jail.62
White leaders and segregationists applauded the arrest o f Zellner and McDew
and supported closing the university, expelling the activists, and requiring all students
to reapply for admission. A Morning Advocate editorial called Clark’s actions “unusual
and dramatic” but added “practically all Baton Rougeans o f both races” backed him in
his efforts “to get the student body back on track, eliminate disturbing influences, and
protect the institution, the greatest o f its kind in the country, from the damage it might
suffer through continued agitation and confusion.” Calling them “extremists,” the paper
claimed that the students cared little about whether they destroyed ‘Valuable
institutions” in their efforts to “force conformity with their opinions and attitudes on
others.”63
White liberals, on the other hand, opposed Clark’s actions. On January 21, the
ACLU’s Executive Director Patrick Malin of New York and LCLU President David
Dover o f New Orleans sent telegrams to Clark, Governor Jimmie Davis, and State
Board o f Education President William Dodd and told them “students who demonstrate
against segregation merit no discipline.” Wade Mackie and the AFSC also tried to help

“ “Sixth Charge Against Negro is Filed Here,” Morning Advocate, March 9,
1962,4A; “Habeas Corpus Hearing Delayed in Diamond Case,” Morning Advocate,
March 10, 1962,2A; Summary o f Testimony of Charles McDew, Committee of
Inquiry, May 25,1962, CORE Papers, Series V, reel 17; “Reverend B. E. Cox Gains
Freedom on $7,125 Bond,” Morning Advocate, February 13, 1962,1; “March 9 Trial
Set for Negro Boycott Leader,” Morning Advocate, February 14, 1962,14B.
“ “Pressure on Southern University,” Morning Advocate, January 23,1962,4A;
“Civil Liberties Protests SU Closure,” Morning Advocate, January 22, 1962,10A.
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the student activists. He told his superiors, “I could have helped some — if I had been
asked,” but no one asked. When the police arrested Zellner and McDew, Mackie
arranged for a Methodist minister to visit Zellner, whose father was a Methodist
minister. He also tried to convince the two men to work with the LCLU’s legal team,
but both refused. They preferred to retain a black attorney.64
The direct action phase o f the civil rights movement in which protesters
consciously broke the city’s segregation laws, picketed, marched, and proudly went to
jail and refused bail confounded racial diplomats. The student activists failed to abide
by the rules o f traditional race relations and, unlike the World War II activists, refused
to work within the state’s and the nation’s legal systems. While racial diplomats wanted
to end segregation, their methods were in direct contrast to the students. They believed
that the only way whites would agree to grant African Americans equality was if blacks
approached them with deference and asked for small changes to the system o f
segregation. Although they did not directly take part in the protests, World War II
activists supported the student activists. On January 27,1962, Dupuy Anderson urged
Southern students to boycott classes until university officials readmitted the expelled
leaders. Johnnie Jones also backed the arrested CORE members and served as their
attorney.65
When B. Elton Cox’s trial began in January 1962, Jones demanded that Judge
Fred LeBlanc desegregate the courtroom and stated, “This case is one where the

64Wade Mackie to Jean Fairfax, Report on Arrests o f Representatives, April 16,
1962, AFSC, Baton Rouge Correspondence, South Central Regional Office, 1963.
“ “Negroes Ousted from Southern,” Morning Advocate, January 28,1962,1.
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defendant is being charged for the protest o f racial segregation and within the
courthouse itself segregation is being practiced.’*Interest in Cox*s trial ran high in the
African-American community, and 127 people quickly filled the seats in the black
section of the courtroom, and more than 200 waited in the hallway to hear news about
the trial. Captain Herman Thompson o f the East Baton Rouge Parish Sheriffs Office
testified that the crowd remained in the hallway and grew so thick that he and his
colleagues could not clear a pathway. At that point, he called the fire marshals and
dispersed the crowd. Only eight white spectators attended the trial. In light o f this,
Jones asked Judge LeBlanc to allow interested African Americans to sit in the vacant
seats reserved for whites. District Attorney Pitcher strongly objected to this proposal,
and Judge LeBlanc concurred, saying that segregation “has been the practice and
custom in the East Baton Rouge Parish Courthouse for many, many years.” He bragged
that several years earlier he had generously ordered half of the seats reserved for whites
to be assigned to African-American spectators. LeBlanc called Jones’ desegregation
demand “self-serving” and ordered the trial to continue. Just as it had done during the
December sit-ins, the press ignored Jones’ calls to integrate the courtroom. LeBlanc
found Cox guilty of disturbing the peace, obstructing a public sidewalk, and
demonstrating near a public building and sentenced him to a one year and nine months
in jail and fined him $5,700. A month after Cox’s conviction, Jones resigned from the
case because CORE failed to pay the $7,180 it owed him in attorney’s fees and
expenditures that he incurred while representing Cox and the other jailed protesters.
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Within months, the tiff between Jones and CORE blew over, and he resumed his
representation o f the jailed activist66
Cox’s conviction ended CORE’S involvement in Baton Rouge. Although
individual members remained in the city and continued to work to fight segregation, the
expulsion o f the student activists and law enforcement’s zero-tolerance policy for
agitators paralyzed the local CORE chapter, and the organization shifted its attention
away from Baton Rouge toward the rural parishes surrounding the city. Clark’s harsh
treatment o f protesters destroyed not just CORE but student activism at Southern for the
next six years. Yet the sit-ins of March, 1960, and December, 1961, had a lasting
impact on the civil rights movement both nationally and locally. Cox’s case made its
way to the Supreme Court and led to a ruling that protected the right of protesters to
stage peaceful public demonstrations. Locally, CORE’S activities compelled other civil
rights activists to take action, most notably a group of working-class men and women
who wanted to bring an immediate end to segregation and were willing to risk their
economic well-being and physical safety to achieve their goals.

^ “Negroes Ousted from Southern,” Morning Advocate, January 28,1962, 1;
Cox v. Louisiana, 41,199- 42,202, Criminal Section, 19th Judicial District Court, Parish
of East Baton Rouge, State of Louisiana (1962); “CORE Official Found Guilty,”
Morning Advocate, February 1,1962, 1; Johnnie Jones to Lois Elie, March 1, 1962,
CORE Papers, Series V, reel 17.
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Chapter 7
Desegregating the Public Schools, 1956-1969
In 1956, two years after Johnnie Jones and Alex Pitcher attempted to register
black students at Gilmer Wright m 1954, black parents filed a school desegregation suit
for East Baton Rouge Parish — Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board. In the
face o f threatened integration, the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board adopted a
policy o f using the court system to delay a decision on Davis. After four years of
continuances and appeals, A. P. Tureaud, the parents’ attorney, asked the Fifth Circuit
Court o f Appeals to issue a ruling in the case, but Judge J. Skelly Wright refused to rule
on Davis until the Orleans Parish school desegregation suit had been settled. The
integration of New Orleans’s schools created a segregationist backlash that threatened
to destroy public education in Louisiana. In Baton Rouge, the fight over school
desegregation pitted white leaders and accommodationists against the Citizens’ Council
and its supporters. Segregationists wanted to close the public schools if ordered to
desegregate, and white leaders and their supporters wanted to keep them open. From
1960 to 1963, white Baton Rougeans struggled to agree on integration. Throughout the
period, black parents wanted one thing — to obtain a good education for their children.
White leaders realized that the federal courts would eventually order them to
integrate the East Baton Rouge Parish public school system but wanted to delay the
inevitable as long as possible. The nervous School Board sought to appease African
Americans and to convince them to withdraw the suit. In 1959, its members considered
changing the designation o f Gilmer Wright, the elementary school that black parents
had raised money to build but was designated for whites, from white to black.
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Superintendent Robert Aerteker proposed the conversion to the board and claimed that
the white population in the neighborhood surrounding the school had declined
significantly in the 1950s while the number o f African Americans had risen. As a result,
approximately 160 black children had to attend a facility three miles away while Gilmer
Wright went underutilized Aerteker warned the board that integration would cause
tremendous problems and might lead to a mass exodus of black students to white
schools. He implied that giving Gilmer Wright back to the black community might
appease the black parents. “Unless we take constructive steps now,” he warned the
board, “you will come to us later asking why we didn’t let you know o f possible
changes in the area.” White parents, however, appeared before the board and strongly
denounced Aerteker’s proposal. They claimed that a change in designation would lower
their property values and charged that “the NAACP and communists” were behind the
proposal. Because o f the white outcry against the plan, the board postponed taking
action on the proposal for over a year. In light o f white opposition, School Board
members could not support a move that favored African Americans for fear that the
Southern Gentlemen and the Citizens’ Council would label them segregationists and
ruin their political careers.1
When Tureaud made his arguments before Federal Judge J. Skelly Wright in
early 1960, he claimed that his clients originally sought legal redress after the School
Board took Gilmer Wright away from them. Tureaud also announced that African1Minutes, East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, December 17,1959; “Gilmer
Wright Patrons Protest Possible Change,” Morning Advocate, December 17, 1959, 1;
‘Tempers Fly at Meet o f EBR School on Possible Change,” Morning Advocate,
December 18,1959, 1.
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American parents from the neighborhood surrounding Gilmer Wright initially retained
an attorney, Pitcher, to get their school back. Attorney General Jack Gremillion asked
Tureaud if his clients would drop their case if the School Board changed the
designation. The civil rights attorney replied that they would not. Gremillion claimed
that NAACP attorneys came to Baton Rouge and convinced black parents to sue.
Whites throughout the South levied similar charges against all school desegregation
suits because they believed that their black populations would not take such action on
their own. Tureaud countered that the plaintiffs contacted an attorney and not vice
versa.2
In 1956, a large number of activists in East Baton Rouge Parish wanted to be a
party to the suit. Working with J. K. Haynes, Tureaud carefully selected the most
committed ones. The two men refused to allow several o f the parents to act as plaintiffs,
one because he could easily be intimidated, another for being untrustworthy, still
another because the man’s wife was “consumed by fear,” and a final man for being an
alcoholic and receiving treatment in a mental institution. Tureaud and Haynes wanted
the plaintiffs to be upstanding citizens because they knew that the School Board’s
attorneys would investigate their backgrounds and use any flaws that they found as
ammunition against them. Seven individuals made the final cut: Clifford Davis, Sr.,
Richard Payne, Frank White, Louis Moncliffe, Mrs. Bernice Williams, Walter
Williams, and M. F. Moss. Their children ranged from elementary to high school age.3

2“Federal Court Hears Suit on BR Integration,” State-Times, March 14,1960, 1;
“EBR Area Integration Suits Argued,” Morning Advocate, March 15, I960,1.
3J. K. Haynes to A. P. Tureaud, March 30,1960, APT Papers, box 29, folder 23.
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On April 29,1960, Wright ruled in favor o f Davis, et al. Following the “all
deliberate speed” clause o f Brown, he ordered the School Board to submit a
desegregation plan but refused to set a date for compliance, thus allowing the board to
drag out the process for several years. Instead of working on the desegregation plan, the
School Board decided to fight the ruling “all the way to the Supreme Court.” East Baton
Rouge Parish District Attorney J. St. Clair Favrot told the Morning Advocate, “I intend
to exhaust every legal remedy available to the School Board.”4
Nineteen sixty marked the watershed in the Louisiana school desegregation
process. On May 16, Judge Wright ordered racial mixing to begin in New Orleans at the
beginning o f the 1960-1961 school year. That ruling set off an unprecedented wave of
segregationist sentiment both in the state and in Baton Rouge. In the summer of 1960,
Governor Jimmie Davis, who had run for election the previous year on a segregationist
platform, created a sovereignty commission to direct the state’s official segregation
policy. He appointed as its chairman arch-segregationist Willie Rainach, who had run
for governor in 1960, but after his loss in the primary supported Davis. Along with the
state legislature and Attorney General Gremillion, the Louisiana Sovereignty
Commission searched for ways to avoid school desegregation. The legislature even
gave Davis the authority to close all state schools if the courts ordered any of them to

4“EBR, St. Helena Schools Ordered to Desegregate by Federal Judge Wright,”
State-Times, April 30, 1960, I; “Judgement Favors Negroes in EBR, St. Helena Suits
for School Desegregation,” Morning Advocate, April 30, 1960, 1; ‘Tight to Highest
Court is Vowed on Desegregation,” Morning Advocate, May 1, 1960, 12A.
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admit black students, but the governor promised to keep the schools open and
segregated.5
The prospect o f destroying the public school system produced opposition in
Baton Rouge from a group of moderate white businessmen and professionals who
supported segregation but refused either to defy the federal courts or to destroy the
public school system to preserve it. They counseled submission to federal authority not
defiance. These accommodationists shared many characteristics with Baton Rouge’s
white leaders. They belonged to the city’s upper and middle classes, held professional
positions, and were, for the most part, well educated, but for accommodationists, school
desegregation was the only issue that prompted them to speak out. The
accommodationists initially lacked an organization through which to take a firm stand
against the segregationists. In the summer o f I960, Wade Mackie learned that several
women who either worked at LSU or were married to LSU professors wanted to
organize and to lobby the legislature and the School Board to comply with the federal
court’s desegregation order. “Their goal is a strictly defensive one — save the schools,”
Mackie told his supervisors. He helped them form a new group, the Organization for
Public Education (OPEN). Although the women accepted Mackie’s help, they wanted
to avoid any public association with the AFSC. Its members believed that being tied to
the liberal organization would imply that they supported integration and would hurt
their standing in the community. As a liberal, Mackie wanted complete integration, but
he was also practical. He realized liberals and black activists alone could not achieve

sFariclough, Race and Democracy, 235-236.
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this goal; white resistance to total desegregation was simply too strong. Mackie
believed that by cultivating allies, even those who supported segregation but balked at
dismantling the public system to maintain it, the liberals’ and activists’ dream of an
integrated school system would be realized. Without Mackie, the eight women who
formed the foundation for OPEN would probably have remained unorganized. Under
the Quaker leader’s direction, OPEN’s membership grew from 8 to approximately 175
in a few months. It drew its membership, consisting of both men and women, from the
ranks of business owners, professionals, and LSU faculty and staff members.6
Even as he helped accommodationists form OPEN, Mackie worked with liberals
in their fight to attain complete integration. He encouraged liberal rabbis and ministers
publicly to condemn segregation. The city’s two rabbis Marvin Reznikoff and Walter
Peiser and several liberal Protestant ministers also denounced school closing from the
pulpit. On September 4, J. P. Woodland, a minister at Broadmoor Methodist Chinch,
preached a sermon in which he declared that closing the schools would be disastrous for
the state of Louisiana. In an October 2, 1960, sermon at University Baptist Church, J.
Bruce Evans declared that segregation created hate in the hum an heart and proclaimed
that the only way to end this hatred and heal the hearts of countless southerners was
through integration. He realized that his stance would not be well-received by his
congregation and told them that he feared their rejection. Nevertheless, his conscience

6Annual Report, October 17, 1960, AFSC, Baton Rouge Program Reports,
South Central Regional Office, 1960; Wade Mackie to Garnet Guild, August 10,1960,
AFSC, Baton Rouge Program School Desegregation Correspondence, South Central
Regional Office, 1960; "Ad Contends School Group not Spontaneous,” Morning
Advocate, August 16,1960, 13A.
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would not allow him to remain silent on the issue. Declaring their support for
integration placed these ministers in a precarious position because they served at the
pleasure of their congregations and could be removed.7 Despite the threat of a loss of
their pulpits, a group o f liberal Baton Rouge ministers issued a statement urging
Governor Davis “not to interrupt, restrict, or abandon public education in Louisiana.”
They also asked like-minded individuals to contact the governor and voice their support
for m aintaining the public school system.8
As the deadline for integration o f the Orleans Parish public school system
approached, the state legislature, called into a special session by Davis, passed a series
of acts aimed at preventing desegregation. As soon as the governor signed them into
law, Wright declared them unconstitutional. With the threat o f school closings a
probability, OPEN began lobbying Davis and the legislature and asking them to comply
with Wright’s desegregation order. On November 4, Leslie M. Addison, the
organization’s chairman, sent a letter to Davis urging him to allow the Orleans Parish
Schools to desegregate under the terms of the state’s pupil placement law, which

7Methodist ministers were not as vulnerable as those from other Protestant
denominations because the were appointed by a bishop rather than hired directly by the
congregation.
8Wade Mackie to Garnet Guild, August 10, 1960, AFSC, Baton Rouge Program,
South Central Regional Office, 1960; “BR Minister Warns Against School Closing,”
Morning Advocate, September 5, 1960, 8A; Bruce Evans, “Christianity and
Segregation,” October 2, I960, J. Bruce Evans Collection, folder Civil Rights in Baton
Rouge 1957-1960, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State
University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; “BR Clergymen Group Urges School
Closure,” Morning Advocate, August 21, 1960,1 (The headline refers to a
segregationist group formed in opposition to the liberal ministers, but the article also
discusses the ministers’ declaration.).
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required blacks to apply for transfer to white schools and set up seventeen criteria for
school boards to follow in approving their requests. He told the governor that several
states including North and South Carolina, Arkansas, Texas, Florida, and Tennessee
used similar laws to “integrate” their schools without incurring the wrath o f the federal
government. Addsion pointed out that the number o f African-American children
admitted to white schools could be limited through legal means, such as creating a set
of criteria that would prevent most black students from transferring to integrated
schools. On November 5, OPEN members, along with two dozen like-minded men and
women from New Orleans, held a demonstration at the State Capitol to urge Davis and
the legislature not to close the public schools. The same day, a.Morning Advocate
editorial claimed that life would go on if the schools closed, but progress would come to
a halt:
Even a temporary closing in the schools in one of our larger cities, to say
nothing o f throughout the state, would mean a year but to thousands o f students,
a year o f progress, a year of learning that could never be recaptured. The loss of
this inevitable time, the shock to business and industry, the strain on parents and
children, would be a very high price to pay for a victory which would in fact be
a defeat.
In short, closing the public schools would not only be bad for business, it would also
hurt both black and white children in East Baton Rouge Parish.9
Although they wanted to preserve segregation if possible, white leaders in East
Baton Rouge Parish also supported maintaining the public school system. In a
9Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 237-241; “OPEN Letter to Governor Davis
Hits School Closure Plan,” Morning Advocate, November4,1960,4F; Fairclough,
Race and Democracy, 239; “Groups Opposing Closure,” Morning Advocate, November
4, 1960, 1; “The Schools Must Be Kept Open,” Morning Advocate, November 6, 1960,
4B.
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November 1960 poll, the majority o f School Board members declared that they wanted
open schools, even if it meant allowing integration. One member, John Sheppard stated,
“I am absolutely opposed to closing schools. I would prefer them open and segregated,
naturally.” Ben Peabody also expressed support for maintaining segregation but added,
“I would not want to see the schools closed. It would hurt too many people.” Mrs. John
E. Coxe echoed the two men and declared that closing the schools would hurt the
children and deprive them o f educational opportunities.10
While white leaders and accommodationists expressed their support for the
public school system, segregationists adamantly demanded that the schools be closed.
The Citizens’ Council supported Davis’s and the legislature’s stand against integration,
and letters from Baton Rouge segregationists flooded the office o f Senator Russell
Long. A World War II veteran declared that in a democracy, the majority ruled but
added that minority rule in the form o f school desegregation was turning the country
into a dictatorship. One constituent railed against the Supreme Court and demanded that
Long do something to reestablish Louisiana’s sovereignty. Another urged him to “use
every effort possible to prevent the great tragedy of integration that is being forced upon
us by the dictators that we have in government.” A fourth voter wrote, “You surely
know the majority of the people do not want their children to go to school with negroes

10“Members of the Board Favor Open Schools,” Morning Advocate, November
11,1960,1.
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\sic\” Dozens more constituents echoed these four and pleaded with Long to do
everything in his power to restore Louisiana's sovereignty.11
Yet Long and other elected officials could do nothing to prevent the integration
of the Orleans Parish school system. The reaction o f white New Orleanians to
desegregation appalled white leaders, accommodationists, and white liberals in Baton
Rouge. On November 14, as the four little African-American girls made their way to
the New Orleans elementary schools for the first time, white crowds gathered to jeer at
them. The mob became violent on November 15 when a group o f angry whites went on
a rampage in downtown New Orleans, throwing rocks and bottles at African Americans
riding in buses and cars. The police used fire hoses to disperse the crowd, hi an appeal
for an end to the violence, Mayor deLesseps Morrison told New Orleanians that this
type of unrest could damage the city's image “as a thriving center of commerce and
industry.” His appeal fell on deaf ears, and, every morning, huge crowds of
segregationists gathered outside the two elementary schools “to taunt, shove, heckle,
threaten, [and] spit at” the young black students and the small number of white ones
who remained enrolled in these schools. Most white parents had withdrawn their
children from the integrated schools immediately following the desegregation order.
Throughout the crisis, photographs and newsreels of angry whites shouting at the young
black girls made their way into the national press, and many compared New Orleans’

“Wesley Stewart, Jr. to Russell Long, November 15,1960; J. D. Passons to
Russell Long, November 16,1960; Clyde Wilson to Russell Long, November 16,1960;
Robert Weble to Russell Long, November 16,1960; Ed Armistead to Russell Long,
November 18, I960; Milner Michel to Russell Long, November 23, 1960; James Ware
to Russell Long, December 1, 1960. All in Long Papers, box 357, folder 12.
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integration battle with Little Rock’s. White leaders and accommodationists in Baton
Rouge wanted to avoid this type o f negative publicity when their schools integrated. In
the late 1950s, the city had suffered an economic downturn when the nation entered a
recession, and new plant construction and the expansion o f existing facilities had
stopped. Business leaders feared that if school desegregation in East Baton Rouge
Parish mimicked that in New Orleans or Little Rock, then the city would suffer
permanent economic damage.12
Fearing that school desegregation in East Baton Rouge Parish was imminent, in
December 1960 the School Board voted five to two to make Gilmer Wright a black
school. Although white property owners in the neighborhood complained about the
conversion, board members refused to reconsider their decision. Longtime board
member, Mrs. John Coxe, the wife o f the former state superintendent of education,
argued that with the school desegregation suit pending, the board could not defend
busing African-American children out o f the neighborhood to a substandard black
school miles away from their homes. Throughout the desegregation process, Coxe
allied with the white leaders and always chose compromise and compliance with federal
court rulings over conflict and open defiance.13

12Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 245-247; Morton Inger, Politics and Reality
in an American City: The New Orleans School Desegregation Crisis o f I960 (Madison:
Center for Urban Education, 1969), 51-53; Garnet Guild to Steve Cary and Barbara
Moffitt, June 13, 1960, AFSC, Baton Rouge Program Correspondence, South Central
Regional Office, 1960.
13Minutes, December 15,1960, East Baton Rouge Parish School Board. “Gilmer
Wright to Become Negro School Next Fall,” Morning Advocate, December 16,1960,1.
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While segregationists in New Orleans protested against integration, their
counterparts in Baton Rouge turned their attention to silencing Baton Rouge’s white
liberals. In December I960, ardent segregationist Senator Wendell Harris, who had
earlier that year defeated liberal J. D. DeBlieux to become Baton Rouge’s state senator,
as well as East Baton Rouge Parish State Representatives A. T. “Apple” Sanders and
Eugene McGehee, received a letter from LSU English Professor Waldo McNeir, who in
1958 had testified before the House Education Committee against shutting down the
public school system to prevent integration. In it, he denounced the legislature’s actions
during the New Orleans School desegregation crisis and called the marathon special
sessions “a disgrace and national scandal.” On January 13, 1961, the House Education
Committee passed a resolution condemning McNeir and launching a probe into unAmerican activities at LSU. The resolution charged that the professor made “scurrilous,
unwarranted, and unproven statements which constitutes an attack on the character,
integrity, and good intentions of the legislature.” The committee also threatened to strip
twenty-five million dollars from the university’s budget “until such time as the
legislature shall be assured that all due and proper action as is necessary has been taken
by the proper authorities at Louisiana State University to insure its operation and
administration in accordance with the policies enunciated in the Constitution and the
laws o f the state.”14

14Joint Legislative Committee on Un-American Activities, The Case o f Dr.
Waldo McNeir (Baton Rouge: State of Louisiana, 1961), “Un-American Activities Probe
at LSU Approved by Solons in Vote Today,” State-Times, December 15,1960,1.
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The threat o f a huge budget cut and an investigation into un-American activities
threw university officials into a panic. LSU supporters in the legislature abandoned the
budget cut before it made its way out of the committee, but segregation leaders
overrode opposition and rammed through legislation to allow the Joint Commission on
Un-American Activities to conduct a search for “subversive elements” at LSU.
Members o f the legislature with strong ties to LSU wanted to spare the university the
bad publicity of the probe and allow Troy Middleton to handle the situation internally.
Ultra-segregationists in the legislature, such as Representatives Welbom Jack and Frank
Falco from Caddo Parish, publicly declared that because McNeir advocated integration
that he also espoused com m unism . They even claimed that the English professor used
his position to brainwash his students. Senator Harris, a member of the Sovereignty
Committee and father of an LSU student who was in one o f McNeir’s classes, shouted
during the debate that the professor was a threat and that the Sovereignty Commission
possessed information about subversive elements at LSU “that would turn your hair.”
He added that LSU would be derelict if it failed to remove McNeir.15
The un-American activities probe left LSU’s administration little choice but to
ask McNeir to leave. Citing the fact that the English professor had written his letter
upon university stationary, on December 20, Dean o f Arts and Sciences Cecil Taylor
asked him to resign for “the good o f the university.” McNeir refused, but in a meeting

15“$60,000 Sought for LSU Probe,” State-Times, December 16, 1960,1; “Solons
Approve Un-American Probe at LSU,” Morning Advocate, December 16,1960,1.
Unfortunately, a gap from the mid 1950s through the mid 1960s exists in the Office of
the President’s Papers, so no archival sources o f Middleton’s response to the charges
against McNeir could be located.
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with Middleton, he learned that the president planned to charge him with bringing
discredit to the university and teaching integration in his classes if he remained at LSU.
Although many faculty members supported him, McNeir ultimately left the university
because of “certain outside threats and inside pressures that seemed to me to endanger
the welfare o f LSU.”16
Accommodationists supported McNeir. hi a letter to the state legislature,
Addison, the president of OPEN, denounced the legislature’s actions and added that
although his organization did not agree with McNeir’s position on segregation, it
backed McNeir’s First Amendment right to freedom of speech. In addition to OPEN’s
support, more than 700 LSU students signed a petition declaring their belief in freedom
of speech and their displeasure with the legislative probe. Wade Mackie, a close friend
of McNeir, wanted the faculty to issue a statement condemning the legislation and
supporting the principles of both academic freedom and freedom o f speech. The Quaker
leader met with several faculty members and circulated a petition condemning the
“atmosphere o f fear” created by the un-American activities probe and obtained 152
signatures. Fearing that they would suffer retribution if the petition became public, the
signers wanted to keep its existence quiet. Mackie disregarded them and leaked the
petition to the press. He bragged, “It hit the front page.” Although the petition did little
to stop the probe, it forced the LSU Board of Supervisors to pass a resolution
supporting academic freedom and stating that the university could not punish a faculty
l6December 1960-1961 Report, AFSC, Baton Rouge Program, South Central
Regional Office, 1960; “McNeir Quits Post; Charges Pressure,” State-Times, January 4,
1961,1; “McNeir Resigns, Cites Pressure, Outside Threats,” Morning Advocate,
January 5,1961, 1.
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member acting as an individual and not as a university employee from exercising his or
her freedom of speech. In the end, the Un-American Activities Committee reported that
although his views were “repugnant,” McNeir was not a communist.17
While the battle over the desegregation of the Orleans Parish school system
marked the high point of segregationist power in Louisiana, the McNeir probe ushered
in the beginning o f its decline. During the frenzied fight to prevent integration, white
moderates realized that segregationists were fanatical and would sacrifice the state’s
educational and economic well-being to preserve the system o f Jim Crow. When the
Un-American Activities Committee finally released its report in May 1961, moderate
members of the state legislature denounced it, something that would have brought
immediate ostracism and meant political death only two years earlier.18
Segregationists were far from broken, however. After the McNeir incident, they
launched an attack against white liberals, especially ministers, who called for
desegregation. In January 1961, Wade Mackie began receiving phone calls every fifteen
to twenty minutes. The caller would always hang up. When the AFSC held meetings,

l7“Un-American Activities Probe at LSU Approved by Solons in Vote Today,”
State-Times, December 15,1960,1; “LSU Students Hit Probe,” State-Times, December
21, 1960, 1; December 1960 - January 1961 Report, AFSC, Baton Rouge Program,
South Central Regional Office, I960; “117 LSU Faculty Members Protest ‘Free
Atmosphere,’ ” Morning Advocate, January 7,1961, 1; “117 Faculty Members Rap
‘Atmosphere of Fear,’ ” State-Times, January 7,1961, 1; “LSU Board States Academic
Freedom Policy at Meeting,” Morning Advocate, January 8, 1961, 1; “Board Restates
Policy on Academic Freedom,” State-Times, January 9,1961,7B; “More LSU Faculty
Hit Probe,” State-Times, January 11,1961,6B; “35 More Faculty Petition La.
Legislature,” Morning Advocate, January 11, 1961,1.
^“Legislative Probers Say McNeir is Not Involved in Un-American Activities,”
Morning Advocate, May 9, 1961,1.
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segregationists made their way through the parking lot writing down license plate
numbers and snapping photographs of people attending the meetings. A day or two after
the gatherings, investigators from the district attorney’s office and the chief o f police
went to the AFSC office and asked Mackie’s secretary to identify the people in the
snapshots. She refused. When Mackie asked District Attorney Pitcher about the request,
he claimed that he wanted to identify the people in the pictures to protect them.19
In late February, Mackie began to suspect that segregationists had tapped his
phones when they began quoting his private conversations back to him, and in May
1961, he received confirmation that segregationists had placed wire taps on his home
and office phones. They had also tapped Rabbi Marvin ReznikofFs line. On May 29,
Garnet Guild o f the AFSC South Central Regional Office established guidelines for
phoning Mackie. “There is no good reason for tipping the DA off to everything we
might want to plan,” he told AFSC members. In July 1961, Mackie and Rabbi
Reznikoff contacted United States Attorney M. Hepburn Many and reported the
suspected tapping. Many directed the men to Chandler Josey, “Southern Bell super
sleuth,” who sent a team of investigators to check Mackie’s lines. They found a tap on
the AFSC office phone and traced it to an empty apartment nearby. When the phone
company discovered the tap on the AFSC line, the FBI joined the investigation. On
August 23, Mackie discovered a bug on his home phone and traced it to the home of his
neighbor, Jack Rogers, a Baton Rouge attorney and a segregationist who represented
both the legislature’s Un-American Activities Committee and the American Legion’s
I9Wade Mackie to Garnet Guild, September 19,1961, AFSC, Baton Rouge
Program, South Central Regional Office, 1961.
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Un-American Activity Committee. Charles Reynard, who, in 1958, had testified against
school closing before the House Education Committee, and his wife lived near Mackie
and Rogers and saw the crude wire connecting their homes. Mackie even joked about
“the extra ‘togetherness’ ” of his immediate neighborhood. In December 1961, the
Justice Department charged three prominent Baton Rougeans, Senator Wendell Harris,
businessman Leon Patterson, and private detective Lawrence Hall, with wiretapping
and disseminating information garnered from the taps. Although their motives for the
taps never became public, Mackie suspected that Harris, Patterson, and Hall wanted to
harass and intimidate white liberals and force them to abandon the cause of school
desegregation.20
In addition to their war on white liberals, segregationists in state government
also aimed their sights on the white leaders. Fearing that the School Board would refuse
to close the parish’s schools if ordered by the federal courts to integrate, the legislature
devised a plan to pack the board with segregationist members. On January 30, 1961, the
State-Times asked board members if they would support closing the schools to avoid
desegregation. Two members, Ben Peabody and Wally Wells, stated that they wanted to
keep the schools open. “I would say the majority of people want to keep schools open,
even if it means token integration,” Wells said. “I want to abide by the wishes of the
majority of my people.” Peabody vowed that the board would develop a desegregation
plan that would satisfy the federal courts. The other five members refused to answer the
20Gamet Guild to Jean Fairfax, May 29,1961, AFSC, Baton Rouge Program,
South Central Regional Office, 1961; Wade Mackie to M. Hepbum Many, July 19,
1961, ibid.; Wade Mackie to Garnet Guild, September 19,1961, ibid; “Three BR Men
Plead Innocent o f Wiretapping,” Morning Advocate, January 18,1962,1.
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paper's questions, but from their voting records, the State-Times concluded that two
members, Winston McVea and T. H. Harris, would vote to close the schools. Two
others, Pat Collier and Mrs. John Coxe, would oppose closure. The final member, John
White, Jr., had taken office only several weeks earlier, and the paper refused to
speculate on how he would vote.21
In early February, the court of appeals upheld Wright’s ruling in the East Baton
Rouge Parish desegregation case, and segregationists in the legislature sprang into
action. As Attorney General Jack Gremillion and District Attorney Sargent Pitcher
planned a further appeal, one of Baton Rouge's segregationist representatives, “Apple”
Sanders, introduced an emergency bill to add four additional members, to be appointed
by Governor Davis, to the Baton Rouge School Board. Their appointment would insure
a segregationist majority on the board and a vote to close the schools. The parish’s
moderate representative, Eugene McGehee, refused to cosponsor the bill and declared,
“I know nothing that the School Board of the parish o f East Baton Rouge has done
which would justify action as drastic as ‘packing' o f the School Board.” He added that
if the legislature wanted to add members to the board, then it should allow the voters to
select them. Of course, polls showed that most East Baton Rougeans wanted open
schools even if it meant integrating them. On February 17, the House voted seventynine to fourteen to add four members to the board. Although segregationists won by a
large margin, the fact that fourteen members voted against the bill was significant
From 1956 until the McNeir case in late 1960, nearly every piece of segregationist
2I“Believes School Board in EBR Against Any School Closure,” State-Times,
January 30,1961.
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legislation passed with a unanimous vote, and any member who voted against the
majority was described as “soft” on segregation. On February 20, Davis, after
consulting with Sanders and Harris, chose the four new members: Lewis Doherty n, a
fifty-five-year-old businessman and Citizens’ Council member; I. M. Shelton, the
thirty-nine-year-old president o f Shel-Boze, Inc.; forty-year-old Levy Chaney, a
patrolman for Ethyl’s security department; and Charles S. Davis, a lab technician at
Humble Oil (ESSO).22
The five existing board members passed a resolution denouncing the packing
scheme, and three of them incurred the wrath o f the segregationists. Coxe received
threatening phone calls warning her that she would die before the next School Board
meeting. Klansmen made appearances at the homes o f Peabody and Collier, and
segregationists phoned Peabody’s home and harassed his thirteen-year-old son. The
angry board member challenged the man who phoned his son to meet him face-to-face.
“Our only crime was voting that resolution opposing packing our board with people the
voters had no chance to elect,” Peabody told the Morning Advocate, “We’ve reached

22“Seek Rehearing in Integration Ruling in EBR,” State-Times, February 10,
1961, I; “State to Seek Rehearing in EBR, St. Helena,” Morning Advocate, February
11, 1961; “Court of Appeals Upholds Integration Order in EBR,” Morning Advocate,
February 10,1961,1; “Plan Would Let Governor Davis ‘Pack’ EBR School
Board,” Morning Advocate, February 16,1961, 1; “House to Vote Today on Bill to
‘Pack’ School Board Here,” Morning Advocate, February 17, 1961,1; “Local Option
School Plan Voted in House,” State-Times, February 17,1961,1; “BR Board Bill,”
State-Times, February 18,1961, 1; “Davis Names Four to Serve on EBR Board,”
Morning Advocate, February 21,1961,1; Minutes, February 17, 1960, East Baton
Rouge Parish School Board.
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the point that if you dare question anything this legislature does your family stands to
suffer.”23
The new board members wasted no time in asserting their dominance. At the
March 9 meeting, they rammed through a resolution to send two board members, two
staff members, and a representative from the district attorney’s office to Virginia to
study that state’s pupil placement law and its private school cooperatives.24 On the trip,
the group visited Prince Edward County, which in 1959 had closed its public school
rather than submit to court-ordered integration and created a network o f private schools
for white students. The county also closed all black schools but refused to create a
private school system for them. After touring Prince Edward County’s private schools,
White remarked, “The key to the whole situation is the determination o f the citizens of
the county to have a private school system.” In response to the trip, accommodationists
and liberals denounced the plan and pointed out that the “private” schools in Virginia
operated under substandard conditions.25

23“EBR Board Hits Bill,” State-Times, February 18,1961, 1; “BR School Trio
Become Target of Abuse, Threat,” Morning Advocate, February 24, 1961,1.
24Baton Rouge’s delegation included Sargent Pitcher, Assistant School
Superintendent Robert Aerteker, Assistant Secondary Schools Supervisor John
Fitzpatrick, and board members White and Doherty.
“ Minutes, March 9,1961, East Baton Rouge Parish School Board; “EBR
Delegation Begins Virginia Schools Tour,” Morning Advocate, April 11, 1961, 1; “EBR
Delegation Continues Tour o f Va. Schools,” Morning Advocate, April 12, 1961,1;
“OPEN Criticizes Virginia Private Program,’’ibid.; “EBR Officials Get Data from Va.,”
Morning Advocate, April 13,1961, I; “Pitcher Praises Citizens’ Stand in Virginia,”
Morning Advocate, April 14,1961,1; “Doherty Inspects Front Royal, Va., Private
School,” ibid.; Jean Fairfax to Wade Mackie, April 24,961, AFSC, Baton Rouge
Program, Southern Program, 1961.
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While segregationists supported dismantling the public school system to prevent
integration, white parents in East Baton Rouge Parish were split on the issue, hi 1961,
several Parent-Teacher Associations (PTA) discussed and voted on resolutions either to
oppose or to support school closure. The PTA of Highland School, in a sprawling
middle- to upper-class neighborhood near the LSU campus, was the first to vote on the
issue. Native Baton Rougean Mary Benton Kenyon was one of the most outspoken
advocates for keeping the schools open. The wifo o f an attorney and a former public
school teacher, Kenyon had ties to Baton Rouge society. She grew up in the city and
graduated from Baton Rouge High School. As a student at LSU, she played an active
role in student government and served as president o f her sorority, Chi Omega. In the
late 1950s, Kenyon taught school, and when the board began improving conditions at
black facilities, she recalled, “Some of my colleagues were objecting to the fact that 85
percent of the funds that year were going to the black schools.” Kenyon added, “I, of
course, was very proud that the black schools were beginning to be brought to the level
of the white schools.” When the state legislature threatened to close the public schools
to avoid integration, Kenyon took action. On March 1,1961, she and other members of
the Highland School PTA debated a resolution to support open schools. After more than
three hours of debate, which included two unsuccessful attempts to table the resolution
and the departure o f fifty members, the organization voted by secret ballot 112 to 8 in
favor of the declaration. Kenyon recalled:
I observed in my PTA that those people [who supported the resolution] had
some awareness o f what they said and did impacting how people might think in
the future in the state or how people might think in the future in town. Some of
them knew that this was a moment for them to stand up and speak and be
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counted. At that time, that was considered a very way out statement. . . by the
anti-Negro forces.
The fifty members o f the Highland School PTA who walked out o f the March 1
meeting declared that votes that occurred after they left were invalid, and in a meeting
of their own, voted to rescind the resolution and named twenty delegates to the
upcoming state PTA meeting. They asked the supporters o f open schools to withdraw
their delegates. On April 19, the two factions met and hammered out a compromise that
technically rescinded the resolution and replaced it with one that declared the group’s
support for maintaining the school system. The resolution fell short of advocating open
schools. Kenyon described the second vote:
Apparently, it was considered important enough so that the forces on the other
side really got to steam-rolling and a recall was called for in our PTA. On the
night of the vote, we lost a few votes. The opposition called for an open ballot
and I thought, “How undemocratic.” They knew that many of the people in that
room would not be able to [publicly vote for open schools]. The guy that sold
gasoline and the druggist, all these people couldn’t possibly vote their
conscience in an open ballot. That was the kind o f tactics that were considered
okay to keep our voice from being heard. I was disappointed, but, at the same
time, I felt that we maybe lost that battle but we won the war, and I think that we
did.
Kenyon believed that others voted against the resolution “because they really
couldn’t see the PTA moving out of the cookie making role.”26
“ “Highland PTA Favors Open Schools After Teachers, Opponents Stage
Walkout,” Morning Advocate, March 2,1961, 1; “Highland PTA Faction Selects 20
Delegates for State Convention,” Morning Advocate, April 18, 1961,6B; ‘‘Highland
PTA Reverses on Resolution to Urge Keeping Public Education,” Morning Advocate,
April 20, 1961,1; Martha Mikell, interview by author, tape recording, May 25, 1996, T.
Harry Williams Center for Oral History Collection, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley
Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Mary Benton
Kenyon, interview by Shirley Marvin, tape recording, December 10, 1982, YWCA Oral
History Collection, East Baton Rouge Parish Library, Centroplex Branch, Baton Rouge,
Louisiana.
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The PTAs in lower class neighborhoods encountered no dissension. All o f their
members denounced integration. The Glen Oaks High School PTA voted, without
debate, to support segregation even if it meant dismantling the public school system.
Nearly three hundred parents at Belfair School invited Representative Welbom Jack of
Caddo Parish, one o f the state’s leading segregationists, to attend their meeting. Jack
warned the parents to begin organizing cooperative schools because “you’re gonna be
next to receive an integration order.” A resolution by the parents of children attending
White Hills Elementary School read, God “in his infinite wisdom created white and
Negro races with different traits, characteristics, and abilities” and when whites and
blacks were “forced to mix disastrous results followed.” They urged Davis, the
legislature, and the School Board to adopt any means necessary to prevent integration.27
The Davis board members agreed with the segregationist parents and attempted
to remove white leaders from positions of power within the school system. In June
1961, Superintendent o f East Baton Rouge Public School System Lloyd Funchess
incurred the wrath of the Davis faction by denouncing the addition of the new board
members. A native Louisianian, Funchess moved to Baton Rouge in 1925 to attend
LSU where he eventually earned three degrees. In 1955, the School Board appointed
him superintendent The segregationist board members charged that Funchess refused
to cooperate with them on “budget matters and segregationist questions” and asked him
to resign. When he refused, the segregationist majority voted to oust him and named
27“Glen Oaks High PTA Reaffirms for Segregation,” Morning Advocate, March
14, 1961,5A; “Segregation Resolution Wins Unanimous Approval at Belfair School
Meet,” Morning Advocate, March 17, 1961, IOC; “White Hills School Group Opposes
Mixing of Races,” Morning Advocate, March 28,1961,5A.
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former school principal Lloyd Lindsey as his replacement. An angry Funchess sued to
retain his position. Supporting his segregationist friends, District Attorney Pitcher filed
a motion saying that Funchess had illegally occupied the position since 1957, when the
board renewed his contract, because he failed to take the oath of office. In response,
Funchess’s attorney administered the oath of office to his client on June 30 and, to
prevent Lindsey from taking over, Funchess locked himself into his office and refused
to leave. Pitcher warned the School Board staff that if they helped Funchess, he would
charge them with “adhesion to a usurper.” Despite the order to leave the position,
Funchess continued to operate as superintendent and on July 3 sent out notices and an
agenda for the upcoming board meeting. Pitcher promised to arrest him if he attended.
The board canceled the meeting, and when it met on July 13, it voted six to five to bar
Funchess’s pay checks. The vote reflected the influence o f the Davis members. Without
them, the board would have voted to pay Funchess. In late July, Judge Fred Blanche
ruled in Funchess’s favor and ordered the board and Lindsey to allow him to fulfill his
duties. Days later, a state court of appeals ruled in his favor. The board gave up and
allowed Funchess to retain his job.28
“ Minutes, June 8,1961, East Baton Rouge Parish School Board; “School Head
Under Pressure to Quit,” State-Times, June 1, 1961, 1; “School Board Gives No Hint of
Ouster Move,” Morning Advocate, June 2, 1961,1; “Funchess Denies Charge That He
Has Held Up Budget,” Morning Advocate, June 3, 1961; “Say BR School Case Worries
Governor; Statement Issued,” State-Times, June 5, 1961, 1; “Board Expected to Oust
Funchess,” State-Times, June, 7,1961,1; “Criticism Continues Here Against EBR
School Head,” Morning Advocate, June 8, 1961,1; “School Board Drops Funchess,”
State-Times, June 9, 1961, 1; “Board Decided as Expected to Oust Funchess,” Morning
Advocate, June 9,1961,1; “Lloyd Lindsey Named School Superintendent,” StateTimes, June 13,1961, 1; “Board Picks Lindsey a Superintendent, Complications Seen,”
Morning Advocate, June 14,1961,1; Minutes, June 13,1961, East Baton Rouge Parish
School Board; “Funchess Enters Lawsuit on Ouster,” Morning Advocate; June 17,
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In March 1961, Wade Mackie, along with Rabbi Reznikoff, Reverend Irvin
Cheney of Broadmoor Baptist and other members of the Baton Rouge Ministerial
Association, began working on an affirmation of religious principles and obtained the
signatures o f fifty-three ministers of various faiths. On April 10, they published their
statement in the city’s newspapers. It denounced discrimination and proclaimed that
God created “all men in his own image with equal dignity and worth, giving no
superiority to any one race or group of people.” The ministers also announced their
support for freedom o f speech and an end to prejudice, character assassination, verbal
threats, and violence. They called for maintaining the public school system equally for
all under the law and an end to racial discrimination.29
Segregationists immediately denounced the resolution and launched an attack
against the fifty-three ministers. In letters to the editor o f the Morning Advocate, they
urged the ministers to stay out of secular affairs and claimed that the Bible supported
segregation and not integration. One writer declared that the ministers wanted to
destroy both Louisiana and the South. “The Negro has not required sufficient selfcontrol to warrant the removal of all restraint,” he proclaimed. He also charged that

1961, 1; “Funchess Defies DA, Board; Slate Hearing,” State-Times, July 1,1961, 1;
“Dr. Funchess Takes Oath,” Morning Advocate, July 1, 1961, 1; “Funchess and Staff
Spend Day at Office,” State-Times, July 3,1961, I; “Funchess Will Attend Meet as
Superintendent,” Morning Advocate, July 4, 1961, 1; “School Board Lacking Agenda,
Cancels Meet,” Morning Advocate, July 7,1961, 1; “School Board Acts to Bar Any
Checks to Funchess,” Morning Advocate, July 14, 1961, 1; “Court Rules for Funchess,”
Morning Advocate, July 27, 1961, 1; “Appeal Court Upholds Rule for Funchess,”
Morning Advocate, August 8, 1961, 1.
29“53 Local Ministers Hit Discrimination, Affirm Basic Religious Tenets,”
Morning Advocate, May 7, 1961,1.
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African Americans were indolent, lacked inhibitions, and could not support themselves.
Another reader called the fifty-three ministers confused. Not content merely to
denounce the signers in the newspapers, segregationists formed the East Baton Rouge
Parish Laymen’s Association. The new organization called the ministers “agitators” and
endorsed the segregationists’ policy of maintaining separate schools even if it meant
destroying the public school system. When the group held its first public meeting,
nearly five hundred people from various religious backgrounds attended.30
Several o f the fifty-three ministers suffered severe reprisals from segregationists
and their own congregations. Reverend Irvin Cheney, whose phone conversations with
Mackie had been taped and played back to “ultraconservative, white segregationists in
the Southern Baptist churches,” was questioned by the board of deacons o f his church
after the affirmation appeared. He wrote a cryptic letter to Mackie on June 22 resigning
his membership in the Ministerial Fellowship and asking to be removed from the AFSC
mailing list. He noted, “The whole thing has hurt me greatly.. . . Some o f the
conversations on tape indicate very strongly an attempt by you to manipulate the
feelings of some of the ministers.” Mackie tried to contact him but discovered that he
resigned his post at Broadmoor Baptist Chinch. Before leaving, Cheney denounced the
AFSC. ‘T do not consider myself an integrationist in the usual sense,” he told his
congregation, “I deplore agitation, the force and the effort for total, forced integration
just for the sake of integration. I cannot really identify myself with either group of
30“Letters to Editor,” Morning Advocate, May 11, 1961,12B, May 12,1961,
12A; “Laymen’s Group Organizing Here, Opposes Ministers’ Move to Racial
Question,” Morning Advocate, May 23,1961,1; “500 OK Laymen’s Unit Here to
Uphold Racial Segregation in Churches,” Morning Advocate, May 23, 1961, 10A.
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extremists and especially do I resent those from outside who come into our midst and
force the issue.” Bruce Evans’s wife, Ann, who worked as a math teacher at Baton
Rouge High School, lost her job because of his activism. Undaunted by the firing,
Bruce Evans continued to denounce segregation from the pulpit, and in April 1963, he
resigned from the staff of University Baptist Church under duress and founded
Fellowship Baptist Church, the city’s first ecumenical and racially integrated church.31
The school desegregation hysteria that led to the packing o f the East Baton
Rouge Parish School Board, the wiretapping of liberals, and the flurry o f PTA
resolutions was premature. A year after Wright’s battle with Governor Davis and the
state legislature, President John F. Kennedy appointed the beleaguered judge to the U.S.
District Court o f Appeals in Washington, D.C., as a reward for his unfaltering support
for Brown. The Baton Rouge school desegregation case then fell to Kennedy appointee
and segregationist, E. Gordon West, Russell Long’s law partner. A polar opposite o f
Wright, West adopted a policy o f delaying school desegregation as long as possible. So
committed was West to maintaining segregated schools that at one point the Fifth
Circuit Court o f Appeals reprimanded him for delaying implementation of Brown. In

31Wade Mackie to Jean Fairfax, July 31,1961, AFSC, Baton Rouge Program,
South Central Regional Office, 1961; Wade Mackie to Garnet Guild, September 19,
1961, ibid.; Read by the Minister to the Membership o f the Broadmoor Baptist Church,
June 18, 1961, J. Bruce Evans Collection, folder Civil Rights 1961-A; “School Board
Refuses to Hire Wife of Pastor,” Morning Advocate, September 2,1961,1; “Minister’s
Wife Gives Reaction to the Board,” Morning Advocate, September 4,1961; Su m m ary
of Civil Rights Involvement, J. Bruce Evans Papers, folder Civil Rights 1961-A.
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the East Baton Rouge case, West nevertheless successfully stalled integration for nearly
two years.32
Although the delay prevented the immediate desegregation o f East Baton Rouge
Parish’s public school system, it also gave the community a cooling-off period after the
tension-filled months o f the New Orleans school desegregation crisis. Eleven
accommodationist lawyers, including former judge and candidate for governor Carlos
Spaht, Victor Sachse, and H. Payne Breazle, even filed a brief with Judge West in
March 1962 asking that he delay any discussion on Davis until after the July 28 School
Board election. West granted their request. These lawyers knew that if the
segregationist-packed School Board received a desegregation order trouble would
follow and that, in all probability, the city would be dragged into a New Orleans-like
confrontation between state and federal authority.33
In the primary elections held in the summer of 1962, the issues of school
desegregation and the packing of the School Board by Governor Jimmie Davis
dominated the campaign, hi a crowded field of eighteen, three o f the four Davis
appointees, I. M. Shelton, Chaney Calmes, and Charles Davis, ran for their seats on the
School Board. The final member Lewis Doherty did not seek election. Shelton, Calmes,
and Davis were the most outspoken supporters o f maintaining the dual system of
education in the field o f eighteen candidates. Running for a four-year term from Ward

32Rogers, Righteous Lives, 100; Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts, 250; Frank
T. Reed and Lucy McGough, Let Them Be Judged: The Judicial Integration o f the Deep
South (Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1978), 162-167.
“ “Attorneys Seek School Mixing Decision Delay,” Morning Advocate, March
10, 1962, 1.
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One, Shelton pledged his undying support for segregation and promised to resist courtordered integration.34‘Tor me to tell you that I advocate or would willingly accept
integration, would, in my opinion, tell you that I believe in retarding our school growth
and degrading our entire system,” stated Benny Brannon, who was seeking a two-year
term from the Ward One. The Baton Rouge native worked as an instrument technician
at Humble Oil (ESSO) and promised that the only way he would submit to integration
was at gunpoint “I am unalterably opposed to any sort o f integration of the races and
will do everything in my power to oppose it” said Calmes. Charles Davis denounced
federal intervention in local affairs and promised to resist even token desegregation.35
Other candidates took a more moderate approach to the issue. A longtime board
member from the first ward, Ben Peabody, promised to act in the best interest of the
community. “I do not favor closing the schools,” he stated. “My primary interest is in
the best education possible for all children of East Baton Rouge Parish.” The
community-minded Peabody held positions of leadership in several civic organizations
including the Chamber of Commerce and the United Givers Fund. Most other
candidates shared Peabody’s concern for the well-being o f the community, but because

^Members of the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board were elected to
staggered terms ranging from two to six years. Candidates for the board ran in three
wards. Ward One included the city of Baton Rouge. African Americans held the
majority in six of its fifty-three precincts. Ward Two encompassed the suburban areas
in the northern part of the parish, including Scotlandville, Baker and Zachary. Out of
the sixteen precincts, two held black majorities. Whites dominated the rural Ward
Three, and African Americans made up a tiny portion of the voters. “Rockhold, Furr
Win Local Races” Morning Advocate, September 2,1962,1.
35“Vote for #40,” Morning Advocate, July 26,1962, 12B; “School Board
Candidate In Statement,” Morning Advocate, June 19,1962,3A; “23 Candidates Seek
Judgeship,” Morning Advocate, July 26,1962, 10A.
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they did not possess his constituency, they proclaimed their support for segregation. But
unlike the Davis appointees, they did not promise to support it at all costs. W. Harry
Perkins, another candidate from the first ward, came out in favor o f separate but equal
facilities but added that he possessed the ability to “cooperate with others.” By stressing
his willingness to “cooperate with others,” this active member o f various civic
organizations implied that he was moderate on the issue of segregation and would not
vote openly to defy federal authority. Irving Boudreaux, a car salesman running for a
seat from the suburban Ward Two, also advocated moderation. “I am for equal but
separate school facilities and further convinced that at the present time the mixing of
the races can only produce ill-feeling and bitterness between the two groups and that for
the peace and harmony of our community the schools should be operated on their
present segregated basis,” stated Boudreaux. Like Perkins, however, he refused to
advocate closing the schools to preserve segregation.36
Two African-American candidates, Dupuy Anderson and Acie Belton, also
sought seats on the board. Calling the schools “an integral part o f socially desirable
change,” Anderson, a World War II activist, said he wanted to use the schools to erase
bigotry. Racial diplomat Acie Belton issued a more moderate statement. “I am certain
that due to my training and experience in working with people, when elected to the
School Board, I will be able to work with other members to the best interest of our
system.” Unlike Anderson, he did not call for the integration of the schools or ask that

36**23 Candidates Seek Judgeship,” Morning Advocate, July 26, 1962, 10A;“Ben
Peabody Gives Statement for Re-Election,” Morning Advocate, July 15,1962,4A; “I.
R. Boudreaux Seeks Election,” Morning Advocate, M ay 27, 1962,12A.
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they be used to eliminate bigotry. Instead he informed voters, both black and white, of
his history o f working “others,” i.e., whites, and his willingness to continue the practice.
Belton would not demand; he would negotiate.37
While the issue of school desegregation dominated the rhetoric of the
candidates, the local papers denounced the Davis board members and urged Baton
Rougeans to vote them out of office. “Some candidates may try to make it appear that
segregation is the chief issue. It is not,” proclaimed a Morning Advocate editorial.
“There is not an integrationist on the Baton Rouge board, and there is no chance of one
being elected this time. The issue is not integration. It is another no less important issue,
home rule.” The paper went on to suggest a slate o f candidates, which included
Peabody and the other more moderate candidates.38
Baton Rouge voters followed the Morning Advocate's advice and ousted two of
the three Davis board members, Calmes and Davis, in the primary. Calmes lost his seat
to Boudreaux; James Randall Goodwin, a staunch segregationist, defeated Davis for the
Ward Three seat. In Ward One, Shelton ran second to civil engineer Lloyd Rockhold,
who favored segregation but would not vote to close the public schools. Because neither
received a majority, the two men made it to the run-off election where Rockhold
received 12,632 votes and Shelton 9,184. The other seats in Ward One went to
moderate candidates. Brannon lost to Naylor Cragin, an officer at a Baton Rouge

37‘D . H. Anderson Gives Statement on Candidacy,” Morning Advocate, July 19,
1962, 5D.
38“Unpack the School Board,” Morning Advocate, July 22,1962,4B;
‘‘Recommendations for School Board,” Morning Advocate, July 24, 1962,2A; “For
Local Government,” Morning Advocate, July 27, 1962,2A.
252

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

savings and loan company, and Peabody and Perkins won the two six-year seats. In
Ward Two, Acie Belton received enough votes to make it into the runoff election,
marking the first time an African-American candidate enjoyed such success. In the
September 2 election, however, he lost to the moderate A. T. Furr, 2,441 votes to 5,696
votes. The School Board election demonstrated the support of the majority o f whites for
moderation and indicated their desire to maintain the peace and stability o f their
community even if it meant desegregating the public school system.39
Several months before the School Board election, the Baton Rouge branch of
the NAACP, which had been dormant since 1956, reorganized, and its members elected
Reverend Arthur Jelks as their president An African Methodist Episcopal (A.M.E.)
minister, Jelks moved to Baton Rouge from Elkhart, Indiana, in late 1961; before that,
he had lived in several cities in the Midwest. In these communities, including Baton
Rouge, he quickly became a civil rights Leader.40 On August 8, 1962, Jelks presented a
resolution to the School Board requesting immediate integration. He warned that if he
received no response, the NAACP would launch a series of demonstrations to demand
the admission o f black students to white schools. When the board failed to act, Jelks
went to the school system’s office and tried to enroll his daughter, Patricia, in the white
39“23 Candidates Seek Judgeship,” Morning Advocate, July 26, 1962, 10A;
“School Posts at Stake in Area Voting,” State-Times, July 28,1962,1; “Five School
Board Places Filled,” Morning Advocate, July 29,1962,1; “How East Baton Rouge
Voted,” Morning Advocate, July 29,1962, 6A; "5 Win EBR School Posts; Factors in
Race are Viewed,” State-Times, July 30,1962,1; “Rockhold, Furr Win Local Races,”
Morning Advocate, September 2,1962,1; “Lear, Furr, Rockhold Win in EBR,” StateTimes, September 3, 1962,1.
40The reorganization of the NAACP will be discussed in greater detail in the
following chapter.
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Baton Rouge Junior High School. Assistant Superintendent Aerteker gave Jelks the
transfer form and promised that the minister’s request would be forwarded to the board
for consideration. As he left the office, Jelks told Aerteker that other African-American
parents would follow suit Segregationists immediately labeled Jelks as an outside
agitator and a troublemaker. Assistant District Attorney John Ward told the Morning
Advocate that Jelks moved to Louisiana from Indiana, “where he promoted the same
kind of activity by harassing the city government and starting sit-in movements in
taverns, restaurants, etc.” Ward added, “Perhaps we should not refer to the Reverend
Jelks as merely an outside agitator, but instead should more properly refer to him as a
roving outside agitator.” He charged that Jelks came to Baton Rouge with the sole
purpose of reorganizing the local branch of the NAACP “on a more militant basis along
the lines adopted by the Congress o f Racial Equality.”41
In late August, the board rejected Jelks’ transfer request. In response, the civil
rights leader and his daughter went to Baton Rouge Junior High and attempted to
register. The school’s principal, Robert L. Smith, met them at the door and refused to
let them enter. Jelks warned the white community that the NAACP would sponsor
demonstrations and sit-ins until the school system integrated. When classes began on
September 3, a group of black parents, including Jelks, went to several schools and
attempted to enroll their children. The police department dispatched several officers to

4I“School Board Indicates ‘Wait’ in Integration,” Morning Advocate, August 9,
1962; Gloster Current to Roy Wilkins, et al., August 9, 1962, NAACP Papers, Group
HI, box C52, folder 10; “Negro Seeking to Enroll Girl in White School,” Morning
Advocate, August 10, 1963, 8A; “Any School Integration Move Termed Premature,
Improper,” Morning Advocate, August 11,1962,3A.
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Baton Rouge Junior High as a crowd of angry white women gathered to watch the
integration attempt The women shouted at Jelks* party and followed the group to its
next stop, Fairfields Elementary. As it moved to the second school on Jelks’ list, the
white crowd grew to more than one hundred, but police held the shouting crowd at bay.
From Fairfields, the African Americans went to Baton Rouge High School where
school officials turned them away. The same day, NAACP members began staging sitins at downtown lunch counters.42
Along with demonstrations, Jelks and the local branch of the NAACP pursued
legal action against the board. The failure of the courts to force the East Baton Rouge
Parish School Board to submit a desegregation plan angered NAACP members, and
they demanded that their attorneys push the case forward. In January 1963, the Baton
Rouge branch of the NAACP sent a resolution to the national office demanding action
by LDF lawyers, especially A. P. Tureaud. Field Director for Louisiana Gloster Current
warned NAACP chairman Roy Wilkins, “Reverend Jelks has led a continuing crusade
for freedom. Such a fearless fighter and the good people o f Baton Rouge who are

42“BR Negro Girl Denied Entry in White School,” Morning Advocate, August
31, 1962, 5B; “Local NAACP Head Claims He’ll Sue Board,” Morning Advocate,
September 1, 1962, 1; Gloster Current to Jesse DeVore, September 6, 1962, NAACP
Papers, Group HI, box C52, folder 10; “New School Year Opens for 60,000,” StateTimes, September 4, 1962,1; Johnnie Jones to Norman Amaker, September 11, 1962,
APT, box 29, folder 24; “Crowd Jeers at Mixing Try by Negroes,” Morning Advocate,
September 5, 1962, 1; “Sit-In Flurries Follow Attempt at Enrollment,” State-Times,
September 5,1962,2C; Clarence Laws to NAACP Leaders, September 18,1962,
NAACP Papers, New Orleans Branch, box 73.
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backing him should have action.” Heeding Current’s warning, Tureaud filed a motion in
February asking Judge West to order the School Board to submit a desegregation plan.43
Because the desegregation o f East Baton Rouge Parish’s public schools began
nearly a decade after Brown, white leaders and accommodationists could draw on the
integration experiences of other southern cities. They knew that they wanted to avoid
the types o f confrontation and defiance that occurred in Little Rock and New Orleans.
Although the Davis-packed School Board had flirted with implementing the Virginia
Plan in 1961, all of those board members had been defeated in the 1962 election, and in
1963 the new board members refused to dismantle the school system to preserve
segregation.44 For the accommodationists and white leaders in Baton Rouge,
dismantling the school system was unacceptable because it would harm the city’s
economy. With the defeat o f the Davis members in the 1962 elections, white leaders
again controlled the School Board and began looking to other southern cities for a
desegregation model and after careful examination decided that they wanted to emulate
Atlanta. Calling itself “the city too busy to hate,” Atlanta was the embodiment o f a New
South city. Its residents embraced progress and economic expansion and viewed
themselves as progressive and unfettered by the region’s prejudices. By the 1960s,
Atlanta was the South’s leading transportation and business center. Just as in Baton

43GIoster Current to Roy Wilkins, January 17, 1963, NAACP Papers, Group HI,
box A102, folder 4.
44The Virginia Plan dismantled the public school system and replaced it with a
series o f publicly funded private schools forwhite children. The state and school
districts provided grants for white children to attend these “private” schools. With the
closure, no public schools existed for black children.
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Rouge, white leaders wanted to avoid racial violence because o f the economic damage
that it might cause. In 1957, citizens o f Atlanta elected William Hartsfield as their
mayor, and after the election, he proclaimed, “The people o f Atlanta don’t want
Atlanta’s growth and prosperity stopped by racial controversy.” He added, “Our aim in
life is to make no business, no industry, no educational or social organization ashamed
of the dateline ‘Atlanta.’ ” Like Atlanta residents, Baton Rougeans want to avoid racial
violence because of the economic damage that it might cause.45
In late1962, a group o f prominent white leaders and accommodationists, mostly
wealthy businessmen and attorneys, created an unofficial, behind-the-scenes biracial
committee to discuss ways to desegregate the school system peacefully. Wade Mackie
and the AFSC asked Doug Manship, who besides owning WBRZ, a local television
station, also served as president o f the Chamber o f Commerce, to meet with a group of
African Americans to discuss desegregation. Manship agreed to meet with them if
Mackie allowed him to approve the list of attendees. Again, the traditional pattern of
race relations took over. Manship wanted to insure that the African Americans with
whom he met were community “leaders,” i.e. racial diplomats. Knowing that Manship
would refuse to meet with “troublemakers,” Mackie selected a group o f prominent
racial diplomats and World War H activists to serve on the committee. “All of these
people are college graduates and have demonstrated their own leadership in the
community,” Mackie reported. They included J. K. Haynes, John G. Lewis, Leon

45Bayor, Race and the Shaping, 223, xv, 30-31; Alton Hornsby, Jr., “Black
Public Education in Atlanta,” 22; Lassiter and Lewis, “Massive Resistance Revisited,”
in The Moderates ’Dilemma, 1-10; Harmon, Beneath the Image, vii-viii, 45-47.
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Netterville, B. V. Baranco, Horatio Thompson, Acie Belton, Dupuy Anderson, Johnnie
Jones, James Cook, and the Reverend W. T. Handy. Manship agreed to meet with the
men on February 10,. 1963, and after the meeting, invited other prominent white leaders
and accommodationists to join the group. This unofficial biracial committee wanted its
existence to remain secret, but some African-American members, most notably Johnnie
Jones, criticized this approach and wanted the group to go public. After a few months o f
secret meetings, Jones could no longer tolerate the secrecy and leaked information
about the group and its discussions to Reverend Jelks. Because he broke the vow of
silence, the committee expelled Jones.46
None o f the white members on the committee wanted integration, Mackie
reported, ‘They were iust opposed to disintegration.” The unofficial biracial committee
asked Judge West for a meeting, and because it boasted so many prominent members,
he complied.47Committee members and the judge discussed the East Baton Rouge
school desegregation plan, and West promised to approve a plan that would drag out
integration but would be acceptable to the Supreme Court.48

46“Manship Assumes President’s Office at Chamber of Commerce,” Morning
Advocate, October 12,1962, 1; Notes on Advisory Committee Meeting, November 13,
1962, AFSC, Civil Rights Division — Baton Rouge Office, South Central Regional
Program, 1962; Wade Mackie and Yvonne Coleman to Garnet Guild and Peter
Lippman, February 20, 1963, AFSC, Baton Rouge Program— Reports, South Central
Regional Program, 1963; Comprehensive Report, November 4, 1963, AFSC, Civil
Rights Division Baton Rouge Office, South Central Regional Program, 1964.
47Although the date of the meeting is unclear, it probably took place in March or
April 1963.
^Comprehensive Report, November 4,1963, AFSC, Civil Rights Division Baton Rouge Office, Southern Program, 1963; Wade Mackie to Barbara Moffett,
January 28,1963, ibid.; Wade Mackie and Yvonne Coleman to Garnet Guild and Peter
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On March 5, 1963, West reluctantly ordered the East Baton Rouge Parish
School Board to submit a desegregation plan and told the spectators that he viewed
Brown “as one of the truly regrettable decisions o f all time.” He also claimed that
school desegregation brought “discontent and chaos to previously peaceful
communities.” West added that the black leaders, i.e., racial diplomats, helped to insure
the long delay in the Davis case because they “exercised restraint despite the proddings
and agitation of outside elements.” Finally, West lamented the fact that Brown required
him to order the desegregation of the East Baton Rouge Parish public schools and
claimed that he resisted issuing the order “as long as feasiblely possible.”49
To prevent segregationists from influencing the white masses, Manship and
other members of the biracial committee drafted a petition in support of open schools
and peaceful desegregation. Prominent attorney B. B. Taylor circulated it among his
friends, which included the most prominent Baton Rouge residents. Mackie noted that
Taylor obtained signatures from people who had played no role in the desegregation
debate and added that most o f the signers were “pretty strong segregationists.” Taylor
refused to allow OPEN members, liberal ministers, or African Americans to sign. The
committee believed that by getting the signatures o f prominent citizens, they would

Lippman, May 7,1963, AFSC, Baton Rouge Program Reports, South Central Regional
Office, 1963; Wade Mackie to Garnet Guild and Jean Fairfax, April 10, 1963, AFSC,
Civil Rights Division Baton Rouge Office, Southern Program, 1963.
^ “Desegregation Plan Deadline Set for July 5,” Morning Advocate, March 6,
1962, 1; Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, U. S. District Court Eastern
District of La., No. 1662; “Desegregation Plan for EBR Schools Asked,” Morning
Advocate, March 2, 1963, 1; E. Gordon West to Russell Long, March 6, 1963, Long
Papers, box 558, folder 8.
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diffuse the segregationist threat. “We believed they would either be overwhelmed or
attack hardest those that were known to be segregationists and had deserted their ranks
to sign the declaration for financial reasons. This would likely backfire on the
segregationists.” On April 4, one month after West ordered the East Baton Rouge
Parish School Board to submit a desegregation plan by July, the committee made its
petition public. It urged compliance with the court order and warned that if the School
Board failed to present an acceptable desegregation plan, then the federal government
would impose a far more comprehensive one on the people o f East Baton Rouge Parish.
“We believe that an acceptable plan, prepared by our own well-informed School Board,
would be less disturbing to our community than a plan provided by the court” The
social prominence of the signers silenced the segregationists, and the School Board
faced no white opposition as it formulated and submitted a plan to West.s0
With Manship at its helm, the Chamber of Commerce also issued a public
statement calling for peaceful desegregation. Citing its commitment to maintaining the
community’s welfare and economic prosperity, the chamber warned that both could be
“seriously damaged by incidents, disorder, and violence.” Manship’s Morning Advocate
echoed the warning. “In the nation’s financial center, talk once again is being heard of a
new wave of plant expansion by large industries that brought about the industrial
growth in the Baton Rouge area. . . after World War n.”This expansion could “help
Baton Rouge achieve its apparent destiny as one of the South’s major industrial cities,”

S0Minutes, March 7, 1963, East Baton Rouge Parish School Board; “School
Integration ‘Declaration’ Goes Into Board Records,” Morning Advocate, April 5, 1963,
1.
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the editorial added. “Those who will decide on the location o f new plants, or as it may
be on the expansion of existing plants will be guided by many factors. But not the least
important factor will be the wisdom and efficiency with which Baton Rouge handles its
current problems.” The threat o f economic reprisals convinced all but the staunchest o f
segregationists that peaceful desegregation was the best option.51
Unwilling to take on the Chamber of Commerce, the petition’s signers turned on
African-Americans. They charged that outside agitators, most notably Arthur Jelks, had
forced the judge to issue the ruling. School Board member A. T. Furr complained, “a
vast majority o f the local negroes [sic] have only passing interest and some are as
opposed to integration as the white people.” In reality, the so-called outside agitators
played almost no role in pushing for school desegregation. Jelks had moved to Baton
Rouge from Indiana, but local people sued and served as the plaintiffs.52
Although the School Board agreed to submit a desegregation plan by July, it
wanted to delay its implementation for another year. To insure that black students
would continue to attend segregated schools in the fall of 1963, the board sent out
student-assignment cards for the 1963-1964 school year in May and gave parents only
until the end o f the month to submit their transfer requests. The board would not
consider any request after this deadline. Because the board had yet to present its

5I“Chamber Chiefs Ask Integration Be Peaceful,” Morning Advocate, March 21,
1963, 1; “Baton Rouge at a Turning Point,” Morning Advocate, April 4,1963,2A;
Ralph Dreger, interview by Betty Morse, tape recording, July 12,1983, T. Harry
Williams Center for Oral History Collection, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley
Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 22.
S2A. T. Furr to Russell Long, March 12, 1963, Long Papers, box 558, folder 8.
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desegregation plan to West, African-American parents did not know which grade the
board would integrate first and therefore could not submit transfer requests to integrated
schools. Jelks urged parents not to sign the assignment cards because their signatures
would indicate that they accepted the segregated school assignments. On May 9, a
group of black leaders, including racial diplomats Jemison and Leo Butler, World War
ELactivists Scott and Anderson, and Jelks sent a letter to the School Board members
asking them to rescind the transfer request deadline. Claiming that the assignment
letters “had a near explosive force in the Negro community,’*Mackie contacted
Manship, warned him of the danger o f violence, and urged him to convince the School
Board to withdraw the assignments until after the desegregation plan was made public.
He gave Manship the choice of either convincing the board to reconsider the
assignment deadline or spending time building a bomb shelter because without a
reversal, violence was imminent. Although Manship’s role in the process is
undocumented, the School Board postponed the assignment deadline.53
On June 27, 1963, the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board finally presented
its plan to the public and promised to comply with the court order beginning in
September 1964. Based on Atlanta’s plan, Baton Rouge’s desegregation plan called for
integration to begin in the twelfth grade and to add an additional grade level each year.
It also set up sixteen rules for placement, including intelligence, a good home
environment, and good morals. Whites applauded the plan, but the NAACP denounced

53“Negroes Urged Not to Sign School Forms,” Morning Advocate, May 7, 1963,
IOC; Community Relations Program, School Desegregation Emphasis, ca. May 1963,
AFSC, Baton Rouge Program, South Central Regional Office, 1963.
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it and filed an official protest with West. It argued that desegregation should begin
immediately and should proceed faster than one grade per year. The NAACP’s lawyers
also denounced the sixteen rules for transfer saying that the board would use them to
keep the number o f black students in white schools to a m in im u m . They also asked
West to begin the desegregation process with the first grade rather than the twelfth since
young students would have fewer problems with integration than older ones. Younger
children would be more accepting of each other because their racial prejudices had not
yet become set. In addition, school pride and friendships tied seniors to their schools,
and the NAACP feared that few o f these well-established teenagers would want to
move to white schools. Despite the NAACP’s protest, on July 18, West accepted the
Baton Rouge plan with one exception. He ordered the board to implement it
immediately.54
With the plan in place, African Americans scrambled to find seniors willing to
transfer to white schools. A student at Southern Laboratory School, Freya Anderson,
Dupuy’s daughter, recognized the board’s ploy:
I knew that Baton Rouge was going to start with the senior year because they
knew that if they started with the senior year they’d have fewer kids wanting to
go. They wouldn’t get any athletes because they couldn’t come in and get on the
teams. It was just planned that way. I knew all along that they were going to
start with the twelfth grade year, I was just hoping and praying they wouldn’t.
Then when they made the decision, I knew I had to go. It wasn’t any if, ands, or
^Minutes, June 27, 1963, East Baton Rouge Parish School Board; “School
Board Would Start Mixing in 1964,” Morning Advocate, February 28, 1963,1;
‘NAACP is Protesting Mixing Plan,” Morning Advocate, July 9, 1963, 1; “EBR School
Mixing Plan is Defended,” Morning Advocate, July 17,1963, 1; “Judge Orders EBR
School Mix in Fall,” Morning Advocate, July 18, 1963, 1; Comprehensive Report,
November 4,1963, AFSC, Civil Rights Division Baton Rouge Office, South Central
Regional Office, 1964.
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buts about it, I just had to go. After I made my decision, I figured the best thing
to was to get some more black students to come with me, so I wouldn’t be out
there alone.
Lending his support to the NAACP, Mackie and a group of World War H activists,
including Johnnie Jones, Raymond Scott, and Dupuy Anderson, quickly contacted the
parish’s black high schools and asked the principals to provide lists o f students who fit
the board’s criteria.55 One principal quickly complied. Others took much longer, and
some never submitted their lists. The head o f one schooL even went on an unscheduled
vacation when he discovered that the men were looking for potential transfers, and his
assistant principal, when pressured, provided a phony list. Mackie and the black leaders
sent students on the list and their parents letters asking them to consider applying for a
transfer. Freya Anderson recalled:
Most of them [the students] wanted to do it. Their parents were apprehensive;
they were afraid, which was natural. “How were they going to get to school?
How were they going to be protected on the campuses? What would they be
able to do in the schools as far as participation activities and those kinds of
things?” We had meetings with Daddy and Raymond and Johnnie Jones and a
white guy who was a Quaker named Wade Mackie. Wade was real nice and
worked with us. They all helped us get through it, and they talked to the parents
and convinced them to let their kids go. We all wanted to go.
Anderson, Jones, Mackie, and Scott even asked local ministers to encourage high
school seniors in their congregations to consider transferring. “The ministers were never
in our minds as a major resource for the kind o f work that we were required to do,”
Mackie noted, “but we had hopefully expected they would be able to give us a much
needed assist.” When the recruiters approached the black ministers to ask for help,
“miraculously, all o f the leading ministers were out of town.” Even without the help of
ssMackie was the only white person involved in the transfer process.
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the ministers, Mackie and the black leaders convinced thirty-eight students to apply for
transfer. Thirteen more students filled out applications, but their parents refused to sign
them.1
On August 8, Superintendent Lloyd Lindsey, who, in 1962, had succeeded
Superintendent Funchess when he willingly resigned from his position, began
reviewing the applications and assessing the students’ qualifications. Two weeks later,
he accepted twenty-eight requests. The rejected applicants, according to him, failed to
meet the educational requirements for transfer. A student rejected for not meeting these
standards, Oliver Mack, was the top student in his class at McKinley High School.
Mack’s parents, along with those of eight others, Lindsey rejected appealed, but the
superintendent refused to reconsider. Mackie noted that the number of qualified
applicants angered the superintendent because he intended to allow only three or four
black students to enroll in white schools. Because so many qualified candidates applied,
however, he could not justify rejecting most o f them. Lindsey later lambasted the black
principals who gave Mackie and the other men lists of students. Yet the number of
African Americans allowed to enroll in white schools was minuscule when compared to
the entire school enrollment, hi 1963, the East Baton Rouge Parish school system
contained approximately 52,600 students. Twenty-one thousand o f them were black.

‘Comprehensive Report, November 4, 1963, AFSC, Civil Rights Division
Baton Rouge Office, Southern Program, 1964; Freya Anderson Rivers, interview by
Maxine Crump, tape recording, July 16,1993, T. Harry Williams Center for Oral
History, Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State University
Libraries, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 29-30.
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More than. 2,300 students parish-wide were seniors, but only twenty-eight blacks would
go to white schools. No whites would attend black schools.53
As the African Americans students prepared to enter the four designated high
schools — Baton Rouge, Lee, Istrouma, and Glen Oaks — white leaders,
accommodationists, and segregationists called for calm. Lindsey even asked white
parents and citizens to stay away from the four campuses for the first week o f classes to
prevent large, angry crowds from gathering outside the schools. On September 2,
Catholic and Protestant clergymen urged their congregations to help maintain “peace
and tranquility” in both the city and the parish.54
Remarkably, arch-segregationists in Baton Rouge heeded the warnings o f Baton
Rouge businessmen and quietly, albeit grudgingly, accepted integration. In a public
statement, Citizens’ Council member and District Attorney Sargent Pitcher claimed,
that if the board refused to comply with West’s order, “we would have forced
integration at the point of bayonets.” He called for his fellow segregationists to remain

53Minutes, January 20,1962, East Baton Rouge Parish School Board; Minutes,
February 22, 1962, ibid.; “Lindsey to Assign Negroes to Schools,” Morning Advocate,
August 9,1963,1; “28 Negroes Pass Screening Tests to EBR. Schools,” Morning
Advocate, August 20,1963, 1; “Negro Pupils Accept Transfers to White Schools,”
Morning Advocate, August 24,1963, 1; “28 Negro Transferees Registered,” Morning
Advocate, August 29,1963,1; Oliver Mack, interview by author, tape recording, July
29,1993, T. Harry Williams Center for Oral History Collection, Louisiana Lower
Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge,
Louisiana, 1-7; Comprehensive Report, November 4,1963, AFSC, Civil Rights
Division, Southern Program, 1964; Johnnie Jones to A. P. Tureaud, August 28, 1963,
APT, box 29, folder 24; “EBR Schools Desegregate Today,” Morning Advocate,
September 3, 1963, 1.
54“Lindsey Appeals for Orderly EBR School Opening,” Morning Advocate,
August 31,1963, 1.
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calm because the whole community would suffer if Baton Rouge became another Little
Rock. “Our forefathers lived through and defeated Reconstruction,” he told his
supporters and added that they could do the same with school desegregation. The
Citizens’ Council did urge high school teachers to treat their black students like
interlopers — “Do not call on him to recite, answer his questions briefly, discourage
him from participating in extracurricular events.” The organization also warned the
teachers that African Americans would select the friendliest, most personable students
for transfer and told them to resist their charm because, “If a Negro integrationist is
welcomed, then he has gone far towards winning the school integration battle. As long
as he is a willing tool o f evil forces, he should be treated in such a manner.” But, like
Pitcher, the Citizens’ Council never advocated violence or staged protests outside the
city’s schools to prevent integration.55
On September 3, 1963, East Baton Rouge Parish’s public schools desegregated
peacefully. As television cameras rolled and newspaper photographers made snapshots,
the twenty-eight black students arrived at their new schools by taxi and entered the
buildings without the intervention o f the law enforcement officers and FBI agents who
stood outside the buildings waiting to protect them. The principals o f the four high
schools reported that the white students ignored the African Americans, but the day
passed without incident. White Baton Rougeans congratulated themselves on their
restraint. The incident-free desegregation caught the nation’s attention and brought

" “Integration Plan Given Board Bow,” Morning Advocate, July 19,1963,1;
Baton Rouge Citizens’ Council to High School Teachers, n.d., APT, box 30, folder 5.
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praise to the city and parish. On September 17, the “Huntley-Brinkley Report” devoted
seven minutes of air-time to the parish’s peaceful desegregation.56
Although the process o f school desegregation occurred peacefully, conditions in
the schools for the pioneering students were horrid. Taking the Citizens’ Council’s
advice, teachers ignored their black pupils. Some white students followed their
teachers’ examples. At Lee High, white students even formed a club, Don’t Admit They
Exist (DATE). By the end of the school year, African-American students showed the
strain of the abuse. On April 22,1964, Velma Hunter, a Baton Rouge High student,
snapped. As she and five o f her African-American classmates ate lunch near the
teachers’ table, a white male student walked up to her, accused her of bad-mouthing
him, and dumped his food on her. In response, she threw a plate at him, and it broke
over h]£ head. School officials suspended the male student for throwing his food on her
and suspended Hunter for cursing the boy.57
Many members o f the black community supported the students, and some even
donated money to ease the financial burden on the parents of the twenty-eight
transferees. Despite their misery at the integrated high schools, several of these
students, including Freya Anderson and Murphy F. Bell, sued and won admission to

56“EBR Schools Open on Tuesday,” State-Times, September 2, 1962, 1; “BR
Schools Admit Negroes Without Incident,” State-Times, September 3,1963; “No Major
Incidents As Negroes Attend BRHigh Schools,” Morning Advocate, September 4,
1963, 1; ‘Trouble Free School Mixing Draws Praise,” Morning Advocate, September 5,
1963, 1; “TV Program Praises BR’s Peaceful Mixing,” Morning Advocate, September
18, 1963, 7B.
57Walt Barton, “Around the Capitol,” Fall 1963, Russell Long Collection, box
360, folder 28; Wade Mackie to Seymour Samet, AFSC, Civil Rights Division — Baton
Rouge, South Central Regional Office, 1964.
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LSU’s undergraduate program and began taking classes there in the summer of 1964.
The university’s administration realized that opposition to the suit was fruitless and,
when Judge West ordered the school to admit the black students, LSU did not appeal
his decision.58
The second group of African Americans to attend integrated high schools fared
worse than the first twenty-eight. Fearing that even more qualified black students would
want to move to white schools, the School Board limited the time for their parents to
apply for transfer to five days. Although the superintendent required parents to submit
the forms in person at the School Board office, some black principals and teachers told
them to bring the forms to them. Fearing for their jobs, African-American teachers even
discouraged their students from transferring to white schools.59
Fifty-seven black students enrolled in white schools for the 1964-1965 school
year. The reaction of white students and school officials to the increased number of
African Americans became more severe. One white student tried to run down three
black ones as they walked home from school. He barely missed them. The police
refused to charge the teenager although he admitted intentionally trying to hit the black
youths. At another school, a white boy tossed his food in the face of an AfricanAmerican girl. The principal expelled the young woman even though she did not

58Program Evaluations, AFSC, Baton Rouge Program — Reports, South Central
Regional Office, 1964.
59Wade Mackie to Garnet Guild, April 24,1964, AFSC, Baton Rouge Program,
South Central Regional Office, 1964.
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retaliate. School officials at Glen Oaks High School singled out the black students at
student assemblies by requiring them to sit together on the front row.60
The tokenism that characterized the desegregation o f East Baton Rouge Parish’s
public school system and the abuse of the students disturbed the city’s black population.
In 1964, African-American parents petitioned the School Board and asked for
immediate and complete desegregation. The board refused, so the parents asked Judge
West to order full integration. He sided with the board, and for the rest of the decade,
the parish’s public schools remained virtually segregated. Although East Baton Rouge
Parish allowed a few black students to transfer to white schools, it maintained a dual
system of education. The School Board began discussing the creation o f a unified one
only in 1969 when the Fifth Circuit Court o f Appeals began ordering neighboring
parishes to dismantle their dual systems. In an attempt to control the conversion to a
single school system without making any real changes to the existing one, the School
Board appointed a biracial committee to find a way to “preserve the school system and
at the same time convert public schools to a unitary system.” In 1969, NAACP
President D’Orsay Bryant and Regional Vice President Alphonso Potter sued seeking
immediate integration o f the entire school system. Members of this biracial committee
urged Johnnie Jones, attorney for the two NAACP officers, not to pursue the suit and to
allow them to reach a desegregation agreement among themselves. Jones, who had
always been an opponent of these types of biracial committees, refused and proceeded

^ ‘School Integration is Reported Quiet,” Morning Advocate, August 29,1964,
13A; Wade Mackie to Norman Amaker, December 11 1964, AFSC, Baton Rouge
Program, South Central Regional Office, 1964.
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with the suit. On January 16,1970, Judge West ruled the unification o f East Baton
Rouge Parish’s public schools to be complete by August 31. Although it ordered the
creation of a unitary school system, West’s decision did not bring completely integrated
schools to East Baton Rouge Parish. In the three decades following West’s ruling, most
of the parish’s schools remained racially segregated. Through a series o f court orders
and consent decrees, the School Board attempted to force integration but only
succeeded in creating white flight and the founding o f private and parochial schools
throughout the parish. The board tried to lure white students back into the public school
system and, at the same time, advance integration by placing magnet schools in black
neighborhoods, but failed to convince large numbers o f white parents to send their
children to these inner city schools. In the end the 1962 compromise was a victory for
the white leaders and accommodationists. It preserved peaceful race relations in the
parish, prevented the segregationists from closing the city’s schools to prevent
integration, and, for all intents and purposes, maintained a publicly-funded dual system
of education. Forty-three years after it was filed, Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish
School Board remains active, and school desegregation remains incomplete.61

6IDaniel Byrd to Norman Amaker, October 13,1964, APT, box 29, folder 25;
“HEW Ruling to Increase BR Students,” Morning Advocate, August 3,1969, 1; “EBR
Biracial Group Gingerly Airs Goals,” Morning Advocate, January 6, 1970,1; “EBR
School Mixing May be Sought in Motion File Today,” Morning Advocate, January 16,
1970,6C; “Desegregation is Ordered for EBR by Next August 31,” Morning Advocate,
January 17,1970,1.
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Chapter 8
Working-class Activists, 1962-1964
The protests over school desegregation in 1962 marked the emergence o f a new
group of civil rights protesters — working-class activists. Led by Arthur Jelks, the
NAACP pushed the East Baton Rouge Parish School Board into implementing a school
desegregation plan. The working-class activists rose to the forefront o f the movement
just as the World War II and student activists were being persecuted by District
Attorney Pitcher and CORE was being banned from the city. In early 1962, they
launched a series of protests against segregation and because o f their efforts, the civil
rights movement in Baton Rouge escalated. Unlike the student and World War II
activists who were well educated and, for the most part, came from middle- and upperclass backgrounds, few working-class activists possessed more than a high school
education; most worked in menial jobs and had very little disposable income. Also
unlike earlier activists and especially CORE members, working-class activists
abandoned the principles of nonviolence and fought back when faced with police
brutality and threats from segregationists. Their goals also differed from the student and
World War II activists in that they sought economic equality in addition to social
equality. The working-class activists had very little in common with the middle- and
upper-class racial diplomats and clashed not only with white leaders and segregationists
but also with the black leadership. The radicalism o f the working class activists created
an atmosphere of racial discord and led to a series o f violent clashes between protesters,
their opponents, and the police.
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Both World War II and student activists attempted to reorganize the Baton
Rouge chapter o f the NAACP following a Supreme Court ruling in February, 1960, that
overturned the 1956 state ban on the organization, but they could not meet the national
office’s minimum of fifty members required to reactivate the chapter. Racial diplomats,
who had controlled the NAACP in the 1940s and 1950s, refused to take part in bringing
the chapter back because white leaders and segregationists believed that the
organization was attempting to foment discontent within Baton Rouge’s black
population. The savvy negotiators knew that, in order to maintain their relationships
with white leaders and continue to work to improve conditions for African Americans,
they could not reactivate the local chapter. Instead, they joined FOCUS. Unlike civil
rights organizations such as the NAACP and CORE, FOCUS refused to take part in
protests and worked to increase voter registration, lobbied white leaders to employ
African Americans in public agencies, and attempted to convince local hospitals to
admit black doctors to their staffs.1
In early 1962, NAACP officials finally succeeded in reactivating the local
branch. On February 27, more than one hundred African Americans gathered at Green
Chapel African Methodist Episcopal (A.M.E.) Church to elect officers for the new
group. To the surprise of the racial diplomats, who, to maintain their stature in the
community attended the first meetings of the newly organized branch and were
accustomed to serving as officers o f organizations, the members elected Reverend

lDonald T. Moss to Herbert Wright, May 30,1960, NAACP Papers, Group HI,
box C52, folder 10; Lucille Black to C. J. Gilliam, October 25,1961, ibid.; A. P.
Tureaud to Dorothea Combre, April 4, 1962, APT, box 11, folder 7.
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Arthur Jelks as president. Unlike past presidents o f the Baton Rouge branch, such as
Benjamin Stanley and T. J. Jemison, he was not well-educated and served as pastor o f a
church with a predominately working-class congregation. Jelks and the working-class
members o f the NAACP shared many o f the goals o f the student activists. Both groups
wanted an immediate end to segregated public facilities and increased employment
opportunities for African Americans, and neither wanted to spend decades fighting for
equal rights in the federal court system. Yet the two groups differed significantly.
Working-class activists were, for the most part, older than the student activists and were
not well-educated. Most had families, lived paycheck to paycheck, and worked for
white employers. The reprisals that they faced for taking part in the protests were
harsher than those faced by the students. For example, Leo Hamilton, a machinist, lost
several jobs because of his activism. His son, Leo Charles Hamilton recalled, “He
marched and did that kind of stuff, as much as he could and keep jobs. You know, you
hack people off, you lose your job.” Although Southern expelled student activists, many
continued their education at northern colleges and universities. Another difference
proved especially important. Although both groups used the methods of protest, sit-ins,
marches, and picketing, the working-class activists were not bound by the principles of
nonviolence. When confronted by segregationists and hostile police officers, they often
fought back.2

2Gloster Current to Mr. Moon, February 28,1962, NAACP Papers, Group HI,
box C52, folder 10; “NAACP Organizational Meeting Slated Here,” Morning Advocate,
February 27,1962, 13A; “Reverend A. Jelks Will Head BR NAACP Chapter,” Morning
Advocate, March 1,1962,4A
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The differences between the working-class activists and the racial diplomats
were even more striking. Initially, the racial diplomats tried to appease the workingclass activists in the organization by proclaiming their support for “the welfare of the
underprivileged” but did little to help working-class blacks. At the organization’s April
3 meeting, Jemison called for white officials to hire African-American policemen in
order to help curb juvenile delinquency in the black community. Even when talking to
members o f his own race, Jemison spoke in the language of racial diplomats. He
addressed the white fear of black youths and reasoned that black police officers would
be better able to control these young troublemakers than white officers. By taking such
action, Jemison added, white leaders would be following the example o f the nearby
communities o f Port Allen and Hammond. In contrast, at the same meeting, Jelks
announced that he had sent telegrams to Governor Davis and Mayor-President Christian
and asked for a meeting to discuss an end to segregation. Unlike Jemison who rationally
pointed out to whites the benefits to integration, Jelks warned them, “We can have
peace and tranquility, or we can have the battle of Baton Rouge.” Jelks’ ultimatum
angered racial diplomats, who complained to the NAACP’s national office. The
national leaders urged the fiery minister to clear all correspondence with his branch’s
executive committee, upon which several racial diplomats sat. Jelks ignored the advice
and continued to press white officials to bring an immediate end to segregation. In early
May, he told white leaders that “the ‘new Negro’ is here to stay.”3
3“Local NAACP Meet Stresses Negro’s Rights,” Morning Advocate, April 4,
1962, 14A; Gloster Current to Arthur Jelks, April 16, 1962, NAACP Papers, Group m ,
box C52, folder 10; “Local NAACP Meeting Set Tuesday Night,” Morning Advocate,
May 1,1962, 7A.
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Under Jelks* leadership the Baton Rouge branch became the driving force
behind the city*s civil rights movement In August 1962, the NAACP launched the
campaign, discussed in the previous chapter, to integrate the East Baton Rouge Parish
School System. On August 2, Jelks announced that the organization would hold a rally
in support of school desegregation and planned to invite Martin Luther King, Jr. to
speak. The threat o f King’s visiting the community frightened white leaders because
they knew that a demonstration would accompany his visit and that national attention
would be focused on the city. Attorney General Jack Gremillion warned, “Anyone who
seeks to stir up the emotions of our people by mass demonstrations, the purpose of
which is to induce violence, will be prosecuted to the fullest extent o f the law.”4
While Gremillion threatened to prosecute agitators, District Attorney Sargent
Pitcher adopted a more direct approach. Fearing that Jelks would mobilize the black
community in the same way CORE Field Secretary B. Elton Cox had done in leading
1961 march to downtown Baton Rouge, and the student activists had done in organizing
the Southern University demonstrations, Pitcher placed Jelks and several other NAACP
members under surveillance and targeted them for arrest. Jelks believed that Pitcher
tapped his phones and placed him under twenty-four hour police surveillance.5
Pitcher’s fears became a reality when a group of working-class activists staged
sit-ins at several downtown lunch counters. One group of eight young women entered
4“Local NAACP Will Discuss Desegregation,” Morning Advocate, August 7,
1962, 14B; “NAACP Slates Mass Meeting Here Sunday,” Morning Advocate, August
11, 1962,2A.
s“Negro Seeking to Enroll Girl in White School,” Morning Advocate, August
10, 1962, 8A.
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McCrary’s lunch counter, sat in the white section, and waited to be served. In response,
the food department's manager, F. J. Bertrand, closed the area. The eight remained
seated even after he turned off the lights. At Montgomery Ward’s counter, another
group of African Americans placed a take-out order, but instead of leaving, they sat in
an area reserved for white customers. Fearing that the incident would harm her
business, the manager, Dorothy Bush, told the press that the black customers tricked her
and added, “We didn’t feed them deliberately.” Jelks promised that these sit-ins marked
the beginning o f a larger campaign for desegregation push and claimed that the NAACP
would pick up where the banned CORE left off.6
District Attorney Pitcher and white leaders feared that he might be right and
decided that the best way to prevent larger demonstrations was by silencing Jelks. The
district attorney thought that with Jelks out o f the picture, the local movement would
crumble. When the NAACP met on the evening of September 4, Pitcher sent several
informants to the meeting to gather “evidence” against Jelks and Cox, who was free on
bond from his 1961 arrest and speaking at the meeting. Using the information gleaned
from these spies, Pitcher accused the two men of slandering him and several local
judges. In their speeches, the two men bad accused the district attorney of encouraging
several judges to hand down rulings that favored the prosecution in civil rights cases.
Cox had also informed the crowd that one of his fellow prisoners in the East Baton
Rouge Parish jail told him that Pitcher accepted $3,000 from a prisoner in exchange for
6“Crowd Jeers in Mixing Try by Negroes,” Morning Advocate, September 5,
1962, 1; “Hit-and-Run Negro Sit-Ins Reported Here,” State-Times, September 4, 1962,
10A; “Sit-In Flurries Follow Attempts at Enrollment,” State-Times, September 5, 1962,
2C.
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a lenient sentence. Within days, a grand jury convened and indicted Jelks and Cox on
charges o f defamation of character. The indictment claimed that the two men had
exposed the district attorney “to hatred, contempt, and ridicule” and deprived him “o f
the benefit of public confidence and social intercourse.” Ironically, Pitcher committed
the very same offenses in his public statements about Cox, Jelks, and other civil rights
leaders.7
Judge Fred LeBIanc immediately issued bench warrants for both men and set
their bonds at $10,000 each. Ronnie Moore and Patricia Tate, two CORE officers who
remained in Baton Rouge and both o f whom attended the September 4 meeting, offered
to testify for Jelks and Cox. Pitcher and the grand jury refused to hear them. At that
point, Moore and Tate issued a public statement denouncing both the district attorney
and the grand jury. They claimed that East Baton Rouge Parish officials “have used
every un-American and unethical tactic to maintain segregation, whereas civil rights
leaders are intimidated by parish officials through criminal prosecutions, incarcerations,
and violent cross burnings.” Moore and Tate continued, “Members o f the White
Citizens’ Councils, KKK, and other similar organizations are not prosecuted.” Within
days, the grand jury indicted Moore and Tate, too, on the charge of defamation of
character. Judge LeBIanc set their bonds at $5,000 each.8

7B. Elton Cox’s Speech, September4,1962, Lawyer’s Constitutional Defense
League Papers, box 17; Indictment, B. Elton Cox and Arthur Jelks, CORE Papers,
Series V, reel 17.
8“Grand Jurors to Probe BR Meet Comments,” Morning Advocate, September 7,
1962, 8B; “Negro Ministers are Indicted in Defamations,” Morning Advocate,
September 8, 1962, 1; “Defamation and Kidnaping Indictments Filed by Jury,” StateTimes, September 8,1962, 1; Injunction, Patricia Tate and Ronnie Moore, Lawyers
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Johnnie Jones represented Jelks and asked a prominent, but unnamed, black
businessman to post bond for his client. The man, a racial diplomat, refused because he
believed that Jelks and the three others were militant troublemakers who were actually
hurting the advancement of African Americans. Unable to raise the bond locally, Jones
asked the NAACP’s national office for help. The civil rights attorney wanted to secure
the bail money before Jelks surrendered to the police because he believed that his client
would suffer abuse at the hands of his jailers if allowed to remain in prison. Jones
hoped to keep this plan a secret, but Jelks leaked it to members o f the press to gain
media attention for the cause. When police officials learned o f the plan, they decided to
make the activist’s arrest a media event As Jelks, Jones, and Clarence Laws, the
NAACP’s field secretary for Louisiana, walked into the bondsman’s office, policemen
arrested the minister. Laws later complained that the police treated Jelks like a common
criminal and added that “newsreels [and] pictures were made o f the entire proceeding as
the sheriff, district attorney, and senior law inforcement [sic] officers tried to get into
the act.” Even though he suffered the humiliation of a public arrest, Jelks was released
on bond, which was paid for by the NAACP, and succeeded in calling attention to
continued segregation in East Baton Rouge Parish.9

Constitutional Defense League Papers, box 17; “Pair Indicted in Defaming of Grand
Jury,” Morning Advocate, September 15, 1962, 1; “Book Pair Indicted in Defamation,”
State-Times, September 15,1962,1; "Negro Woman Indicted Turns Self In,” Morning
Advocate, September 16,1962, 1.
telephone Report by Clarence Laws, September 12,1962, NAACP Papers,
Group Efi, boxC52, folder 10; Roy Wilkins to Richard McClain, September 11,1962,
ibid.; “Jelks is Free After Posting $10,000 Bond,” Morning Advocate, September 11,
1962, 1; “Jelks Free on Bond in Defamation,” State-Times, September 11, 1962,1.
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Instead o f destroying the movement, die arrests of the four civil rights activists
actually strengthened it. When Cox went on trial in November 1962, Jelks and the
NAACP demanded the desegregation of all public facilities in the courthouse, including
the courtroom, restrooms, lunch counters, and water fountains. Acting as Cox’s
attorney, Johnnie Jones asked Judge LeBIanc to end segregated seating in the
courtroom. LeBIanc denied the request and twice ordered Jelks to move when he sat in
the white section o f the room. Jelks complied when LeBIanc threatened him with
contempt of court. The following day, November 29, two members o f the NAACP’s
Youth Council, McArthur Triplett and Joe Lewis Smith staged a sit-in in the
courthouse’s lunch room. Police quickly arrested them. The same day, three women
Pearl George, Willie Lee Harris, and Laura Harris took even more drastic action.
They entered the courtroom and found no empty seats in the black section, so they sat
on the front row o f the nearly vacant white section. The bailiff ordered them to move,
the women refused, and LeBIanc asked them to leave the courtroom or be charged with
contempt George recalled:
We said we were going to leave. When I walked to go out that door, something
struck m e
I was thinking about the things that I had been deprived of for
being black, and I thought about my child, who I knew was going to be
deprived. I remembered that song “I Ain’t Going to Let Nobody Turn Me
Around,” and I went back. The three o f us went back and we sit down. The
bailiff came back again. He said, ‘T m going to have to ask you-all to leave
again.” I told him I wasn’t leaving.
George’s response shocked the African Americans who had gathered for Cox’s trial.
According to hen
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At this time, blacks were standing up on their feet because this is the first time
that a black woman had ever talked up to a white judge. This was something
unusual. Because, if a black man tried to speak up for himself, you know, they
would beat him; they would humiliate him. I says, “Well, if I ’m going to die, let
me die fer something. That black folks would enjoy some o f the things that I
couldn’t enjoy.” I stood there, and I told him that if he would let me go back
again, I’d sit on the side that was all white. I said, “Judge LeBIanc, you’re
talking about justice in the courtroom, and you’re telling me just because my
skin is black that I have a certain side to sit on.” I said, “There’s no vacant seats
to sit over there.” He say, “Stand up against the wall like the rest o f them.” I told
him, “Not on your life.” He says, “You’re telling me, that if I let you go, that
you wouldn’t leave the courtroom.” I say, “I’m telling you, if you let me go, I’ll
sit on the white side.”
LeBIanc immediately charged George and the other women with contempt o f court and
asked the bailiff to arrest them. When questioned by the judge, all three claimed that
they took this action to make life better for their children. “I was thinking about my
little girl at home,” George recalled, “She had been deprived, and I was tired of it.”
Laura Harris testified, “I know it wouldn’t help myself, but I know it would help my
children some day. That’s why I sit there.” LeBIanc found all three women guilty of
contempt of court, fined each $100, and sentenced them to ten days in jail. When they
refused to pay their fines, he increased their jail time to thirty days. Arresting these
three mothers heightened racial tension in Baton Rouge and strengthened the resolve of
the working-class activists to fight segregation. At the same time, it widened the gulf
between them and the racial diplomats. No black leader spoke out in support of the
women or used his or her influence with white leaders to secure their release. Instead,
they allowed the women to remain in jail.10
I0Gloster Current to Robert Carter, November 29,1962, NAACP Papers, Group
m , box C52, folder 10; George v. Clemmons, December 3,1962, NAACP Papers,
Group 5, box 53; Opposition to Applicationfo r Bail, ibid.; Pearl George, interview by
unknown, tape recording, January 7,1983, YWCA Collection, East Baton Rouge Public
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All three women came from working-class families and all were mothers. Willie
Lee Harris, the mother o f six children ranging from five to sixteen, belonged to the
NAACP. Laura Harris had five children ranging in age from fourteen to three and lived
a few blocks away from George. She also belonged to the NAACP. In the years
following this incident, Pearl George became one o f the city’s most outspoken workingclass activists and headed the local NAACP Youth Council. A widow and the mother of
one child, the twenty-six-year-old George grew up without a father. As the second of
four children, she and her older sister took care o f their younger siblings while their
mother worked two jobs. Although their mother encouraged them to get an education,
George and her sister had to stay at home with the younger children, so they divided
their school days. One attended classes in the morning and the other in the afternoon.
George and her husband married shortly before he left for the Korean conflict where he
was killed, leaving her to raise their daughter alone. As a child, George recognized the
inequalities that existed between the races but did not become involved in the civil
rights movement until her daughter was five or six years old and began asking questions
about the existence of segregated facilities. Around that same time, the CORE sit-ins
began and Reverend Jelks moved to Baton Rouge. Realizing that Jelks was a civil rights
activist, she began attending services at his church and asked him how she could
become involved in the movement “At that time, you couldn’t get black ministers” to
take part in civil rights demonstrations, she recalled. “I don’t know if they was afraid at

Library, Centroplex Branch, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.
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that time or they just wasn’t concerned.” Jelks invited her to an NAACP meeting, and
she soon became an active member o f the organization.11
The actions o f Pearl George, Willie Harris, and Laura Harris confounded white
leaders. Until this point, the majority o f activists belonged to the black middle class and
the intelligentsia. White leaders believed that these two groups represented a small
portion o f the city’s black com m unity and did not reflect the views o f the black working
class — the men and women who mowed their lawns, cleaned their homes, and cooked
their meals. They convinced themselves that the black masses were content with the
system o f segregation and would never strike out against it unless duped into it by
outside agitators. Initially, white leaders tried to paint the three working-class women as
patsies o f the NAACP. During the trial o f George and the Harrises, Sargent Pitcher
implied that their attorney, Johnnie Jones, and Jelks conned the women into sitting in
the white section of the courtroom. According to the district attorney, Jones and the
NAACP wanted to use their arrest as a test case that they would appeal to the Supreme
Court. Pitcher also questioned the honesty of the women and claimed that Jones told
them to use their children to gain sympathy from the court and the public. By describing
these working-class women as pawns, white leaders underestimated their commitment
to ending segregation. They also erred in believing that by arresting a few of these
lower-class protesters, imposing astronomically high bails and fines, and jailing them

1[La. NAACP Leader Fights Jim Crow in Courthouse, November 30,1962,
NAACP Papers, Group HI, box C52, folder 10; George v. Clemmons, November 29,
1962 - December 3, 1962, NAACP Papers, Group V, box 53; Pearl George, interview
by unknown.
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when they could not pay the fines, that they could discourage others from taking part in
the civil rights movement.12
After the arrest o f the three women, Cox’s trial began. The following day, a jury
found him guilty, and LeBIanc offered to release him on a $5,000 bond pending his
sentencing. Cox declined the bail and chose to remain in jail to draw attention to the
racial injustice that existed in Baton Rouge. But after the violent clash over the
desegregation o f the University o f Mississippi that had occurred two months earlier and
the previous year’s mass arrests in Albany, Georgia, the imprisonment o f one man
attracted very little attention outside of Baton Rouge.13CORE officials in Louisiana
urged the national office to use a “total saturation” campaign to get word o f Cox’s
imprisonment out. They called the case a “true horror story” that needed to be brought
to the attention o f the press, but the national office did little to publicize the young
minister’s plight. Cox, who suffered from chronic health problems, grew ill in jail while
his sacrifice went unnoticed.14
The arrests o f George, Jelks, and the others in the fall of 1962 invigorated the
working-class activists, however. “The white folks would put these types o f charges on
you so you could stay in jail, so they could try and discourage you from participating
again,” said George, “but the more that they would try to make it hard or discourage

l2George v. Clemmons, NAACP Papers, Group V, box 53.
l3Taylor Branch’s Parting the Waters provides a good description for both
events.
I4Robert Collins, et al. to Marvin Rich, January 25, 1963, Lawyers
Constitutional Defense League Papers, box 17; Jones, interview, October 2, 1993,8790.
284

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

me, the more determination I had. It got to be something good. I needed to have a white
man trying to discourage me.” On October 2, five African-American women staged sitins in the cafeterias o f two local hospitals — the Baton Rouge General and Our Lady of
the Lake. Cafeteria workers refused to serve them at both locations, but at the Lake, the
activists refused to leave when they were denied service. The women purchased food
and drinks from vending machines, brought them into the cafeteria, and ate at a table
reserved for whites. In response, hospital officials closed the cafeteria and sent its white
customers to a dining facility used by student nurses.1S
In addition to bringing their own meals into the cafeteria, this new breed of
activists also lengthened their sit-ins. Whereas the previous year Southern students
affiliated with CORE had staged a series of hit-and-run sit-ins that lasted only a few
minutes, NAACP members occupied seats at white lunch counters for hours at a time.
On October 5, for example, seven young African Americans occupied two booths in the
white section of McCrory’s lunch counter for two hours and twenty minutes after
employees refused to serve them.16
The division within the black community grew as the working-class activists
intensified their protests and became more confrontational, and by early 1963, only a
few racial diplomats remained in the NAACP. Like the white leaders and the
segregationists, the director of branches, Gloster Current, reported to National NAACP

lsPearl George, interview by unknown; “Sit-In Attempts at Hospital Apparently
Fail,” Morning Advocate, October 3,1962,9A.
l6“Negroes Try Sit-In But Aren’t Served,” Morning Advocate, October6,1962,
6B.
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President Roy Wilkins, the racial diplomats viewed Jelks as “an outside agitator, a
militant Negro, and not socially acceptable.” Yet this “socially unacceptable” minister
quickly rose to a position of prominence in the black community. Current recognized
the animosity that the racial diplomats had toward Jelks and the working-class activists.
“These groups [including FOCUS], it would appear, do attempt to minimize the
NAACP’s effectiveness,” he stated, and “have opposed the reorganization of the
branch.” Current believed that the rift between the elite and working-class African
Americans could not be repaired. Although he admitted that Jelks was “a loose-tongued
individual, impetuous, overly sensitive, and difficult,” Current told Wilkins that they
could not remove him because “he has the support of the common people in Baton
Rouge, and they are the only ones apparently concerned with effecting fundamental
change in the status quo.” Current claimed that the racial diplomats openly thwarted
what they viewed as “militant activity” to “maintain the peace and tranquility of the
community.”17
White leaders shared the racial diplomats’ low opinion o f Jelks and wanted to
prevent him and his followers from engaging in “militant” activities. They believed that
if Jelks abandoned his civil rights activities or left Baton Rouge, the resolve of the
working-class activists would crumble and peaceful race relations would return. When
Jelks and the NAACP initiated a voter registration drive in early 1963, white leaders
saw an opportunity to oust the civil rights leader. Although white officials in East Baton
Rouge Parish allowed African Americans who could pass a literacy test to register, the
17Gloster Current to Roy Wilkins, April 25,1963, NAACP Papers, Group HI,
box C52, folder 11.
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test prevented the majority of working-class blacks, who were for the most part poorly
educated, from voting. Many African Americans who could read and write refused to
register because they believed they would suffer economic retribution from whites. A
black domestic told Jelks that her employer would fire her if she took part in a
registration drive because “voting was white folks’ business.” The principal of one of
the city’s black schools also discouraged teachers from voting. When the NAACP
president asked black ministers to announce the drive and to solicit volunteers for the
registration school, he received no cooperation from them. To advertise the drive, Jelks
decided to hold a voter registration rally on April 5 and invited James Meredith to
speak. White leaders feared that the controversial Ole Miss student would radicalize the
city’s black population, which would lead to increased protests. They also worried that
Meredith’s presence would antagonize the segregationists, already up in arms over the
African Americans’ demands for school desegregation, which might lead to white
violence.18
To the relief of white leaders and racial diplomats, Meredith did not appear at
the rally. Jelks and other activists, including Willis Reed, claimed that racial diplomats
working with white leaders phoned the Ole Miss student and canceled his appearance.
Jelks told Jack Minnis o f the Southern Regional Conference (SRC) that:
“One o f the big Baptist preachers” [undoubtedly Jemison] got in touch with “a
big mason”[John G. Lewis] who, in turn, contacted “a big NAACP lawyer in
New Orleans” [Tureaud]. The purpose o f all o f this maneuvering was to get the
lawyer to use the influence he had with Meredith (this influence being based
l8“Meredith Says Impersonators Taking Calls,” Morning Advocate, April 5,
1963, 1; Jack Minnis to Wiley Branton, August 23, 1963, Southern Regional
Conference Papers, Series VI, reel 176, file 153 (microfilm).
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upon the fact that the lawyer had met Meredith through Mrs. Motley19) to
persuade Meredith not to appear at April 5 mass meeting.
The preacher added that racial diplomats such as Jemison and Lewis had “a vested
interest in things remaining as they are, because of business and professional interests.”
He also hinted that white leaders used dossiers of improper behavior to blackmail the
racial diplomats into compliance. While Jelks and other activists charged that the racial
diplomats canceled Meredith’s appearance, the city’s white newspapers claimed that the
young activist never received the invitation because white students in his dormitory
intercepted Jelks’ call, impersonated Meredith, and accepted the speaking invitation.
Although neither the activists nor the white leaders mentioned it, Meredith may have
canceled the speaking engagement himself. The Ole Miss student could have withdrawn
for any o f these reasons, but of paramount importance is the fact that working-class
activists were convinced that racial diplomats in conjunction with white leaders
sabotaged the rally. Their belief in the duplicity of black leaders created further
animosity and distrust between the two groups.20
In the end, Meredith did not attend the rally but sent Mississippi NAACP leader
Medgar Evers as a replacement. To white leaders, Evers was no better than Meredith,
and they remained firm in their resolve to prevent the rally from taking place. On the
evening o f the rally, police officers stopped Evers for a traffic violation as he entered
East Baton Rouge Parish and detained him for several hours, making him extremely late
l9NAACP Legal Defense Fund attorney Constance Baker Motley.
20“Meredith Says Impersonators Taking Calls,” Morning Advocate, April 5,
1963, 1; Reed, interview, July 14,1998; Jack Minnis to Wiley Branton, August 23,
1963, Southern Regional Conference Papers, Series VI, reel 176, file 153.
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for the meeting. By the time he arrived, only a few o f the most committed NAACP
members remained. White leaders also prevented Jelks from making an appearance.
When he left his home that evening, police arrested him on a bench warrant for failure
to answer a summons to appear in court earlier that day for a hearing on a traffic
citation that he received in March21. Jelks spent the night in jail and was released on a
$500 bond the next morning. On the April 6, he received his summons in the mail. The
NAACP and Jelks believed that local police and the postal service had orchestrated the
delay in delivery. They charged that mail carriers held the summons, which bore an
April 1 postmark. In a letter to Postmaster General J. Edward Day, Roy Wilkins
claimed that Jelks’ mail had been interfered with several times and asked him to
conduct an investigation into the incident. After an investigation, a postal inspector
ruled that the summons had been accidentally misdirected.22
Segregationists shared the racial diplomats’ and white leaders’ belief that Jelks
was an outside agitator, and they also wanted to drive him out of Baton Rouge. Their
methods were more violent and more overt than those of the black and white leaders.
On April 14, an arsonist burned down Jelks’ church. Initially, the fire marshal intimated
that he believed that the minister set the fire to attract sympathy to his cause, but a

21On March 18, a Baton Rouge police officer ticketed Jelks for passing a vehicle
in an intersection. He pled innocent on March 29, and the judge told him to await a
summons to appear in court
22Medgar Evers was assassinated two months after his appearance in Baton
Rouge. “Baton Rouge Integration Chief Arrested Before Meeting,” Morning Advocate,
April 6,1963,7A; Arthur Jelks to Roy Wilkins, April 11,1963, NAACP Papers, Group
HI, box C52, folder 11; Gloster Current to Roy Wilkins, April 25,1963, ibid.; H. B.
Montague to Roy Wilkins, May 3, 1963, ibid.; Jack Minnis to Wiley Branton, August
23, 1963, Southern Regional Conference Papers, Series VI, reel 176, file 153.
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thorough investigation proved this theory wrong. The culprit, most likely a
segregationist, was never caught. The fire destroyed Green’s Chapel, and the workingclass congregation could not raise enough money to rebuild their church. Jelks and the
church’s officers asked local lending agencies for loans only to be turned down by each
one. Loan officers told them that the Citizens’ Council and the Ku Klux Klan
threatened to boycott any institution that aided Jelks and his congregation.23
Just as with the other attempts to destroy the movement, the fire only
strengthened it. In late April, Gloster Current urged the Baton Rouge chapter to
intensify its attack on the segregation o f lunch counters, public facilities, and public
transportation. He also urged the working-class activists to invite the racial diplomats to
take part in the protests but added that they should not trust these black leaders or allow
them to take over their program. Current claimed that, if united, the black community
could successfully wipe out segregation. In May 1963, the activists, following the
national officer’s advice, stepped up their protests. White leaders realized that Jelks and
the working-class activists would not back down in the face o f intimidation.24
When Jelks demanded that Mayor-President Jack Christian create a biracial
committee composed of working-class activists and white leaders and give it the
responsibility o f bringing a quick end to segregation, the mayor and council complied
but named racial diplomats and a couple of World War II activists to serve on it. White
“ Arthur Jelks to Roy Wilkins, April 19, 1963, NAACP Papers, Group III, box
C52, folder 11; Arthur Jelks to Robert F. Kennedy, April 19, 1963, ibid.; Gloster
Current to Roy Wilkins, April 25 1963, ibid.; Delors Green to National Office, n.d.,
ibid.
24Gloster Current to Arthur Jelks, April 29,1963, ibid.
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leaders considered these African Americans safe. For years, all o f them had worked
with the white elite to maintain, peace and stability in Baton Rouge25. The committee
consisted o f fifteen white members and fifteen black ones. All o f the appointees
belonged to the city’s middle and upper classes and most were businessmen, plant
employees, ministers, or professionals. Established by a decree of the city-parish
council, the Committee on Community Relations met in secret and reported directly to
the mayor-president. The NAACP denounced the composition of the committee and
claimed that most of the black members were Uncle Toms. Jelks even released a public
statement declaring that, other than Dupuy Anderson, the members of the committee
“did not represent any real Negro leadership.” Fearing that the composition of the
biracial committee would further divide the black community, Clarence Laws, the
NAACP field secretary for Louisiana, called a meeting o f the Baton Rouge chapter’s
officers and convinced them to refrain from “public criticism or derogatory statements
against Negro leaders or the Mayor.” The group also promised as a good faith gesture to

“ Black members of the Biracial Committee included: Leon Netterville, vice
president of Southern; Horatio Thompson, owner of Horatio’s Auto Parts; Raymond
Scott, owner of Scott the Tailor’s; Joseph Dyer, a dentist; Dr. B. V. Baranco; John G.
Lewis, owner of the Fraternal Press; James C. Cook, Humble (ESSO) Oil employee and
owner of Cook’s Theater; T. J. Jemison, Reverend W. T. Handy of St. Mark’s
Episcopal Church; Dupuy Anderson; Acie Belton, Humble Oil employee; John Hatcher,
a dray contractor; Reverend L. L. Haynes, pastor of Wesley Methodist Church; Calvin
Washington, Humble Oil employee; and Reverend E. D. Billoups, pastor of Second
Baptist Church. White members included: James L. Winfree, an executive with Gulf
Oil Company; Charles Thibaut, Jr., Tom Collins, Frank Craig, and Carlos Spaht, all
attorneys; William J. Hughes, Jr, an architect; Reverend Sam flushing of Istrouma
Baptist Church; Joe Kavanaugh, counsel in the Attorney General’s office; A. A.
Breeden, owner of Breeden’s Tractor Company; Dr. Henry Jolly; Millard Jackson and
Thompson Cannon, Humble Oil employees; Melvin Stephens, Solvay Chemicals
employee; Dr. Sherman Slaughter, and Fred Frey, former LSU dean of students.
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refrain from any protests for thirty days. If the biracial committee made no progress,
then the demonstrations would resume.26
When Jelks went to trial for the March 1963 traffic violation in early June, the
NAACP again demanded that the judge completely desegregate the Municipal
Building, including lunch counters, courtrooms, restrooms, and water fountains. When
the judge refused to do so, they staged a sit-in at the courthouse’s lunch counter, hi
response to their demands and the sit-ins that followed, Mayor Christian, taking the
advice o f the biracial committee, ordered the desegregation o f the Municipal Building’s
water fountains and restrooms and of the courtrooms. To keep blacks and whites from
actually drinking from the same fountains, the city mounted paper cup dispensers
beside them. The committee also urged the mayor and the council to hire black police
officers; they complied but allowed African-American officers to patrol only in black
neighborhoods and arrest black suspects. This legal action did not stop the
demonstrations.27
The operator of the courthouse’s coffee shop, Sam Passaro, who happened to be
blind, shared Pitcher’s opposition to the mayor’s desegregation order. He claimed that
the presence o f black customers upset his white patrons and added that he would
continue to deny services to all African Americans. Passaro contended that he had the

“ Minutes of Special Meeting, March 28, 1963, East Baton Rouge Parish CityParish Council; “Chairmen o f Bi-Racial Body Named,” Morning Advocate, June 1,
1963, 1; Buell, “The Politics of Frustration,” 136-137; Clarence Laws to Gloster
Current, May 31, 1963, NAACP Papers, Group IH, box C52, folder 11.
27“Jelks, NAACP Ask Injunction Go, Payment,” Morning Advocate, June 3,
1963, 9D; “2 BR Buildings Mark First Day of Integration,” Morning Advocate, June 8,
1963, 10A.
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right “to refuse service to anyone whose tone o f voice indicated — [that] they might
cause his business trouble.” He asked Judge Coleman Lindsey to issue a temporary
restraining order against the NAACP and to order Jelks and the NAACP to pay him
$5,000 for humiliating him by staging a sit-in at his counter. At 2:30 p jn. on July 22,
Judge Lindsey complied and issued a restraining order forbidding Jelks and the NAACP
from holding sit-ins or demonstrations at Passaro’s counter. Thirty minutes later, Pearl
George and two men entered the shop and sat at a table. The men left after a couple o f
minutes but George remained. She recalled:
I was sitting in the coffee shop, reading a paper, first time a black had ever tried
to enter into the coffee shop. You could stand at the door and order what you
wanted, and somebody would bring it to you. But you could not go in and sit
down and eat like white folks could. There was a black lady [working] there
then, I guess I could understand her. It was her job to tell the white man that I
was there, that I had bought a paper and a Hershey Bar candy. I was sitting at
one of the tables eating it. When I walked in the coffee shop was full, he
(Passaro] waited on me. She whispered and told him that I was black. He said,
“If there’s any colored people in here sitting to the tables, I will have to ask you
to leave.” I didn’t answer. So, he buzzed for the deputies. The deputies came in.
He [the deputy] told the proprietor, “You will have to ask her to leave in my
presence.” The proprietor told me, “I told you colored people ain’t allowed to
eat in here. You will have to leave.”
Police arrested her for disturbing the peace and LeBlanc set her bond at $1,500. The
same day, an unidentified woman staged a sit-in at a coffee shop in the Municipal
Building. Police did not arrest her, but the manager immediately closed for the day.28
The sit-ins at the courthouse and the Municipal Building marked the beginning
of a series of protests. On July 23, thirty African Americans, including Pearl George,
attempted to use the swimming pool at City Park. Thirty minutes before the protesters
28“Negroes Seek Service at BR Coffee Shops,” Morning Advocate, July 23,
1963,12C; Pearl George, interview by unknown.
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arrived, the police received an anonymous call telling them o f the pending
desegregation attempt. Police Chief Wingate White immediately notified the Recreation
and Parks Commission and went, along with a contingency o f policemen, to the scene.
Pearl George believed that an informant who attended a planning session the previous
evening called authorities. “When we got to the City Park, there were sheriffs
department, city police, state police,” she recalled, “They was there with their guns and
billy clubs waiting to receive us and ask where we were going as we walked into the
City Park, and I told them that we was going to swim.” The group o f African
Americans, including George’s daughter and several other children, rushed Robert
Clanton, a lifeguard posted at the entrance of the pool house, and went into the locker
area. Chief White and Captain Leslie Font arrested two of the men who had pushed
passed Clanton, twenty-one-year-old Sam Green and twenty-one-year-old Richard
Thompson. They charged both with disturbing the peace and simple battery. Then, the
officers moved the protesters out o f the building. Once outside, the activists became
unruly. When the paddy wagon arrived to take Green and Thompson to jail, the activists
rushed it and pulled the doors open. Green attempted to escape, and the officers pushed
him back inside. At that point, White engaged in a shouting match with the protesters.
White told George, “You better be glad that it was I who came to arrest you-all because
if it was [anyone else], Gilbert’s [the black funeral home] would have picked you up.”
She replied, “I’ll tell you one damned thing. You know Rabenhorst [the white funeral
home] is riding too.” Unlike the student activists, George refused to be bound by the
principal o f nonviolence. “I believed an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth,” she said,
“I believed that if I turned my left cheek, you were going to slap me on the right one.
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Either you was going to die, or I was going to die.” The officers arrested three more
demonstrators, including George, and charged them with disturbing the peace, simple
battery, and resisting arrest. Their bonds ranged from $3,000 to $6,000.The biracial
committee met on July 23 but did not discuss the battle at the swimming pool. The
following day, Jelks and a small group of NAACP members picketed outside the City
Park Clubhouse. Several of them carried signs that read, ‘The Biracial Committee is
Sleeping on Our Rights.”29
Six months later, the five arrested at the pool stood trial in a state district court.
Their attorney Johnnie Jones tried to argue that they were protesting against the
continued segregation of the city’s publicly funded parks and recreation system. Judge
Jess Johnson refused to listen to the argument and told Jones, “No one objects to a
demonstration, — but to walk into a place where admission is charged and manhandle
an attendant is not a demonstration.” Chief White testified that if the five had purchased
tickets to use the pool, he and Font would not have prevented them from entering the
facility. O f course, the city’s segregation laws prevented George and the others from
paying for their admissions. Johnson found the five guilty and sentenced them to jail
terms ranging from ninety days to six months and ordered them to pay fines ranging
from $100 to $250. George received the six-month sentence.30

“ “Negro Group Tries to Mix Pool in Park,” Morning Advocate, July 24, 1963,
1; Pearl George, interview by unknown; “Mayor, Law Officers Pledge Action on any
Mob Violence,” State-Times, July 24,1963, 1; ‘Tickets Appear at City Park Again
Thursday,” Morning Advocate, July 26,1963, 6C.
3°«pive Negroes at Swim-In Convicted,” Morning Advocate, January 8, 1964, 1;
“Supreme Court Holds Negroes’ Sentences Valid,” Morning Advocate, May 2,1964, 1;
Pearl George, interview by unknown; Johnnie Jones to Robert Carter, July 24, 1963,
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Ia response to the biracial committee’s refusal to take any action after the
swimming pool incident, the NAACP asked U. S. District Judge E. Gordon West for a
hearing on the 1953 park desegregation suit. The renewed interest in the park suit
stemmed not only from the swimming pool arrests but also from a federal court ruling
the previous week that desegregated New Orleans’s public parks. Jelks promised that
picketing of the park would continue until either the court or the biracial committee
allowed all people to use these publicly funded facilities, hi February 1964, the
Supreme Court overturned a Louisiana law requiring segregation of public park
facilities. As a segregationist, West delayed his decision as long as possible because he
knew that legal precedents required him to desegregate these facilities. In April 1964,
the attorney handling the case, Johnnie Jones, complained about the delay and filed a
renewal motion for a summary judgement. West chastised him, “As soon as I can get to
it, I will get to it.”31
On May 7, the Recreation and Parks Commission, knowing that West would
eventually order the desegregation of the public pool at City Park, decided to close it
rather than allow black and white children to swim together. The commission wanted to
prevent more demonstrations and claimed that the decision to close the pool was a
financial one. According to Eugene Young, superintendent of the parks, it never made a
profit and, in fact, usually ran a deficit. Yet the anticipated loss for 1964 was in line

NAACP Papers, Group V, boxB3, folder Correspondence: Carter, Robert (Joh-Joy),
1957-1963.
31“Rec. Facility Desegregation Efforts Planned,” Morning Advocate, August 6,
1963, 8A; “West to Deliberate on Park Integration,” Morning Advocate, April 18,1964,
11A.
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with those of previous years. Commission Chairman William McGehee promised that
the group would look into leasing the pool out to a private company, which would have
removed it from public control and would have allowed African Americans to be
excluded even if West issued a desegregation order. On May 18, West ordered the
Recreation Commission to integrate its facilities but added that there was “no legal
obligation or duty on the part of the city or parish to provide or operate recreational
facilities.” Following the judge’s advice, the commission decided to fill in the pool at
City Park rather than allow black and white children to swim together.32
The day after West’s ruling, three African Americans attempted to play golf at
one o f the city’s white courses. Park employees refused to allow them to do so and
stated that until the commission received official notification of West’s decision, the
facilities would remain segregated. Six days later, park officials turned away four black
golfers at another course, again pending receipt o f the court order. Although West
suggested that the city-parish abolish its public park system, the commission decided to
comply with his ruling. On May 27, park facilities, except for the swimming pools,
desegregated without incident when several black golfers used two white courses.33

32“BR Swim Pools To Stay Closed,” State-Times, May 7,1964,1; “EBR Plans
to Keep Public Pools Closed,” Morning Advocate, May 8,1964,1; “EBR Parish Pool
Closing Is Confirmed,” Morning Advocate, May 10, 1964,1; “Recreational Area in
City Desegregated,” Morning Advocate, May 19, 1964, 1.
33“Three Negroes Apply to Play at City Park,” Morning Advocate, May 20,
1964, 14B; “Four Negroes Turned Away at Webb Park,” Morning Advocate, May 26,
1964,12C; “Anti-Mixing Move Killed by BREC,” Morning Advocate, May 23,1964,
1; “Park Facilities Here Integrate Without Alarm,” Morning Advocate, May 28, 1964,1.
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Although the biracial committee played little role in bringing about park
desegregation, it successfully negotiated the end to segregation at other facilities. With
the intervention of committee members, twelve downtown stores desegregated their
lunch counters without any fanfare. When Pearl George and several others attempted to
take part in the first integration attempt, they discovered that in the deal worked out
between the committee and the managers, Southern students were the only African
Americans allowed to participate in the initial desegregation o f the counters. George
was indignant, so the manager told her to call her leader, Reverend Jemison. She told
the manager, “Reverend Jemison do not lead me. I lead myself.” George believed that
the biracial committee selected the Southern students to desegregate the counters
because they belonged to the black elite. Although George bristled at the involvement
of the biracial committee in lunch counter desegregation, without its intervention, these
businesses would have remained segregated.34
With lunch counter desegregation achieved, working-class activists turned their
attention to obtaining economic equality. They wanted to open up jobs traditionally
reserved for whites, such as cashiers and store clerks, and to obtain higher wages for
black workers. In October 1963, Pearl George and a group o f African Americans
demanded that white-owned grocery stores in black neighborhoods hire black workers.
When the owners refused, George and her supporters picketed these businesses. Their
protests often ended in violence. On October 3, a group o f young picketers threw rocks

^ “Lunch Counters at 12 Major BR Sites Integrated,” Morning Advocate, August
7,1963, 7A; “Negroes Picket Downtown BR Wednesday,” Morning Advocate, August
8, 1963, IOC; Pearl George, interview by unknown.
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and bottles at a city bus. Three weeks later, protesters fought with segregationists who
taunted them as they marched.35
In February 1964, the biracial committee attacked another vestige o f segregation
when members reached an agreement with local hospitals to allow black doctors to
have hospital privileges, but stipulated that they could only treat black patients. This
change did little for working-class African Americans who could not afford to pay for
health care and relied on the state’s charity hospital system to meet their medical
needs.36
Through its efforts, the biracial committee achieved not only desegregation of
downtown lunch counters and hospital privileges for black doctors but also convinced
the mayor to hire black police officers and to desegregate restrooms, lunch counters,
and water fountains in the Municipal Building. Yet, the biracial committee and its
composition concerned World War II activists. Although some, such as Dupuy
Anderson and Raymond Scott, served on the committee, others wanted to abolish it.
Johnnie Jones denounced the committee’s secrecy and declared that if voters elected a
black man to the city-parish council “the necessity of a biracial committee that meets
behind closed doors, not responsible to the people, will be eliminated.”37

35“Negroes Throw Bricks Through Bus Windows,” Morning Advocate, October
3, 1963,1 IF; “Negroes Picket White-Operated Grocery Stores,” Morning Advocate,
October 10, 1963, 8C; “Negroes Create Ugly Scene in Front of BR Food Store,”
Morning Advocate, October 20,1963,5C.
36“Plan to Admit Negro Doctors,” Morning Advocate, February 24, 1964,1.
37“ Jones Gives Statement in Council Race,” Morning Advocate, June 28,1964,
11A.
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Segregationists also denounced the biracial committee and resented the secrecy
surrounding it. The committee met in private and reported directly to Mayor Christian,
who kept its recommendations, even those he implemented, confidential. When the
committee negotiated the admission of black doctors to the staffs o f white hospitals, for
example, it made no public statement. In fact, the city’s newspapers discovered the
existence of the changes only when unnamed committee members leaked the
information to the press. This shroud o f secrecy may have made the interaction between
committee members easier, but it also allowed segregationists to engage in wild
speculation about its activities. Segregationists circulated a rumor that the committee
created the August 1963 school integration plan. when, in reality, it played no role in the
process. In February 1964, a frustrated city-parish council demanded that the mayor
report on the body’s activities. Christian outlined the group’s accomplishments and
commended its members for their work in “maintaining the ‘proper image’ for Baton
Rouge.” Two months later, the biracial committee met in an executive session with the
mayor and the council for nearly two hours and convinced a majority of council
members that it should remain active.38
Controversy surrounding the committee did not end with the council’s vote, hi
fact, Councilman Robert T. “Bobby” Clegg issued a statement following the meeting to
express his opposition to the committee. He noted that he had voted against the
formation of the group and continued to oppose it because he believed it violated the

38“Council Looks at Biracial Responsibility,” Morning Advocate, February 24,
1964, 1; “Council Backs Its Bi-Racial Group’s Work;” Morning Advocate, April 2,
1964,1.
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constitutional rights o f white Baton Rougeans and created a “knife at the throat
atmosphere.”39
The biracial committee became a dominant issue in the!964 mayoral election.
Four candidates challenged Jack Christian for mayor Woodrow W. “Woody” Dumas a
twelve-year member o f the city-parish council and salesman for Commercial Steel
Building & Metal Company; L. W. “Puna” Eaton, owner o f L. W. Eaton Construction
Company; Mike Safer, owner o f Mike Safer Scrap Metals, Co.; and Ossie Brown, an
attorney. Christian, Dumas and Eaton supported the biracial committee and believed
that it helped to maintain peace. ‘Tor fourteen months this community has been without
racial conflict largely through the efforts of those individuals serving on this
committee,” Christian said. “The committee has served as a medium o f communication
so essential to peaceful relations in the community.” Dumas also congratulated the
group for maintaining peaceful race relations in Baton Rouge and stated, “I believe that
recent occurrences of racial violence in neighboring states have manifested the wisdom
of maintaining the lines of communication between the races on a local basis, thus
blocking the pressures of foreign irritant sources.” Dumas believed that before the
creation o f the committee “the responsible Negro leaders in this community were losing
their following to a certain Reverend Jelks.” Although he recognized the effectiveness
of the committee, he denounced the secrecy surrounding it and promised that, unlike
Christian, he would issue M l reports on the biracial group's activities. Eaton also called
for the activities of the committee to be made public but vowed to maintain the group in
39“Councilman Clegg Still Against Bi-Racial Group,” Morning Advocate, April
8, 1964, 11A.
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order “to prevent violence, bloodshed, or any discord in our community.” Mike Safer
denounced the committee and claimed that race relations in Baton Rouge remained
peaceful because the mayor and the council “gave our rights away in May 1963" when
they created the biracial body. Brown denounced the secrecy surrounding the
committee but refused to take a stand on the issue.40
Although segregationists denounced the biracial body, the voters of East Baton
Rouge Parish supported it, and, in the July 26 primary, gave the most votes to the
group’s most ardent supporters Dumas and Christian. The councilman received 15,101
votes to the mayor’s 13,841. In fact, the role played by Christian in creating the
committee and his willingness to carry out the group’s recommendation pleased the
majority of black voters, and their 3,143 votes secured him a spot in the runoff. The
four other candidates combined garnered only 1,886 African-American votes. However,
the support of blacks did little to help Christian in the August 29 election and, in fact,
probably helped to secure Dumas’ victory.41
The new mayor encountered a racial situation that differed from that o f his
predecessor. On July 2,1964, President Lyndon Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act
into law. It removed the legal basis for segregation inmost public accommodations and
^ “Candidates for Mayor-President Answer Questions,” Morning Advocate, July
17, 1964,5B; “Christian, Dumas Defend Formation of Biracial Group,” Morning
Advocate, August 4, 1964,10A; “Mayor’s Race Quickens; Talks by Candidates
Heighten Pace,” Morning Advocate, July 10,1964, 5B.
41“Primary Election to Attract EBR Voters Tomorrow,” State-Times, July 24,
1964, 1; “State, City Go to Polls Today, See Normal Vote,” State-Times, July 25,1964,
1; “Dumas and Christian in Runoff,” Morning Advocate, July 26, 1964,1; “Christian,
Dumas Get Ready for Second Primaiy Struggle,” State-Times, July 27,1964, 1;
“Dumas Defeats Christian,” Morning Advocate, August 30, 1964,1.
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proved to be a turning point for the movement in Baton Rouge and in other southern
cities. In New Orleans, black patrons received service at one o f the French Quarter’s
most famous landmarks, the Cafe du Monde. In Birmingham, African Americans
quietly desegregated white theaters, restaurants, and lunch counters. Baton Rouge was
no different. Several restaurants served black diners, and a local hotel even allowed an
African-American man to have a drink in its lounge. Yet, in Baton Rouge as in all these
communities, resistence to integration remained strong. Segregationists viewed the
Civil Rights Act as a violation of the sovereignty of the states as outlined in the
Constitution and believed that a business owner had the right to select his or her
clientele. Several Baton Rouge restaurant owners defied the new law and continued
refusing to serve black customers.42
On July 6, Jelks led one of the successful integration attempts. He and two
women, Betty Wilson and Cordelia Antoine, went to the State Capitol’s segregated
cafeteria to test the Civil Rights Act. Fearing the reaction of segregationists, the civil
rights activist phoned local FBI Agent Elmer Litchfield, who later became sheriff of
East Baton Rouge Parish, the cafeteria’s manager, and Superintendent of State Police
Thomas Burbank to advise them of his plans. Knowing that African-American patrons
were on the way, the manager told his employees to treat Jelks and the women like their
white customers. The three activists entered the establishment, selected and paid for
their food without incident, and made their way into the dining area. When they sat, all
but one of the sixty white patrons in the dining room stood up and left. Ultra
42“Negroes Try Rights Law in Louisiana,” Morning Advocate, July 4, 1964,1;
“Atlanta Negroes Meet in Opposition,” ibid.
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segregationist Leander Perez happened to be eating lunch when the three African
Americans arrived, and led the white exodus, stood in the doorway and shouted,
“Paging Texas Turncoat Lyndon Johnson’s federal marshals. Paging Batface Bobby
Kennedy’s federal marshals — you know damned well they are here.” Jelks and his
dining companions ate their meals while the white crowd of mostly state government
employees taunted them from the doorway. When they finished, the three walked out of
the restaurant and through the crowd single file to avoid contact with anyone. As they
left, an unidentified white man punched Jelks, but with the help of State Police
Superintendent Burbank, the three walked to their car with no further incidents.43
Believing that Perez stirred up the crowd and egged on the man who attacked
him, Jelks sued the segregationist leader. The suit accomplished something that three
years of police harassment had not — it forced Jelks to leave Baton Rouge. Perez
refused to let Jelks go unpunished for being so ‘‘uppity” and began a six-month
undocumented campaign of terror against the civil rights leader. In February 1965, a
frazzled Jelks abruptly left Baton Rouge because o f “pressure from the whites” and
because his superiors in the A.M.E. church feared that Perez would have him killed. He
later dropped his suit against Perez.44

43Thomas Burbank’s Statement, NAACP Papers, Group V, box 53, folder Jelks
v. Perez, General Case Material; Arthur Jelks’ affidavit, ibid.; Peter Teachout to Robert
Carter, July 17, 1964, ibid.; Lydia Venton’s Statement, ibid.; “Negro Mixing Cafeteria
Gets Socked in Jaws,” Morning Advocate, July 7,1964,11A.
““Gioster Current to Reverend Bishop Joseph Gomez, February 4, 1965,
NAACP Papers, Group in , box C52, folder 11; Arthur Jelks to Barbara Morris, April 2,
1965, NAACP Papers, Group V, box 53, folder Jelks v. Perez General Material.
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Jelks’ departure left the working-class activists without a powerful leader and
for the next three years, the group floundered. Many o f these civil rights advocates,
including Pearl George, left the NAACP when the organization’s national office refused
to finance the defenses o f the five arrested in the swimming pool protest o f 1963.
Others abandoned the group because they suspected that an informant had infiltrated it
and was passing on protest information to white leaders. In addition, the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act o f 1965 changed the nature o f the movement.
The two acts accomplished the primary goals o f civil rights activists — the
desegregation of public accommodations and the ability to register to vote. Although
pockets of resistance to both laws remained in Baton Rouge, the acts allowed the
working-class activists to shift their attention away from the legal barriers that
preserved segregation and to focus on the economic barriers that prevented them from
attaining full citizenship.45
From 1962 until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, working class
activists dominated the civil rights movement in Baton Rouge. While they failed to
achieve their goal of complete equality, their unrelenting protests and refusal to back
down forced white leaders to address their demands. Fearing that the working-class
activists would convince the black masses to rise up in protest and thereby shatter the
stability of the Baton Rouge community, white leaders tried to undercut their authority
in the African-American community. When Jelks asked Mayor Christian to create a
biracial committee, he complied but appointed racial diplomats to it. Although working45Arthur Jelks to Lucille Black, August 21, 1964, NAACP Papers, Group HI,
box C52, folder 11.
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class activists denounced it, the committee made some concrete changes to the system
of segregation in Baton Rouge. In 1963, it secured the hiring o f black police officers,
something blacks had been asking for since the mid 1950s. Before the passage o f the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, the biracial committee also negotiated the desegregation o f
downtown lunch counters and convinced the mayor to desegregate facilities in the
Municipal Building. Although these gains seemed small to the working-class activists,
they mollified the majority African Americans and prevented the types o f mass
demonstrations and violence that occurred in 1963 in Birmingham.
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Chapter 9
Black Power and the End of the Movement, 1965-1972
Although the Civil Rights Act o f 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965
granted African Americans in the South full citizenship and improved conditions for
black Baton Rougeans, these laws could not end racism or eliminate the economic
disparity that existed between the black and white populations. They did change the
nature o f the civil rights movement in Baton Rouge, however. In the late-1960s, for
many African Americans, especially the World War II activists, the movement was
over. Although they realized that serious problems remained in their community, they
believed that working within the system could solve the remaining racial problems. At
the same time, two new groups o f activists appeared. One consisted o f angry, young
working-class African Americans from inner-city neighborhoods and the other was
composed o f Black Power activists who attended Southern University. Like the older
working-class activists, the young members of this group were poorly educated and
lacked the skills to find well-paying jobs. United in frustration over the continuing
racism that plagued Baton Rouge, they responded to racially-charged situations, such as
the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., with violence. Preaching racial separatism
and pride, the Black Power activists from Southern also advocated using violence to
empower African-Americans. Often the rhetoric of the Black Power advocates
influenced the young working-class activists and led to violent confrontations between
them and the white community.
White leaders feared both groups o f young African Americans and believed that
they would cause race riots and shatter the community’s peace and stability if allowed
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to go unchecked. After more than three decades o f using compromise and arresting
activists to defuse civil rights demonstrations, white leaders discovered that their timeproven strategy no longer worked.1The divisions within the black community and the
inability of whites to deal with the new groups o f activists became apparent in the late
1960s when, on several occasions, white police officers, who were known for their
racism and brutality, shot and killed black suspects. While all African Americans
condemned the use o f deadly force, they reacted differently. Black leaders turned to
traditional methods o f protest. They staged marches, rallies, and picketing and
negotiated with white leaders to change police practices. The young activists took part
in the leaders’ mass protests, but afterward, mobs o f them ran through the streets
attacking whites and burning down buildings. White leaders responded to the violence
with massive force and sent in large contingents of policemen, sheriffs’ deputies, and
the National Guard to subdue the violence. By the early 1970s, this combination of
rioting answered by massive force so heightened racial tension within the city that
large-scale rioting became all but inevitable.
The divisions within the black community that characterized the civil rights
movement grew deeper in the years following the Civil and Voting Rights Acts. With
Jelks’s departure, the Baton Rouge chapter o f the NAACP collapsed. From 1964 until
1Other New South cities that, like Baton Rouge, worked diligently to avoid
confrontation and violence during the 1950s and 1960s experienced similar increases in
Black Power activism and racial discord in the late-1960s and eariy-1970s. In Tampa,
Florida, frustration and anger over job discrimination and poverty led to a riot in a black
neighborhood near the downtown business district. It began when a white police officer
shot an unarmed black robbery suspect. For more on the Tampa riot see: Steven F.
Lawson, “From Sit-In to Race Riot: Businessmen, Blacks and the Pursuit of
Moderation,” in Southern Businessmen, Jacoway and Colburn, eds., 257-281.
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1967, very little organized civil rights activity occurred in Baton Rouge. In April 1966,
the NAACP’s State Conference declared the Baton Rouge branch dormant. Gloster
Current even came to the city to discuss reorganization with black leaders but found no
one interested. Racial diplomats refused to join the organization because of the
reputation for activism the branch had earned under Jelks’ leadership, and working
class activists distrusted the national office, which, in 1963, had refused to pay for the
defenses of Pearl George and the other activists arrested in their attempt to desegregate
City Park’s pool. In 1967, NAACP Field Director for Louisiana Harvey Britton tried
again to reorganize the Baton Rouge chapter and like Current failed. He discovered that
many African Americans in the city were happy with the status quo, especially the
racial diplomats and the World War n activists, and refused to join the revived NAACP
chapter. “Baton Rouge, like any other capital city, tends to offer more opportunities for
employment, recreation, and other social events which fastens a false sense of
accomplishments among its Negro citizenry,” Britton explained. In late 1967, though,
he finally convinced nineteen people to join the organization. They launched a
membership drive and, optimistically, set their goal at 5,000. The drive added only a
few new members, and Britton blamed the insurmountable division between the “Negro
leadership,” meaning the racial diplomats, and the “grass-roots leadership,” meaning
working-class activists, along with the subterfuge o f white leaders for the failure. When
Britton tried to open an office in Baton Rouge, the local utility and telephone
companies doubled their security deposits. In the end, only a little more than one
hundred African Americans joined the NAACP. The field director held out little hope
for the branch’s sustained success. Britton’s fears were unfounded. When Pearl George
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decided to return to her role as Youth Chapter advisor, other working-class activists
renewed their memberships.2
In the late 1960s, working-class activism was centered in the Eden Park area of
Baton Rouge. One o f the poorest sections o f the city, the neighborhood suffered from
high crime, drainage and sewerage problems, and rampant unemployment. Frustrated
by these conditions, a group o f residents in the summer o f 1968 presented Mayor
Woody Dumas with a list o f grievances.3 Unlike his predecessor Jack Christian, who
allowed the biracial committee to study the problems o f the black community before he
took a public stand on them, Dumas examined the complaints himself. After looking
them over, the mayor commented, “It is unfortunate we let some of these things
continue until someone tries to make a fuss.” He forwarded the petition to the biracial
committee and demanded that it submit its recommendations for improving conditions
in Eden Park the following week. After receiving the committee’s report, Dumas gave it

2Gloster Current to Murphy Bell, April 1,1966, Papers o f the NAACP Field
Director, hereafter cited as Field Director’s Papers, box 1, folder 3, Amistad Research
Center, Tulane University, New Orleans, Louisiana; Monthly Report, March 20, 1967,
Field Director’s Papers, box 2, folder 3; Harvey Britton to Members of the Executive
Board, March 22,1967, ibid.; Harvey Britton to Emmitt Douglas, March 27, 1967,
ibid.; Monthly Report, March 27, 1967, Field Director’s Papers, box 2, folder 4;
Monthly Report, June 14,1967, Field Director’s Papers, box 2, folder 7; Supplementary
Monthly Report, July 2,1967, Field Director’s Papers, box 2, folder 9.
3Having witnessed the devastating riots in northern and western cities, Dumas
wanted to prevent this type o f violence from erupting in Baton Rouge. The mayor knew
that such an incident would devastate the city’s economy and would discourage large
industries from building plants and refineries in their area. Dumas adopted a pragmatic
approach in dealing with the demands for racial equality. For information on riots in
large industrial cities see: Gerald Home, Fire This Time: The Watts Uprising and th e.
1960s (Charlottesville: University o f Virginia Press, 1995) and Sidney Fine, Violence in
the Model City (Ann Arbor University o f Michigan Press, 1989).
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to the city-parish council for consideration. The body promised to discuss improving
drainage, housing, recreational facilities, street lights, and sidewalks and to attempt to
provide more jobs for Eden Park residents. Dumas immediately increased the police
patrols in the crime-riddled neighborhood and ordered the Department o f Public Works
to hire black workers. The council also contacted the Recreation and Parks Commission
and asked that body to improve the recreational facilities in the poverty-stricken
neighborhood. Dumas did not take these actions because he sympathized with the
residents o f Eden Park or because he wanted to improve conditions in a poor
neighborhood. Rather, he acted to prevent a racial uprising in a ghetto. He told the CityParish Council, “We’re not going to make the same mistake they made in Detroit.”
Dumas believed that maintaining peace and harmony required that white and black
leaders deal with the complaints o f civil rights activists at a conference table rather than
on the streets.4
In the summer of 1967, young working-class activists tested Dumas’ resolve to
use negotiations to deal with the racial problems when African Americans from
Bogalusa staged a march from their community to Baton Rouge. Sponsored by the
Bogalusa Civic and Voters’ League, marchers demanded improved education and
increased voter education. The group also announced that Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) Chairman H. Rap Brown, one of the nation’s most
outspoken Black Power activists, would appear at its rally on the steps of the State
Capitol at the culmination of the march. Bom and raised in Baton Rouge, Brown was
4“Council Meets Monday Over Negro Grievances,” State-Times, August 5,
1967,4B; “Negro Gripes Laid on Line,” State-Times, August 8, 1967, 1.
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the son of a refinery worker and attended Southern University before becoming
involved in the civil rights movement in the early 1960s. He became a full-time SNCC
worker in 1966 and soon after became chairman of the organization. Brown recognized
the plight of working-class African Americans and told them that the only way to seize
power was by force. Brown’s and SNCC’s pro-working class rhetoric proved popular in
Baton Rouge’s poor neighborhoods, as it did in communities across the country. On
July 24, police in Maryland arrested Brown for inciting a riot in Cambridge in which
protesters burned a school. The day before, he had told African Americans attending the
Maryland rally, “If this town don’t come around, this town should be burned down!”
Fearing that he would express a similar sentiment at the State Capitol rally, Governor
John McKeithen threatened to arrest the young activist if he used incendiary language
in his speech. Refusing to be intimidated by McKeithen, Brown replied, “I didn’t make
the laws, neither did black people in this country. If the laws defeat my purpose, why
should I conform to them?” Justice Department officials, fearing that Brown’s arrest in
Baton Rouge would lead to a riot, arrested him in New York a couple of days before the
Baton Rouge rally and charged him with carrying a weapon on a flight from New York
to New Orleans/ A federal judge set his bond at $25,000. Because he could not raise
bail, Brown missed the rally.6

sFedetal law prohibited anyone under indictment from transporting a weapon
across state lines.
6Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 412-414; Claybome Carson, In Struggle:
SNCC and the Black Awakening o f the 1960s (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1981), 252-257; “H. Rap Brown Arrives for Sunday Rally,” State-Times, August 17,
1967,4A; “Brown Held, Can’t Post High Bond,” State-Times, August 19,1967, 1,
“March Nears City Limits After ‘Hot’ Friday Walk,” Morning Advocate, August 19,
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Even without Brown there, white leaders feared that the Bogalusa to Baton
Rouge march would heighten racial tensions in the city and urged all residents to stay
home on the day o f the rally. Dumas told his constituents, “Ignore any marchers or
similar intruders in our community. If we are to continue to run our community, then
we must do so with proper responsibility.” The mayor promised that police officers
would arrest anyone, regardless o f race, who violated the law. Committed to preserving
the peace, he also promised that violence would not be tolerated, and in the hours
following the civil rights rally and the Ku Klux Klan meeting that followed it,
policemen confiscated weapons from whites traveling into or driving near Eden Park.
They detained one man for possession of an M-16 semiautomatic rifle, several pistols,
and approximately nine boxes of ammunition. Because Louisiana law allowed citizens
to carry unconcealed weapons in their cars, officers did not charge any o f the armed
men, and the police department returned the weapons the next day. The fact that
officers prevented them from entering Eden Park remained significant. In southern
cities dominated by segregationists, law enforcement officials took few, if any,
precautions, to prevent violence and sometimes even encouraged it.7
Despite their best efforts, white leaders in Baton Rouge could not prevent
violence from erupting in Eden Park. After the rally, a dozen fires broke out, six of
them started by fire bombs. White-owned businesses were the primary targets for those
who started the fires, but none caused major damage. Although they failed to capture

1967, 1.
7“Police Integration Order Withdrawn,” State-Times, August 15,1967, 1.
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the arsonists, police arrested eleven young black men ranging in age from eighteen to
thirty-three: seven for vagrancy, one for obscenity, another for carrying a concealed
weapon, and two for disorderly conduct. One o f those arrested was Walter Leon
Jenkins, also known as “Big Black Billy Brooks,” a twenty-six-year-old Houston
native. The young activist attracted the attention of law enforcement officers when he
disrupted the rally at the Capitol by shouting Black Power slogans. Later, when
violence erupted in Eden Park, he grabbed a black policeman and prevented him from
calling headquarters when a group o f young African Americans smashed the windows
of a white-owned grocery store. Police arrested him and charged him with inciting
arson, simple battery of a police officer, and intimidating a police officer. After his
arrest, the city’s newspapers reported that Jenkins came to Louisiana in 1965 as a field
worker for CORE and took part in demonstrations in the Baton Rouge area.8 Despite the
fires, the following day, white leaders applauded the law-abiding citizens of Baton
Rouge for their restraint and sense of civic responsibility. The city’s peaceful facade,
however, hid the anger and discontent that young African Americans felt.9
The working-class activism, inspired by the Black Power activism of SNCC and
CORE, that led to the fire bombing of Eden Park businesses created division and
distrust within the black community. Fearing that the violent tactics of the young

8In the mid 1960s, CORE abandoned the principles o f passive resistance and
nonviolence and embraced Black Power. Meier and Rudwick, CORE, 374.
9“Tense Weekend Ends with Fire Bombs in City,” State-Times, August 21,
1967, 1; ‘Tire Bombs Fly in the City After Racially Hot Day,” Morning Advocate,
August 21, 1967, 1; “Interracial Help Invited by Dumas,” Morning Advocate, July 22,
1967, 1; “City Quiet in Wake o f Incidents,” State-Times, August 22,1967, 1; “Walter
Jenkins Pleads Innocent to 3 Counts,” State-Times, August 23, 1977, 12A.
314

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

protesters would alienate the white leadership and make further racial progress
impossible, the racial diplomats attempted to unite the black community by creating a
coalition o f various organizations from around the city and parish. On February 19,
1968, representatives from twenty churches and organizations met at Mount Zion
Baptist Church to “disseminate information relative to employment, civic activities, and
political action.” The chairman o f the meeting, Acie Belton, claimed that until the black
community united nothing could be accomplished. Suspicious o f the racial diplomats’
motives, the Black Power activists questioned their sincerity. One claimed that for the
new organization to truly represent the community, it would have to include young
people and not just “respected” people. Another asked what the new group would do for
the black community other than coordinate. At a March 4 meeting, the new
organization crumbled. Nearly one hundred African Americans attended, but the
divisions within the black community were so deep that they could not even agree on a
name for their group.10
As the split between older African Americans and the young working-class
activists widened, segregationist sentiment in the city intensified. On March 8, three
off-duty police officers brandished their weapons at a group of NAACP picketers
outside Ancona’s Grocery Store, a white-owned business in a predominately black
neighborhood. The three off-duty policemen, who were not in their uniforms, went into
the store to purchase beer; on their way out, they flashed their weapons after

l0“Negro Church Leaders, Delegates Meet to Form Parish-wide Organization,”
Morning Advocate, February 20,1968, 11C; “Meet to Organize BR Negroes is Bogged
Down in Bickering,” Morning Advocate, March 5, 1968, 8C.
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exchanging a few angry words with the leader o f the protesters, Pearl George. Ten
minutes later, the three drove by, jeered at the picketers, and made insulting gestures.
George immediately called the sheriffs department to report the incident, and while the
deputies were taking the African Americans’ statements, the men returned. Deputies
pulled them over, took their guns, and drove off with the men in the back of their squad
car. George and the others later discovered that their tormenters were policemen. The
sheriffs department refused to give the activists their names. Sheriff Clemmons
referred the activists to Chief Bauer, and he sent them to Pitcher. The district attorney
would not allow George and the demonstrators to press charges against the men. To
ease racial tension, Bauer did suspend the officers but then allowed them to return to
work after a few days11.
Angered by the racism o f the police officers and the failure of white officials to
respond to their complaints, Pearl George and other NAACP officials demanded a
meeting with the mayor, the chief of police, and several councilmen to submit a list of
complaints. In a two-and-a-half hour meeting, the African Americans charged that
policemen harassed members of the black community, used derogatory language when
talking to them, searched all African Americans near crime scenes, even if they were
not suspects, and unsnapped their holsters and rested their hands on their guns while
questioning black suspects. Chief o f Police Eddie Bauer defended his officers and said
that unsnapping the holster was standard operating procedure for his policemen.

1‘“Local Grocery is Picketed by City NAACP,” Morning Advocate, March 8,
1968, 6A; “Baton Rouge Officers Get Suspension,” Morning Advocate, March 18,
1968, 1.
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Although he defended his officers, Bauer recognized that segregationist sentiment
within the police department heightened racial tension. He told the NAACP
representatives that a newly implemented community relations program taught officers
how to deal with the city’s minority population and added that he had transferred the
more racist officers out of black neighborhoods.12
On April 4,1968, the discontent o f African Americans rose to a fever-pitch
following Martin Luther King, Jr.’s assassination, and his death led to a rise in Black
Power sentiment at Southern. On April 6, approximately 1,500 black students marched
from Southern University to the State Capitol. When they reached the ESSO refinery,
they turned their thumbs down and demanded that the company set up an equal
opportunity hiring program. Although they claimed to be advocates of nonviolence
several students warned that if whites continued to oppress African Americans, a race
riot was inevitable. “We are moving from nonviolence and civil disobedience to
guerilla warfare and civil rebellion,” warned student leader Jodie Bibbens. “If Lester
Maddox could get to be governor o f Georgia by waving an ax handle I should be able to
get to be governor of Louisiana by beating up some honkies.” He promised that if white
policemen shot and killed protesters in Baton Rouge, like they did in Orangeburg,
South Carolina, then the students would respond with “10 Detroits.” An unidentified
student tore up his draft card claiming, “I refuse to fight for this society. . . where
private property is worth more than human life.” Another student leader, Sam Mims,

t2“Negro Leaders List Problems, Warn that Violence Could Come,” Morning
Advocate, March 15,1968,1ID.
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claimed that the marchers went to the Capitol to express their ‘‘dissatisfaction with the
white government structure and especially over the death of Martin Luther King.’*13
In the months and years following the assassination, the black university became
a stronghold for Black Power activism. The students abandoned King’s principles of
nonviolence and passive resistance and advocated the use of force to express their
discontent with the current state of race relations. They also gave up the idea o f an
integrated society that earlier student activists had advocated and touted black
nationalism. Black Power activists wanted “cultural and political autonomy for black
communities” and urged African Americans to reclaim their history and cultural
identity. They also refused to work with whites who, to them, were the enemy. For
older African Americans, Black Power separatism rejected the civil rights movement,
and many o f them denounced the young activists and their tactics. 14
In response to the April 6 march and rising Black Power sentiment on campus,
President Felton Clark attempted to follow the precedents that he set during the student
protests of the early 1960s; he closed the campus and ordered the students to clear out.
His tactics had worked earlier in the decade because the student body feared the
consequences o f continued defiance. They witnessed the arrest and expulsion o f their
leaders and refused to risk the consequences o f taking part in protests after the “cooling
off periods” created by Clark. However, the student activists of the late 1960s refused to
allow Southern’s administration to destroy their movement. Although they left campus

I3“Capitol Rally Climaxes Day o f Marching in BR,” Morning Advocate, April 6,
1968, 1.
I4Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 382; Carson, fn Struggle, 215-220.
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as ordered, the student activists returned to school poised to carry on their fight for
equality.15
Besides intensifying Black Power sentiment at Southern, King’s death also
angered the young working-class activists, who responded to the assassination with
violence. On April 7, in separate incidents, several o f them threw six fire bombs at
buildings in Scotlandville and tossed bricks and Molotov cocktails at white-owned
businesses in Baton Rouge. On April 8, city officials received reports that African
Americans were planning a riot, so Dumas ordered a “voluntary” curfew to go into
effect at dusk. Chief Bauer and Sheriff Clemmons sent patrols to black neighborhoods
to insure that all businesses, especially bars and liquor stores, complied with the
mayor’s order. Bauer even asked his officers to give him a list of any businesses that
refused to close. When he received it, the chief immediately phoned the proprietors and
convinced them to shut down voluntarily. Despite the curfew, several protesters threw
fire bombs, but no large scale rioting occurred.16
Segregationist sentiment also manifested itself following King’s assassination.
Racist whites threatened George, and on April 11, someone fired shots into her home.

l5“Capitol Rally Climaxes in Day of Marching,” Morning Advocate, April 6,
1968, 1.
i6“BR March Sparked by King’s Death,” State-Times, April 5,1968, 1;
“Louisiana Negroes React,” Morning Advocate, April 5, 1968,1; “Memorial Rites
Slated for King at St. Joseph’s,” Morning Advocate, April 6, 1968, 1; “Service Here
Fills Cathedral,” Morning Advocate, April 8, 1968, 1; "M. L. King Ecumenical Rites
Held,” State-Times, April 8,1968,1; “Parish in Curfew, Peaceful Monday,” Morning
Advocate, April 9,1968, 1; “Fires Quenched; Rains Come,” ibid.; “Semi-Curfew Makes
City Quiet,” Morning Advocate, April 10,1968,1.
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Fearing that a segregationist’s bullet would injure or kill George, Chief Bauer gave her
twenty-four-hour police protection.17
Just as King’s death escalated racial tension in Baton Rouge, it also increased
interracial cooperation. On April 6, an integrated group o f LSU students staged a
peaceful march from the campus to the Capitol, and religious leaders held an interracial,
ecumenical service at St. Joseph’s Catholic Cathedral. Following the assassination,
white liberals began to play a more active role in the civil rights movement On the day
after King’s murder, white students at LSU attempted to lower to half mast the flag
flying over the Parade Ground, only to be thwarted by the school’s administration. They
also formed an interracial organization — the Martin Luther King Action Movement
(MLKAM) — to work for increased integration both on and off campus. Its members
took part in voter registration drives and lobbied LSU officials to recruit black athletes,
especially football and basketball players. A month after King’s death, the MLKAM
sent interracial groups to desegregate several bars near the campus that students
frequented. All of the businesses refused to serve them.18
Perhaps the most substantial instance o f interracial cooperation came in the
summer of 1968, when black businessman Joe Delpit ran for a seat on the City-Parish

l7“4 Shots Fired at Home o f NAACP Official,” Morning Advocate, April 12,
1968, 9A; Monthly Report, April 15,1968, Field Director’s Papers.
18“LA Flags Fly at Half Mast, But Not Without Controversy,” Morning
Advocate, April 6,1968, 1; “Mixed LSU Student Units Denied Service in 8
Bars,” Morning Advocate, May 15 1968,5A; John McNeese, interview by author, July
15, 1992, tape recording, T. Harry Williams Center for Oral History Collection,
Louisiana Lower Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries,
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 38-50; Leo Hamilton, interview, August 21,1993,43-48.
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Council. Liberals, accommodationists, and white leaders supported him and publicly
urged whites to vote for him. In an August 14,1968, advertisement, his white
supporters declared that since blacks made up one-third o f the city’s population, they
deserved representation on the council.19
Delpit was a candidate whom both whites and blacks could support As a
member o f the biracial committee, a business owner, a civic leader, and “a voice of
progress within the framework o f law and order,” he fit the white community’s
definition o f a black leader and, at the same time, actively campaigned for the white
vote. Yet Delpit attracted support from the black community as well. He spoke out for
improved conditions and increased job opportunities for residents o f Baton Rouge’s
inner city neighborhoods. He described himself as a logical choice for councilman. “As
a businessman and a lifelong resident o f Baton Rouge,” Delpit declared, “I have a
personal investment in the city, and I have established a reputation o f fiscal integrity
and civic consciousness.” He told potential voters that he could serve as a liaison
between the black and white communities and advocated maintaining continuous
industrial expansion. He stated:
Large industries are increasingly concerned with the manner in which local
governments deal with the problems of race and urbanization.. . . As a
businessman, I am familiar with the interests o f commercial enterprise. I know
if we are to “sell” industry on the potential of our city, then we must be united in
our efforts to improve the environment of Baton Rouge.

19“White Voters Support a Negro Candidate,” Morning Advocate, August 14,
1968,13A; “75,000 People Need One Voice,” State-Times, August 16, 1968, 17A
(advertisement).
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Delpit’s message o f stability and harmony proved attractive to whites, who had been
saying the same thing for two decades, and in the primary, he received 12,230 votes,
running second in a field of seven. Although segregationists described Delpit’s success
as a testament to the power o f the “Negro Bloc Vote,” whites cast 8,149 o f the votes
that made him a close second in the race. He easily won a spot on the council in the
September runoff.20
Delpit’s election brought with it advances for black Baton Rougeans and
convinced many World War II activists to abandon the movement because these
advances marked the fulfillment o f the last of the goals that they had established in
1945. After Delpit’s election, white officials began appointing African Americans to
jobs in city-parish government In February 1969, the Recreation and Parks
Commission named Willie Spooner as its first black member. A racial diplomat,
Spooner worked as a school teacher and a coach in East Baton Rouge Parish and held a
bachelor’s degree from Southern and a master’s from the University o f Wisconsin. He
belonged to the Prince Hall Masons and the Negro Chamber o f Commerce and had
played an active role in the recreation commission’s youth programs. White leaders also
received praise from African Americans for another appointment hi early 1969, the
City-Parish Council hired Johnnie Jones as an assistant city-parish attorney. By making
20Ibid.; “Council Candidates Release Formal Campaign Statements,” Morning
Advocate, July 18, 1968,7C; “50-60% BR Voter Turnout Expected,” State-Times,
August 17, 1968, 1; “Council Seats Garnered,” Morning Advocate, August 18, 1968, 1;
“Dumas Wins Demo Mayor Race Easily,” State-Times, August 19,1968,1; “BR
Negroes Utilize Vote-Splitting Techniques to Make Power Effective,” Morning
Advocate, August 21, 1968,6C; “Councilmen in Runoff Lose,” Morning Advocate,
September 29, 1968, 1; “Over 12,000 Voters Support Negro Candidate,” Morning
Advocate, September 27,1968, 9B.
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him a public employee, however, white leaders consciously and effectively silenced one
of the community’s most vocal and well-respected civil rights activists. Nevertheless,
after Delpit’s election and Jones’s appointment, most African Americans believed that
they now had a voice in city-parish government and abandoned marches and
demonstrations to work within the system for change.21
As white and black leaders formed alliances, the harassment o f civil rights
activists by segregationists intensified in early 1969 when the NAACP, still under the
control o f the working-class activists, launched a “total community action program.”
The organization called for boycotts and picketing o f all businesses that refused to hire
black employees. In February, NAACP President Joseph Melanson announced that
African Americans would boycott Schlitz Beer, the Beer Industry League, and A. & P.
Supermarkets for discriminating against African-American distributors. Because of the
threat of economic reprisals, George F. Brown o f the League phoned NAACP
Executive Board Member J. J. Sims, a local bar owner with a criminal record, to ask for
a meeting. Sims and Melanson met with Brown once. Melanson, Sims recalled, told
him that the encounter seemed like a setup and refused to meet with Brown again.
However, the beer industry representative badgered the NAACP president and Sims
into getting together another time. At that meeting, Brown handed Sims a paper bag
filled with $ 12,000 and told him to use the money to buy enough votes on the NAACP
executive board to cancel the boycott. Shortly after the exchange, the police arrested
2I“Willie Spooner Named to Recreation and Park Commission by Council,”
News Leader, March 2, 1969, 1; “Council to Meet Saturday to Choose Parish
Attorney,” Morning Advocate March 1,1969,9C; “Keogh is Given Job as Parish
Attorney,” Morning Advocate, March 2,1969, 1.
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Sims and Melanson and charged them with extortion. The warrants for their arrest had
been written before Sims even received the money. Several days later, a grand jury also
indicted Pearl George for taking part in the scheme.22
Although Sims did indeed accept the $12,000, members o f the Baton Rouge
NAACP immediately suspected a set up. Emmitt Douglas believed that Pitcher and the
police department used Sims to entrap Melanson and to discredit the NAACP. Gloster
Current hypothesized that Pitcher pressured Sims into taking part in the extortion
scheme. Showing his disdain for the working-class activists who dominated the Baton
Rouge branch, Current added that he doubted George played any role in the plot
because o f “her militancy and limited intelligence.”23
The arrests of the NAACP officials divided the activists and moderate black
leaders, which included racial diplomats and World War II activists. The executive
board, which was more conservative than Melanson, named Dr. D’Orsay Bryant, a local
gynecologist, as his replacement. Over Current’s objection, the board obtained evidence
in the extortion case from District Attorney Pitcher before voting seven to six not to pay
for Melanson’s legal representation but to fond George’s defense if she used an attorney

“ Harvey Britton to Joseph Melanson, February 3, 1969, Field Director’s Papers,
box 5, folder 7; “NAACP Working to Help Get Jobs in Local Area,” News Leader,
February 9, 1969, 1.
“ Chronological Report o f Events Leading to the Baton Rouge Grand Jury’s
Indictment of Three Officers o f the Baton Rouge NAACP for Extortion, Field
Director’s Papers, box 34, folder 7; Minutes of the Baton Rouge Branch, February 28,
1969, ibid.; “NAACP Officials in BR Arrested on Extortion Charge, Released on
Bond,” News Leader, March 2, 1969,1; Minutes o f the Baton Rouge Chapter, March
13,1969, Field Director’s Papers, box 34, folder 7; Monthly Report, March 13,1969,
Field Director’s Papers, box 35, folder 8.
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of its choice. She refused. The board believed that, although the ousted president
probably did not take part in the plan, he knew about it beforehand.24
Days after the NAACP extortion scandal, Black Power activists and racial
diplomats clashed on the campus o f Southern University. On April 1, students staged a
sit-in in the office of the Dean of Student Affairs Martin Harvey. They presented him
with a list o f demands that included, besides his own resignation, repairing campus
streets and naming them after African Americans, improving the physical plant, and
ending compulsory ROTC. Unlike LSU, which operated under the direction o f an
autonomous board of supervisors made up o f members who, for the most part,
possessed strong ties to the university, the State Board of Education, composed entirely
of white political appointees, controlled Southern. It rarely had the best interest of the
university at heart. For the Black Power activists, having a white-controlled body in
charge of an African-American institution was unacceptable, and they demanded that
blacks, preferably those who agreed with their ideology, should govern the university.
Southern’s President Leon Netterville, who had replaced Felton Clark after his
retirement in 1968, attributed the tension on his campus to a combination of antiVietnam War sentiment and a frustration with the current state o f race relations in
Baton Rouge.25

24“NAACP Officers Held in Jail in BR Following Extortion Indictment,” March
16, 1969, News Leader, 1; Gloster Current to Emmitt Douglas, March 25,1969, Field
Director’s Papers, box 35, folder 8.
25Fairclough, Race and Democracy, 429-431; “SU Students Abandon Sit-In
With Naming of Interim Group,” Morning Advocate, April 2, 1969,9A.
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The anger o f the students rose to the surface on May 12 when two false rumors
about white violence against African Americans circulated around campus. One
claimed that police officers had arrested an African-American picketer for firing a gun
into the air. The second rumor alleged that a white man had assaulted a black girl in a
local cafe. Although false, both rumors sent Southern’s student body into an uproar.
They seized control of the campus and built a barricade across its entrance. Netterville
called the sheriffs department and asked it to remove the barricade. Fearing that
violence would erupt, the sheriff immediately dispatched deputies to Southern. When
they arrived, the furious students hurled rocks at the deputies. In response, the officers
threw tear gas canisters into the crowd. Following this show of force, the students
agreed to meet with sheriffs officials to discuss a peaceful end to the confrontation.
During the meeting, deputies removed the barricades, but the conference did little to
ease racial tensions on campus. In fact, while Black Power leaders and the deputies met,
three hundred students and law enforcement officers engaged in a face-off at the
campus’ entrance. Fearing that a full-scale riot might break out, Governor John
McKeithen sent in the National Guard and called the state legislature into a special
session to allocate $100,000 to reinforce security at Southern.26
McKeithen even went to Southern to talk to students and promised to address
their concerns. While there he also warned them that he would not allow Southern’s

26“Southem Univ. Students Demonstrate on Campus, Prexy Gives
Statement,” News Leader, May 18, 1969,1; Monthly Report, May 19, 1969, Field
Director’s Papers, box 6, folder 5; John Morris, “Students Barricade SU Campus,”
Morning Advocate, May 12, 1969,4A; “SU Unrest Blamed on Untrue Rumors,”
Morning Advocate, May 13,1969, 1.
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students to imitate their counterparts at Cornell, where black students had seized control
of a campus building. Because of the massive force amassed against them, the students
called off their protests and returned to classes. McKeithen made some token
improvements to Southern’s campus, including resurfacing some streets on campus and
erecting highway signs directing motorists to the university. State officials, however,
continued to ignore the real needs of the university, which included faculty pay raises
and funds for the repair and construction of buildings on campus. The governor’s
interest in Southern soon waned, but the anger and frustration of the Black Power
activists remained.27
In the summer of 1969, the fury o f the young activists resurfaced when police
officers shot and killed two young black crime suspects. Even African Americans who
usually opposed the activists were incensed by the deaths of the young suspects, and
their deaths united the black community. Baton Rouge’s police department had a long
history of racism and brutality, and white officers had harassed most African
Americans, even racial diplomats. As noted in chapter one, during World War n,
policemen chased a suspect into a drugstore owned by black leaders, Leo and George
Butler, and beat and arrested several people. World War n activist, Dupuy Anderson
was a frequent target of policemen. Because his wife looked white, officers frequently

27Anderson, interview by Maxine Crump, December 8, 1993, 16-18; Jones,
interview, December 4, 1993, 110-115; “Calm is Restored on Campus o f SU,” Morning
Advocate, Maiy 15, 1969, 1; “Calm Prevails at SU After Governor Meet,” Morning
Advocate, May 15,1969,1; Cushing Strout and David I. Grossvogel, eds., Divided We
Stand: Reflections on the Crisis at Cornell (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, hie.,
1970), 15-41; “Governor McKeithen Tours Southern University,” Morning Advocate,
May 20,1969, 10A.
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stopped the two o f them when they traveled together. Once, a member o f the force even
arrested Anderson for talking to her. Law enforcement officials also harassed other
activists. They frequently stopped Johnnie Jones for traffic violations that he did not
commit and used the same ploy against Jelks. hi the late 1960s, the brutality o f the
city’s white police officers had increased dramatically. No longer were officers merely
harassing African Americans; they were also killing them. Beginning in 1967, officers
shot and killed at least one young black male suspect each year. This increase in
violence marked the last stand for organized segregation in Baton Rouge. The police
force was the final area in which white leaders had made no concessions to African
Americans. Although in 1963 they agreed to hire black officers, the mayor and the cityparish council required that the police force be internally segregated. Whites had white
partners, and blacks had black ones. In addition, city officials prohibited African
Americans from patrolling in white neighborhoods and from arresting white suspects.
Moreover, the police force was one o f the few remaining areas within the white
establishment dominated by segregationists. The presence of racist officers in the
department undercut the interracial cooperation that was developing in Baton Rouge.28
Following the first incident of deadly force in 1967, Mayor-President Woody
Dumas attempted to appease African Americans who were angered by the fact that the
officer shot an unarmed suspect in the back. He consulted with the biracial committee
and then ordered the integration of patrol cars and promised to transfer black officers to
the motorcycle squad. Dumas feared that the types of riots that occurred in Detroit and
“ Supplementary Monthly Report, July 2, 1967, Field Director’s Papers, box 2,
folder 9; Harvey Britton to Gloster Current, July 26,1967, ibid.;
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Newark earlier that year would take place in Baton Rouge, if the police force remained
segregated. By having integrated patrols, “there will be less chance for inflammatory
situations and charges o f police brutality,” he contended. Dumas hoped that the
integration o f the patrol cars and the motorcycle units would “give some o f the [black]
members o f the biracial committee more stature with their people” and would keep “the
leadership o f that community in responsible hands.” In 1967, the police force employed
12 African-American officers and 259 whites. Therefore, the desegregation order would
only affect a few white policemen, and Dumas promised that the pairing of blacks and
whites would be voluntary.29
White officers immediately denounced the mayor’s decree and threatened to
resign if ordered to partner with African Americans. “We are already integrated,” one
white policeman complained. “What more do they want? Where will this stop?”
Another argued that if patrols were integrated, recruiting new officers would be
difficult. Segregationist reaction paralleled that o f the officers; a group o f
segregationists formed the Baton Rouge Support Your Local Police Committee. The
organization’s chairman, M. A. “Mike” Tassin, claimed that Dumas’s order grew out of
the demands o f a “prejudiced, illegally constituted, appointed biracial committee.” He
accused the mayor o f ordering police officers not to arrest African-American protesters
because he feared their arrests might incite a rio t Segregationists also flooded city
council members with angry phone calls. In response, Councilman Robert T. Clegg
issued a statement declaring that the mayor’s order was an administrative decision and

^ “Mixing Moves Bared,” State-Times, August 12,1967.
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had not received the council’s approval. Faced with police and segregationist
opposition, Dumas rescinded his decree.30
The mayor’s refusal to follow through with the police desegregation order
naturally angered the black: community, but it also drew a negative response from white
liberals. Two organizations, the Council on Human Relations and the Louisiana Chapter
of the American Civil Liberties Union (LCLU) stepped in to fill the void left by
departure of the AFSC. After the passage of the Civil and Voting Right Act, the
American Friends Service Committee shifted its attention away from the civil rights
movement and launched an anti-Vietnam war protest. First organized in the mid 1950s,
the Baton Rouge chapter o f the Council on Human Relations worked behind the scenes
until the mid 1960s, when its members accompanied African Americans as they
attempted to desegregate several local restaurants. After taking a stand on the school
desegregation issue in the late 1950s, the LCLU had floundered after the departure of
McNeir. In the mid 1960s, the organization elected LSU English Professor Herbert
Rothschild as its president, and he revitalized the group. Under him, the LCLU took
part not only in civil rights activities but also pushed for an end to the war in Vietnam.
In early 1968, Rothschild warned Dumas that if he failed to end police brutality and
racism within the police department racial violence would erupt in the city. He
complained that white officers used “widespread, undisguised racial prejudice” in

30“Mayor Restudying Integration Order,” State-Times, August 14,1967,1;
“Police Mixing Moves Bared,” State-Times, August 12,1967, I; “Chairman Calls
Special Meet of BR Police,” State-Times, August 16, 1967,1IF; “Mayor Restudying
Integration Order,” State-Times, August 14,1967,1.
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dealing with black citizens and addressed them as “nigger” and “boy.” He warned the
mayor that this continued humiliation would lead to violence.31
The possibility o f a race riot in Baton Rouge intensified in early 1968 when
police officers shot A. C. Scott in the head for resisting arrest. Scott happened to be
kneeling on his front porch and surrendering when the policeman shot him. A grand
jury cleared the officer o f all wrongdoing, and he returned to active duty. In another
incident, police stopped John Lee Jackson, forced him out o f his car, handcuffed him,
and sprayed him with mace for being “drunk and wild.” Yet the police report stated that
Jackson was sober at the time of his arrest The LCLU urged Dumas to investigate these
incidents, to hire more black officers, and to establish a zero-tolerance policy regarding
the use o f derogatory terms when addressing African Americans. The NAACP also
complained to the mayor and the city council about police practices and described
Baton Rouge as “one o f the most segregated cities in the state.” Its members held that
the community's racist police force targeted African Americans for brutal treatment and
arrest even if there was no proof that they had committed a crime.32
The LCLU’s charges brought no changes in police policy, and, in the summer of
1969, the NAACP asked Police Chief Eddie Bauer to remove white officers from beats
in black neighborhoods until African Americans could either patrol white areas o f the

3‘Williams, interview by Glenda Stevens; Herbert Rothschild to W. W. Dumas,
ca. February 1968, American Civil Liberties Union Papers, box 3, Louisiana Lower
Mississippi Valley Collection, Louisiana State University Libraries, Baton Rouge,
Louisiana (hereafter cited as ACLU Papers).
32Herbert Rothschild to Eddie Bauer, February 15, 1968, ibid.; Press Release,
n.d., Field Director’s Papers, box 42, folder 8.
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city or partner with whites. Bauer ignored its demand. On June 30, the organisation
again asked Dumas and Bauer to end “lily white” patrols. Again, the city dismissed the
request. The refusal of white leaders to address the racism o f white officers and the
internal segregation of the police force coincided with another fatal shooting of a young
black burglary suspect by white officers. The policeman who fired the shots claimed
Lionel Hughes, a twenty-year-old, ran when they ordered him to stop. One officer shot
him twice in the back. After the shooting, they discovered that he held a knife in his
hand. Hughes was about fifty feet from the officers when he fell, but the policemen
claimed that they feared the suspect would throw the knife at them if they failed to act
Bauer refused to suspend the officer who shot Hughes despite Councilman Delpit’s
warning that the incident created unrest in the black community. On July 23, an allwhite grand jury failed to indict the shooter. The verdict angered the black com m unity
and heightened racial tensions in the city.33
Most African Americans, regardless of social class, had, at some time, been
harassed by the police, and they wanted city officials to reform the force. On July 25,
two days after the grand jury ruling, a police officer shot and killed still another black
burglary suspect, seventeen-year-old James Oliney, as he attempted to flee. As in the
Hughes incident, officers shot the young suspect in the back. C hief o f Detectives J. O.

33Harvey Britton to Joseph Melanson, February 3,1969, ibid.; “NAACP Leader
Requests Change by City Police,” News Leader, July 4,1969, 1; “NAACP Asks
Integration of Police Force,” Morning Advocate, July 8, 1969,4A; “BR Suspect Fatally
Shot by Police,” Morning Advocate, July 7,1969,1; “Police, Doctor Agree on Shot,”
State-Times, July 8, 1969, 1; “Delpit Asks Council Study of Shooting,” Morning
Advocate, July 10,1969,1; “Officer Unable to Give Answer,” State-Times, July 9,
1969, 1; “Jury Doesn’t Indict Here in Slaying,” Morning Advocate, July 24,1969,1.
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Dunigan claimed that Oliney, who had a knife in his hand, made an 180-degree turn as
he attempted to slash the officer who shot him.34The day after Oliney’s death, a group
of young African Americans picketed the police station, while older members o f the
community, including racial diplomats and World War II activists, planned to take part
in a NAACP-sponsored protest march to the city hall. Fearing that violence would
erupt, Woody Dumas immediately met with the biracial committee and Emmitt
Douglas, the NAACP’s State Conference president, to discuss the situation. The mayor
urged all Baton Rougeans to remain calm and promised to keep the police away from
the march that would go from the grounds of McKinley High School, the site of the
shooting, to the Municipal Building for a rally. When the marchers reached the city
hall, Douglas addressed them. He called for equal justice for African Americans and
urged the black citizens of Baton Rouge to protect themselves against police attacks.
D’Orsay Bryant told the crowd that the NAACP eschewed violence, but the next
speaker, twenty-two-year-old Jerry Johnson, voiced a different opinion. “It’s hot
today,” Johnson told the crowd, “but tonight it’s gonna be a little hotter.. . . I’m sure
gonna fill my coke bottle with gasoline.” Bryant later admitted that he asked Johnson to
speak to show Dumas and Bauer the extent of the anger and frustration among young
blacks.35

34“Officer Kills Young Negro Dining Chase,” Morning Advocate, July 26, 1969,
1.

3S“Negroes Hold Protest Rally, Picket Police,” State-Times, July 27, 1969, I;
“Negroes Picket BR Police,” Morning Advocate, July 27, 1969,1.
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The impassioned speeches fueled the already considerable anger o f the young
working-class activists over the police shootings. As the meeting broke up, a group o f
them headed to the downtown business district and began attacking the white people
that they encountered. One group even fired shots at a car carrying five whites. Another
small mob pulled a delivery man out of his truck when he stopped to let them cross the
street. They kicked and punched him and stole $25 from his wallet. Others beat two
pedestrians on Third Street, sending both men to the hospital. After dark, three major
fires broke out One destroyed a department store in the heart of a black
neighborhood.36
Dumas, in an attempt to forestall full-scale rioting, declared a state o f
emergency and ordered a strict curfew to begin at dusk. Governor McKeithen mobilized
the National Guard and sent more than seven hundred guardsmen with bayonet-tipped
rifles to patrol the streets o f Baton Rouge. The mayor also turned to black and white
leaders for help. He asked Pat Collier, the president o f the Chamber of Commerce, and
T. J. Jemison to appear on television to appeal for calm. Collier begged the white
community to remain calm and enjoyed some success. He assured businessmen and
plant managers that city and state officials would protect their properties and quickly
reestablish law and order. Dumas believed that Jemison could convince the angry
youths to stop rioting, but the Black Power activists viewed Jemison as an Uncle Tom
and refused to listen to him. When the spots began running, some activists made

36Ibid.
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threatening phone calls to him. Fearing that the callers would harm the minister, Dumas
stopped running the advertisements.37
Young African Americans not only refused to listen to Jemison’s pleas; they
ignored the curfew. A crowd o f several hundred gathered near the burning department
store at 9 p.m., hours after the curfew began, but scattered when police arrived. That
evening, officers arrested fifty curfew violators ranging in age from seventeen to thirtytwo. They also arrested Jerry Johnson and charged him with inciting a riot.38
The next day, Douglas blamed Dumas for the violence. He claimed that the
mayor promised to suspend the policeman but then backed down. The NAACP state
president added that in his July 29 meeting with Dumas and the two other black leaders,
he agreed to attempt to quiet the black community in exchange for a promise that Bauer
would suspend the officer. By backing away from his vow, Douglas added, Dumas
proved to African-American activists that white leaders could not be trusted to keep
their word and that the police had free rein to kill black suspects.39
After two nights o f curfew and unrest, calm returned to the city, and McKeithen
sent the National Guard home. Racial tension remained high, however. In a statement to

37“Whites Beaten on Third Street,” Morning Advocate, July 31,1969, 1; “Guard,
Lawmen Patrol City in Strict Curfew,” Morning Advocate, August 1, 1969, 1; “Curfew
is Continued by Dumas,” State-Times, August 1, 1969, 1; “Curfew is Lifted, Guard Go
Home,” State-Times, August 2, 1969, 1; “BR Returns to Normal Saturday,” Morning
Advocate, August 3, 1969, 1.
38Ibid.; “City is Quieter as Second Night of Curfew Ends,” Morning Advocate,
August 2,1969,1.
39“Curfew is Lifted, Guard Go Home,” State-Times, August 2, 1969,1; “City is
Quieter As Second Night o f Curfew Ends,” Morning Advocate, August 2, 1969, 1.
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the Morning Advocate, Joe Delpit blamed Dumas and the police for the unrest He
claimed that much of the anger arose from the wholesale arrest o f African Americans
for violating the curfew and told the paper that officers even arrested blacks who were
sitting on their front porches or standing in their own yards for being out after dark.
Dining the state o f emergency, the councilman had created a citizens’ patrol, and he
bragged that his group helped to keep the number of arrests down by convincing
policemen to release some detainees.40
While African Americans condemned the actions o f the police officers, many
whites, especially segregationists, supported them. More than eight hundred whites
signed a petition that claimed pandemonium would prevail if the officers were not
allowed to do their jobs. “We believe that local police officers are our first and last line
of defense against crime, anarchy, and insurrection,” the petition read. “A strong,
armed, and independent local police force is an impassible barrier to the advance of
communism.”41
The refusal of white leaders to address the police force’s problems bolstered the
view of the black community. On August 5, the NAACP threatened to launch a
selective buying campaign aimed at white-owned businesses throughout the city unless
Bauer and white leaders immediately suspended the officer who shot Oliney, dropped
the charges against Johnson, and transferred segregationist officers out of black

40“BR Returns to Normal Saturday,” Morning Advocate, August 3,1969.
41“Criminals Must be Punished or Anarchy Will Prevail,” Morning Advocate,
September 2,1969,18A.
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neighborhoods.42The NAACP also called for an end to police brutality and better
training o f officers. Its president D’Orsay Bryant urged African Americans to purchase
only the bare necessities from white merchants. He promised that young blacks would
patrol business districts to “remind” African Americans to comply with the campaign.
He warned whites that, “The embers of unrest still smolder here, awaiting only another
slaying incident or similarly provocative catalyst to ignite them.”43
Dumas condemned the selective buying campaign. “I was rather disappointed in
the NAACP move. I felt people were working rather closely together. The progress o f
race relations in this city has been terrific,” he told his constituents. He cited Delpit’s
election and Jones’ appointment as examples of this progress and added that during his
term the city parish had employed 451 black workers — 103 as garbage men. Dumas
condemned the NAACP for placing economic pressure on the city’s merchants when he
and Chief Bauer were responsible for the police force. Dumas apparently did not
understand that appointing a few upper- and middle-class blacks to civil boards and
hiring a few hundred black workers meant little to a community terrorized by racist
policemen. The continued refusal of Dumas and Bauer to take any action against the

42The NAACP named one of the police officers that they wanted removed from
patrols in black neighborhoods — Uniform Patrol Division head Major R. S. Trigg, Jr.
Bryant referred to Trigg as the “catalyst which fires the seed o f racism within the police
department”
43“Negro Group is Launching ‘Selective Buying’ Here,” Morning Advocate,
August 6, 1969,1; “NAACP Asks Negroes to Cut Buying,” State-Times, August 6,
1969, 1; D’Orsay Bryant to Friend, August 8,1969, Field Director’s Papers, box 34,
folder 7.
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offending officers kept the racial tension in the city high and the black community
united.44
The selective buying campaign and the grand jury investigation into Oliney’s
death both began on August 6. Approximately 150 picketers gathered outside Church’s
Fried Chicken in an African-American neighborhood near the LSU campus. When
officers tried to break it up, picketers responded with violence. One picketer hit a
policeman and others threw rocks and a piece of lumber at his partners. To prevent a
riot, Bauer ordered his officers to leave the area without arresting their attackers, but
later he sent a large, heavily armed group into the area to break up the protest The
NAACP’s selective buying campaign was incredibly effective. Within a week, the
economic pressure forced two white-owned grocery stores in black neighborhoods to
close. “I’ve had it. I haven’t done a penny’s worth of business in two days,” declared
Edward Haley, the owner of one o f the businesses. The other owner claimed that black
militants intimidated his customers and kept them away from his store.45
Because of the selective buying campaign and its threat to the city’s economy,
accommodationists again stepped into the civil rights melee. On August 7, more than
one hundred business and professional leaders represented by banker Charles McCoy
met with Dumas to discuss ways to end the campaign and to ease racial tension. They
also issued a public statement calling for the return of law and order. The

44“Negro Group is Launching ‘Selective’ Buying Here,” Morning Advocate,
August 6, 1969,1.
45“N o Arrests Follow Confrontation Here,” Morning Advocate, August 7, 1969,
1; “Racial Difficulties Still Simmer in BR,” State-Times, August 7 , 1969,1; “Boycott

Closes White-Owned Groceries Here,” Morning Advocate, August 10, 1969, 8A.
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accommodationists declared their support for the police department but denounced the
racism and police brutality perpetrated by some o f its officers. “Every man who is on a
police force has the duty to comply with the law and respect the rights o f every person
with whom he deals without regard o f race or color,” the statement read.46
White liberals soundly condemned the actions of the police and called for
sweeping reforms. They wanted African Americans to enjoy the same treatment and
opportunities enjoyed by white citizens, hi a statement issued on the same day as that of
the accommodationists, the Council on Human Relations, with its one hundred fifty
members, proclaimed, “We wish to express our deep convictions that the lives of black
persons are sacred, and that we cannot endorse the unnecessary taking o f life in the
defense of property.” The statement added that the police could enforce the law without
using deadly force. The Council also circulated a petition that declared, “The safety of
our city depends, not only on the presence of the police, but also upon their selfdiscipline and sense o f justice. It is our conviction that the city government must
recognize in a public and official way the common humanity of our citizens.” Five
hundred black and white Baton Rougeans signed the statement, and an integrated group,
which included LSU professor and Council on Human Relations member Paul Bums
and African-American minister Charles Smith, presented the petition to Dumas 47

46“BR Leaders Cite Rights of Citizens,” State-Times, August 7, 1969, I;
“Picketing Now Shows Slowdown,” Morning Advocate, August 8, 1969, 1.
47Dreger, interview by Betty Morse, 13; “Citizens File an Open Letter,” Morning
Advocate, August 9,1969,9A.
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Segregationists, in contrast, again expressed their unwavering support for the
police department. On August 11, twenty members of Citizens for Law and Order met
with Dumas. Its president, Charles Macmurdo, told the mayor that his group wanted the
police to enforce the law and to be given complete authority to carry out their duties. He
claimed that a “communist-inspired plan to disarm the police”and to demoralize police
officers existed in Baton Rouge. He added that the so-called communist plan used
charges o f police brutality to undermine the authority of the city’s law enforcement
agencies.48
On August 12, the grand jury hearing the case against Oliney’s killer refused to
indict the officer. Instead, at District Attorney Pitcher’s request, it handed down an
indictment against Emmitt Douglas for inciting a riot Douglas’ indictment harkened
back to the district attorney’s early 1960s policy of using the legal system to persecute
activists. D’Orsay Bryant called the charge, “a cold, calculated political move on the
part of Sargent Pitcher.” In fact the district attorney did carefully craft the charge
against Douglas and in it claimed that the activist’s speech at the July 31 rally set off a
chain of events that culminated in rioting, arson, the selective buying campaign, and the
death of a picketer.49To support the charges against Douglas, Pitcher alleged that the

48“Law, Order To Be First, Says Dumas,” Morning Advocate, August 12, 1969,
1; “BR Lawmen Agree to Remain on Duty,” State-Times, August 11,1969,1.
49On August 9, a group o f young picketers attacked a sixty-seven-year-old black
man, Louis Mosely, for refusing to take part in the selective buying campaign. During
the attack, Mosely fired a round from his .22 caliber pistol and killed one of his
attackers. “Facility Here is Connected to Picketing,” Morning Advocate, August 10,
1969,1; “21-Year-Old Youth Shot to Death in Picketing,” News Leader, August 17,
1969,I.
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NAACP leader told the crowd, “I have been preaching peace for eleven years. I no
longer preach peace. We want an eye for an eye, a life for a life. Go out and do your
thing.” At the time of the rally, none o f the city’s newspapers reported this incendiary
statement. Douglas condemned the grand jury and Pitcher: “I believe the indictment
coming from an all-white jury is not worth the paper its written on.” He added that the
July 31 rally was peaceful and recalled that to help prevent violence, he had confiscated
nineteen knives and four pistols from participants. In 1971, a state court convicted
Douglas, despite testimony by white and black witnesses who declared that the civil
rights leader worked for peace and not violence, hi the end, Judge Donovan Parker
fined him $350 and gave him a three month-suspended sentence. Jerry Johnson, who
had called for violence at the July 31 rally, received a six-month jail term.50
Pitcher’s prosecution of Douglas further antagonized the city’s black population
but also strengthened the ties between moderate blacks and white liberals. In 1969
moderate activists and white liberals circulated a recall petition to remove Pitcher from
office. “This has been a wonderful experience for me. This is the first time we have
been able to get the white community concerned about the role it should play,” Douglas
said. “More intelligent whites are expressing themselves.” These “intelligent” whites
for the most part belonged to the Council on Human Relations and the LCLU. The

50“Officers Freed in BR Killing; Negro Indicted,” Morning Advocate, August
19,1969, 1; “NAACP President Indicted by BR Grand Jury, Denies Charge o f Inciting
Riot,” News Leader, August 24,1969, 1; Summer Report, June 14 - September 15,
1969, Field Director’s Papers, box 7, folder 2; “Sentencing of NAACP Head Douglas
Delayed by Judge,” News Leader, June 13, 1971, 1; “State NAACP President if Given a
Suspended Sentence,” News Leader, June 20,1971,1.
341

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

recall petition failed to gamer enough signatures to oust the district attorney, but it
succeeded in strengthening the alliance between moderate blacks and liberals.51
After the grand jury ruling against Douglas in August 1969, Dumas took an
even harder line against the Black Power activists. “Police officers no longer will take
abuse and vilification horn anyone. If there are any doubts in your mind that I don’t
mean what I say, just try me,” he announced. The city’s only African-American
newspaper, the News Leader, reported that Dumas threatened to shoot anyone caught
looting. On the night of the grand jury ruling, police officers stopped a black doctor on
his way to the hospital to answer an emergency call. They aimed their guns at the
physician and “subjected him to a humiliating search on a public street causing a crowd
to gather.” The next evening officers forcefully removed a college student from a
downtown movie theater and searched him in the lobby without showing proper cause.52
These incidents infuriated African Americans and their white supporters, and
several o f them appeared before the September City-Parish Council meeting to express
their displeasure with the police force. Numerous speakers described the police officers
as racist, discourteous, and brutal and asked the council to take steps to rectify the
situation. World War II activists Raymond Scott and Dupuy Anderson told the council
that the black community supported law and order as much as the white community but

SI“NAACP Set to Attempt D. A. Recall,” Morning Advocate, August 17,1969,
1; “Recall o f EBR Parish DA to be Sought by NAACP,” News Leader, August 24,
1969, 1; “Human Relations Council Seeks Federal Marshals,” ibid.
52“Officer Freed in BR Killing; Negro Indicted,” Morning Advocate, August 13,
1969, 1; “Grand Jury Indicts State NAACP Leader,” State-Times, August 13,1969, 1;
“Human Relations Council Seeks Federal Marshals,” News Leader, August 24,1969, I.
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added that they also wanted justice. Working-class activist Jerry Johnson complained,
“The major problem with the city police department is it seems that they treat us like
we are some type o f beast.” LSU professor and Council on Human Relations President
Ralph Dreger echoed Johnson: ‘There are many white people who feel a black life is
not worth as much as a white life is.” The city-parish council still refused to take action
against the police force.53
Three days after the September 1969 city-parish council meeting, a Baton
Rouge police officer killed yet another black suspect. The officer shot eighteen-year-old
John David Reed in the back as he ran from the scene of a crime but claimed that he
aimed for the young man’s legs. After Reed’s death, white officials realized that racial
tension in the city remained incredibly high and feared that large-scale rioting would
erupt in the city if they failed to take action against the officer. Dumas and police
officials decided to change police policy to prevent more rioting. Although he believed
that Bryant and Douglas brainwashed “respectable and responsible Negro leaders,”
Sargent Pitcher urged the mayor and the chief to take some action to preserve the
standing of the racial diplomats within the black community. He accused the NAACP
leaders of instilling the idea in the minds o f the black masses that police officers were
racists who used unnecessary force in the apprehension of suspects. Pitcher also
claimed that the “reputable” African-American leaders supported Bryant and Douglas
in order to defend “their right to be classified as leaders with the rank-and-file Negro

53“Police Relations With Negroes Termed Good by Chief of City,” Morning
Advocate, August 23, 1969, 8B; “Negroes Vent Their Feelings Here at Meet with CityParish Council,” Morning Advocate, September 10,1969, 15C.
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community.”54 He urged Bauer to tell his officers to deploy their weapons only in
extreme emergencies and not to use them to apprehend individuals suspected of
committing misdemeanors unless attacked or threatened. Heeding Pitcher’s advice and
fearing a repeat of the demonstration that followed Oliney’s death, Bauer, Dumas, and
Sheriff Clemmons adopted a new policy that required the immediate suspension of any
officer who used deadly force and applied it to the officer who shot Reed.ss
The revised rules appeased the racial diplomats and World War n activists but
did little to. ease the anger of Black Power activists. At a NAACP-sponsored rally
following Reed’s death, several activists walked out when Douglas and Bryant invited
white reporters to attend. Ironically, the purpose of the meeting was to discuss black
unity. It ended when a Black Power activist tried to hit a white reporter. To insure the
reporters’ safety, Douglas and the other organizers escorted them to their automobiles.
The militancy and proclivity toward violence of the young men and women of the
Black Power movement frightened the older activists. After events in Watts, Detroit,

^Pitcher listed Leon Netterville, T. J. Jemison, and Horatio Thompson as
“respectable leaders.”
ssSargent Pitcher to Eddie Bauer, September 16, 1969, Field Director’s Papers,
box 34, folder 8; “BR Policeman Shoots, Kills Fleeing Suspect,” Morning Advocate,
September 14, 1969, 1; “BR Policeman Shoots, Kills Fleeing Suspect,” State-Times,
September 14, 1969, 1; “Chief Relieves Policeman,” State-Times, September 15, 1969,
1; “Officer is Relieved of Duty,” Morning Advocate, September 15, 1969, I; “Racial
Situation Calm, Report Police Agencies,” Morning Advocate, September 16,1969,
14A.
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and Newark, they realized that destroying white-owned businesses in the black
community actually hurt African Americans because whites would not rebuild.56
The reaction of Black Power activists to white reporters and their denunciation
of the new police policy on deadly force renewed the split between the young activists
and the more moderate black majority. This division became apparent in 1972 when
two more blatant incidents of lethal force by police officers against African Americans
occurred. The first grew out of a visit to Baton Rouge by a group o f Black Muslims.
Not associated with the local chapter o f the Nation o f Islam, the outside group held a
rally at the Masonic Temple Building on January 7 and promised to “deliver the city
back to the black people.” Several local African Americans told them, “We never lost
it.” Robert Williams, a Black Power activist and the law partner of civil rights attorney
Murphy Bell, attended the meeting but left before it ended because the Muslims
“appeared to be talking rhetoric with no real desire to ‘deal with honkies.’ ” In fact,
their message attracted only young African Americans mostly teenagers who later
staged protests at their high schools.57
On January 10 the Muslims assembled outside the Masonic Temple Building
and a crowd o f more than two hundred young African Americans gathered to listen to
56“NAACP Leaders Request Unity, Announce Plan,” Morning Advocate,
September 18, 1969,1; “NAACP Branch Issues Call for Unity, Announces Plan,” News
Leader, September 28, 1969,1.
^Harvey Britton to Nathaniel Jones, February 28,1972, Field Director’s Papers,
box 13, folder 2; “Eight Downed in BR Flareup,” State-Times, January 10, 1972,1;
“Relation Seen with Unrest at McKinley,” Morning Advocate, January 11,1972, 1;
“School Troubles, Local Violence Connection Denied,” State-Times, January 11,1972,
1; “2 Teachers Attacked at BR School,” Morning Advocate, January 12, 1972, 1; “Black
Says Muslims M et by Disbelief,” Morning Advocate, January 14,1972, 1.
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their message. According to bystanders and businessmen in the area, the Muslims
stirred up the crowd. Averill Aucoin, the white owner o f Owl Drug Store, which was
located near the rally, reported that black teenagers entered his store shortly after the
speeches ended and began throwing merchandise on the floor and breaking items.
When they left, he called police and locked his shop. However, the youths returned,
jimmied the lock, and threatened him. He called the police again and waited half an
hour for the officers to arrive and escort him to his car. While the angry mob ransacked
Aucoin’s store, the Muslims began talking about killing whites and ordered all white
journalists to leave. As the reporters turned to walk away, the crowd attacked them. One
newspaper photographer, Bob Johnson, suffered severe brain damage, and two others
also required hospitalization. Throughout the ordeal, no police presence could be
detected.
When officers finally arrived, they ordered the crowd to disperse, but the
Muslims refused to leave. Instead, they formed a line on one side of the street and
policemen lined up on the other side. The two lines slowly advanced toward each other,
and when they met, the African Americans began throwing bottles and rocks. Someone
fired a shot, and a gun battle ensued. The officers claimed that the Muslims fired first,
but they later found no weapons on them besides the ones that the African Americans
had snatched from the hands of officers. In the end, two sheriffs deputies and two
Black Muslims died and thirty-one others suffered injuries.58
S8“Law Officials Blast Claim of Negligence,” Morning Advocate, January 14,
1972, 1; “Eyewitness Story o f Violence Given,” Morning Advocate, January 11,1972,
1; ‘Two Detectives Lose Lives in Shootout,”ibid.; “Lawmen Die, Newsman Critical,”
State-Times, January 11,1972,9A; “Bob Johnson Still in Critical After Beating,”
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White leaders reacted as they had after the 1969 protests. Mayor Dumas
immediately declared a curfew and sent police officers and sheriff’s deputies, heavily
armed and dressed in riot gear, to patrol the city. Governor John McKeithen activated
seven hundred members of the National Guard and dispatched them to Baton Rouge.
Both political leaders feared a repeat o f the attacks on whites and the arson that
followed the 1969 protests. Even the civil rights leaders supported the curfew and called
for calm. Emmitt Douglas issued a statement asking all Baton Rougeans, regardless of
race, to cooperate with the police. Harvey Britton urged African Americans to be on
their best behavior because police were “very scared and tense.” Although a few minor
incidents occurred, no violence erupted in Baton Rouge, and no large-scale marches or
picketing followed the shootings.59
Although Baton Rouge’s African-American community deplored the deaths of
the Black Muslims, they also condemned the separatists’ use of violence against the
white reporters and police officers. In November 1972, the split between the two
factions became apparent when Southern students and the police clashed on campus.
The violence at the city’s black university grew out of the students’ longstanding

Morning Advocate, January 12,1972, 1; Account of 6 p.m. News Broadcast, January
26, 1972, Field Director’s Papers, box 13, folder 2; Report, Baton Rouge Confrontation,
February 28, 1972, ibid.
59“Pleas for Calm Voiced,” State-Times, January 11,1972,1; “The Monday
Incident: A Senseless Tragedy,” Morning Advocate, January 11, 1972, 14A; Report on
the Baton Rouge Confrontation, February 28,1972, Field Director’s Papers, box 13,
folder 7; “Law Officials Brace to Meet Emergency,” Morning Advocate, January 11,
1972, 1; “Curfew Again in the City,” State-Times, January 11,1972, 1; “National Guard
Troopers Help to Maintain Order in the City,” Morning Advocate, January 11, 1972,
2A; “Curfew is Lifted Here; Guard Troops Go Home,” State-Times, January 13, 1972,
1.
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dissatisfaction with the operation o f the school. Throughout the 1960s, Southern’s
student body had accused the administrators o f Uncle Tomism and demanded that they
stand up to state officials to secure more funding for the university. Calling the
administration corrupt, the Black Power activists, in October 1972, demanded the
resignation o f President Leon Netterville. They also asked for the creation of an
advisory council made up of students and faculty, for the inclusion o f student members
on the University Senate, for improvement of facilities and equipment, and for student
input on the Food Service Committee. On October 23, several students presented these
grievances to Netterville. The following day, the university called for the students to
follow existing channels for filing complaints and refused to review those presented
directly to the president In response, about two thousand students marched to the
downtown office of the State Board of Education to present their demands and then
went to the State Capitol to give them to Governor Edwin Edwards. As marchers met
with officials of the Superintendent o f Education’s office, police dressed in riot gear
and armed with night sticks, tear gas, pepper fogger, semiautomatic rifles, and shotguns
waited outside the building.60
Angered by the lack of response from university and state officials, the students
decided to boycott classes until their complaints were addressed. Wanting to get the
university running again, Southern’s administration and the State Board of Education
^ ‘SU Students Stage March to Protest Life at Southern,” Morning Advocate,
October 25, 1972,1; “Minor Tiff Seen Triggering March,” State-Times, October 25,
1972,1; William Guste, Jr., Report o f the Attorney General’s Special Commission o f
Inquiry on the Southern University Tragedy o f November 16, 1972 (Baton Rouge, State
of Louisiana, 1973), 3; “SU March Brings Out Heavy Force,” Morning Advocate,
October 24, 1972,1.
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met with student representatives on October 26 and attempted to work out a
compromise. A t this meeting student leader Fred Prejean o f Lafayette, Louisiana,
demanded that a ratio of two students to one faculty member be established on
department councils and that students be give a voice in hiring new faculty members.
Prejean promised that once students gained a voice in the university the unrest would
end. The Board o f Education members agreed to review the students’ demands but
stated that they saw no problems with the Southern administration. At that point,
Prejean and his supporters walked out.61
After their departure, the Board o f Education set up a seven-member committee
to study the students’ grievances, and Netterville established several faculty and student
committees. Unimpressed by these gestures, the students continued to boycott classes,
and on October 31, a large group o f them marched to the Administration Building and
demanded a meeting with Netterville. Fearing that violence would erupt, the president
called the sheriffs department to ask for assistance. In an attempt to defuse the
situation, Netterville followed the precedent set by his predecessor and closed the
university. Hoping that the tempers o f the students had cooled, he then reopened the
campus on November 6. The majority o f students, though, continued to boycott classes.
Netterville asked Sheriff A1 Amiss to send a contingent of deputies to the campus to
maintain peace.62

6I“SU Group is Heard by Board,” State-Times, October 26, 1972, 1; “SU
Students Stage Walkout at Meeting,” Morning Advocate, October 27, 1972, 1.
“ “SU Problems Probe Committee Named,” State-Times, October 27,1972,1;
“Head of SU Pledges Action on Protests,” Morning Advocate, October 28, 1972, 1;
“Southern University Students Continue in Boycott o f Classes to Get Demands,” News
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The unrest concerned state and local officials and drew the attention o f
Governor Edwin Edwards. On November 7, he met with the Board of Education and
agreed to appoint a committee to investigate conditions at Southern. The governor’s
interest, however, came too late to prevent violence on the campus. The same day,
explosions occurred in two building on campus, and officials found six Molotov
cocktails near the Horticulture Bam. Police issued arrest warrants for eight students.
In the week that followed, tension continued to mount on campus. On
November 10, Netterville promised amnesty to all students in exchange for an end to
the protests. The Black Power activists declined the offer, and the following day,
several students disrupted a football game. On the fourteenth, the boycott of classes
resumed. The next day, Netterville withdrew the amnesty offer. November 16 marked
the culmination of the protests. That morning, sheriff’s deputies arrested several
students in connection with warrants issued on November 8. Director of Administration
Services James Hunt had charged the four with interfering with the operation o f an
educational institution. At 8 a.m., crowds of students gathered at various points on
campus. The students converged on the Administrative Building and demanded to see
the president. He agreed to meet with five of them, but the crowd pushed its way in.
The students demanded the release of the four arrested students. Netterville refused to
discuss the matter and left the office. To prevent the students from following him, his
aides barricaded the door. Netterville then ordered Hunt to call the sheriff. Before the
deputies arrived, campus security convinced the students to leave the Adm inistrative

Leader, November 5, 1972, 1.
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Building. After their departure, the guards found Netterville and escorted him to his car.
He left the campus to attend a Board of Education meeting. Meanwhile, a crowd of
students gathered outside the Administrative Building but never occupied it.
Sheriff’s deputies finally arrived an hour after Netterville’s departure. A
misunderstanding between them and campus security occurred, and the deputies
assumed that the students actually occupied the Administrative Building and were
holding a security guard hostage. Under the direction of Sheriff A1 Amiss, units
surrounded the building and prepared to use tear gas to disperse the crowd o f students.
All deputies were heavily armed. When Amiss ordered the students to leave the area,
most complied, but about fifty refused. They shouted, “Come and get us!” Without an
order from the sheriff, one deputy launched three tear gas canisters into the crowd. The
students picked two of them up and tossed them back at the officers, creating confusion
among the law enforcement units. Simultaneously, the third canister went off, and the
students scattered. Two students, Leonard Brown and Dennis Smith, brought up the
rear, and as they ran past the officers, shots from a deputy’s rifle mortally wounded
both. Netterville immediately closed the campus to prevent further violence.63
In the days following the incident, both white and black Baton Rougeans
attempted to make sense out of the events at Southern. Unlike the aftermath of the 1969
police shootings, peace prevailed. National Guardsmen and heavily-armed police
officers did not patrol the city’s streets. The mayor did not impose a curfew and no
arson occurred. The only hint of trouble came when an integrated group o f LSU

63Guste, Attorney General’s Report, 5-20.
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students staged a march from their campus to the State Capitol. Harambe, a Black
Power organization from LSU, sponsored the march. The organization’s president, Leo
Hamilton, worked out an acceptable route with city officials, but whites participating in
the march, mostly antiwar activists, urged the African Americans to stray from the
agreed-upon a route to attract media attention. Hamilton refused to allow his group to
be diverted because he knew that if they followed the prescribed route, the press would
cover their protest. Governor Edwards greeted them when they arrived at the Capitol
and told them that the Southern students were responsible for the two deaths. The LSU
students booed him, but the crowd remained peaceful.64
Unlike the earlier incidents o f violence that ended with no discussion or
examinations of events by whites, the Southern riots led to the formation of the Special
Commission of Inquiry by the state’s attorney general. Made up o f black and white
leaders from around the state, the commission blamed the students and the sheriff’s
department for the violent outcome. While acknowledging the “intensity and scope” o f
the students’ anger and frustration, the commission charged that they went beyond their
First Amendment rights by creating disorder on campus and disrupting classes. But the
blue ribbon panel decided that the sheriffs department bore some blame for the deaths.
Its officers had arrived heavily armed and, in the heat of the moment, one unidentified

MLeo Hamilton interview, August 21, 1993,97-100; “Southern U Closes in
Aftermath of Killings,” News Leader, December 3,1972, 1.
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sheriff’s deputy had fired the fatal shots. The students, the report concluded, had done
nothing to justify the use o f deadly force.65
Because the commission laid the blame on both the students and the deputies,
most African Americans in Baton Rouge applauded the panel’s report as fair and
balanced. The refusal to support the students grew out of the division within the black
community that had developed during the late 1960s. With the passage o f the Civil
Rights Act o f 1964 and the Voting Rights Act o f 1965, African Americans achieved the
«

rights that activists had fought for since 1945. De jure segregation was dead, and race
relations were improving. Joe Delpit won a seat on the city-parish council with white
support. With their calls for black pride and separatism, Black Power activists attracted
a committed following among young African Americans who denounced the gains of
the civil rights movement as negligible because, for the most part, blacks remained
powerless. For these young activists, the only way to attain power was through force.
To older activists, who adhered to the principles o f nonviolent protest and the ideal of
an integrated society, the goals of the supporters o f Black Power would mean reviving
segregation albeit self-imposed and the loss o f progress. Although the issue of police
brutality temporarily united the black community, longstanding divisions remained.
Because of the split, participants in the Black Muslim and Southern riots garnered
support from only a small segment of the black population. For white leaders, the
events of 1972 marked the realization of their greatest fear— that black protests would
end in violence. Yet the reaction of the African-American majority defused the
65Guste, Attorney General’s Report, 25-25; “Southern U Closes in Aftermath of
Killings,” News Leader, December 3,1972,1.
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situation. Rather than staging marches, rallies, and boycotts, it simply allowed law
enforcement to handle the situation. Peace and stability quickly returned. In addition the
nation’s attention had shifted away from the civil rights movement and toward the war
in Vietnam and the student protest movement. Because the Black Muslim and Southern
riots ended quickly and produced very little national response, peace and stability
quickly returned to Baton Rouge and business continued to flourish.66

“ Bartley, The New South, 343.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
Divided by social class, generations, and educational Levels, few racial groups
are monolithic, but scholars often depict the civil rights movement as a battle between
united groups of blacks and whites over the issue of segregation. In fact, the interactions
among different racial groups shaped the speed and nature o f racial change. In places
dominated by segregationists, whites who staunchly refused to accept integration met
demands for integration with massive resistance. The violence that often accompanied
civil rights protests in these areas attracted the attention of the national media and
government and led to federal intervention, including the use of federal troops, to
ensure the desegregation of Central High School in Little Rock and to protect James
Meredith at Ole Miss. In communities controlled by moderate whites, peace and
stability prevailed. Away from the national spotlight that violence brought, change
occurred with little fanfare. Baton Rouge belonged to the latter type of southern
community. Although all African Americans wanted to end segregation, the city’s black
community was divided along generational and class lines. The resulting groups never
agreed on the best method of obtaining equality. Similarly, most white Baton Rougeans
wanted to maintain segregation but also disagreed about how to preserve it.1
Because the relationship between and among the various groups of African
Americans and whites in Baton Rouge was multifaceted, the desegregation process was
complex and change was spurred by a combination of local initiatives, federal
1White liberals disagreed with the majority and advocated dismantling Jim Crow
and granting African Americans racial equality.
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intervention, and the possibility o f violent confrontations. Civil rights activism, with its
threat o f sustained protests and violence, prompted white leaders to make some changes
to the system to maintain peace. The small alterations that they made in the system o f
Jim Crow appeased most African Americans, especially the racial diplomats, who
viewed changes as signs o f racial progress. In addition, the compromises convinced
blacks who supported the civil rights movement, but were not activists, that they could
do little to facilitate greater change. During the 1953 bus boycott, a large number of
African Americans had advocated pushing for an end to segregation on public
transportation, but the racial diplomats and white leaders negotiated a compromise and
ended the boycott without consulting them. White leaders also discouraged many black
Baton Rougeans from becoming involved in the movement by their harsh treatment of
activists. Few ordinary black citizens were willing to risk arrest, high bails, and long jail
terms to take part in demonstrations. While the compromises and arrests prevented
sustained protests from occurring in Baton Rouge, they did not render the activists
completely ineffective. As the civil rights movement intensified in the early to mid
1960s, the increased militancy of the activists and the threat o f violence pushed white
leaders into granting more substantial concessions. The formation o f the biracial
committee in May 1963, for example, followed an increase in protests by working-class
activists and a series o f large-scale and violent demonstrations in B irm ingham ,
Alabama. White leaders feared that the same thing would happen in their community if
they failed to address some of the activists’ demands. Out of the committee came.
compromises that brought some changes to the existing system without completely
dismantling it. While white hospitals agreed to admit black doctors to their staffs, for
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example, they refused to allow African Americans to treat white patients. In a similar
fashion, the agreement that allowed blacks to join the police force relegated them to
segregated patrol cars and prohibited them from patrolling white neighborhoods.
Federal intervention helped to bring integration to areas that required blacks and
whites to interact on a daily basis, most notably schools. Whites simply did not want
their children to attend the same schools as blacks, and many shared the archsegregationists’ belief that allowing African-American children to enroll in white
schools would lead to the lowering of academic standards. While they did not want
their children attending the same schools as blacks, white leaders refused to defy federal
authority, which would attract negative national publicity and might lead to the
deployment of troops to force integration. Therefore, accommodationists and white
leaders decided to meet the minimum requirements for compliance. In 1963, they
created a twelve-year plan for school desegregation designed to prevent the vast
majority of black students from enrolling in white schools. White leaders in Baton
Rouge successfully manipulated the courts and continued to maintain a racially divided
school system more than three decades later.
The federal laws also helped to destroy Jim Crow in Baton Rouge. The Civil
Rights Act o f 1964 led to the desegregation of public facilities, including restaurants,
and the Voting Rights Act o f 1965 removed all barriers to registration. Yet in these
areas, activists had already forced white leaders to make concessions. Downtown lunch
counters and facilities in the Municipal Building removed racial barriers in 1963, and,
in the years following World War n , more than ten thousand African Americans in the
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city and parish had registered to vote. Therefore, federal law merely accelerated a
process that local activism had already begun.
Violence brought few changes to the system of segregation. In late July 1969,
rioting erupted in the black community following the shooting death o f burglary suspect
James Oliney by white policemen; white leaders responded with massive force and
refused to punish the officers who killed the young African American or to address the
racial problems that existed within the department. Instead, they charged activists
Emmitt Douglas and Jerry Johnson with inciting a riot Even the selective buying
campaign and the picketing that followed the riots could not convince white leaders to
address police brutality. However, when an officer shot and killed another black suspect
a month later, the threat of further rioting forced white officials to alter its policy on the
use of deadly force.
Changes in race relations in Baton Rouge were shaped by the divisions within
the racial groups and the interactions among the different factions. The presence of the
activists pushed white leaders into granting concessions to the racial diplomats and led
to greater changes than either they or the diplomats could have achieved on their own.
Although activists and racial diplomats saw themselves as working at cross purposes,
the presence of both groups served as a conduit for change that did not exist in
communities dominated by segregationists and plagued by violence. However, most
studies focus on the areas where violence accompanied desegregation. To understand
more fully the civil rights movement and the nature of race relations in the decades
following it, scholars must turn their attention away from the areas plagued by violence
and massive resistence and look at community development and relationships between
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blacks and whites in areas where integration occurred peacefully. They must also look
at how divisions within these areas affected the movement. Baton Rouge, with its many
factions, was not unique, hi fact, similar splits existed in cities throughout the South,
even those plagued by violence. Yet historians have too often depicted the freedom
struggle as a battle between activists and segregationists and have paid little attention to
the other groups that shaped the course o f events.
Although several violent incidents marred the last years o f the civil rights
movement in Baton Rouge, white leaders working with racial diplomats managed to
preserve the peace and stability of the community by responding to protests with
moderate concessions, and the city’s economy continued to flourish. The civil rights
movement in Baton Rouge ended segregation, led to African American participation in
government, and opened jobs to blacks. Yet racial problems continued to plague the
city after the 1972 riots and persist in 1999. Poverty and high crime still afflict the black
community. Schools remain, for the most part, either predominately white or
predominately black, and African Americans still face racial discrimination. To solve
these problems, Baton Rougeans must once again go beyond black and white and form
new groups to address the issues that threaten the peace and stability of the community.
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